Buying blow Cucuta

__________________________

📍 Verified store!

📍 Guarantees! Quality! Reviews!

__________________________

▼▼ ▼▼ ▼▼ ▼▼ ▼▼ ▼▼ ▼▼

▲▲ ▲▲ ▲▲ ▲▲ ▲▲ ▲▲ ▲▲

Buying blow Cucuta

The Colombian border town of Cucuta has smuggling coursing through its veins, underpinning its economy and strengthening organized crime, which is raking in millions from everything from beef to gasoline. The city streets are lined with shacks where vendors siphon out the fuel from Venezuelan pickups and decant it into Colombian cars; restaurants serve Venezuelan beef that crossed the border stuffed into stripped-out cars; pharmacies sell out-of-date and damaged Venezuelan painkillers; and the marketplace hosts block after block of stalls offering everything from toothpaste to toilet cleaner that has been smuggled in from across the border. But while the contraband trade has colonized Cucuta, its impact is not limited to the city. Smuggling in the border region is creating mass shortages of essential goods in Venezuela and undercutting legal businesses in Colombia. It is also creating new contraband mafias, fuelling violence between organized crime networks and facilitating the regional cocaine trade. As in many Latin American border towns, Cucuta has a long history of contraband smuggling. The profits on offer from this price gap are magnified by the exchange rate imposed by the Venezuelan government. Venezuelan Bolivares can officially be traded at 6. But in Cucuta, 2, Colombian pesos — roughly one dollar — buys 89 Bolivares. The result, say the POLFA, is that smugglers pay Venezuelan contacts two or three times the retail price for products, sell them in Colombia for five or six times their original price and still easily undercut legal businesses in Colombia. The POLFA say they have indentified five specialist smuggling networks operating in and around Cucuta, which are transporting and distributing huge quantities of contraband goods across Colombia. These operations begin with a phone call from Venezuela, where smugglers assemble bulk shipments of goods, either by making many small purchases, or getting businesses to quietly set aside the merchandise. To move their loads into Colombia, the smugglers use clandestine border crossings — narrow dirt tracks of mud and sand that wind their way towards the Tachira River, which marks the border between the two countries. At the river, poles topped by fluttering plastic bags mark the shallowest points where it is safe to cross. Before they are shipped on, many goods are wrapped in Colombian packaging, and disguised with legal invoices purchased from corrupt contacts in legitimate businesses. The POLFA and other authorities tasked with tackling the trade are now playing catch-up with these sophisticated networks. Over the last year, they have stepped up their efforts against contraband smuggling in the region, with notable results. As indicated in the chart below, the most commonly seized contraband items in and include clothing, medication, and meat. The police patrol the clandestine border crossings on dirt bikes, typically accompanied by a truck, acting on tip-offs and relying on speed and surprise to snare smugglers. However, the odds are against them and their seizures are just a fraction of what makes it through. The police count on the fact that once on the narrow trails, it is usually impossible for the smugglers to turn around. However, each route has its own hiding places — including nearby ranches and farms — where the owners are paid off in exchange for letting the smugglers park their vehicles on the property, hiding out from police patrols. When police do make a seizure, they can confiscate the goods and sometimes the vehicles, but almost always have to let the smugglers walk. The smugglers, aware of the law, will rarely carry anything over the limit. The region has long been a stronghold for the Rastrojos criminal network, which despite having suffered some major blows in recent years remains strong in Cucuta, according to police. Intelligence reports indicate that not only is Megateo importing contraband gasoline for cocaine processing, he is also paid for drug shipments in Venezuelan contraband, helping him to quickly and easily launder drug proceeds by converting them into almost untraceable pesos. As with any multi-million dollar criminal business in Colombia, the Cucuta contraband trade has also been facilitated by official corruption. In an attempt to clean up the force, the POLFA have introduced confidence tests for officers, meet with internal affairs monthly and, critically, have started rotating staff and removing officers with local ties. Below, police in Cucuta inspect a seizure of medications. Venezuela has also begun to take steps to tackle corruption in the Bolivarian National Guard GNB , which monitors the border. In August, Venezuelan authorities even arrested 15 guards in the neighboring state of Tachira and accused them of repairing a smuggling trail after it had been destroyed. On one smuggling trail, InSight Crime saw a burned-out car riddled with bullet holes in the wheels and engine. The work of the GNB, the police said, and a common sight during their patrols. Despite the ongoing concerns over the GNB, Venezuela now certainly appears to be taking the issue of contraband seriously, especially as popular discontent with widespread shortages in the shops grows. President Nicolas Maduro has put aside his often antagonistic relationship with Colombia to call for increased cooperation on anti-smuggling operations, and Colombian officials speak highly of the improved relationship. In August, Venezuela began closing the border between 10 pm to 5 am. Although it is a temporary measure, both the Colombian authorities and residents say this has been an effective — but controversial — move. Meanwhile, police are hoping a new anti-contraband law currently making its way through Congress will give them the powers to go after the serious criminals. However, attempts to take down the contraband mafias are already running into the same wall as the fight against drug trafficking — while the profits are there, then it does not matter how many arrests they make, or how many networks they dismantle, the trade continues. This article is the first in a four-part series looking at the contraband trade in Colombia. Subscribe to our newsletter to receive a weekly digest of the latest organized crime news and stay up-to-date on major events, trends, and criminal dynamics from across the region. Donate today to empower research and analysis about organized crime in Latin America and the Caribbean, from the ground up. Skip to content. SEE ALSO: Venezuela News and Profiles To move their loads into Colombia, the smugglers use clandestine border crossings — narrow dirt tracks of mud and sand that wind their way towards the Tachira River, which marks the border between the two countries. All we can do is try to make sure it is not out of control. Stay Informed With InSight Crime Subscribe to our newsletter to receive a weekly digest of the latest organized crime news and stay up-to-date on major events, trends, and criminal dynamics from across the region.

Cucuta: Colombia’s Contraband City

Buying blow Cucuta

In the run-up to the special session of the UN General Assembly on the World Drug Problem in , the debate on drug policies has gained fresh impetus. Nevertheless, on the ground in production countries such as Colombia, strategies have not changed much so far: we continue to fumigate coca cultivations, destroy laboratories, detain small-scale traffickers and point to the lack of action of the consumption countries to reduce demand. Instead of limiting ourselves to eliminating these links, we should shift our attention to the intermediaries — the narco-brokers and the financiers — the glue that holds together the supply chain links of cultivation, production and consumption. Fumigations, manual eradication and alternative development programmes did diminish the area of coca cultivation by 51 per cent between and in Colombia. But, innovations in processing methods and transportation have maintained stable levels of cocaine production. Targeting coca farmers, traffickers and dealers has failed to reduce the cocaine business in any significant way. The large number of farmers, the abundance of territories available for new cultivation, the ease of substituting destroyed laboratories and the infinity of new mules, traffickers and dealers easily fill the voids of the captured and the killed ones. There is a firm rock in this ocean of adaptation and reconfiguration: the narco-broker, who coordinates agreements between the various supply chain links and helps reduce mistrust between the groups that participate in this lucrative business. In the case of fumigations, captures or killings, the broker can reconfigure the network which facilitates the drug trafficking flow. The broker is the element which is most difficult to replace because he or she features three characteristics that are scarce in illegal businesses: trustworthiness, reliability and strong networking skills. Yet these deals are by no means legally binding; the possibility of cheating and betrayal is omnipresent, which makes trustworthiness a characteristic that is hard to find. Megateo, a wanted narco-broker of Eastern Colombia, is one of the few exceptions. During my travels in Colombian Catatumbo many people told me that he is perceived to comply with what he says. Second, in order for the narco-deals to materialise, the broker has to be perceived as a reliable business parter by all parties involved. Given the quickly changing nature of the drug business, it is difficult to find people with many years of experience in the cocaine industry: often, narco brokers do not even reach the age of 30, making it difficult to fill the void left by a captured or killed broker. Like an octopus which has its tentacles in many parts, the narco-broker has connections which extend vertically to penetrate all classes of society and, horizontally to all sectors including politics. Having networks across different sectors and classes of society requires skills of versatility and adaptation that few people possess. The narco-brokers are the intermediaries who primarily manage the later stages of the cocaine supply chain. Yet in order to adopt a holistic strategy, we have to identify the brokers at all levels, starting from the coca cultivation and the coca paste. As I have discovered in conversations with local coca farmers in Southern and Eastern Colombia, they ensure that the first links of the cocaine supply chain stay connected in at least three ways. First, the financiers buy the coca leaves or the coca paste from the farmers in order to sell the product to those in charge of processing. If there are no roads on which the farmers would be able to take the products to the market, the financiers arrive at the farms to buy the coca. Second, if any of their clients are no longer able to sell coca due to fumigations or manual eradication, they provide the coca farmers with new seeds or look for other farmers to ensure the supply for the laboratories. Third, if farmers attempt to substitute coca with other crops, the financiers may increase the prices of the coca paste to make the deal more lucrative. At the same time, the financiers contribute to uncertainty and ignorance among the communities regarding the identity of those who administer the laboratories, and of those who control the other supply chain links, including the armed groups who are present in the territory: it is neither clear who operates in the name of whom, nor who decided to impose a new price. Hence, while on the one hand, the financiers increase the stability of the cocaine supply chain, on the other hand they reduce clarity on the rules of the game for the farmers. Continuing to kill or capture farmers, mules and traffickers will not bring any signifcant changes nor effective solutions. Of course this does not replace sustainable development policies that address issues such as education, health and infrastructure in order to offer alternative livelihood strategies to the communities affected by the cocaine supply chain. But it constitutes a complementary approach which should form part of the discussions on the solution to the illegal drug problem and the debate on drug policies more widely. Skip to content. Rethinking the Problem In the run-up to the special session of the UN General Assembly on the World Drug Problem in , the debate on drug policies has gained fresh impetus. The Narco-broker There is a firm rock in this ocean of adaptation and reconfiguration: the narco-broker, who coordinates agreements between the various supply chain links and helps reduce mistrust between the groups that participate in this lucrative business. The Financiers The narco-brokers are the intermediaries who primarily manage the later stages of the cocaine supply chain. Addressing the Glue between the Links Continuing to kill or capture farmers, mules and traffickers will not bring any signifcant changes nor effective solutions. Share this post. Share on X Share on X. Author: Annette Idler. Related Posts. Cocaine Insights 3 — Women in the cocaine supply chain 21st March Remember me.

Buying blow Cucuta