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Zawiya buying powder

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Zawiya buying powder

Armed groups and society in a western Libyan city. Groups experienced serious disruptions in access to government funding and official status. Those with revenues from illicit activities became the dominant actors and, on this basis, benefited from significantly greater influence in state institutions from onwards. The legitimacy and budgets associated with state security institutions facilitated the expansion of armed groups that had become deeply rooted in criminal activities. Official status was a resource in itself, since it allowed armed groups to man checkpoints or operate migrant detention centres that were major sources of income. Funding from illicit activities, in turn, enabled militia leaders to offer additional incentives to their fighters; to hire mercenaries; and to buy the cooperation of politicians, bureaucrats, and security officials. Official status, state funding, and state capture. Across Libya, access to state resources and the mantle of legitimacy has been volatile since , and in Zawiya, this was even more the case than elsewhere. Limited salary budgets were available through the Central Security Apparatus, headed by Omar al-Khadrawi in Tripoli, with the Zawiya branch led by his brother, Mohamed Hussein al-Khadrawi. As will be shown below, the migration and countermigration businesses rapidly became closely intertwined. The police directorate, long headed by Col. Ali al-Lafi, provided cover and budgets to various armed groups. Most notoriously, Bahroun operated under the police directorate from onwards. When Interior Minister Bashagha attempted to replace him in August , strong opposition from Zawiya eventually compelled him to relent. New bodies and units proliferated—most significantly the SSA— along with new military units, as well as the Law Enforcement Force promoted by Interior Minister Bashagha. As Dabeiba focused on his political survival, the funds armed groups could obtain corresponded to the level of support they could offer him and the threat their defection to Bashagha would pose. This also went for the new army units, such as Brigades 52 and Beyond their salary budgets, the extent to which their commanders could expand and dispense patronage primarily depended on the operating budgets, which could vary greatly and be used at discretion. In the search for legitimate status and funding, militia leaders frequently changed their institutional affiliation. As of late , that body had churned out hundreds of recruits at its bases in Sabratha, Sorman, and Tripoli, but had yet to establish any presence on the ground. Nevertheless, it obtained lavish funding from Dabeiba in December Together, these militia leaders now wielded decisive influence over the distribution of government positions, as well as over whether a government could take or retain power in Tripoli. While the tug of war between the two competing governments lasted, the talks explored ways to overcome the deadlock, by either agreeing an electoral framework for elections, or forming a new government. Despite failing to achieve a consensus on the reshuffle, the parties successively reached deals on a range of other issues. His research focuses on conflict dynamics in Libya and the Sahel, and relies on frequent fieldwork. April 7, Official status, state funding, and state capture Across Libya, access to state resources and the mantle of legitimacy has been volatile since , and in Zawiya, this was even more the case than elsewhere. Previous post The odd case of the literally dirty Libyan money found in Estonia. The Right to be Like Any Other October 19, Read More. Yes, Libya Does Matter October 19, Libyan oil output poised for boom after end

Zawiya buying powder