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Protests Erupt in Taiz Demanding Government Action to Halt Currency Decline

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The rise of Salafi militias in the Yemeni city of Taiz has contributed to the now frequent outbursts of violence there between ostensibly pro-government factions. If not addressed directly, these developments are likely to continue destabilizing the city and wider governorate well after any potential resolution to the larger conflict in Yemen. While Taiz has traditionally been known for its leftist political tendencies, the Salafi presence has grown steadily in recent decades. Following the massive public demonstrations against then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh, Salafis leaders in Yemen were at odds over whether to support the protest movement. The Houthi siege of Taiz City, which began in , led to the rise of local armed resistance groups; primary among these were three distinct clusters of Salafi militias. The Saudi-led military coalition intervening in the Yemeni conflict, and the United Arab Emirates in particular, have helped inflame these rivalries with their preferential provision of arms and financing to militias unaffiliated with Islah. Yemeni army divisions operating in Taiz are similarly divided over their affiliations with Islah. These factors, combined with absence of effective state institutions and public services, have created a deeply unstable security environment in which AQAP has found opportunities for influence and expansion. Importantly, the factors undermining stability in Taiz are increasingly divorcing themselves from the larger battle against the Houthi forces and their allies. The implications of this are that national and international stakeholders will likely need to engage directly with the situation in Taiz if stability there is to be achieved in any larger post-conflict scenario. The majority of Taizis supported the republican revolution that overthrew the Imamate, and largely fought with the republicans against the royalists during the subsequent civil war, repelling attempts to restore the Imamate. The latter went on to dominate Yemeni politics for decades, particularly after Ali Abdullah Saleh became president in Since its formation in , the Yemeni Congregation for Reform, commonly known as Islah, has developed strong grassroots support in Taiz. Islah is made up of a broad spectrum of moderate and more extreme Islamist factions, including the Muslim Brotherhood, Wahhabi, and Salafi elements. In Taiz, charitable activities were particularly pronounced among Salafis associated with the al-Hikma and al-Ihsan branches of the Salafism, which were known for their financial largesse. The increased presence of Salafi groups in Taiz brought with it increased competition between them as they looked to operate in the same space. Salafis in Taiz also competed with other well-established religious groups, such as followers of the Sufi branch of Islam that were active in Taiz City and the outlying villages. With the exception of members of the al-Ihsan faction who are also close to the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen, there has generally been a tense relationship between Salafis and Sufis in Taiz. Continued opposition to Saleh led to members of the Salafi movement questioning one of its central tenets: the jurisprudence on whether it is permissible to revolt against a sitting ruler. One school of thought, headed by the prominent Salafi scholar Sheikh Yahya al-Hajuri, viewed the anti-Saleh protests as an unacceptable act of disobedience. This stance was tied to the Islamic notion of Wali al-Amr , whereby adherents are fully obedient to the ruler and should remain apolitical. By contrast, other Salafi leaders that belonged to the al-Hikma and al-Ihsan branches, most prominently Sheikh Abdulwahab al-Homaiqani, decided there was a need for Salafis to engage in Yemeni politics. Supporters claimed the move was borne out of necessity and that participation in mainstream politics and the abandoning of the principle of Wali al-Amr was, in this instance, deemed to be justifiable. The primary Houthi doctrine is the preservation and promotion Zaydi Shiism, while Houthi opponents often go as far as accusing the group of wanting to restore the Hashemite dynasty and Imamate that fell in The Houthis had participated in the anti-Saleh protests, given their longstanding grievances with the president. These included the establishment of Wahhabi and Salafi schools in Dammaj, which began soon after Saleh took power. From mid until January , the Houthis launched an armed offensives against the Salafis in Dammaj, and later tribal forces affiliated with Islah and the al-Ahmar family in neighbouring al-Jawf and Amran governorates. The Houthi military campaign against the Dammaj Salafis focused on the Dar al-Hadith institute and its students. The Houthis denounced the institute as an existential threat, claiming it was an incubator for foreign fighters, that Salafi militants as well as weapons were being sent to the institute ahead of a planned attack on Houthi strongholds in the governorate. Not only did they feel abandoned by a transitional government that had not intervened on their behalf, but they felt they had been sold out in a political deal between the transitional government and the Houthis. This deep sense of abandonment and injustice amongst Salafis displaced from Dammaj still permeates today — particularly among groups in Aden and Taiz governorates — and helped fuel eventual Salafi militarization. The Houthi military expansion that continued after Dammaj, with the help of their former adversary-cum-ally-of-convenience Saleh 22 , also helped provoke a general rise in sectarianism that, historically, had largely been absent from Yemeni society. The Houthis themselves also began labeling all opponents generally as terrorists and Sunni religious extremists. President Hadi was held under house arrest in the capital until escaping to Aden in February An initial coalition objective was to clear Houthi-Saleh forces from Aden, which was accomplished by July As Houthi-Saleh forces withdrew from Aden, the battle for control of Taiz then gained increased strategic importance. Initially, local resistance in Taiz to the Houthi-Saleh occupation arrived in the form of peaceful demonstrations. When these demonstrations were met with force, however, different armed resistance groups started to assemble. In response to the formation of local armed resistance groups, the Houthi-Saleh forces imposed a stifling blockade, controlling the main entry and exit points into the city to their tactical advantage. The blockade choked both the opposition fighters and civilian population off from access to food, goods and medicine, while Houthi-Saleh forces also commonly shelled residential areas. The term, however, gives the mistaken impression of a united opposition front. It ultimately fails to account for the entrenched rivalries that divide different factions of the Taiz resistance, which often operate independent of, and at times in direct competition and opposition with, each other and the Hadi government. Along with al-Mikhlafi and his pro-Islah militias, three main clusters of Salafi militias emerged as a key component of the anti-Houthi-Saleh effort in Taiz city. The second cluster includes Islah-affiliated Salafis. Al-Saddouq had close ties with Hammoud al-Mikhlafi until the latter departed for Saudi Arabia in early These fighters are originally from outside Taiz, but relocated to the central governorate to join the fight against Houthi-Saleh forces. Kataib Hasm fighters are present along several fronts in Taiz, and are commanded by Adnan bin Ruzaiq al-Qumaishi, more commonly known as Adnan bin Ruzaiq. Bin Ruzaiq reportedly commanded a number of Kataib Hasm fighters in Shabwa under the banner of the al-Qamoush tribes, and before relocating to Taiz had fought the Houthis in both Abyan and Shabwa governorates. Although there are clear differences between the three main Salafi militia clusters in Taiz, there are also a number of operational and organisational similarities. Each militia quickly sought to differentiate itself from other armed groups and political actors in Taiz. This is in marked contrast to the groups of Salafi fighters in Aden, who were allied with, and integrated themselves within the established political and security forces. For the Salafi groups in Taiz unaffiliated with Islah, part of this differentiation strategy included an attempt to distance themselves from the established political parties in the city. Following the Houthi expansion and subsequent capture of swathes of territory in the north, Islah was experiencing a general state of decline. The party still maintained grassroots support, but was less able to influence developments inside Taiz city. Al-Abbas sought to fill this socio-political vacuum using religion to transcend political boundaries. For example, he targeted outreach towards youth in the inner-city neighbourhoods, who had experienced an upsurge in religiosity as conflict descended on Taiz. Even the Islah-affiliated militias in Taiz appear to operate with a degree of autonomy from the larger political party. Fighters of most Salafi militias in Taiz are primarily loyal to their respective leaders, with the factions named after these leaders. The main Salafi militia clusters in Taiz all have clear lines of authority, set out in a pyramidal structure to enhance the effectiveness of their respective political, military, and communications strategies. Orders and responsibilities essentially filter down from leader — the emir or sheikh — to the rank and file. The militia competition for greater recognition and legitimacy among local communities in Taiz, as well as members of the Saudi-led coalition, has seen the Salafi groups place significant value on a media communications officer, who is responsible for promoting their respective battlefield victories, as well as liaising with political actors and other armed groups. The three main Salafi militia clusters have thus established varying degrees of local recognition and legitimacy. Generally speaking, the appeal of all three militias for some Taiz city residents has risen. The Salafi militias offer residents some form of protection on the ground against Houthi-Saleh attacks, and a degree of law and order amid the breakdown in local governance, which has strengthened the position of Salafi militias even in non-religious circles. While also divided by their affiliation — or not — with Islah, competition for resources and influence on the ground has been a major source of tension between Salafi militias in Taiz. Perhaps most significant in this regard has been the contrasting levels of support the Saudi-led coalition, and the United Arab Emirates UAE in particular, has provided to anti-Houthi militias in Taiz. The UAE has reportedly provided Abu al-Abbas and his cadre of Salafi fighters with weapons airlifted into Taiz city, as well as financial support. In Taiz, the UAE appears intent on strengthening a local ally it hopes can not only prevent Islah-affiliated militias from dominating the battlefield, but also rival Islah politically once the larger conflict has subsided. The extent to which Islah-affiliated militias have struggled to obtain outside assistance can be seen from the regional tour that al-Mikhlafi embarked on in early , when he left for Saudi Arabia before visiting Turkey and Qatar. The stated priority for each of the three main clusters of Salafi militias in Taiz is battle against Houthi-Saleh forces. Yet, despite the looming presence of this common enemy, the Salafi militias are engaged in their own local turf wars, in which they have sought to defend or even increase their authority at the expense of their competitors. This jockeying for position has led to frequent outbreaks of inter-factional violence, which in turn further entrench the rivalries. Inter-factional violence has thus far largely been defined by targeted assassinations and sporadic armed clashes. For example, on April 23, , clashes broke out north of Taiz city between Islah-affiliated fighters loyal to al-Mikhlafi and those loyal to bin Ruzaiq. One of the most volatile inter-factional rivalries in Taiz has pit the increasingly-empowered al-Abbas and his fighters against Islah-affiliated militias. Al-Abbas claimed he intervened to stop the al-Mikhlafi brothers and their gang from extorting money from shoppers and shop owners in the local marketplace. Al-Abbas himself acknowledged the underlying tensions during an interview published in October Although he did not specify who these alleged dissidents were, his comments appeared to be a thinly veiled reference to Islah, as indicated by the rest of his interview, which included extensive criticism of the party. Al-Abbas criticised Islah-affiliated factions for what he saw as a lack of desire to help end the Houthi-Saleh siege on Taiz City, a claim he supported with an allegation that Islah-affiliated factions were notably absent on the frontlines in the months prior to his interview. The lack of commitment from Islah-affiliated militias, he claimed, was the reason why the UAE had diverted resources elsewhere in the governorate. Al-Abbas also criticized anti-Houthi-Saleh forces stationed in the western part of the city. This rivalry continued throughout the first half of , with particularly intense clashes in central Taiz on July The absence of a strong, united national army has facilitated the anarchy in parts of Taiz. The two main Yemeni army units that are stationed in Taiz governorate appear to operate independently of one another, and are split in terms of their loyalties to al-Abbas and Islah. The 35th Armoured Brigade commanded by Adnan al-Hammadi is thought to have a close working relationship with al-Abbas. The 22nd Armoured Brigade commanded by Sadiq Sarhan has ties with al-Saddouq, and is also said to have pro-Islah fighters in its ranks. The conflict in Taiz has created an environment in which religious extremism can thrive. The Salafi movement as a whole has previously been accused of fomenting religious extremism in Yemen. In Taiz, since the escalation of the conflict after the Saudi-led coalition intervention began, each of the three main groups of Salafi fighters are said to include fighters with suspected ties to AQAP. Against the backdrop of the longest-running continuous battle of the Yemen conflict, which shows no sign of abating, reports indicate AQAP has gained a stronger foothold in eastern Taiz city. The presence of AQAP and the more extreme Salafi branches in Taiz is also contributing to the rising sectarianism in the city, the governorate, and Yemen more broadly. These extremist groups are using sectarian rhetoric to portray themselves as the defenders of Sunni Islam as well as the defenders of Taiz against Houthi-Saleh aggression. These religious arguments prey upon the underlying resentment felt by people residing in Taiz as a result of their desperate situation. This resentment is not only felt towards Houthi-Saleh forces for the destruction they have wreaked upon the governorate but also towards Yemeni government and the Saudi-led coalition for the perceived neglect of Taiz. The severe deterioration of the local economy and increased poverty has also potentially increased the prospects of people turning to extremist groups for financial survival. As of this writing, the Houthi-Saleh siege on the city of Taiz has been in place for more than two and half years, barring two brief instances in which the siege was temporarily and partially lifted. Although these recent developments are a breakthrough of sorts, the abovementioned anti-Houthi gains have not drastically altered the power dynamics on the outskirts or indeed inside Taiz City. This in turn would foster an ever more conducive environment for religious extremist elements and general human misery. The formation of realistic and actionable policy options to head off this prospective future will require intensive further study. Prospective policy options should also take into consideration the need to remove the financial incentives local leaders may have to continue the hostilities, and neutralize the ability of radical groups to act as spoilers in the peace process. There are also thousands of fighters — who fought both with and against the Houthis — who will need to be demobilized to rejoin society in a productive capacity or incorporated in some manner into official security apparatuses; the latter of these, to be successful and conducive to national stability, would likely require an institutional overhaul of the Yemeni army and other security bodies, a daunting prospect in itself. She holds a bachelor in History from Taiz University. This report was edited by Anthony Biswell. The evolution of militant Salafism in Taiz Analysis. September 29, Reading time: Executive summary : The rise of Salafi militias in the Yemeni city of Taiz has contributed to the now frequent outbursts of violence there between ostensibly pro-government factions. Competition for resources and influence While also divided by their affiliation — or not — with Islah, competition for resources and influence on the ground has been a major source of tension between Salafi militias in Taiz. Looking ahead As of this writing, the Houthi-Saleh siege on the city of Taiz has been in place for more than two and half years, barring two brief instances in which the siege was temporarily and partially lifted. Hashemites in Yemen are an elite, minority group that made up approximately 12 percent of the population in ; Zaydism is a moderate brand of Shia Islam that is unique to Yemen and closer to Sunni Islam than the Twelver Shia doctrine popular in Iran; prior to unification in , Yemen was two separate countries colloquially referred to as North Yemen and South Yemen. Saleh facilitated the establishment of Islah as a part of his broader attempts to marginalise southern leaders and the Yemeni Socialist Party YSP following the unification of North and South Yemen in By , this objective had largely been achieved, as shown by the and parliamentary election results the YSP boycotted the election , after which Saleh started to distance himself from Islah. Accessed September 28, Read also in Publications.

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