Quetzaltenango where can I buy cocaine
Quetzaltenango where can I buy cocaineQuetzaltenango where can I buy cocaine
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Quetzaltenango where can I buy cocaine
Soldiers and police in helicopters swooped on Mr Ortiz's home in the city of Quetzaltenango. He is accused of smuggling tonnes of cocaine through Guatemala and Mexico into the US. The operation is the latest sign of the US's growing involvement in the fight against organised crime in Central America. He added that Mr Ortiz would probably be extradited to the US to face trial. Guatemala is struggling against the growing influence of Mexican drugs cartels in large areas of the country. The UN has also promised more international support for Central America, amid concerns that the region's government's do not have the resources to contain the growing power of the drugs cartels. Obama in Central America pledge. UN backs Central America security. Guatemala fears advance of Mexican drug gangs. Mr Ortiz is facing extradition to the US. More on this story.
Pumas RAID that took place in Quetzaltenango, Guatemala. We were able to seized Pumas counterfeited goods.
Quetzaltenango where can I buy cocaine
Drug traffickers survive under one premise: adapting to change. At the regional level, the agents of change emerge from the interaction between traffickers and the authorities, as well as among drug trafficking structures. The group that does not adapt does not survive. The result is a molotov cocktail of both planned and unanticipated consequences, in which the authorities can act as a stimulus if they are corrupt, or even if they do their job. These circumstances have reconstructed drug trafficking in Guatemala in the past five years, and led to the fracturing of some groups, the violent territorial conquest of new actors, and the displacement of traditional actors. The attack against nine policemen in Salcaja, Quetzaltenango on June 13 seemed like deja vu — something we had seen before. But it also seemed like something more serious: a possible sign that the Zetas were making an incursion into western Guatemala after securing the Franja Transversal de Norte route — the bridge between Honduras and Mexico — and contesting the eastern part of the country. This article was translated from Plaza Publica. See original article here. The case involved the murder of eight police in a police substation and the kidnapping of a police deputy-inspector, Julio Cesar Garcia Crotez, of whom only three fingers and a piece of his uniform have been found. The authorities revealed to the press that Garcia was suspected of participating in a robbery of the gang that presumably carried out the attack and the kidnapping. At the same time, a police source unofficially revealed that the massacre was vengeance for the robbery of a cocaine shipment, and that while the robbery did not involve all the victims, the gunmen had killed everyone in order to leave no witnesses. On July 14, the authorities captured seven men and two women in La Democracia, Huehuetenango, who were suspected of the murders, but did not identify them as members of a particular criminal structure. Later, on July 16, a tenth suspect was captured in Chimaltenango. This time, the authorities linked him to an offshoot of the Gulf Cartel that is beleived to be active in Huehuetenango. But until the arrests, the police had suspected the Sinaloa Cartel and had given assurences that the Zetas had not perpetrated the massacre for three reasons: The first is that Quetzaltenango and Huehuetenango are territories of influence of Sinaloa Cartel associates and the killers used escape routes and even weapons that the group often uses. The type of weapons used is also a very weak indicator — all criminal groups are able to obtain all kinds of firearms. Proof of this is that now the police are blaming the Gulf Cartel, not the Sinaloa. Therefore one cannot automatically attribute something that happens in Quetzaltenango or Huehuetenango to the Sinaloa Cartel. In addition, some authorities seem to have forgotten that drug trafficking is like plasticine — it has as many forms as hands, intentions, and events can shape it into, and one of the consequences of this is that more than one group can operate within the same province, even if it is not in the long term. They have been familiar with the northwestern border of the country since they arrived in Guatemala in the mids, when they were still part of the Gulf Cartel. Later, during the first week of March, , police captured two Mexican and eight Guatemalan Zetas that had stolen weapons from the National Civil Police PNC in Alta Verapaz and that knew how to move easily through five provinces to escape the authorities: Quiche, Huehuetenango, Solola, Totonicapan, and Suchitepequez. In April , the Zetas gunned down five anti-narcotics police investigators in Amatitlan, supposedly in revenge for the robbery of a cocaine shipment, according to the MP. When two guards were taking Gomez from one floor to another, he encountered the Zetas in the lobby in front of the elevator, and he shook each of their hands before continuing on his way to the next floor. Their motive was revenge against the property owner because he supposedly still trafficked drugs with the Gulf Cartel, according to a source in the MP. Ten days after the massacre, they kidnapped and dismembered auxiliary prosecutor Allan Stowlinsky in Coban, Alta Verapaz, after the police and the MP intercepted a Zetas cocaine shipment in Raxruha, Alta Verapaz. On September 26, last year, residents of the town of Santo Domingo Sinlaj, in Barillas, Huehuetenango meters from the border with Mexico , reported that the Zetas had threatened them with death when they refused to join the organization. There are other drug trafficking groups capable of killings like the Salcaja murders. In fact, some authorities have revealed that those detained between July 14 and 16 are linked to the Gulf Cartel. However, the attorney general Claudia Paz y Paz said the MP suspsects that those detained for the attack in Salcaja, Quetzaltenango, are also linked to the murder of seven people in San Pedro Necta, Huehuetenango, in December , which the Zetas are suspected of committing. Among the victims, who were burnt to ashes, was a prosecutor from Chiquimula, Yolanda Olivares. In terms of drug trafficking behavior, no country shows a pattern. One cannot speak of the Mexicanization of Guatemala, the way that a few years ago one could not speak of the Colombianization of Mexico. No country plagued by drug trafficking becomes an identical copy of another, because the behavior of drug trafficking depends on the interaction between the drug traffickers, the reactions of the authorities and the geographical context, more than on any predetermined pattern, says Rosada. These factors mark the differences in the behaviour of drug traffickers between one country and the next. Guatemala is not Colombia, where Plan Colombia along with the capture of drug traffickers wanted for extradition and the destruction of coca laboratories contributed to alleviating the war between the cartels and the sustained period of narco-violence. Later the cartels transformed into small cells that left production in the hands of the guerrillas and the paramilitaries. But neither is Guatemala Mexico, where the size of the cartels is much larger and their interaction with the authorities much more complex. Guatemala is a unique animal. But what is it? And why? What happens and what is decided in the United States and in Mexico in terms of drug trafficking resonates through Guatemala and the rest of Central America. The engine of change in Guatemala can be divided into two. One on side are events that the United States unleashed in Mexico and Guatemala, and on the other side is the attention paid to requests made by the Public Ministry during the administrations of Amilcar Velazquez and Claudia Paz y Paz. It is during the current administration, under Otto Perez Molina, that Walter Overdick, an important Zetas associate, was captured. In contract, no important Gulf Cartel allies, such as members of the Mendoza group have been captured. The capacity of the drug traffickers for violence continues, as they continue bringing in contraband arms through the blind passes of the Guatemalan border, as a Woodrow Wilson Center report lays out. One of the triggers for the reconstruction of drug trafficking in the region came from the United States in , with the arrest of Osiel Cardenas Guillen, leader of the Gulf Cartel in Mexico, his extradition in , and the resulting infighting within the cartel. Cardenas ran a vertical organization, a narco-dictatorship. A dictatorship is the most vulnerable structure, according to German political scientist Hannah Arendt, because it is managed by violence and not by legitimacy. Cardenas was more feared than respected. Given that he believed he was infallible, he never prepared anyone to succeed him, and he surrounded himself with a security team made up of Mexican ex-military men known as the Zetas. Internal divisions resulted in the Zetas definitively separating from the Gulf Cartel in January At the same time, the Zetas had used their three years of relative independence to fortify alliances in Guatemala and open their own routes between Honduras and Mexico. The blind pass of Ingenieros, to the north of Ixcan, en Quiche, which connects with Chiapas, became one of their routes for bringing drugs up to Mexico. The location was just a few kilometers from the farm where Guatemalan authorities found a Zetas arsenal in March There were very few associates of that cartel who resisted the Zetas conquest, and who had the capacity to keep on trafficking. Overdick also permitted the Zetas to get a foothold in Peten, where he had various properties. This allowed them to harass the Mendoza family, one of the few remaining bastions of the weakening Gulf Cartel in Guatemala — which meant the Zetas immediately considered the Mendoza their enemies. The Zetas had learned something from experience: that it was helpful to ally with family-based drug trafficking groups, which had stronger ties to communities where they had lived for generations like the Cardenas family in Tamaulipas. Although it was on a smaller scale, Overdick and his strong presence in Alta Verapaz offered them this in Guatemala. By , when Osiel was about to fall, the Lorenzana family were trafficking drugs in Guatemala that were sent by the remains of the Cali Cartel and then passed on to the Sinaloa Cartel in Mexico, according to the US Department of Justice, and were part of the transport network of Otto Herrera in Central America. But by , the Lorenzanas would make a decision that would change their history for forever. But Juancho was also stealing drugs from other traffickers in Guatemala and Honduras, and his robberies had created enemies for the Lorenzanas. They knew the execution would occur with or without their consent. They knew to choose their battles, and they recognized that this was not the time for a violent war with the Zetas. It was a matter of honor among criminals. If the Zetas killed without permission on Lorenzana territory, they would have to respond. They knew they should wait, take their time, and then decide if they would make a strategic alliance with the Zetas, or if they would begin a war against them like the conflict seen in Mexico. Juancho had stolen a Zetas shipment in Honduras, and he had killed two of their men, according to the same Mexican and Honduran intelligence sources. On March 25, , the Zetas responded. It was not simple revenge. The Zetas showed what would happen if anyone killed or robbed any of them which is what might have happened with the Salcaja case. It was a lesson that the historian Thucydides proclaimed in ancient Greece: the emperor, or whoever aspired to be emperor, should always respond to attacks to show that he is not an easy target. In this way, the Zetas raised their profile in Guatemala and also took the pulse of other rival groups. On November 30, they interrupted a horse race organized by allies of the Sinaloa Cartel in the town of Agua Zarca, in Huehuetenango. The shootout left 17 dead, including people from both groups. This would be the signature of the Zetas in the following years, and they would become one of the principal factors behind the instability in drug trafficking in Guatemala — more even than the police. Guatemalan authorities, including the MP and the Ministry of the Interior, and the United States with their orders of capture and extradition, dealt the Lorenzanas a serious blow. In the list of people eligible for extradition to the United States, there were people from all the criminal groups. But in Guatemala, operations concentrated on allies of the Sinaloa Cartel. An ex-official with the Drug Enforcement Administration DEA , Michael Braun, said that in Colombia the strategy was to attack one cartel at a time, and maybe that was the strategy also used in Guatemala. Regardless, whatever the intention was, the results ended up favoring the Zetas. By , the government of Alvaro Colom boasted of having captured at least a hundred Zetas, although two-thirds were Guatemalan many, replaceable , and the majority were mid and low-level members. Between and , the Interior Ministry signaled in an interview with a Spanish media outlet that the army was the source of leaks that alerted traffickers. But the police in Zacapa were also untrustworthy, according to a police investigator who worked the case. With the Lorenzanas busy trying to keep a low profile without neglecting their business, the mid-level commanders and junior narcos assumed they had the green light to try and improve their positions. Between and , the arrest warrants and extradition orders from the United States and the arrests made in Guatemala by the MP and the PNC started molding drug trafficking in Guatemala like plasticine. In theory, these arrests should have taken down the whole structure. In practice, it did not. What factor saved it? Another factor is corruption. Sources in the PNC say that Chamale directed all his drug trafficking operations from prison, which is an example of when interaction between drug traffickers and certain authorities favors the trafficker. The groups in the west led by Chamale continued to operate, perhaps even with a higher level of influencee due to their geographic proximity to their Mexican counterparts. At the same time, the Lorenzanas were exposed to other factors, the biggest of which was the Zetas. In , the arrests of the Lorenzanas cleared the path for the Zetas to force an alliance. Thus the moment arrived for the Lorenzanas to make the decision they had put off since , when they gave the Zetas permission to kill Juancho. With more drugs moving overland, there were more routes to fight over and more violence on both sies of the border. It is not that there was more drug production for the narcos, but rather a greater volume of drugs was passing across the Honduras-Guatemala border that previously would have been transported by air from South America to Guatemala, meaning there were more drugs being transported overland that were vulnerable to robberies. The arrests and the extraditions, in Guatemala and Mexico, and the expansion of the Zetas allied with local drug trafficking groups started to change the face of drug trafficking in the country. In , they entered through Huehuetenango, but they made Alta Verapaz their base of operations. By , they had dominated the corridor between Honduras and Mexico, starting with Izabal, following the Franja Transversal del Norte, passing through Alta Verapaz — its bridge to Quiche —, but they also moved toward Peten in the north, and toward the capital and the Pacific coast to the south, according to the MP. In it was clear that the Zetas had found the path and access to arms in military storehouses. In March and April, the authorities found numerous weapons, thousands of bullets, and at least a thousand grenades in Ixcan, Quiche, and Amatitlan. In Amatitlan, the authorities found a rifle that belonged to a set purchased for the police during the government of Oscar Berger , said Carlos Menocal, who was the Ministry of the Interior for President Colom from onwards. Between and , the Zetas fortified their extension towards the eastern part of the country with the same aggression they had employed in Mexico. The expansion occurred after the arrests — when the Lorenzanas were at their weakest and were keeping a low profile. They continued trafficking, but by now they did not have the power to maintain a monopoly over what went on in Zacapa. Their control over drug robbers on the border with Honduras and, to the south, with El Salvador, was further weakened. So the Zetas seized the moment. In Mexico, their modus operandi consisted of taking territory and then monopolizing criminal activity in the area. That is to say, they take control of a zone not just to engage in criminal activity, but also so that they can charge a tax on anyone who wants to pass through or engage in criminal activity in their territory — a kind of criminal tax. Thus they have agreements with migrant smugglers and human traffickers, among other criminal groups. The killings included attacks against some landowners in the eastern part of the country who the police linked to drug trafficking , some small-time drug dealers, and shipment thieves in the area. Among these cases, one that stands out is that of Jairo Orellana, who, according to civilian intelligence sources, the Zetas tried to execute for failing to pay the tax. The Zetas gunmen killed his seven bodyguards in front of a clinic building in Zone 15 of Guatemala City in an attack in November from which Orellana is beleived to have escaped unharmed. By , the Zetas were already operating in the southern and western parts of Guatemala. By last December, they had received two shipments on a farm in Escuintla. The person who sent them from Zacapa is believed to be Marta Julia Lorenzana, according to unofficial information. This marked a dividing line in the history of the family, who for years had trafficked exclusively for the Sinaloa Cartel. For the Zetas, in contrast, the incursion into the southern coast was not unusual. Some of the Mexican Zetas detained in had identification documents that marked them as residents of municipalities along the southern coast, according to the MP who investigated whether the documents were forged or whether they had been legally issued based on false identities. It is believed that once they were in Escuintla in , the Zetas used another transporter to move the shipments to Mexico. Hall Institute and year-old son of Marta Julia Lorenzana, was detained last June in San Marcos with a shipment destined for the Sinaloa Cartel when a military source says his mother has been linked to the Zetas since December although the US Treasury Department only links her to the Sinaloa Cartel. Guatemalan authorities determined that the 15 kilos of cocaine that were seized from Lemus Lorenzana were marked with a horseshoe, a characteristic symbol of the Sinaloa Cartel. The fact that it was a small shipment could indicate that it was meant as a demonstration, to prove the efficiency of a new route or sender before risking a larger shipment — a test that that the adolescent evidently failed, either through inexperience or because somebody informed on him. One former government official suspects that the the fracturing of the power of the Lorenzanas left some members and allies of the family free to negotiate with people unrelated to the Sinaloa Cartel. If some members of the Lorenzana family are trafficking with one group, and other members trafficking with another, the potential for conflict is even higher. If this is indeed the case, friction and an increase in violence in the western part of the country is only a matter of time. Until then, drug trafficking will remain subject to the hands that will write — both within and outside the law — its next chapter. It was translated and reprinted with permission. Subscribe to our newsletter to receive a weekly digest of the latest organized crime news and stay up-to-date on major events, trends, and criminal dynamics from across the region. Donate today to empower research and analysis about organized crime in Latin America and the Caribbean, from the ground up. Skip to content. The Dividing Line The engine of change in Guatemala can be divided into two. Battles Postponed By , when Osiel was about to fall, the Lorenzana family were trafficking drugs in Guatemala that were sent by the remains of the Cali Cartel and then passed on to the Sinaloa Cartel in Mexico, according to the US Department of Justice, and were part of the transport network of Otto Herrera in Central America. Capture of the Lorenzanas Guatemalan authorities, including the MP and the Ministry of the Interior, and the United States with their orders of capture and extradition, dealt the Lorenzanas a serious blow. Alliances and the Conquest of Routes In , the arrests of the Lorenzanas cleared the path for the Zetas to force an alliance. Stay Informed With InSight Crime Subscribe to our newsletter to receive a weekly digest of the latest organized crime news and stay up-to-date on major events, trends, and criminal dynamics from across the region.
Quetzaltenango where can I buy cocaine
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