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The package was called the Merida Initiative so as to avoid being compared to the controversial Plan Colombia. Summary: This paper examines the background to cooperation programmes in the realm of security and defence between Mexico and the US, based on the fact that Mexico has traditionally received very little aid. However, since the entry into force of the North American Free Trade Agreement NAFTA in , and also due to the increase in cocaine trafficking from Colombia to the US in the 80s, mainly through Mexican territory, the strategic positions of the two countries have gradually converged. Mexican drug-traffickers, at the helm of organised crime in the country, were catapulted to a powerful position by the effects of the war on drugs in Colombia and in the Andean region in general. In Colombia, in the early 90s, the economic and political power of the cartels was unrivalled. He was captured in with the help of the US. The success of the US support for Colombia in dismantling the powerful mafias had a negative impact on Mexico. The business was dispersed, the heirs of the great capos spread their operations throughout Colombia and this prevented medium-sized cocaine producers and traffickers from forming large monopolies. The big business, namely exports to the US, helped by Mexican traffickers, underwent a metamorphosis: Mexicans saw their role change completely and they became the sole cocaine suppliers to their northern neighbours there are an estimated 1. Some tonnes of cocaine are estimated to enter the US every year, and only 36 tonnes are seized in Mexico Similarly, marihuana and heroin exports from Mexico to the US have also increased, as have exports of what is currently the most fashionable drug, methamphetamine. In , kilograms of methamphetamine were seized, whereas in the figure was 2, kilograms. The raw materials for this new drug come mainly from China. The Colombian phenomenon was emulated in Peru and Bolivia, where the great capos were hit by US anti-drug strategies and the programmes to eradicate plantations and to seize the drugs, making the Mexicans the owners of the businesses in these countries too. This made the Mexican cartels the most powerful criminal organisations in Latin America. In the last 20 years, US security doctrine and policies have undergone major changes, making its national security highly inconsistent. From the Cold War and the prevailing bipolar paradigm of 45 years, there was suddenly disproportionate optimism as the communist regimes were dismantled. This singular perception of superiority led to the unipolar-multipolar era of the 90s, with one superpower competing and co-existing with regions and countries that were readjusting to the new global geopolitical situation. But an enemy soon emerged outside the continent: terrorism, and Latin American countries were urged and indeed pressured to cooperate in its defeat. The superpower was attacked, but terrorism is not very widely accepted as a hypothetical threat to security in Latin America. However, countries could not break away from the superpower and anti-terrorist cooperation was not called into question. Islamic fundamentalism and its terrorist offshoots remained little more than a hypothesis or an imported abstraction. This was the case of Mexico, as well as the other Western Hemisphere countries, including even those whose rhetoric was anti-imperialist, such as Cuba and Venezuela. Throughout the hemisphere there was talk of cooperative security. This was more realistic in some sub-regions than in others, most notably South and Central America, and commitments were secured which were difficult to fulfil at the meeting of the Organization of American States OAS on Hemispheric Security in October Since the efforts to combat the terrorist threat were not widely popular due to the doctrine of pre-emptive strikes in Iraq, the weakness of States emerged as a source of instability, due mainly to the fragility of public security and judicial institutions. In Central America, the population began to be terrorised by transnational gangs, known as maras , and it was asserted that the real insecurity came from inside the countries themselves: public insecurity, the spread of petty crime and the increasing presence of organised crime rings. Thus, the paradigm of the 80s and 90s returned: drug trafficking and its offshoots in other words, organised crime became the new threat. This blight, unlike that of terrorism, is real, and exists in all the countries and is gaining strength. Latin American governments do not have efficient instruments with which to fight it. Laws are inconsistent, if indeed there are laws, and they do not manage to develop human and material resources and structures to combat the problem. This is not a military issue, as one might think based on a simplistic view. Organised crime is invisible and has considerable capacity to penetrate into the State itself via corruption. Military personnel are equally susceptible to being corrupted by the power of money. The intelligence services are hardly developing any investigative capacities to combat this problem and the armed forces can scarcely be deployed efficiently if they do not work in partnership and coordination with other State institutions and with broad international cooperation. Furthermore, the new organised crime in Latin America is, by nature, transnational, so that one of the obstacles is the sovereignty of individual countries. Furthermore, there is mistrust among the institutions of some countries with respect to those of others. For example, the mistrust on the part of the US security system in their Mexican counterparts is notorious, and with good reason, and it is well known that Guatemalan institutions do not trust Mexican security agencies. This is perpetuated ad infinitum , especially in neighbouring countries with long-running or bitter disputes, or due to a lack of communication in a context of different policies implemented by their various leaders. The US is experiencing the consequences of having focused its national security strategy on other parts of the world. The debate regarding migration has fuelled unprecedented tensions with Mexico since , with the construction of a wall to prevent illegal migration seen as an affront to Mexico and symbolically viewed as a kind of Berlin Wall. The subject has become politically charged and in Mexico there is a powerful campaign to prevent the wall from being built. The Bush Administration did not manage to secure the signing of the Free Trade Agreement with Colombia, in early If this is the case with its closest allies, the distances are considerably greater with those who openly do not share the aggressive discourse of the Bush Administration, not to mention those who are actually striving to build a Bolivarian counter-hegemony, with Venezuela at the helm. The shift in the policy of cooperation with Latin America, and the de facto abandonment of the focus on terrorism, to concentrate more on organised crime which is a real threat that is present in all the countries alike, although in different ways has paved the way for more realistic relations. The new threat is everywhere, all-corrupting and justifies a new integrated cooperation policy. Strengthening institutional security structures is a priority. This can be done with internal resources or external aid. Accordingly, the Merida Initiative, which is popularly known as the Plan Mexico , is the first experiment in hemispheric cooperation of its kind. Plan Colombia , which was devised during the last few years of the Clinton Administration, involved, from the very outset, a component that does not exist in Mexico: on the one hand were the armed left-wing groups, led by the FARC, and on the other the right-wing paramilitary groups. Both the promoters of the Merida Initiative and its critics have raised the level of expectations of Mexico in combating organised crime. It is an insignificant amount of money in relation to the requirements for an integrated plan to combat organised crime and the big cartels. It is a very small sum to be able to affect sovereignty. Whoever believes that this is possible underestimates sovereignty. What is serious is that the Mexican State itself has still not devised, on its own and using its own resources, an efficient strategy after 20 years of countless failed attempts at fighting drug trafficking. In other words, the problem is the absence of a real national security strategy. Under the Vicente Fox government , 60, people were arrested for drug offences which in Mexico are classed as infringements of the Public Health Act. However, only 15 were cartel leaders: 50 belonged to their financial structures and only 71 hired assassins were captured. Most of those arrested belonged to the lower part of the distribution chain or were peasant farmers. One of the main arguments of the US government is the low rate of drug seizures in Mexico. A report by the Government Accountability Office GAO estimates that on average some tonnes of cocaine enter the US from Mexico annually and that the Mexican government only manages to seize 36 tonnes. The report recommends strengthening cooperation, so as to increase the interception capacity of Mexican counternarcotics agencies. The Initiative is aimed at preventing the entry and transit of drugs, arms, persons related to drug trafficking activities, and financial resources, through the region and into the US. It includes providing inspection equipment, ion scanners, canine interception units, communications technology, technical advice and training for legal institutions, witness protection programmes, surveillance helicopters and airplanes for rapid reaction in interception. Unlike other countries in Latin America, Mexico has refused to accept significant amounts of funds from the US in military aid or for the war on drugs. Under the Merida Initiative, Mexico will receive more funds in a single year than it has in the last 12 years put together. In terms of equipment for the war on drugs, modernisation will depend largely on the US. This could apply added pressure to adapt the national defence and security structures to US requirements. One of the main weaknesses of the armed forces is their financial fragility. The same is true of the Navy Department. However, this amount is insufficient for both these Departments, considering that the current equipment is obsolete, much of it has already come to the end of its useful lifespan, and to successfully fulfil the two fundamental missions counternarcotics and help for the civilian population in the event of natural disasters , military equipment must evidently be modernised. This argument highlights the greater danger of the way in which the guerrilla, paramilitaries and drug trafficking do violate the sovereignty of a State and nation, more than the involvement of a foreign country, its advisors and its military equipment do. In Colombia, those who support Plan Colombia point out that its success is measured by the fact that major cartels have not reappeared in the country, the army has regained control of many rural areas, and if it were not for the Plan, the amount of cocaine entering the US would be at least double what it is. Its critics focus on the abstract issue of the violation of sovereignty. In the case of Guatemala, international aid to overcome a grave conflict, culminating in the peace agreement and, more recently, the creation of the International Commission against Impunity CICIG , on 19 November , led to the realisation that the country is in the clutches of a serious emergency due to the power of organised crime, which prompted its government to call on the help of the UN. Like Mexico in its relationship with the US, recognition of its own incapacity led Guatemala to ask for help in combating this new threat. The increase in aid from the US via the Merida Initiative can have two effects: one positive and one negative. The positive side is that the Mexican government recognises the need to modernise its military equipment, and to update the technology used in its intelligence systems and in the systems for training people who are involved in defence and national security institutions. The negative side is that it could lead to an unwanted increase in the militarisation of the strategy for fighting organised crime, which could have negative consequences in terms of human rights, and which could also imply a dominating role for the armed forces in controlling many police security forces which should, by their institutional nature, be civilian. Based on these two factors, the Merida Initiative could have the collateral effect that decision-making processes in defence matters are not modernised, and this could undermine the process to fully democratise the State. Another factor to take into account is the collateral effect on markets. Drug trafficking is a global phenomenon and should be tackled globally, based on multinational cooperation. If the amount of cocaine entering the US is reduced, then the traffickers will seek to tap European markets. And there is already evidence that the drug routes between the Andes and Africa and Europe are being consolidated. Accordingly, these cooperative efforts must be transformed into a multinational strategy, not only focused on bilateral programmes. Drug traffickers are successful businessmen and have shown considerable flexibility and capacity to adapt to the various strategies which have sought, and failed, to control and remove them. Consenting to these technologies will allow us to process data such as browsing behavior or unique IDs on this site. Not consenting, or withdrawing consent, may adversely affect certain features and functions.. Functional Functional Always active The technical storage or access is strictly necessary for the legitimate purpose of enabling the use of a specific service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user, or for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission of a communication over an electronic communications network. The technical storage or access that is used exclusively for statistical purposes. 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This Is What It’s Like Trying to Buy Drugs During Venezuela’s Economic Crisis

Merida buy cocaine

She is on the hunt for some crack or some bazuco , a type of smokable coca paste used by the poorest in the country. Due to spiralling poverty in Venezuela, those with addictions are struggling more than ever to come up with the money to buy drugs. But the bazuco dealers are different. They will take any payment. As well as bolivar notes, they also take food products in exchange for drugs, like corn flour or rice. It is bizarre that in a country next door to Colombia, the biggest cocaine producer in the world, most people in Venezuela struggle to afford even low grade cocaine products such as bazuco. One way drug users have found, amid the chaos of hyperinflation, to gather the money needed to keep the drug market afloat is at the huge, snaking queues of cars and trucks outside gas stations. Venezuela suffers, among many other things, from a severe shortage of fuel. Gas stations get fuel maybe once a week, making queues that can last days and can be several kilometers long. People fight for spots and have to sleep in their cars. But this situation has created a new way of scraping together cash for people in need of drugs. David is a year-old unemployed handy man. In Maracaibo, the market for heroin has almost completely collapsed due to the economic and migratory meltdown. We could only find one place selling it. Bazuco tends to disappear for a couple of days at a time when the price of the dollar goes down. Not everyone finds it hard to afford drugs. I spoke to one of several high-end dealers in the city who deliver to upper- and middle-class cocaine users and use the banking app Zelle. He does not have huge numbers of customers, but they spend enough to sustain a niche market. Yet there is one thing in common among five dealers I spoke to: No matter what they sell, none of them are doing better than five years ago. All of them miss their clients, many of whom, out of desperation, have migrated away from the crisis in this county to live abroad. They can even pinpoint where in the world their buyers have ended up, missing them as if they are family. The sheer size of Caracas and the professionalization of its drug market has made it more resilient than regional markets, said Antillano. The market is mainly reliant on weed sales, with cocaine uncommon and heroin even more so. In cities such as Merida in the Andes, or Cumana in the east, things are more like Maracaibo, according to local drug treatment agencies. Back in Maracaibo, Poly finished her Tuesday empty handed, and desperately called her boss to change the payment to cash, which she managed. So the next day we made the walk yet again. No one had any change. It happens with food. It happens with crack. But Poly was finally happy, taking some 24 hours and surely 10 kilometers of walking to score once. By Manisha Krishnan. By Nathaniel Janowitz. By Max Daly. Share: X Facebook Share Copied to clipboard. Videos by VICE. Read Next.

Merida buy cocaine