Leon buy Heroin

__________________________

📍 Verified store!

📍 Guarantees! Quality! Reviews!

__________________________

▼▼ ▼▼ ▼▼ ▼▼ ▼▼ ▼▼ ▼▼

▲▲ ▲▲ ▲▲ ▲▲ ▲▲ ▲▲ ▲▲

Leon buy Heroin

When police officers who had stopped a person suspected of selling heroin ordered him to remove his shoes in order to prevent his flight while they conducted further inquiry, they exceeded the bounds of an investigatory stop, and probable cause for detaining the defendant was required. A statement made by an unknown informant to officers in a police cruiser, telling the officers that she had recently been in a bar with a man named Leon, who was selling heroin, and giving a detailed description of the man and his clothing, did not give the officers probable cause to arrest a man matching the informant's description whom they saw in the neighborhood of the bar a short time later. Conduct by a defendant in attempting to flee from two police officers who had detained him and in attempting to swallow eight bags of heroin taken from his pocket did not dissipate the taint of the initial illegal detention by police officers without probable cause, and thus suppression of the heroin as the fruit of an illegal arrest was required. The case was reported by Wilkins, J. Dana A. Weiner, Assistant District Attorney, with him for the Commonwealth. A Bristol County grand jury indicted the defendant, Leon Borges, for possession of heroin with intent to distribute. A judge of the Superior Court denied the defendant's motion to suppress eight bags of heroin, and a single justice of this court granted the defendant's request for leave to take an interlocutory appeal. The facts, as found by the motion judge, are these. At approximately P. The pedestrian told the two police officers in the cruiser that she wanted to speak with them, but not on the main thoroughfare. The officers and the pedestrian met minutes later on a nearby side street. She stated that the bags of heroin were in Leon's left pants pocket, and she described in detail both Leon and his clothing. The conversation lasted approximately five minutes. The police officers did not know the identity of the pedestrian; neither one had received information from her before. The officers then radioed a second cruiser and arranged to meet those officers in a nearby parking lot. The second pair of officers were to act as back-up while the first pair went to the area of the bar. The officers then drove toward the bar looking for the defendant. One of the officers had known the defendant for many years and had assumed that the pedestrian had described the defendant when she spoke of 'Leon. The defendant and his clothing matched the description given by the pedestrian. Upon approaching a magazine store located feet from the bar described by the pedestrian, the officers saw the defendant standing with several other people in front of the store. By the time the officers parked the cruiser in front of the store the defendant had gone inside the store. The officers entered the. The three exited the store to the sidewalk. One of the officers then asked the defendant to remove his shoes. He touched the bulge and asked the defendant, 'What's this? The three struggled. During the struggle the defendant removed several bags containing heroin from his pants pocket and stuffed them into his mouth. By this time the back-up officers had arrived. One of the officers shouted that the defendant was eating something. Another officer then applied a chokehold to the defendant, causing him to spit out eight bags of heroin. The defendant was subdued and handcuffed. The motion judge ruled that the defendant was illegally seized when the police officers asked him to step out of the store and to remove his shoes. The judge reasoned that, although there may have been reasonable articulable facts to justify a brief detention of the defendant to conduct a threshold inquiry, see Terry v. Ohio, U. Silva, Mass. The judge concluded, however, that, despite the fact that an initial, illegal seizure occurred, intervening events, sufficiently detached from the illegal seizure, established probable cause to arrest the defendant, and therefore the seizure of the evidence was proper. We conclude that, although the officers may have had a reasonable suspicion that the defendant had committed a crime which would warrant an investigatory stop, the initial seizure of the defendant, i. Moreover, the initial seizure was unsupported by probable cause. Thus, the seizure violated the defendant's rights under art. See Commonwealth. Bottari, ante We disagree with the judge, in that we believe that subsequent events did not establish probable cause to arrest the defendant. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to suppress was denied improperly. At the outset we note that the officer's request that the defendant remove his shoes clearly constituted a seizure within the meaning of art. Mendenhall, U. See United States v. Hensley, U. Delgado, U. Texas, U. Commonwealth v. Riggins, Mass. A recent United States Supreme Court case contemplates an objective standard within an analogous factual pattern. In Florida v. Royer, U. The detectives retained the defendant's airline ticket and identification throughout the encounter and obtained, and had possession of, the defendant's luggage. The Court held that such action was a seizure for purposes of the Fourth. Royer cites the reasonable person test of Mendenhall, supra, thus reconfirming the application of an objective, rather than a subjective, standard. A reasonable person whose shoes have been removed would not feel free to leave. The defendant was seized. We turn now to the question whether the intrusiveness of the seizure was proportional to the degree of suspicion that prompted the intrusion. See Commonwealth v. Bottari, supra. Hayden, U. Royer, supra, the Court also addressed the question of the proper scope of a stop. A majority of the Royer Court believed that there was reasonable suspicion for a stop. A plurality, however, ruled that the limits of a Terry-type stop had been exceeded. The detectives retained possession of the defendant's ticket and identification, and obtained possession of his luggage. The Court stated: 'The scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification. Similarly, the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time. Thus, Terry and Royer state a 'principle of proportionality. Currency, F. Holmes v. United States, U. Berryman, F. The degree of intrusiveness on a citizen's personal security, including considerations of time, space, and force, must be proportional to the degree of suspicion that prompted the intrusion. See Bottari, supra. We believe that the officers exceeded the bounds of an investigatory stop when they requested that the defendant remove his shoes. Unlike Adams v. Williams, U. There was no evidence that the officers feared for their safety in asking the defendant to remove his shoes. While, on the basis of the informant's information, the officer might have been justified in stopping the defendant and inquiring about the bulge in his pants pocket, the officer requested that the defendant remove his shoes before he noticed the bulge. In short, the means used by these officers to conduct their investigatory inquiry raised the seizure to the level of an arrest. Thus, probable cause was required to justify this type of seizure. We address the question whether there was probable cause to support the seizure. Under Commonwealth v. Upton, Mass. In the present case, the. The basis of knowledge inquiry has been satisfied, since this information apparently was derived from the informant's personal observations. However, no evidence supports the veracity or reliability prong. The informant was unknown to the officers; she never before had supplied either of them with information. At the time the officer asked the defendant to remove his shoes, only the informant's description of Leon had been corroborated. Boswell, Mass. There was no probable cause to require that the defendant remove his shoes. Having concluded that the officers exceeded the limited scope of a proper investigatory inquiry and that they acted without probable cause, we last consider whether the evidence seized must be suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful seizure. Loughlin, Mass. We disagree with the judge's ruling that independent and intervening acts supplied the police officers with probable cause to arrest the defendant. Because the initial stop was improper and the subsequent actions occurred as an immediate and direct result of that illegality, the Commonwealth is not entitled to introduce in evidence the fruit of the unlawful act. A sufficient causal connection to view evidence as the fruit of an illegal act is not established merely because 'but for' the illegal police conduct the defendant would not have responded as he did. King, Mass. Saia, Mass. Accord Dunaway v. New York, U. Bailey, F. In determining whether the connection between an illegal arrest and a subsequent arrest or search has become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint of the illegality, we consider the following: 1 the temporal proximity of the arrest to the defendant's response;. See Brown v. Illinois, U. The defendant attempted to flee moments after the illegal arrest. The struggle and attempted disposal of the evidence quickly followed. Thus, there is a close temporal proximity between the illegal arrest and the defendant's response. Generally, flight alone does not establish probable cause for a 'second' arrest. Thibeau, Mass. Crowley, 13 Mass. Morrison, F. Ogilvie, F. But see United States v. Garcia, F. Martinez-Lopez v. Compare United States v. Nooks, F. Hughes v. Nor does the attempted disposal of evidence constitute an independent, intervening act sufficient to justify a subsequent arrest where the disposal is in direct and immediate response to the illegal police action. Beck, F. Painten, F. United States, F. Although, in the present case, the defendant attempted both to flee and to dispose of evidence, we believe that because of the close temporal proximity of these events to each other and to the illegal act of the police officers, they cannot be considered independent and intervening acts sufficient to establish probable cause. The judge relied on Commonwealth v. King, supra, in ruling that the defendant's independent and intervening acts gave rise. This case, however, is distinguishable from King. In King, supra at , we ruled that the act of shooting at the police officers by the defendant's companion 'broke the chain of causation and dissipated the taint of the prior illegality. United States v. Bailey, supra at defendant's forcible resistence to arrest was itself a 'new, distinct crime'. There is no indication here that the police officers undertook the arrest with consideration of the defendant's intervening acts; only one crime, possession of heroin, motivated the officers' actions throughout the incident. See Painten, supra at Apparently, the police officers did not arrest the defendant for assaulting them. See G. Thus, the purpose of the misconduct, i. In sum, while intervening acts occurred, as in King, we cannot say that these acts were sufficiently independent, in nature and temporal proximity from the primary illegality to justify the defendant's subsequent arrest by the officers. We reverse the order denying the defendant's motion to suppress. As frequently occurs in search and seizure cases, we are dealing here with line-drawing of a difficult nature. Necessarily so, because of the subtle balance that we must preserve between law enforcement and the protection of individual privacy. A majority of the court, not counting my contribution, says the evidence in this case must be excluded. The case is close enough to the line so that I bow to the majority's wisdom, but not without doubt on my part. First, I assume that the court is approaching the issue of the informant's reliability in light of this court's recent emphasis that the dual test of Aguilar-Spinelli still has vitality under Massachusetts law. In that light, I am troubled by the court's. The reliability of the anonymous informant, under the Draper principle, can be found where the informant particularly describes the appearance, conduct, and expected behavior of the suspect, and the description is later corroborated by observations of the police before they detain the suspect. As in Draper, the description here was not stale news, but right up to the hour, if not to the minute. A good argument can be made that the details provided by the informant here compare favorably with those in Draper, including a description of the precise pocket of the suspect where the police could observe a bulge caused by the presence of the contraband. I write this brief concurrence with the hope that the court will in the future give continued credibility to the Draper principle, because that approach, carefully applied, is both in the public interest, and consistent with the spirit of Aguilar-Spinelli. I add only that I do not agree with the dissenting opinion in this case, which relies, in part, on Terry v. Clearly the police here and also in Commonwealth v. Bottari, ante, which is published simultaneously with this opinion , were detaining the suspect for purposes of making a search for contraband. They were not merely, for their own protection, conducting a pat-down for weapons while they questioned a suspicious person. The requisite for a search and seizure in this Commonwealth is probable cause, and not the 'articulable suspicion' of Terry. I dissent. If ever a fact pattern came within the boundaries of Terry v. If ever police officers had the right if not the obligation to stop and frisk a person, it was here, armed as they were with specific information as to name, place, and particulars of the location of the drugs 'left pants pocket'. One police officer, the judge found, had known Borges for many years. In Terry, supra at , it should be recalled, the detective was not acquainted with either man suspected of. The Court in Terry acknowledged the 'seizure' of the men whose suspicious conduct the detective had observed and insisted that the test was one of reasonableness. Terry v. Ohio, supra at 19, For some reason which the opinion has failed to disclose, the court today decides that it was unreasonable for the officers to require the defendant to remove his shoes to prevent his escape. Would it have been 'more reasonable' to keep a gun pointed at his head to prevent his escape? This is but another example of the extent to which the exclusionary rule has led to a travesty of good order and common sense. The officer knew that the defendant was on parole and believed that the defendant might run if confronted by police officers. Florida v. Rodriguez, U. In Commonwealth v. Meehan, Mass. Avery, Mass. A complete restriction on liberty of movement occurs in the typical investigatory stop. LaFave, Search and Seizure Section 9. Bautista, F. Moreover, Terry apparently contemplates some use of force. Place, U. See, e. State, Md. One commentator has noted that a reasonable person standard actually plays an insignificant role in the outcome of most cases and has concluded that an objective standard is more useful in defining a seizure than it is in distinguishing a stop from an arrest. In Massachusetts Gen. Revere, Mass. McKethan, F. LaFave, Search and Seizure Section 5. See Avery, supra. Some courts believe that an officer's intentions at the time of a stop are irrelevant in determining whether an arrest occurred. Danielson, F. What is significant, however, about Massachusetts Gen. As will be discussed more fully, infra at , such a use of force was inconsistent in nature and degree with that authorized by an investigatory stop. Our opinion in Commonwealth v. Bottari, supra, illustrates, also, that, as matter of State law, use of excessive force in detaining a suspect may raise the nature of a seizure from an investigatory stop to the level of an arrest requiring probable cause. Wallace, Mass. Holmes, Mass. As I have discussed, a lawful stop must be so strictly limited that it is difficult to conceive of a less intrusive means that would be effective to accomplish the purpose of the stop. However, if the act were an illegal search, the temporal proximity between that illegal act and the defendant's response would be even closer than the one at issue. Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes. Get free summaries of new Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court opinions delivered to your inbox! Annotate this Case. A motion to suppress evidence was heard by George Jacobs, J. Louis D. Coffin for the defendant. The officers entered the Page store and asked the defendant to accompany them outside. See Commonwealth Page v. The Court held that such action was a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Page Amendment. In the present case, the Page informant stated that she had recently been with a person named Leon, and that he was selling heroin. In determining whether the connection between an illegal arrest and a subsequent arrest or search has become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint of the illegality, we consider the following: 1 the temporal proximity of the arrest to the defendant's response; Page 2 the presence or absence of intervening circumstances; and 3 the purpose and flagrancy of the misconduct in the context of the circumstances of the arrest. King, supra, in ruling that the defendant's independent and intervening acts gave rise Page to probable cause for arrest. So ordered. In that light, I am troubled by the court's Page failure to confront more fully the principle of Draper v. In Terry, supra at , it should be recalled, the detective was not acquainted with either man suspected of Page planning a robbery and the detective had received no information about them. Toggle button Get free summaries of new Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court opinions delivered to your inbox! Enter Your Email. Justia Legal Resources. Find a Lawyer. Law Schools. US Federal Law. US State Law. Other Databases. Marketing Solutions.

COMMONWEALTH vs. LEON BORGES.

Leon buy Heroin

United Nations. Office on Drugs and Crime. Site Search. Farmers cultivate an opium-free future for Laos. All Stories Subscribe. Website I Opening. All Press Releases. In Focus. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

Leon buy Heroin