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Opinion mining from medical forums such as health check-ups is sparking growing interest and a stimulating area for natural language processing. This allows for a better understanding of patient health status and drug reactions while generating new knowledge for health care professionals and drug manufacturers, which helps improve the quality of service and produce more effective treatments. In this paper, the researchers present a framework of opinions classification of drug reviews. In this sense, the researchers oppose classical text vectorization methods bag of words, term frequency-inverse document frequency and word embedding methods Word2vec, GloVe for classical opinion mining face to modern machine learning tools with the Convolutional Neural Network CNN , the Recurrent Neural Networks Long Short-term Memory and Bidirectional Long Short-Term Memory. 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How can I buy cocaine online in Tlemcen

Border closings between Algeria and Morocco have been the norm rather than the exception. Since Algeria gained independence from France in July , the Algerian-Moroccan land border has only been open for ten years in total. Territorial and resource disputes born from decolonization and continual heightened tensions led the border to close in the Sand War , the Western Sahara War , and after the terrorist attack on the Atlas Asni Hotel in Morocco. These repeated closures divided families Moroccans and Algerians along the border have historically married and traded with each other , but they did not disrupt cross-border commercial activities. During the s and early s, trade rules and regulations—and particularly the import restrictions imposed by Algeria —made the clandestine import of Moroccan agricultural products, clothes, shoes, and alcohol highly attractive. By the late s, many Algerian food and petroleum products became subsidized, reversing the flow of goods between the two countries. The smuggling of subsidized products —especially fuel—into Morocco became a lucrative business. Intermediaries and smugglers became indispensable in connecting border communities and delivering affordable basic goods. Contraband and illegal crossings became major facets of everyday life. State officials initially tolerated this state of affairs because alternative economic options were scarce. National development efforts in border areas were crippled by insufficient budgets, inappropriate allocations, and inadequate quality. For both the Algerian and Moroccan governments, smuggling generated a level of employment that helped attenuate youth unemployment and mitigate poverty. Over decades, smuggling helped to revitalize the Algerian border towns of Zouia, Bab al Assa, and Maghnia and the Moroccan towns of Ahfir and Oujda, transforming them into significant trading centers. For example, heavily subsidized gasoline in Algeria created the incentive for outbound smuggling to Morocco. Currency devaluation in Algeria also made a wide range of commodities cheaper compared to its neighbor, contributing to a boom in illicit trade. And, as is often the case, the trade opened up routes and crossings for the trafficking of other products, including prescription drugs and cigarettes from Algeria and cannabis from Morocco. Both residents and smugglers grew savvy in using their knowledge of the border to evade security patrols and collude with border authorities. In the early s, the black market trade carried on largely unabated. The government, fearing unrest due to lingering high unemployment and poverty, continued to heavily subsidize commodities, maintaining the allure and incentives for border residents to smuggle. The contraband economy also created financial incentives for border officials, corrupt politicians, select formal businessmen, and powerful illicit smugglers to fuel trading in gasoline, food, and cigarettes. Migrant smuggling from Algeria to Morocco also increased. While the Islamist insurgency in Algeria was weakened in the s, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb AQIM , formally established in January , continued to crisscross parts of the Maghreb and adjacent Sahelian areas. In the late s, the security risks were further compounded by parts of West Africa becoming a major transit hub for cocaine smugglers out of South America and into Europe. Both Algerian and Moroccan authorities feared that drug cartels could use the cigarette and cannabis trails to expand their territories. It was ultimately the Arab uprisings and the resultant political turmoil that engulfed Libya and Tunisia that drove both Algeria and Morocco to tighten border control. The overthrow of Libyan strongman Muammar Gaddafi triggered a far-reaching chain of events, resulting in a wave of refugees and arms proliferation. Algerian and Moroccan officials feared that transnational weapons smugglers, human traffickers, and terrorist groups would exploit the contraband trade and the corruption of some border officials to expand their routes. As a result, both governments began reinforcing their architecture for border management , increasing the number of observation posts, regular mobile patrols, and surveillance systems. This required investment in new technologies and man power, which, in turn, necessitated substantial financial capital, especially for the Algerian government, which was facing mounting security threats along its borders with Libya, Tunisia, Mali, and Niger, as well as rising social discontent. In the summer of , the Algerian regime started cracking down on smuggled fuel , hoping that regaining lost state revenues would help pay for its investments in border management and the substantial increase in social transfers, food subsidies, and state salaries intended to weaken popular opposition and shore up regime stability. With an upcoming presidential election in April , the Algerian regime had a strong incentive to combat the smuggling. The Moroccan government also took unilateral initiatives to clamp down on the inflow of undocumented migrants, tobacco, and medicines. In addition to enhanced electronic surveillance at the border, the authorities invested in strengthening national-level security coordination among the different agencies in charge of border security. Previously, young intermediaries would buy gasoline in Tlemcen, using ordinary passenger cars that have a double gas tank or trucks with extra large tanks. They would then transport it to warehouses, where they put it in storage tanks. Once the gasoline was put into jerry cans, smugglers used four-wheel-drive vehicles or motorcycles to transport the cans across the border to the Moroccan town Oujda. Smugglers of cigarettes, psychotropic drugs, and cannabis also used these animals. To stem the flow of human smuggling and prevent the possible infiltration of terrorists, Morocco began building a security fence begun in and ongoing with electronic sensors. Moroccan authorities also began identifying the donkeys in the region and branding them with ear tags for traceability, while Algeria started to purportedly shoot at any animals crossing the border unaccompanied. These enhanced border control measures appear to have succeeded in curbing the cross-border smuggling of Algerian fuel and other consumer goods such as dates , milk, and Turkish-made clothes. The impact is noticeable on the Moroccan side of the border, where the number of roadside stalls selling fuel has dwindled. Tightened border security, supplemented by government regulations and price changes, has also reduced cigarette smuggling. The 38 percent increase in the price of Algerian cigarettes between and and the emergence of low-priced brands in Morocco in led to a 49 percent decline in the inflows of counterfeit and contraband cigarettes from Algeria to Morocco in However, the allure of contraband cigarettes has not disappeared completely, as Algerian products are still about 43 percent cheaper than those available in Morocco. This helps explain why one in eight cigarettes consumed in Morocco come from contraband. Algerian illicit cigarettes are also prized in the European market, especially in France where, in , Algeria supplied more than 31 percent of contraband cigarettes. Advocates of border defenses point to this relative success in disrupting illicit cross-border trade. Yet, ramped-up enforcement and surveillance have not stemmed the illicit flow of all products between Algeria and Morocco. The most organized and well-resourced trafficking networks have shifted from trafficking highly lucrative fuel to smuggling migrants, cannabis, psychotropic tablets and other medicines, and narcotics. The Algerian border town of Maghnia continues to be a strategic transit point for sub-Saharan migrants intent on crossing into Morocco and eventually Spain. Since Moroccan King Mohammed VI ordered the regularization of over 25, undocumented sub-Saharans in , Morocco has seen the number of migrants increase significantly. Most migrants enter Algeria from Niger, where they travel south through the cities of Tamanrasset and Ghardaia to reach Tlemcen, near the Moroccan border. Assisted by Algerian smugglers, they cross Maghnia into Oujda. Some attempt to get into the Spanish autonomous city of Melilla by jumping over the fence, swimming around the harbor, or hiding under a truck. Others seek smugglers who can help them procure false documents to enter Melilla or Ceuta or attempt the sea crossing to Spain. Since , cannabis seizures have also increased significantly in Algeria. The enhanced border security between Spain and Morocco has driven more cannabis trafficking east. The cannabis shipments to Oran and Algiers are smuggled onto ferries traveling to France, Italy, and Spain. Moroccan authorities are alarmed by the staggering rise in the smuggling of psychotropic drugs. Local media have reported numerous incidents of violent crime being committed by an increasing number of young men under the influence of amphetamine pills Rivotril or Qarqobi in Moroccan colloquial Arabic. Media stories also abound about the dangers of black market medications. In Morocco, these medicines are among the leading causes of poisoning , with 4, cases in compared to 4, in , an increase of almost 30 percent. Yet the smuggling of prescription drugs into the Moroccan black market continues to boom. According to the Secretary General of the Federation of Pharmaceutical Unions, Abdelhamid Nacer, Algerian medicines for asthma, diabetes, and hypertension are prevalent in the Moroccan border town of Oujda. In his estimation, the black market for pharmaceuticals account for at least 10 percent of medicine consumption in the region of Oujda-Nador-Tetouan. Moroccan authorities have tried without success to dismantle this market. Every year, the number of seizures of large quantities of smuggled medicines goes up, but the cross-border trade in prescription medication endures. More worrisome, there has been a steady increase in the distribution of counterfeit medicines , further impacting public health and safety. The trade in fraudulent medicines tends to be linked to organized crime groups, who are attracted to the huge profits. The concern for Morocco is that the logistical infrastructure established for the trafficking and sale of counterfeit medicine may also be utilized by drug trafficking organizations. Both Algeria and Morocco fear becoming a transit route for cocaine originating from South America. Moroccan authorities regularly report interceptions of cocaine air couriers of mostly West African origin on the Rio de Janeiro—Casablanca flight. In , the BCIJ announced the seizure of kilograms of cocaine at the port of Casablanca in a container transported by a cargo ship coming from Brazil. The drug busts provide a window into the drug-related corruption of law enforcement officials. They also signal that narcotic traffickers might be shifting their routes to the Maghreb. Another cocaine scandal underscores the growing importance of the region to transnational drug-trafficking organizations. It also reaffirms the central role that corruption plays. The major bust in the western Algerian port of Oran not only netted kilograms of cocaine but also revealed the involvement of influential real estate moguls, judges, prosecutors, mayors, and the children of prominent politicians. The ringleader, Kamel Chikhi , was a well-connected real estate mogul. His contacts and reach reportedly ran deep, from government circles to the military, intelligence, and police sectors. Due to drugs coming in from multiple origins and pervasive corruption, Algeria and Morocco are struggling to fight against the rising volume of cannabis, cocaine, and pharmaceuticals. In the case of Algeria and Morocco, the vast array of border control measures have had serious side effects. For example, they have crippled the economies of borderland communities. There seems to be little or no limit to these disruptive absurdities. The same applies to agricultural commodities that Algeria imports in mass from outside of the Maghreb— many of the commodities are produced by Morocco. This importing practice has been prohibitively costly. The failure of the Algerian and Moroccan governments to provide formal employment opportunities has exacerbated the problem. The disruption of illicit trade has caused regional distress and popular anger along both sides of the Algerian-Moroccan border. The crackdown on fuel smuggling has set off intermittent protests. According to Driss Houat, former president of the Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Services of Oujda, this situation pushed 30, families living on profits from contraband fuel to organize many sit-ins in —in one instance, blocking the national road linking Oujda to Saidia. The months-long protests over the deaths of three young men extracting coal from abandoned mines in the impoverished eastern town of Jerada in January demonstrated this rising tension. Algerian border towns have also been gripped by intermittent protests. In February , angry protests broke out in the impoverished border towns of Souani and Labtime , where residents demanded alternative economic options to mitigate the impact of border fortifications on their livelihood. The situation bodes ill for other countries considering the use of fortified walls to help control access to their territory. In Maghreb countries that have even less resources and man power than Algeria and Morocco—such as Libya, Mauritania, and Tunisia—the impact on border populations is likely to be even worse. As long as Algeria and Morocco are taking a narrow approach to border security, enhancing law enforcement, erecting barriers, and increasing surveillance will not be wholly effective. Barriers and technology need to be accompanied by fully integrated border control strategies that account for the geographical, political, and socioeconomic contexts. Border enforcement measures that ignore smuggling as a core development issue and disregard win-win neighborly endeavors are likely to fail. The stifling of illicit cross-border trade in subsidized commodities such as fuel and food has merely resulted in new markets and routes. Smugglers still elude border control or bribe their way across the border. Others have simply set up new supply lines. Moreover, as long as Algeria and Morocco continue to work unilaterally, traffickers will continue to bore holes into the border strategies, aided and abetted by the corruption of security officials. Police and judicial reforms are necessary, but so is the political will to address corruption, the greatest enabler of drug trafficking and organized crime. In recent years, Algeria and Morocco have begun to reform and modernize their customs administrations. But more needs to be done to enhance both countries border management systems, including professionalizing the training, recruitment, and promotion of their customs officials and security managers.

How can I buy cocaine online in Tlemcen