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Escuintla where can I buy cocaine

Guatemalan counter-narcotics forces recently captured eight suspects and seized kilograms of cocaine from two fishing boats in the South Pacific Ocean as part of Operation Eye of the Falcon. Law enforcement agents from the Defense Ministry and the National Civil Police found the cocaine hidden inside fuel containers aboard the vessels; they then transported the suspects — including four Guatemalans, two Ecuadoreans, a Salvadoran, and a Colombian — to a Guatemalan Naval Base in the department of Escuintla. The bust took place when Colombian authorities spotted a suspicious boat that had docked along the coast of Panama City. When they alerted their counterparts in Panama, Panamanian security forces followed the two suspects into a residence, took them into custody and confiscated the cocaine, as well as a digital scale and two money-counting machines. The Colombian Navy has seized more than 5. Skip to content Guatemalan counter-narcotics forces recently captured eight suspects and seized kilograms of cocaine from two fishing boats in the South Pacific Ocean as part of Operation Eye of the Falcon. Share on Social Media 0. Related Posts. Argentina Designates Hamas a Terrorist Organization. Nicaragua Forges Diplomatic Ties with the Taliban. For more on security and defense issues around the globe, click on the links below:.

Guatemala Seizes 335 Kilograms of Cocaine in the Pacific

Escuintla where can I buy cocaine

Robert Evan Ellis \[1\]. Despite significant efforts by the government and U. However, budgetary constraints, resistance from conservative elites, and the complex situation in Congress hinder its ability to effectively address the security crisis. The article concludes that, although the situation is precarious, the failure to strengthen security and democracy in Guatemala would have serious regional consequences. The surprise election of reform candidate Bernardo Arevalo in Guatemala in August , and his struggle with elites who sought to block his January inauguration and the legal standing of his Semilla political party, \[2\] casts attention on the struggle of Guatemala as a transit country for illegal drugs and immigration, and the importance of its success as a stable prosperous democracy with healthy institutions, for both the U. It spans the Central American isthmus from Atlantic to Pacific, making it key for the transit of drugs and migrants to the U. Ortega regime in Nicaragua, the leftist populist Libre regime in Honduras, and the maverick authoritarian regime of Nayib Bukele in El Salvador. This work examines the security challenges confronting Guatemala, and the efforts of the current administration of Bernardo Arevalo to confront them. It shows that the government and its security forces, with the support of the United States and others, are making a valiant effort against a range of security threats but are severely challenged by the magnitude of the challenge, associated corruption, resource limitations, and divisions within the government itself. Due to its geographic position, Guatemala has long been a transit route for cocaine produced in Colombia, and later Venezuela, heading for the North American market. Once a source country for migrants, Guatemala has also become a transit country for large numbers of migrants from Venezuela, Cuba, Haiti, Ecuador and elsewhere, passing through the Darien Gap and the Central American isthmus toward the United States. The structure of narcotrafficking routes and the relationship between external and local groups in Guatemala has evolved considerably in recent years. From approximately , two dynamics upset that criminal equilibrium. The Mexican cartel Los Zetas, with significant military capabilities owing to the recruitment of Mexican Military special forces members into their ranks, \[11\] aligned with a disadvantaged Guatemalan smuggling group led by Horst Walther Overdick, \[12\] to move into the country to dominate high value drug smuggling routes there. In , the security forces of the Guatemalan administration of Otto Perez Molina, with significant help from the U. The result was an escalation of the violence, but also a fragmentation of Guatemalan smuggling groups. Eventually, the campaign by Mexican security forces against the Zetas in that country, coupled with resistance by well-entrenched Guatemalan groups such as the Huistas of Huehuetenango, pushed the Zetas out of Guatemala, \[14\] while Guatemalan President Perez Molino was jailed for corruption and association with narcotraffickers. With time, coca growing, and labs for processing it, have begun to appear in remote areas of the country such as Izabal and Alta Verapaz, \[18\] reflecting the relative absence of the state in those regions, and incentives for producing cocaine in Guatemala rather than smuggling it in, or purchasing it from Colombia. The relative fertile ground and appropriate growing conditions, particularly in mountainous areas such as San Marcos, help to produce coca leaves of relatively high alkaloid content, producing more product of higher value. In Guatemala, key smuggling routes continue to involve narcopistas in the Peten, \[20\] crossing the porous border with Honduras to the South, and smuggling overland into Mexico, both along well used routes close to the coast, and in the interior of the country. For Guatemala, the border region in the East with Belize has also become a problem, due to relative lack of state presence and road infrastructure in the sparsely populated area. The territorial dispute is currently before the International Court of Justice ICJ , \[24\] but the efforts to avoid clashes between the armed forces of both nations in the region has arguably contributed to a limitation in presence by the militaries of the two nations, which in turn facilitates the exploitation of the region by narcotraffickers and other smugglers. Taking advantage of limited state presence in parts of Guatemalan territory, augmented by the defunding of the Guatemalan military after the end of the Civil War, \[25\] the mountainous region of San Marcos, near the border with Mexico, became the primary site in the region for the growing of heroin poppies. With the expanded operations by the Guatemalan government against narcotraffickers, groups buying the heroin of San Marcos, and marijuana have reportedly decreased, resulting in a withering of production, although coca growing and labs for limited processing it have reportedly expanded. As a compliment to the drugs flowing through the region, Guatemala, like neighboring El Salvador and Honduras, have been beset by violent street gangs, \[30\] particularly Mara Salvatrucha MS \[31\] and Barrio 18 B The domination of the countryside outside Guatemala City by narcotraffickers and conservative elites has precluded MS and B from establishing a broader presence in the countryside. Moreover, the two principal gangs in Guatemala have generally respected the territory of each other, minimizing violence from turf battles between the two, \[35\] yet leaving citizens in the areas dominated by the gangs prejudiced by their extortion. From to , extortion in Guatemala more than doubled. Beyond drugs and gangs, Guatemala has increasingly become a transit country for migrants passing through the Central American isthmus toward the United States from Venezuela, Ecuador, Haiti, Cuba and other countries. Although Venezuelans have been the largest group passing through Guatemala, by contrast to South America, where Venezuelan criminal groups such as Tren de Aragua have exploited and trafficked those migrants, \[41\] such Venezuelan gangs have not yet created a strong presence in Guatemala. Experts consulted for this work suggest that this is principally because Venezuelan migrants have not remained in Guatemala long enough, in large enough numbers, for Venezuelan gangs to establish themselves there. The population of Guatemalan prisons has tripled since Finally, in , the deliberate setting of fires to clear land, in dry conditions, \[47\] led to a rash of major forest fires in the northern departments of Jutiapa and Peten during more than two months, including damage to over square miles of the Maya Biosphere National Reserve, \[48\] obliging President Arevalo to declare a national emergency \[49\] and deploy the military to support the response. That deployment, including fighting the fires, evacuating local populations, and maintaining security, in support of the national emergency management authority CONRED, taxed the limited capability of the armed forces for responding to other missions. The response of the Guatemalan government reflects initiatives begun prior to the current Arevalo administration, as well as new direction by the Administration. In addressing national security challenges, the Guatemalan National Police has increased its size, and acquired additional equipment, including new motorcycles and 24 trucks acquired in December Beyond numbers, according to those interviewed for this work, the police have been challenged in addressing the fundamental problems of professionalization and corruption within its ranks, limiting their effectiveness. Across multiple prior administrations, changes in the direction of the police have arguably had a chaotic effect on the institution, \[52\] without making real progress. During the administration of Alejandro Giammattei, the government developed an elaborate strategy for police transformation. The police have also created special units to address the particular challenges of the country. FIAAT units, in recent years, have acquired their own helicopters for air mobility through donations from the U. Due to institutional differences between the police and the military that created tensions, undermined unity of command, and thus undercut operational effectiveness, the Alejandro Giammattei administration disbanded the IATFs in March Within the Interior Ministry, the government has also sought to address the problems of prison control and overcapacity. In recent years, recognizing the need to separate those detained without a trial, from those convicted of serious crimes, the government also created a Preventative Detention Center. The Guatemalan government has also sought to build new prisons, including a maximum security facility in Masagua, \[67\] although administrative and legal difficulties have slowed progress. With respect to the Guatemalan military, the priorities of the incoming Arevalo administration and Defense Minister General Henry Saenz Ramos have been first and foremost to ensure that the institution remains removed politics, and to combat corruption within the military ranks. With respect to the fight against corruption, the Arevalo Ministry of Defense has reportedly adopted a strict posture against corruption and wrongdoing within the ranks, including obliging the retirement of some officers who were strongly believed to be corrupt, but for whom proving such in a military tribunal or court of law would have been difficult. In April , it inaugurated a new school for training in human rights in the Headquarters of the Mariscal Zavala Brigade. Beyond these, the new administration is also working to make the military a more inclusive force. It currently has an unprecedented four female Coronels, including the head of the new human rights school. In terms of specific capabilities, the Guatemalan military continues to operate impressively within the constraints of very limited resources. With respect to control of the national airspace against incursions by narcoflights in areas such as Peten, the military has been constrained by a limited number of interceptor aircraft, including a Pilatus PC-7 and two aging U. As, none of which are currently in active service. Although prior government have sought to acquire new interceptor aircraft from Argentina and Brazil, the procurements have been filled with allegations of improprieties and ultimately have not advanced. Similarly for detecting incursions into its airspace, Guatemala relies on an older Spanish Indira radar system. Beyond interceptors, the transport and aircraft-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance ISR capabilities of the Guatemalan armed forces are similarly constrained, with five Cessna fixed wing transports, a Pilatus PC received from the U. A complimentary factor that rotary wing readiness has been the contribution of Taiwan to the training of its pilots. Following the inauguration of President Arevalo, Colombia subsequently renewed its training. In the maritime domain, as noted previously, Guatemala struggles to cover its nautical mile exclusive economic zone against drug transits. Its key tool for maritime interception in the Pacific is its naval special forces, the FEN, \[79\] which operates from relatively small fast boats in the often-rough Pacific seas. The Navy does have minor facilities at Ocos and Champurico, closer to the border, but without large numbers of persons there or substantial capabilities there to support and resupply larger vessels. Nonetheless, the U. To extend the range and time on station of the FEN and its watercraft, the U. Coast Guard. It has deployed smaller boats previously provided by the U. In , Guatemala also opened a modest shipyard on its port on the Atlantic coast, \[85\] which it has used to build approximately 10 smaller watercraft in three sizes, known as Eduarinos. In , when those forces have been called upon to surge to increase control of the border, and fight fires in the Peten and Jutiapa, the Guatemalan military has supplemented their capabilities by temporarily attaching units from elsewhere with the needed specialized capabilities, although at the expense of a high operational tempo of those temporarily attached units, and their non-availability elsewhere in the country. With respect to vehicles for ground mobility, the Guatemalan military continues to operate up armored Jeep CJ-8s provided by the US, \[90\] although they have long been plagued with suspension and other issues that have adversely impacted their operational availability. As a compliment to equipment, as with the FIAAT in the police and the FEN in the Navy, since , the Guatemalan Armed Forces have an elite unit that combines their well respected military special forces, the Kabiles, with enhanced air and other mobility assets. The unit, the Special Battalion for Interdiction and Rescue BEIR , \[94\] is used in operations against high value narcotrafficking, and other difficult targets. Beyond new equipment, support facilities and training, the Arevalo government is currently writing a new National Security Strategy. President Arevalo himself, whose academic background prior to taking office, includes several books on Civil-Material relations in Guatemala, \[95\] has taken a particular interest in the Defense sector and defense policy. Indeed, as the U. The U. Bolstered by such support, the Armed Forces, and particularly the Guatemalan Navy, have reportedly made important strides in defense planning, increasing the rationality of defense acquisitions, understanding of lifecycle costs, and the ability of the military to justify budget requests for the acquisition of specific capabilities to Congress. General Medina chose not to accompany the President and Defense Minister in the march. In the context of a public dispute over whether or not it had been appropriate for uniformed senior officers to join the President in the activity, the underlying tensions apparently became too much, leading the President to dismiss General Medina and replace him with a Coronel, Hermalindo Choz. Arevalo has also had difficulty passing legislation to implement security and other policies. At the day mark of his administration, the President had not succeeded in passing any laws. The failure to do so was principally because his allies in the Semilla party had been blocked by conservative opponents who control electoral institutions, from having a legal identity in Congress, allowing them to occupy committee chairmanships and exercise other forms of procedural power. In April , he fired his Environment Minister Maria Jose Iturbide, over improper use of a government car by her daughter. The corrupting influence and societal stresses of transnational narcotics and immigrant flows through Guatemala, as well as the public insecurity fueled by street gangs and criminality, continue to erode the faith of Guatemalans in their democratic institutions. The selection of Bernardo Arevalo was an expression of Guatemalans frustration with the perceived inability of previous governments to address fundamental challenges of corruption, insecurity, inequality, and a lack of opportunity. The Arevalo regime currently enjoys the benefit of the doubt of the Guatemalan people as it struggles to address those challenges and restore the faith of Guatemalans in their government. Unfortunately, it confronts those hurdles with severely limited resources and little leverage in the legislature to acquire more resources and strengthen legal frameworks. The United States has provided substantial support to the new government in security and other matters, yet the U. It is a fight against considerable odds, yet one in which the costs of failure for Guatemala, the U. Your email address will not be published. The ideas contained in this analysis are the sole responsibility of the author, without necessarily reflecting the thoughts of the CEEEP or the Peruvian Army. Subscribe to our newsletter to receive a monthly selection of our most interesting content in your inbox. Designed by elypsis. Evan Ellis Senior Analyst - Ad honorem. See profile ». Analysis Featured. September 26, Introduction The surprise election of reform candidate Bernardo Arevalo in Guatemala in August , and his struggle with elites who sought to block his January inauguration and the legal standing of his Semilla political party, \[2\] casts attention on the struggle of Guatemala as a transit country for illegal drugs and immigration, and the importance of its success as a stable prosperous democracy with healthy institutions, for both the U. Endnotes: The author is Latin America research professor with the U. The views expressed herein are strictly his own. Guillermo Pacheco, and Diego Solis, among others, for their important inputs into this work. January 14, Americas Quarterly , December 15, July 16, Insight Crime , October 8, Insight Crime , March 20, Accessed June 18, Encyclopedia Britannica , May 29, Insight Crime , September 8, Insight Crime , September 6, March 23, Insight Crime , March 23, Insight Crime , May 21, Prensa Libre , August 6, Global Americans , November 10, April 23, May 9, Insight Crime , May 16, Official Website , May 14, Insight Crime , February 10, Insight Crime , September 24, Prensa Libre , April 28, Insight Crime , February 7, Prensa Libre , April 25, Insight Crime , February 21, Official website , April 30, October 13, CNN , June 10, Insight Crime , February 28, Official website. Mongabay , November 30, June 16, April 10, Official website , December 21, Prensa Libre , March 28, Prensa Libre , June 4, RARN , August 25, Prensa Libre , March 20, Official website , April 6, The Washington Post , January 12, February 8, Emisoras Unidas , April 19, Infodefensa , May 9, Prensa Libre , December 14, Defense Post , January 9, Infodefensa , September 4, Official website , July 26, October February 13, Southern Command. Official website , July 15, October 2, Prensa Libre , January 13, Prensa Libre , May 10, Prensa Libre , May 25, Prensa Libre , April 8, May 18, Leave a Reply Cancel reply Your email address will not be published. The consolidation of the Beijing-Moscow-Tehran axis and its geopolitical implications October 3, Stay connected. Facebook Twitter Youtube Instagram Linkedin.

Escuintla where can I buy cocaine