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Following the death of Enver Hoxha in and the end of dictatorship in Albania in , she was belatedly allowed to attend university, and has worked — multitasking, in the manner of gifted people in small populations — as a teacher, magazine editor, journalist and screenwriter. Earlier Lleshanaku poems were done by the pioneering Henry Israeli and perhaps a dozen other translators. The new book is translated by Ani Gjika, an Albanian-born American poet, who is ideally placed to traffic between the land of her birth and her adopted homeland, the way Charles Simic has done since the s with Serbia see his anthology of Serbian poetry, The Horse Has Six Legs , and his numerous single volumes of Lalic, Tadic, Ristovic, Salamun and many more. I wish her patience, talented originals, and many decades. Lleshanaku is hardly new on the international scene in , in Finland, as one could read in the magazine Guernica , a Slovak poet settled in Mexico was hearing her praises sung by a poet from Iran — this is how things happen in poetry , but she is new to me. Her combination of plain-spokenness and intelligence would have been welcome at any time; at present, when poetry seems to have fought itself to a standstill, when there are no longer any groups or individuals, only on the one hand nonsensical, mutually supportive groupings of individuals and, on the other, individuals who can see no higher goal than to serve as mouthpieces for groups, it is indispensable. What is the more striking about this is that it seems to have been done largely without books, or without external knowledge. But perhaps there is something in the Balkan water, or the Balkan genes, because, even though it may have got there by itself, a Lleshanaku poem will be a welcome and familiar thing to a reader of Herbert or Szymborska. The search for unknown words is a complete failure. They have all been discovered. Poetry to her is chiefly a mode of inquiry. What happened? How did it feel? This is not one of your box-tickers. To me, poetry is a rational act. Her poems function like the old-fashioned slide rule, a grid of fact pushed along another grid of fact, then you look up and across and find your answer under a hair-line. Physical fact and metaphor, metaphor and simile, are kept in alternation. Lleshanaku says it with dumped punctured rice bags and mice. She talks about a residency once in New Hampshire, where she wrote several new poems, but ended up discarding almost all of them:. I felt as if I was following the wrong star, as if I had falsely adapted my literary sensibilities to an American aesthetic. It was too easy to embrace the philosophy of a culture immersed in a long tradition of individualism, metaphysical perspectives and continuity, where artists and writers simply add a stone in a wall that has been under construction for centuries. It is a philosophy completely alien to my culture. Each day you have to build a new house, a house that will probably be destroyed that same evening. One of the pleasures of earlier Lleshanaku, you realise wistfully, is the absence of such things, in the way that Prague or Budapest used not to be lit up at night and their streets not stuffed with advertising posters and neon. Now there are poems about airports and hotels. But perhaps all this is intrusive, over-empathetic, panicky. Las Vegas. In a bar. I am sitting next to Charles Simic. His last name is pronounced differently in his new language than in his mother tongue; the final consonants hardened along the way like cardboard boxes drenched on the deck of a ship only to dry again under another sun. Negative Space is as full of trademark-Lleshanaku violence, sickness and chemical elements as anything before. It shades from wisdom into folklore and back:. The moment you learn how to negotiate — five desserts for a single cigarette, five years of life for a failed romance, five butterfly lives for five caterpillar days in a cocoon — you understand that bitterness is the key to existence. Overnight, the dome was demolished, instantly revealing a myriad of nameless stars that chased the crowd like flies on a dead horse. Some words were actually never uttered, like pages stuck together in a book fresh off the press and long after it sits on a shelf. Or rather, what remained of us. Damaged like lottery numbers scratched away with a blade. Find out more about the London Review of Books app. For highlights from the latest issue, our archive and the blog, as well as news, events and exclusive promotions. Newsletter Preferences. This site requires the use of Javascript to provide the best possible experience. Please change your browser settings to allow Javascript content to run. On Luljeta Lleshanaku Michael Hofmann. Accept Close. Close Search. More search Options Search by contributor Browse our cover archive. She talks about a residency once in New Hampshire, where she wrote several new poems, but ended up discarding almost all of them: I felt as if I was following the wrong star, as if I had falsely adapted my literary sensibilities to an American aesthetic. It shades from wisdom into folklore and back: The moment you learn how to negotiate — five desserts for a single cigarette, five years of life for a failed romance, five butterfly lives for five caterpillar days in a cocoon — you understand that bitterness is the key to existence. Download the LRB app. Sign up to our newsletter. Please enable Javascript This site requires the use of Javascript to provide the best possible experience.

Fall 2023 Journal

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Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit. The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands. The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits. The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law. The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing. The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities. The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market. The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market. The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach. The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance. Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership. Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups. The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities. A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime. The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities. Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs. Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime. France is predominantly a destination country for human trafficking, with victims vulnerable to sexual exploitation, forced labour, forced begging, and slavery, but it also serves as a source and transit country, albeit to a lesser extent. Women and girls are primarily trafficked for sexual exploitation, domestic servitude and other forms of forced labour, along with men. Child victims are also increasingly targeted by traffickers for forced begging and theft. Criminal networks often use online platforms to recruit victims, making it easier for them to reach more people and more difficult for investigators to track. France has seen a sharp rise in sex trafficking, especially in suburban areas, and victims have been increasingly lured by the use of different methods, including sham romantic relationships, debt bondage and physical force. Undocumented workers as well as seasonal workers already in the country have also been trafficked into forced labour, especially in construction, small commerce, agriculture and fishing industries, with fraudulent economic promises. France is a significant transit and destination country for human smuggling, with Algeria and Morocco common countries of departure. Human smuggling has increased in northern France since the closure of migration camps in Calais. A significant portion of human smuggling transiting through France is intended to reach the UK. The port city of Ouistreham in Normandy is a major hot spot. Smuggling across France's borders with Italy is also a cause of concern, with micro-militias pushing people back to Italy. France's overseas territories, particularly Mayotte and Guyana, are entry points for human smuggling activities. French intelligence services have reported an overlap between human smuggling, drug trafficking, sex trafficking, and arms trafficking. There is scarce evidence of extortion or racketeering committed by organized groups in France, except for a few instances of criminal groups involved in extortion practices along with other crimes, including theft and sale of stolen goods, smuggling of tobacco, drug trafficking and laundering of criminal assets. In Corsica, cases are reportedly more common and generally involve racketeering and threats linked to tensions regarding property. In the context of financial subsidies from the state and the EU, local elected representatives are potentially more exposed to Corsican criminal groups who interfere in the awarding of public contracts in the construction sector, agricultural activities, and waste management. The illicit weapons trade in France is primarily fueled by organized crime, particularly drug trafficking networks. Kalashnikovs and submachine guns from World War II are the most commonly found weapons on the illicit market. Converted and reactivated firearms are also increasingly available and used in crimes. There is a worrying trend in the number of weapons entering France, particularly from the Balkans, and disputes are increasingly being settled through physical violence and the use of illegal firearms. The use of war weapons, such as AKs, has enabled terrorist groups to attack civilians and fuels violence in suburbs where young people have easy access to such weapons. New trends in arms trafficking include the sending of arms by post and the emergence of new customers with unclear motives. Counterfeit goods are a significant problem, with products ranging from luxury items to everyday goods being affected. The rise of e-commerce has made it easier for counterfeit goods to be sold, with China being the main source of these products. Counterfeit cigarettes are among the most traded counterfeit goods and have a significant impact on the economy. During the COVID pandemic, there was an increase in the market for counterfeit masks and medicine, prompting the government to launch an action plan to combat counterfeit goods. France is the second-largest country, after the US, in terms of the percentage of customs seizures of products infringing intellectual property rights. The illicit trade in excise goods, particularly cigarettes, is a sizeable market that has been increasing in France in recent years. This may be due to the country's new tobacco legislation, which has raised the price of tobacco products, creating more opportunities in the market for smugglers. French police have conducted numerous operations and seized large quantities of smuggled cigarettes, many of which are destined for the UK. The illegal timber trade has some influence in France, with the country being a destination for illegally sourced timber from Southeast Asia, Central Africa, and Latin America. Illegal logging for timber and mining is also prevalent in French Guiana, with several organized crime groups involved in these activities. Moreover, France is a destination country for illegal rare orchids and cacti. The country is also a major transit and destination point for the illegal wildlife trade, with connections between France, Africa and Asia. Bushmeat, especially meat derived from monkeys, reptiles, and antelopes, is trafficked into Paris suburbs for the African diaspora, while live monkeys and reptiles are smuggled from Morocco to France via Spain. A range of live wild animals is trafficked, and France is a large importer of reptile skins and tigers. Glass eel trafficking is another issue of concern. In terms of non-renewable resource crimes, France is an important destination country for the criminal market, particularly illegal gold from French Guiana. Illegal gold mining in French Guiana is widespread and has led to the destruction of thousands of hectares of rainforest, negatively impacting entire ecosystems. Gold trafficking from France to other European countries also takes place. There are numerous instances of metal theft in France and these are often large-scale operations carried out by foreign criminal groups. The illegal drug trade is a growing problem in France, with various substances being smuggled into the country through different routes. Heroin trafficking is prevalent in the country, with networks involved in the trade buying the drug from neighbouring countries. Heroin is mostly produced in Afghanistan and transported to France via Belgium or the Netherlands before being redistributed across the country. The Northern Department of France, especially the city of Lille, is a major hub for heroin trafficking, while the traffic in the Alps region is controlled by Albanian mafias. The decrease in heroin prices has led to an increase in consumption, with sniffing and smoking replacing traditional injection. The cocaine market is the second-largest drug market in France, with most of the cocaine arriving through two primary entry routes. The first route is through the port of Le Havre, where the drug arrives in containers from Ecuador or Brazil. The second route is via French Guiana, where cocaine is transported by road from Suriname and then flown to Paris using human mules or sent in cans through postal parcels. France also serves as a transit country for the cocaine trade, as some of it is transported to the UK or the Netherlands. While the COVID pandemic has not had a significant impact on the wholesale market's supply, it has accelerated the use of social networks for the purchasing of such substances. Cannabis is the most widely consumed illegal drug in France, and its market has grown considerably in recent years. Although controlled by a few kingpins, the market is difficult to detect as it is fragmented and transnational. Cannabis mainly comes from Morocco, transiting through Spain to reach France and the rest of Europe by car, bus, or truck. Tackling cannabis trafficking remains the primary law enforcement priority for French authorities. The pandemic has confirmed the trend towards the development of domestic cannabis production. The use of new psychoactive substances has been on the rise, with most being purchased online and produced in India and China. The market in France is dominated by cathinone-type substances, followed by ketamine and synthetic cannabinoids. Synthetic cannabinoids have been found to pose significant health risks to consumers, and there is evidence of illicit laboratories in France. The use of the online black market has become more prevalent, especially for rare products such as illicit fentanyl and related fentanyl-based drugs. France has been the victim of numerous cyber-attacks perpetrated mostly by groups based in foreign countries, such as China and Russia. These cybercriminals are becoming increasingly organized and professional, and they are usually motivated by financial gain, espionage, and sabotage. One type of cyber-attack that has increased in frequency is ransomware, with legal entities from various sectors being the primary targets. In fact, French companies were the second most targeted by cybercrime in Europe, with around half of companies established and operating in France becoming victims of cyber-attacks. Telecommuting has revealed many vulnerabilities in digital services, leaving people unprepared for this kind of crime. France has observed cyber-attacks emanating from Russian actors, especially in the context of recent events in Ukraine, which have opened the door for an online aspect of the conflict. With regards to financial crimes, cases of financial fraud and tax evasion are frequently detected in France. These incidents of financial fraud can cost hundreds of millions of euros and may be carried out on behalf of criminal organizations. Examples of such fraud include false transfer orders and fraud to benefit from state aid. Furthermore, tax abuses by multinational corporations account for millions in losses to the state. Currently, there are two emerging forms of financial fraud: learning account fraud and post-COVID aid fraud. The organized crime landscape in France is dominated by foreign actors. North African diasporas are known to harbour organized crime members in French criminal markets. West African and Eastern European groups control sexual exploitation and arms trafficking markets, respectively. Russian and Balkan organized crime groups exert control over France's private security sector, while Asian organized crime groups are active in various sectors, including wholesale trade, logistics, and cybercrime. Nevertheless, criminal networks composed of French citizens exist in France and they are active in various criminal markets such as drug trafficking, arms trafficking, violence, and corruption. They use the dark web and encrypted technology to avoid police detection, but means of detection and repression are being adapted. Local mafia-style groups operate discreetly and are often overlooked, with a high rate of infiltration in legitimate businesses, such as bars, restaurants, hospitality, construction, waste management, public and commercial services, and agriculture. These groups tend to be involved in poly-criminality and are often characterised by ethnicity or loyalty to a specific city, and often have links to drug trafficking groups. Corsican mafia-style groups also engage in a high level of violence, usually due to competition, which leads to revenge killings. The government's reach on the island remains limited. Specialized private companies contribute to the capacity development of organized groups by providing legal structures abroad, shell companies, and bank accounts in countries with a low level of cooperation on tax matters. Corsican criminal groups, in particular, invest in the hotel industry and casinos in the south of France. State-embedded actors, including government elites, politicians, civil servants, and police officers, exist and mostly engage in money-laundering, tax evasion, and corruption in France. Corrupted state-embedded actors have been charged with these crimes at all levels of seniority and position within the state. While it is difficult to estimate their degree of control over criminal markets, some politico-financial affairs linking state-embedded actors to criminal activities have transnational components. French citizens have shown a lack of trust in their government, as evidenced by multiple demonstrations and strikes in recent years. This phenomenon could be attributed to lack of transparency, tax evasion issues, and controversial political decisions. Despite this, the country itself is stable. The fight against organized crime remains a secondary priority behind the fight against terrorism. The country has two independent authorities that oversee government action, handle corruption cases, raise public awareness regarding ethics in politics, and make proposals for legal improvements. However, citizens are calling for more transparency in different areas of government business. The fight against corruption lacks resources and political will, and the focus is mainly on international corruption rather than national corruption. International organizations have called on the national government to reinforce its anti-corruption policies, expressing concern over the proximity of France's executive with lobbies. France is a party to all major international treaties and conventions on organized crime, including drug trafficking, and the arms trade as well as corruption and has played an active role in negotiations and implementation. France also has a number of bilateral and multilateral security cooperation agreements and is one of only a few countries that have been and continue to be involved in subregional, regional and global initiatives. The country does not have a specific definition of organized crime in its legislation but lists various offences that constitute organized crime when committed by organized gangs. France now has a global law on the social use of confiscated assets which is based on the Italian model. However, no confiscation is possible without a criminal conviction of the perpetrator. France has established specialized inter-regional jurisdictions with competencies in various organized crime markets, including drug trafficking and financial crimes. Furthermore, institutions have been put in place to adapt the judicial system to new trends in transnational organized crime. However, the lack of independence of the public prosecutor, who is appointed by the minister of justice, has been regularly criticized. France's prisons have also been criticized for overcrowding, disrepair, lack of hygiene, absence of intimacy, lack of activities, and the alleged risk of radicalization. The French police and gendarmerie, with various specialized units dedicated to specific criminal markets, as part of the ministry of interior are responsible for combating various crimes, including organized crime, drug trafficking, terrorism, human smuggling, and cybercrime. While the country has strong law enforcement against crime, the lack of transparency in the operation of many agencies remains an area for improvement. France's territorial integrity is compromised by various factors, including porous borders with Italy and Spain that are exploited by traffickers and drug smugglers. French territories abroad, particularly French Guiana, are also used as entry points for drug traffickers. Additionally, failed integration policies have resulted in lawless areas in the suburbs of major cities where crime rates are high, and police often do not stay long enough to establish community policing. Criminal networks continue to use various routes to enter France and they are increasingly influential, often working with local officials. Essential infrastructures also remain inadequately protected against cyber-attacks. However, in the last few years, operations conducted by the National jurisdiction in charge of the fight against organized crime Junalco have showed some positive results, especially in the areas of drug trafficking, human trafficking and cybercrime. France has implemented strict measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. However, criminal organizations are known to be involved in money laundering through the betting and gambling industry, and white-collar crimes are also utilized to recuperate funds lost to tax evasion. With criminal networks increasingly operating online, France aims to quickly regulate these new activities. Overall, France is considered a resilient country to money laundering offences and is constantly taking measures to improve its capabilities. Compared to other EU countries, the French economy is more regulated, particularly in network industries such as transport, communications, and energy. The French government has made efforts to reduce regulatory burdens, including launching a regulatory reform agenda. However, there is a tension between economic fluidity and security concerns. The country's informal economy accounts for a small share of its GDP, which is relatively low compared to other European countries. France has a department responsible for access to law, justice, and victim support, and a federation of victim support associations. NGOs identify a significant number of victims of human trafficking, but they are not adequately funded, which slows the identification process. Victims are entitled to special protection as well as support, including legal aid, psychological and medical assistance and housing. However, there have been shortcomings in providing the aforementioned support mechanisms, owing to a lack of resources and identification issues. Even after identifying victims, obtaining a refugee status that would offer appropriate protection can be difficult, and not all victims have access to shelters. Associations that help young people who are victims of extortion and racketeering are available. France has also made efforts to prevent human trafficking by adopting a national action plan against it and establishing an inter-ministerial mission for the protection of women against violence and the fight against human trafficking. Regarding civil society, most NGOs do not receive government funding and rely on other sources, such as private funding, which has an impact on their sustainability. The law allows funds raised from selling confiscated assets to be directed to finance associative projects against human trafficking, compensate victims of crime, or fund law enforcement agencies and addiction prevention institutions. Additionally, while police violence against journalists has declined, there has been a reported increase in violence against journalists, including verbal and online attacks, as well as lawsuits. This tension is fueled by the use of social media and has resulted in a worsening trend in civil liberties. Albania is a source, transit, and destination country for human trafficking. Albanian criminal actors are allegedly responsible for a large number of trafficking victims in Western Europe, especially in the UK, with the majority of women and children transferred from Albania. Sexual exploitation of Albanian victims in Western European countries remains the most prevalent form of this crime. Albania is a destination country for human trafficking, with some irregular migrants from Asia subjected to forced labour and domestic servitude in the country. Domestic trafficking of women and children for sexual exploitation continues, and increases during tourist seasons. There are also reports indicating the exploitation of Roma children in street begging within the country. Albania is a transit zone for smuggled individuals, asylum seekers, and refugees in the region, especially for individuals smuggled from the Middle East and North Africa who travel through Greece and Montenegro on their way to Western or Northern Europe. However, the number of irregular crossings recorded on this route towards the end of is slightly lower than previous years because of tighter border controls by Greece. Albanian organised crime groups are involved in international and domestic human smuggling operations in cooperation with human smugglers in surrounding countries, specifically in Western Europe where they have been consolidating their activities. Albania serves as a source country for irregular migration headed for the UK, where an increase in the activity of Albanian criminal groups who are involved in human smuggling has been recorded. With regards to the extortion and protection-racketeering criminal market, there are reports that extortion is carried out by criminal groups who use compromising materials to target businesspeople and high-level officials. It is alleged that, in some cases, these criminal activities are employed by media companies to extort businesses and high-level state officials. Arms trafficking in Albania remains relatively more limited, than in other Balkan states, as the country is not a producer of weapons or ammunition. Arms from the civil unrest in Albania are still in circulation, creating the foundation for a limited criminal market in small arms and light weapons SALWs , and dismantled weapon parts. Many of these SALWs are destined for other European markets, but some appear to be sold on the domestic market. Arms trafficking routes from Albania to EU countries are either inland, moving north through the Balkans or Greece, or seaborne to Western Europe. Corrupt police and army officers are involved in arms trafficking, either by assisting or playing a leading role in these criminal operations. Illegal modification of convertible weapons as well as the 3D printing of firearms are increasingly being recorded in the country. Albania is a destination and transit country for counterfeit goods from China and Turkey. It is also a source country, but to a lesser extent. Counterfeit items including clothing, accessories, and makeup can be found in shops and online marketplaces. Furthermore, smuggled and counterfeited pharmaceutical products are increasingly becoming widespread in the country. There are instances of informal cultivation and smuggling of tobacco products, e. Albania is a source and transit country for illegal timber in Europe. Illegal logging is particularly widespread in the north-eastern district of Elbasan and the southern district of Vlora. A year export ban was imposed in and successfully curbed some illegal logging. However, it created opportunities for small, well-organized criminal groups in Kosovo and Montenegro to smuggle illicit timber into and from Albania, causing illegal logging in border areas where the mountainous terrain makes it difficult for the police to contain the activity. Corruption, the shadow economy, and the violence used by organized crime groups to protect the timber business complicate attempts to curb illegal logging. There are instances of smuggling of specific trees from Albania, such as old olive trees, although to a lesser extent. Illegal trade in birds, brown bears, and wolves continues to be a relatively common form of fauna crime in Albania, with many protected species and other wildlife traded online or in physical shops. Furthermore, although a nationwide hunting ban has sought to limit poaching, such activities continue to be prevalent because of the inadequate implementation of this ban. Illicit online trafficking of donkey skin has become widespread in recent years. The illegal extraction of natural resources, such as oil and chrome, remains an issue. As an oil-producing country, Albania is home to a small but notable market for illegal oil extraction, which is facilitated by corrupt practices on the part of state officials. While the market itself may not involve major organized crime groups, reports have indicated the presence of organized crime in certain segments of the oil industry that are still under state control. The illicit extraction of stone and marble has also been identified in the Tomorr mountain range, despite its special protected status. Albania is a transit country for heroin trafficked from Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan through the Balkan route to Europe. Trafficking is undertaken by organized criminal actors who are known to cooperate with other criminal actors involved in the heroin supply chain. Most heroin is trafficked into Albania by land through North Macedonia, but heroin-processing laboratories have been uncovered internally by Albanian police. Despite the continuing role of the country in transnational heroin trade, its local consumption remains limited. Albania is a transit country for cocaine trafficked from Latin America to Europe. Albanian criminal groups involved in the cocaine market in Western Europe carry out trafficking as well as storage and distribution activities across EU countries. Albanian mafia-style groups are known to create Albanian-speaking satellite communities abroad that recruit fellow citizens, with an aim to expand drug trafficking in major cities across the UK, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany, among others. Albania is also a destination country for cocaine but to a lesser extent because domestic consumption is relatively low. Albania has been one of the largest producers of cannabis in Europe for at least a decade, making the cannabis market more widespread than other drug markets in the country. However, police intervention, the destruction of plantations, and state efforts to change the business model have caused a drastic decline in cannabis cultivation since Despite the decline in cannabis production, Albania remains a source country for cannabis specifically for the EU, with sea and land routes being used to traffic the drug. The production of cannabis in the country has shifted from outdoor cultivation to indoor methods. Moreover, Albanian criminal networks are increasingly carrying out the production, processing, and distribution of cannabis in foreign countries such as the UK and Spain. While the synthetic drug market in Albania is the smallest drug market in the country because of the lack of production and low levels of consumption of such drugs, it has been expanding in recent years. Synthetic drugs are imported into Albania primarily from neighbouring countries, such as Serbia and Bulgaria, as well as various EU countries. Cyber-dependent crimes are prevalent in the country, increasingly targeting private and public sectors and rendering websites and services unavailable. Most common cyber-attacks targeting Albanian infrastructure involve viruses and malware such as Trojan horses and ransomware. Recently, many private companies have been targeted through ransomware and forced to pay fines. Financial fraud using cryptocurrency trading is on the rise in the country despite the relevant legislations being in place. Crypto activities, largely controlled by well-known organized crime groups, and fraudulent financial cyber-activities are becoming major concerns. Financial crimes, including telephone scams, tax evasion and VAT fraud, pyramid schemes, embezzlement, misuse of public funds, as well as corruption carried out by criminal organizations, private sector actors, and state-embedded actors are widespread in Albania. These crimes are facilitated by the large informal economy in the country. Technology has enabled sophisticated scamming operations, often involving fraudulent online investment platforms or call centres. Other methods used for fraud are the foreign exchange market and taking advantage of the VAT scheme. Financial crimes, specifically tax evasion carried out by private sector actors, are enabled by corruption in the state administration. Even though Albanian mafia-style groups are facilitated by family ties, they are mostly organized in smaller pragmatic and flexible groups with temporary relationships, differing from other major mafia groups such as the Italian mafia. Nonetheless, Albanian groups have a clear structure and members exhibit loyalty to a single leader. These groups are mainly involved in drug trafficking, human smuggling, and human trafficking. Mafia-style groups influence politics and public procurement in the country, especially in towns where they maintain a strong presence. Albanian mafia-style groups are prevalent in other countries, where they have integrated themselves into local criminality. In recent years, Albanian mafia-style groups have gone from providing the Italian mafia with logistical assistance in drug trafficking, to managing the resources and means to run this trade on their own throughout the harbours of Italy and greater Europe. Mafia-style groups in Albania allegedly create smaller, looser criminal networks that gravitate around them. These networks reportedly have a fluid organizational and operational structure with three to four members who take a pragmatic approach by seizing any opportunity for profit. They are responsible for most of the criminal activity, especially the distribution of narcotics in Albania and Western European countries. They are highly violent but cooperate with corrupt police and judiciary officials as well as with foreign actors, particularly the Italian mafia, including 'Ndrangheta and Sacra Corona Unita as well as Turkish organized crime groups. They are known to have links to Kosovar and Montenegrin criminal networks and have a strong presence in Belgium, the Netherlands, and the UK, among others. There is also evidence that Albanian organized crime groups interact with South and Central American crime groups. Because of socio-economic factors such as the lack of employment and education opportunities in Albania, a worrying trend of youth involvement in day-to-day criminal operations in various roles as part of criminal networks is being observed. Albanian criminal networks continue to be heavily involved in drug trafficking, especially the cannabis trade. They often pose as legal businesses and different members are responsible for specific tasks within the organization, such as securing, transporting, and distributing drugs. These networks are connected by temporary and occasional opportunities for illegal activities, especially human smuggling, hence adapting rapidly to needs and circumstances. Members of criminal groups have reportedly been appointed to political positions at various levels of the state apparatus. Criminal networks are highly embedded in local- and regional-level structures, operate with the police, and receive political protection. Infiltration by organized crime of the state apparatus is evidenced by the protection of drug trafficking through bribery and corruption, specifically among border police. Moreover, politicians reportedly use large criminal groups and networks to control the electoral behaviour of citizens through pressure, blackmail and vote buying. Private sector actors, specifically ones involved in real estate and tourism, are increasingly linked to organized crime. Furthermore, the increasing informality of the private sector is fuelling the black market and illicit financial flows. Some segments of the financial services industry and some public-private partnerships demonstrate the interwoven nature of the relationship between organized crime and the private sector. Foreign actors function within Albania but are less influential than domestic groups. For example, Turkish crime groups are mainly involved in heroin trafficking, while Italian groups are influential in the southern part of the country. Even though the trust of most stakeholders was regained following the elections, political polarization and corruption continue to be key issues in the governance of the country. The transformation and governance of the country is hindered by the economic consequences of the COVID pandemic as well as corruption, informal power held by organized crime groups, and political nepotism. In recent years, efforts have been made to combat corruption in the country by increasing transparency of public service delivery, procurement, and recruitment procedures, as well as public participation in local decision-making. Despite these efforts, high levels of corruption and a lack of transparency in many aspects of public and private life persist. Moreover, prominent political members allegedly take part in corrupt or unethical practices with impunity. The country has several extradition agreements in place and has ratified nearly all relevant organized crime treaties. It continues to pursue a foreign-oriented and EU-focused strategy, thanks to which the country benefits from great provisions of technical assistance and allocations of funding, not only from the EU but also from Turkey and the UAE. As for the national framework, Albania has a fairly robust legislative framework to address organized crime. Positive results have been observed in recent years following the implementation of a comprehensive reform aimed at strengthening the judicial system and bolstering the fight against corruption. Nevertheless, internal and external interference with the judicial system continues to be a concern. The perception of corruption in the justice system remains high, which is based on continual reports of heavy sentences for non-serious criminal offences committed by ordinary citizens and light sentences for members of organized crime groups or corrupt state officials. Furthermore, implementation of this justice reform, including the vetting process, resulted in increased backlogs and decreased technical ability, hence affecting the efficiency of the judicial system. The detention system in Albania continues to record the highest proportion of prisoners in pre-trial detainment of all Western Balkan countries, despite a decrease in recent years. Even though positive results have been achieved by law enforcement agencies, especially in the fight against drug trafficking, and some criminal groups have been effectively dismantled, investigations and prosecutions often fail to target the upper echelons of criminal organizations, and the number of convictions is limited. Overall, this translates into little progress being made in the fight against organized crime. Albania lacks the necessary cybersecurity infrastructure and technical and logistical capacities to protect its digital infrastructure. The limited ability to enforce the law, combined with corruption, weak institutions, and a significant informal economy, renders Albania vulnerable to money laundering despite recent efforts to strengthen the anti-money laundering system in the country. These efforts include the introduction of temporary preventative measures such as confiscation of assets, limiting the movements of suspected criminals, and restricting their economic activities. Albania has become an important destination for money laundering and the preferred sectors are the construction, service, and tourism industries. Despite the prevalence of such activities, the number of money seizures and convictions remain low. Weaknesses in contract enforcement, high levels of informality in financial intermediation, unclear property rights, and widespread corruption are major constraints to private sector development. Business-relevant regulations remain cumbersome, and shortcomings in the rule of law continue to hamper businesses and deter investments. The Albanian government has made notable progress in passing legislation on the status and treatment of victims of crime that meets international standards. But challenges persist at the implementation level. There is a lack of support programmes that provide medical, psychological, and social assistance to victims of crime, and only a limited number of public and private actors are involved in offering such services. The country lacks an integrated victim support system, and victim and witness assassinations are not unheard of. Strong ties between mafia-style organizations and the Albanian legislature and law enforcement agencies often put witnesses in danger. As a result, many witnesses have been forced to skip court hearings and refrain from testifying. Civil society organizations with donor support, as opposed to support from government agencies, remain the primary providers of aid for most cases involving vulnerable groups. Nonetheless, there have been some improvements in victim and witness support in recent years, including access to an interpreter, inclusion of additional rights for victims of sexual exploitation and human trafficking, and the creation of a web-based reporting helpline. The culture of crime prevention in Albania is relatively less developed than in other Western Balkan countries. Although legislation and law enforcement mechanisms do exist, prevention mechanisms are ineffective and lack creativity regarding how citizens are engaged with to prevent criminal activity from occurring in the first place. Corruption in the ranks of police and the justice system contributes to the lack of efficient crime prevention. Nonetheless, new action plans and strategies have been adopted by the country which aim to implement awareness-raising campaigns to prevent organized crime with the involvement of central and local institutions, civil society, business, media, and other actors. Even though civil society organizations play a prominent role in providing support to trafficking victims, civil society and media engagement in countering organized crime remains limited. Many civil society organizations are dependent on external donors for financial support while public funding for civil society organizations is minimal and not yet legally regulated. Press freedom is generally respected, but few media outlets in Albania enjoy financial and editorial independence, and many politicians use rhetoric that is not conducive to a free and independent media environment. There have been instances in which journalists have been threatened with violence and intimidation in recent years. The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel. A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index. We're constantly working to improve the Index. By participating in this survey, you will be providing us with insights and suggestions that will help us make the Index an even better resource. This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State. The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State. Income group High income. Population 67,, Geography type Coastal. Criminal markets 5. An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type. Human trafficking 6. Human smuggling 6. Extortion and protection racketeering 4. Arms trafficking 6. Trade in counterfeit goods 7. Illicit trade in excisable goods 5. Flora crimes 4. Fauna crimes 5. Non-renewable resource crimes 5. Heroin trade 6. Cocaine trade 7. Cannabis trade 7. Synthetic drug trade 6. Cyber-dependent crimes 6. Financial crimes 6. Criminal actors 5. An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society. Mafia-style groups 6. Criminal networks 6. State-embedded actors 3. Foreign actors 7. Private sector actors 5. Political leadership and governance 6. Government transparency and accountability 7. International cooperation 8. National policies and laws 7. A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime. Judicial system and detention 6. Law enforcement 7. Territorial integrity 5. Anti-money laundering 8. Economic regulatory capacity 8. Victim and witness support 5. Prevention 7. Non-state actors 7. Analysis 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 People France is predominantly a destination country for human trafficking, with victims vulnerable to sexual exploitation, forced labour, forced begging, and slavery, but it also serves as a source and transit country, albeit to a lesser extent. Trade The illicit weapons trade in France is primarily fueled by organized crime, particularly drug trafficking networks. Environment The illegal timber trade has some influence in France, with the country being a destination for illegally sourced timber from Southeast Asia, Central Africa, and Latin America. Drugs The illegal drug trade is a growing problem in France, with various substances being smuggled into the country through different routes. Cyber Crimes France has been the victim of numerous cyber-attacks perpetrated mostly by groups based in foreign countries, such as China and Russia. Financial Crimes With regards to financial crimes, cases of financial fraud and tax evasion are frequently detected in France. Criminal Actors The organized crime landscape in France is dominated by foreign actors. Leadership and governance French citizens have shown a lack of trust in their government, as evidenced by multiple demonstrations and strikes in recent years. Criminal justice and security France has established specialized inter-regional jurisdictions with competencies in various organized crime markets, including drug trafficking and financial crimes. Economic and financial environment France has implemented strict measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. Civil society and social protection France has a department responsible for access to law, justice, and victim support, and a federation of victim support associations. Download full profile english french. Income group Upper middle income. Population 2,, Criminal markets 4. Human trafficking 5. Extortion and protection racketeering 3. Arms trafficking 4. Trade in counterfeit goods 3. Illicit trade in excisable goods 3. Fauna crimes 3. Cocaine trade 6. Cannabis trade 6. Synthetic drug trade 3. Criminal networks 7. State-embedded actors 6. Foreign actors 3. Private sector actors 4. Political leadership and governance 5. Government transparency and accountability 4. International cooperation 7. National policies and laws 6. Law enforcement 5. Anti-money laundering 4. Economic regulatory capacity 4. Victim and witness support 4. Prevention 5. Non-state actors 5. People Albania is a source, transit, and destination country for human trafficking. Trade Arms trafficking in Albania remains relatively more limited, than in other Balkan states, as the country is not a producer of weapons or ammunition. Environment Albania is a source and transit country for illegal timber in Europe. Drugs Albania is a transit country for heroin trafficked from Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan through the Balkan route to Europe. Cyber Crimes Cyber-dependent crimes are prevalent in the country, increasingly targeting private and public sectors and rendering websites and services unavailable. Financial Crimes Financial crimes, including telephone scams, tax evasion and VAT fraud, pyramid schemes, embezzlement, misuse of public funds, as well as corruption carried out by criminal organizations, private sector actors, and state-embedded actors are widespread in Albania. Criminal Actors Even though Albanian mafia-style groups are facilitated by family ties, they are mostly organized in smaller pragmatic and flexible groups with temporary relationships, differing from other major mafia groups such as the Italian mafia. Leadership and governance Even though the trust of most stakeholders was regained following the elections, political polarization and corruption continue to be key issues in the governance of the country. Criminal justice and security Positive results have been observed in recent years following the implementation of a comprehensive reform aimed at strengthening the judicial system and bolstering the fight against corruption. Economic and financial environment The limited ability to enforce the law, combined with corruption, weak institutions, and a significant informal economy, renders Albania vulnerable to money laundering despite recent efforts to strengthen the anti-money laundering system in the country. Civil society and social protection The Albanian government has made notable progress in passing legislation on the status and treatment of victims of crime that meets international standards. Download full profile english. Next Skip. How to measure organized crime? 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