Crowned 🤴 Pathological Liars 

Pathological Liars: What Makes Them Lie?

They lie like they breathe. Deception is their life credo. They don't notice the boundaries between truth and falsehood. Meet again, these are our family pathological liars. 

PATHOLOGICAL AND COMPULSIVE LIES: WHAT'S THE DIFFERENCE?

The two types of lies have their own characteristics. How do you know who you're dealing with?

Pathological liars:

lie for a specific purpose,

invent fantastic stories that can be endlessly supplemented with new details,

they believe everything they have done,

resent when they are suspected of deception,

lie to strengthen your credibility,

do not blush or feel awkward.

Compulsive Liars:

seriously believe that they are obliged to lie, either because they cannot do otherwise, or if it is inconvenient to tell the truth,

often lie for an incomprehensible reason and without any benefit,

compose tall tales on the go, without really thinking about plausibility,

prefer "holy" lies that others are believed to like to hear,

as a rule, they feel someone else's distrust,

when they are caught, they admit that they have lied, but continue to fool others.

These differences are very conditional, because deceivers easily change masks.

WHAT CAUSES THIS BEHAVIOR?

There is no clear scientific explanation for the tendency to report knowingly false information. This behavior is due to many genetic and external factors, but this set is unique for everyone.

Among the most common reasons are:

1. Personality disorders. As mentioned above, the manner of lying at every turn can be a symptom of a mental disorder.

2. Features of the brain. A number of studies point to structural abnormalities in the brains of pathological liars. One such study revealed an increased volume of white matter in three areas of the prefrontal cortex.

The authors of another work believe that a persistent tendency to untruth is formed as the restraining emotional reaction of the amygdala weakens. Earlier studies have found in 40% of pathological liars damage to the central nervous system caused by epilepsy, head injuries or dangerous infections.

3. The costs of education. As children, we all internalize what is good and what is bad. At an early age, a person may lie for fear of punishment or for profit, and later this becomes an unconditional attitude.

4. Chemical dependence. Drug addicts and alcoholics often trick to hide their problem and at the same time lure money: addictions "turn off" the conscience.

5. Other psychological problems. Someone who lies frequently may suffer from depression, anxiety, or obsessive-compulsive disorder. Such behavior may be associated with fear, guilt or shame, unwillingness to admit one's condition. It is important to understand that not every person with such a diagnosis is a pathological deceiver!

SIGNS OF PATHOLOGICAL AND COMPULSIVE LYING

If you suspect that you are regularly fooled, pay attention to the characteristic signs of lying.

1. The stories of liars are quite incredible. If you notice that you often shake your head, refusing to believe fables, it seems that you have come across just such a person. Does someone tell me how you had lunch with Tom Cruise or set a world record for eating sausages? You're not wrong.

2. There is a desire to attract attention. If someone lies to arouse interest in themselves, and climbs out of their skin, trying to prove their own worth, you have a pathological liar. They practice two ways of attracting attention (see paragraphs 3 and 4).

3. You are lied to in order to stuff yourself with a price. Instead of admitting their mistake or honestly saying that they were in a mess, such people carry nonsense, just to look sinless.

Or...

4. Build a victim out of themselves. To enlist the sympathy and support of others, they complain about imaginary misfortunes. Illnesses, the death of loved ones, someone's cruelty and other disasters in which they allegedly suffered.

5. Liars have low self-esteem. By itself, it does not indicate a pathological or compulsive lie, but in combination with other signs, it complements the portrait of an unabashed deceiver. Usually, low self-esteem is found in compulsive liars: it hides anxiety and uncertainty.

If the liars feel that they are close to failure, they immediately give a back door and change the meaning of what was said.

6. They should have the last word. Arguing with a pathological liar is like banging your head against a wall. He will make the most ridiculous arguments until you get tired of bickering, just to come out of the fight victorious. Compulsive liars are simpler: they are embarrassed when they are exposed and do not insist on their own.

7. They are extremely quirky. They manage to instantly invent plausible versions for all occasions, create a suitable lie literally out of thin air and present it in a convincing form.

8. They know how to turn everything upside down. If liars feel that they are close to failure, they immediately reverse the course and change the meaning of what is said. But catching them at their word is useless: they will object and declare that you did not hear or misunderstood.

9. Their lives are chaotic and full of tragedies. They twist as best they can, trying to seem honest, but people sooner or later realize that something is wrong here. Relationships collapse, another job is lost, friends turn away, but the pathological liar still rushes around looking for simpletons who can hang noodles on their ears.

10. They do not know how to keep secrets and love to gossip. The concept of decency is not familiar to them: they enthusiastically discuss the details of someone else's life, including intimate ones. Nothing is sacred to them.

Harm of rags on the respiratory organs for a healthy person

I'm sitting smoking, Gaga, delving into, bitch, 

Communism is so little - little is needed. 

I listen, I release the rings and stick out, bitch, 

Now I'll finish smoking, get up and fly, fuck. 

The five-year plan took, God willing, we will cut, 

Money will be asked, then interrogated. 

And I'd like more air, Eaga. 

David abandoned us, calm down, Gaga. 

To fuck the world, yes to you with flowers, 

Oh, I forgot, Lady Gaga. 

Deceptive fate, bitch, 

We've all fucked up, all our lives, fuck us. 

Well, what did you think grandpa did? Did you think you'd be patted on the head? 
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights | UNESCO Scope. 

1. This Declaration addresses ethical issues related to medicine, life sciences and associated technologies as applied to human beings, taking into account their social, legal and environmental dimensions. 

2. This Declaration is addressed to States.

https://en.unesco.org/about-us/legal-affairs/universal-declaration-bioethics-and-human-rights

Masks 🎭 2020-2022 have become a habitual attribute of the stupidity of a resident of any territory where the NWO covidobes conspirators rule the ball. The consequences of these experiments we will have to endure for a long time. And the participants of this masquerade of lies asserting in different intonations and in different ways: "this is now a sign of a civilized person who cares about his own and others' health!" are liars and criminals, however, as always and as usual, but why they lie in this case, it is worth writing down point by point in order to be minimally armed, when masks once again come to you with their demands.

So, the main effects of wearing masks are psychological, medical, social, economic and legal.

Psychological effects

The mask is a demonstrative instrument of complete submission, a sign of obedience to someone else's will, humility and humiliation, branding.

Mask is a renunciation of one's own opinion and decision, a willingness to rely on another, knowingly pursuing its own goals.

The mask is a symbol of abandoning one's face, face, personality, depersonalization, transformation into a cog, one of the crowd, part of the herd.

Medical Effects

Headache due to hypoxia and hypercapnia.

Deterioration of lung function in people with chronic diseases.

Decreased immunity due to inhibition of immune system cells.

Aggravation of the severity of the condition in cancer patients due to a number of reasons.

Increasing the concentration of pathogens under the mask.

Penetration of infectious agents into the brain through the nasal sinuses.

According to the conclusions of a number of prominent Russian and foreign medical scientists, forcing healthy people to wear masks leads to serious harm to their health:

increasing the risk of infection with infections that accumulate inside the mask when it is worn,

violation of normal respiratory function, shortness of breath, increased respiratory rate, increased existing diseases of the bronchopulmonary system,

development of cerebral hypoxia, headaches, dizziness,

inhibition of adrenal function, skin diseases, - physiological overload of the cardiovascular system and the thermoregulation system,

sleep disorders, deterioration of well-being, exacerbation of chronic diseases,

suppression of the normal functioning of the psyche, severe psycho-emotional states, the formation of aggression, painful psychopathological states (claustrophobia, anxiety), depressive disorders.

Social effects

The division of society into wearers and non-wearers of masks with a natural opposition of them to each other.

Provoking social conflicts between convinced maskers and convinced maskless people.

Economic and legal effects

Additional costs for masks, which to ensure the safety of use need to be changed almost every hour.

Contradictions in the laws - according to the existing legislation, it is impossible to oblige a person to wear a mask and refuse to provide him with a service due to its absence, therefore, a legal conflict is born, leading to the blurring of legal concepts among the population.

As for social effects, the Internet is full of information and videos showing how aggressive maskers attack maskless people, pushing them out of public transport, for example, or as government officials do. There is no need to even talk about the danger of fixing such scenarios in society, "the war of all against all", it is self-evident, as is the dehumanization of a part of citizens who consider themselves entitled to arrange lynching over earthlings. 

How the NKVD was preparing for war. Documents of the SBU archive testify

On March 13, 1941, on Thursday, Stalin began an evening meeting in the Kremlin, which smoothly turned into a night one. As the leader's visit log shows, Lavrenty Beria was the longest attendant: 4 hours and 40 minutes. The head of the NKVD entered the office earlier than the rest of his associates - at 20.35, and left it together with the last participants - Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Mikoyan and Molotov - at 01.15, that is, already on March 14. In total, during the meeting, Dzhugashvili's cabinet was visited by 16 people, most of whom can be conditionally attributed to the heads of the national economy. Obviously, Stalin gave them the tasks that followed from the decisions taken a few days earlier. It seems that Lavrenty Pavlovich at the same time promised to help certain people's commissariats with a slave force, and also by his presence pre-empted doubts that the instructions of the Master would be fulfilled on time.

The Nazi attack overnight turned all Soviet plans into stacks of waste paper.

March 8, as the same source shows 

http://istmat.info/node/2116

Stalin held a meeting close in number of participants, but with a greater proportion of the military, including Zhukov, Meretskov, Timoshenko and Budyonny. It was probably at this meeting, or at least at the end of it, that the date of the attack on Germany was determined. After all, in the following days, Stalin approved a refined operational plan: the so-called Southern option – with the main blow through Galicia. Deputy Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Vatutin on March 11 made a note on this document: "The offensive should begin on 12.06." That is, in three months. However, as in the case of aggression against Finland, the Red Army did not have time to concentrate in time. Therefore, the Wehrmacht struck first – although it was also more than a month late, compared to the original plan. The Nazi attack overnight turned all Soviet plans with accompanying notes and explanatory instructions into stacks of waste paper.

The March Plan for the Defeat of the Reich, a map from Mikhail Meltyukhov's book "Stalin's Missed Chance"

In the case of the Soviet-Finnish war, the fact that they wanted to attack earlier than they could testify to the words of the concocted song "Accept us, Suomi the beauty": "The low sun of autumn / lights the lights on bayonets." The Winter War began in snowdrifts, on November 30, and lasted until March. And the preparation of the war against Germany was so secret that such a vivid artistic evidence of it did not remain.

But a large assortment of documents has been preserved, and if state Kremlin researchers are studying the Order of the Kremlin, then in Ukraine after the archival revolution, the SBU archive was opened, which shed light on the secrets of the Lubyanka department in Moscow. 

A wonderful collection was published in Kiev: "Soviet State Security Bodies in 1939 - June 1941". 

http://resource.history.org.ua/item/10794

The publication is quite professional in contrast to the contour volumes of the FSB of the Russian Federation series "State Security Bodies of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War". 

First, the compilers of the Kiev collection designated all the banknotes made in the evidence of the era in preparation for printing. Secondly, they did not delete the most valuable fragments of documents. Thirdly, next to the cited source there is always a link to the fund, inventory, file and sheet, that is, everyone can look at the original. Fourthly, in this work, the Ukrainians did not publish documents from other archives and did not pass it off as their own finds or even storage units. In addition, there are no gross errors in the introductory article and notes, which agents report to us in the Moscow series in abundance. In other words, the work was done at a decent level.

The compilers of the Kiev collection did not set out to show the preparation of the USSR for war, but since there was also no task to hide the awl in the bag, the documents told the truth. Here is just a fraction of this evidence from the era.

On August 19, 1939, J. Stalin decided to start the war and prepare the USSR for it. This meant specific decrees throughout the apparatus.

Coincidentally or not, the directive of the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR A. Kobulov to the heads of the regional departments of the NKVD on improving the "operational maintenance" of aircraft factories refers to this date. In other words, catch up on the accidents that were allegedly caused by the actions of the "anti-Soviet underground" and "pests". It is clear that by 1939 there were no tails of the underground in the USSR, but, according to the Chekist tradition, having received instructions to increase vigilance, the authorities reacted as they were accustomed to.

the Chekists controlled the enterprises by official means, as well as with the help of agents.

In addition, the Lubyanka department was affected by the hidden mobilization of industry, the transfer of the country's economy to the military track. The fact is that the Chekists controlled many enterprises by official means, as well as with the help of agents.

All this was expressed in a number of reports on the state of fulfillment of the tasks, where they were described. Torpedo Plant No. 175 named after Kirov in the city of Bolshoy Tokmak, Zaporozhye region: "... On August 19 of this year, the 5th Main Directorate of the People's Commissariat of the Shipbuilding Industry received a task ...". Next comes the nomenclature of the production of deadly products.

Plant No308 in Kharkov: "... In August of this year, a mobilization task was received from the People's Commissariat of Ammunition, according to which in the second half of this year the plant should produce 2.5 million hand grenades of the Dyadkov RGD-33 system of the 1933 model with parts of the fuse to them in the same quantity. "

Mariupol Radiator Plant: "On August 21 of this year, the plant launched a task for the monthly production of the following products ...". The following is a list of eight points, the last two: "BT-25 tank parts – 14692 pieces, [tank parts] BT-7 – 4045 [pieces]"."

Capsule plant in the city of Shostka, Sumy region: "Plant No. 53 until August 1 of this year was preparing to fulfill the mobilization task according to the plan of 1938.

On August 22, and then on September 13 of this year, the People's Commissariat of Ammunition launched a new mobilization task for the 2nd half of 1939, exceeding the past by two times. "

Plant No. 59 - the village of Petrovenki, Voroshilovgrad (now - Lugansk) region: "The mobilization plan of the plant provides for the monthly production of gunpowder in the amount of 750 tons, charges of all systems 160 thousand pieces, charges for mortars of 82 m / m - 150 thousand pieces." The compilers of the collection for some reason deleted the following phrase when preparing the document for printing: "The production of xylin by the 3rd month of the war should be brought to 6.5 tons. per day, and colloxylin up to 4 tons. "

Shostka, production of gunpowder: "Plant No. 9 in September 1939 received from the People's Commissariat of Ammunition a mobilization task to produce 17,000 tons of smokeless powders in the 2nd half of the year."

Kiev Shipyard "Leninskaya Kuznitsa". On September 8, 1939, the Prometheans of this enterprise were given a directive from the People's Commissariat of Shipbuilding, which clearly indicated the priorities in repairing ships: "... The plan for the elements of the shot is a priority task, the failure of which means the failure to fulfill the entire industrial plan of the plant. "

Kievskii zavod "Bolshevik": "14. The IX plant was instructed to switch to the production of shells according to the plan M[obilization] P[lan]-1 with the calculation of the release in the 4th quarter of 1939 of 120,000 shell casings, retaining 40% of the output of general chemical equipment. "

Again the capital of Ukraine: "... The Plant "Red Excavator" from 16.IX switched to the implementation of special orders for M[obylization] p[lan]-1, having the task to produce 92,000 hulls of 122 m / m shells from cast iron and 69,000 hulls of air bombs by the end of the year. "

Konstantinovsky plant "Avtosteklo No. 25", which produced reflectors and glass of different sizes for the Red Army: "On September 17 of this year, the plant received a mobilization task, which defines control figures and a range of products. This nomenclature provides for the production of 104 items, mainly glass of different sizes."

In September 1939, deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR M. Gorlinsky gave a request to the head of the Zaporozhye regional department of the NKVD Gorban "to check and by September 25 to report with a special memorandum on the state of mobile supplies and readiness to implement the mobilization program" of a number of the most important military plants: "In the note, reflect what range of products and [what] its quantity the plant produces now, what and how much should be produced during the mobilization period, how he is prepared for it, how much he can actually release by mobnomenklatura [...] The same should be stated on mob supplies and labor." At the same time, in case of failures, the search for "a specific culprit in the failure of the plant's preparation for the implementation of the task" was not forgotten.

And more and more enterprises joined them. Plant No. 60 in Voroshilovgrad, which produced bimetallic tapes for cartridges and bullets, as well as gunpowder and capsules, did not stand aside: "In accordance with the instructions of the People's Commissariat of Armaments, the plant began to implement a mobilization program on October 1 [1939]."

The closer the date of the attack was, the more attention was paid to control over the strategically important objects of the USSR military-industrial complex. This was the subject of the directive of the People's Commissar of the Gb of the Ukrainian SSR to the heads of the UNKVD "on strengthening operational work" at the enterprises of the military-industrial complex, dated March 23, 1941:

"Some chiefs of the UNKGB of the Ukrainian SSR, apparently, do not understand the seriousness of the tasks facing the state security bodies in ensuring clear intelligence and operational work on servicing defense and other important enterprises and transport.

I consider this situation to be intolerable in the future.

SUGGEST:

All work on the agent and operational maintenance of defense and the most important factories of industry and transport should be carried out in accordance with the order of the NKGB of the USSR No. 0015 of March 5, 1941 to identify espionage, sabotage and sabotage, terrorist organizations, groups and elements, as well as other k[ont]r[evolution] formations at these facilities.

All operational accounts for defense, industrial and transport facilities should be concentrated in the newly organized industrial and transport departments of the KRO UNKGB [...] Systematically inform the 2nd Directorate of the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR on all available operational records and the progress of their development. "

Specific perpetrators were proposed to be held criminally liable.

The USSR actually lived in wartime mode. The NKVD apparatus itself was not spared responsibility. In particular, the irritation of the acting People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR M. Gorlinsky was caused by delays in "the development of operational-Chekist measures for the period of wartime and the conduct of mobilization records management." This resulted in Order No. 3 of January 4, 1940, which listed a number of shortcomings in several regions of Ukraine: "The above facts indicate that the heads of the NKVD departments of these regions do not pay due attention to such an important issue as ensuring the mobilization readiness of our bodies for wartime." A number of specific instructions were also given to correct errors, in particular, the following: "All the heads of the UNKVD personally, without entrusting anyone, to check the state of mob [orisazation] work in the departments of the UNKVD in accordance with the orders of the NKVD of the USSR No. 001122, 001143 and 00559, to report on the results of the inspection and the measures taken by personal reports and notes by 23/I-1940."

Wartime before the attack of his friend Aloizich, the Kremlin demonstrated in mid-January 1940 The order of the People's Commissariat of internal affairs of the Ukrainian SSR was issued to prohibit the transfer to another "work" of the operational personnel who serviced military factories. The movement of "special forces" pulling a strap in "boxes" was allowed only with the approval of the 2nd Department of the Economic Department of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR.

Part of the documents of the collection consists of materials relating to the "cooperation" of the NKVD and the Red Army or at least the control of the former over the latter.

There was also "feedback". Faced with poor preparation of the "pre-field" of the future theater in 1939, the leadership of the KOVO flooded the People's Commissariat of Defense, as well as economic and party authorities with applications for railway construction and infrastructure improvement. When, from the point of view of the military, the measures taken were insufficient, the leadership of the KOVO appealed through its specialists to the head of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR Ivan Serov. The petition ended with a petition to raise all the issues put forward "in the relevant commissariats and departments."

We quote the document from the first line:

"The theater of military operations in the western direction has so far been prepared extremely unsatisfactorily, which can lead to large human casualties in the event of a serious war and complicate the implementation of operations. 1. In terms of railways.

the concentration of troops will need to be carried out in the shortest possible time and before the enemy

The total capacity of all railways to the west of the former border reaches about 90 trains per day [...] Such railway capacity does not at all ensure the conduct of operations in the western direction, which is confirmed by calculations, winter transportation and repeated operational games [...]

The most bottlenecks in the KOVO railway network are:

A) A strip along the former border with Poland. The rail network in this strip was built more, if not exclusively, to defensive actions.

B) The next bottleneck is the strip to the West of the Sarny Line, Rivne, Zdolbuniv, Tarnopol (i.e. right before the border with Germany and Hungary. – A. G.)".

Further, it was proposed to take several measures to rectify the situation, which should lead to overall success:

"If the capacity is developed to 180 train desks, we will be able to deliver 2-2 and a half divisions per day, and with the development of capacity to 252 pairs of trains, we will be able to deliver 3-3 and a half divisions per day. This is also necessary because the concentration of troops will need to be carried out in the shortest possible time and before the enemy. Then we immediately win in time and achieve the superiority of forces over the enemy, which is one of the most important conditions in winning the operation. "

However, the "cooperation" of the NKVD and the Red Army was not always "mutually beneficial" from the point of view of ordinary employees of both law enforcement agencies. Everyday life was surveillance of the army, which in 1939-1941 grew rapidly.

At the end of the Soviet-Finnish war, on March 12, 1940, the People's Commissar of the Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR I. Serov issued a directive to improve the verification of commanders returning to service:

"Currently, the military councils of the districts are working to restore a large number of command and command staff of the reserve in the cadres of the Red Army."

The available incriminating materials are carefully rechecked, and only if they are confirmed, the question of a particular commander should be resolved.

Since the goal of the Chekists was to prevent disloyal commanders from infiltrating the Red Army, the heads of the UNKVD of the regions of Ukraine were invited to carry out a number of measures to strengthen and improve control. But "good intentions" turned into contradictory guidelines for their implementation:

"5. The decision on the possibility of admitting each commander or political worker to the Red Army should be approached strictly individually. The available incriminating materials are carefully rechecked, and only if they are confirmed, the question of a particular commander should be decided. 6. Requests from military enlistment offices on the possibility of enrolling in the personnel of the Red Army of the reserve team should be fulfilled within three days. "

The fact that all this office work was part of the general plan is evidenced by the instruction of the Deputy People's Commissar of the Internal Affairs of Ukraine Ivan Serov to the heads of the UNKVD. It is important that this document was drawn up on August 1, 1940, that is, after the end of all the "liberation campaigns":

"In pursuance of the directive of the NKVD of the USSR No. VD/21 of January 17, 1940 –

SUGGEST:

Immediately submit to the 2nd Department of the UGB nkvd of the Ukrainian SSR operational materials on the results of intelligence work on the maintenance of measures carried out by the district military commissariats for readiness for the war period.

From now on, submit memorandums on this issue to the 2nd Department of the UGB NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR no later than the 5th day at the end of each quarter, without reminders. "

A week later, a new order was issued by the Deputy People's Commissar of the Internal Affairs department of the Ukrainian SSR M. Gorlinsky to the heads of the UNKVD on strengthening the "agent and operational service" of the red army reserve personnel: "In the future, submit memorandums on the results of the agent-operational work to the 2nd department of the UGB nkvd of the Ukrainian SSR by the 15th day of each month." So, they wanted to use the reserve commanders soon.

Something has been preserved in the former archive of the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR and from the documentation of the Red Army.

In particular, there is a reference from the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Kiev Special Military District (KOVO) about the armed forces of Germany on the situation on December 1, 1940 The addressees for the purposes of secrecy are not indicated (sent to 15 respondents), the author is the head of the intelligence department of the KOVO headquarters Colonel Bondarev, for the head of the 3rd department of the RO headquarters of the KOVO Major Lavreshchuk signed another person, whose signature could not be deciphered.

Appendix to the certificate of Colonel Grigory Bondarev

The document is voluminous and includes an analysis of the strategic position of Germany, information about its military industry, as well as data on the Armed Forces, including units and formations stationed "in the KOVO strip", that is, in South-Eastern Poland.

The value of the material is that it was from the territory of the KOVO that the Red Army planned to deliver the main blow to the Wehrmacht, it was in the "Lviv Balcony" that the main tank formations were concentrated.

Paragraph 6 of the reference is called "Engineering preparation of the theater":

"The Germans have been carrying out defensive work in the border strip continuously since the spring of 1940 with unequal intensity in different areas. In 1940, the work was carried out most intensively in the Krakow direction and less intensively in the Lublin direction."

Regarding the second direction, the last word of the scouts spoke for itself: "CONCLUSION: In the Lublin direction, the Germans create three defensive lines along the Western Bug River, the Vepsch River and the Vistula River. The first and second lines in their equipment are not any serious obstacle for the advancing troops. The Vistula River is a serious obstacle as a water barrier, but with a weak development of defensive structures."

The most thorough reconnaissance of the Red Army examined the direction of the main blow

Western Galicia caused greater concern among army specialists: "CONCLUSION: The Germans pay the greatest attention to the production of defensive works in the Krakow direction. Apparently, three defensive lines are being created. The most prepared is the line along the San River, which, given the presence of a water barrier, can be a serious obstacle for the troops advancing from the east. "

Paragraph 7 of the said certificate was called "Road construction" on the territory of occupied Poland, and the vocabulary shows the direction of thinking in the "workers' and peasants' army": "The bulk of the road construction work takes place east of the Vistula River, in the border strip. Both the roads leading to the front (sic! – A. G.) and the rocky roads are being repaired and improved." By the end of 1940, the Soviet-German border had already turned into a fiery line in the minds of Red Banner commanders.

Item 8: "Brief description of the operational directions of the southern part of the General Government": "Based on the nature of the terrain, the outline of the railway network and operational plans, this theater can be divided into the following three operational areas: 1. Lublin-Warsaw; 2. Lublin-Petrokovskoe and 3. Krakowskoe".

After describing the geographical conditions of the future possible first operational direction, it was made "CONCLUSION: The nature of the terrain and the outline of the road network favor the action of large masses of troops in the north-western direction (east of the Vistula River). The operational density is 8-10 km per division."

Enemy aircraft were planned to hit peacefully sleeping airfields

The second operational direction was also recognized as suitable for a deep strike: "The southern border of the direction is along the conditional line Lezhaisk-Mielec-Mekhov. The depth of the direction is 320-340 km, the length of the front along the state border from Włodawa to the San River is 260 km, the width along the Vistula River and the San River is 200 km." "CONCLUSION: The terrain and the presence of the road network allow for the actions of large masses of troops. The operational density is 8-10 km per division. The main defensive line of the Germans, the Vistula River, will require an independent operation to overcome it." Vistula-Oder.

Despite the fact that East Prussia, Central Poland and Romania were in the sphere of responsibility not of kiev, but, respectively, of the Baltic, Western and Odessa military districts, the intelligence department of the KOVO collected information about enemy troops from the Black Sea to the Baltic.

The nature of the terrain and the road network favor the development of actions by large masses of troops in the western direction.

Obviously, the responsibility for the decision on where to attack, the intelligence analysts still decided to assign to colleagues from the operational departments of the headquarters. And the Krakow direction, despite the presence of enemy defensive structures, according to the thought of Soviet intelligence officers, was still suitable for a victorious march:

"The northern border is the conditional line Lezhaisk-Mielec-Mekhov. The southern one is the border with Slovakia. The depth of the direction is 230-260 km. The length of the front along the state border is up to 200 km, the conditional width is 90-100 km. "CONCLUSION: The nature of the terrain and the road network favor the development of actions by large masses of troops in a westerly direction. The operational density is 8-12 km per division. The germans apparently create the main defensive line along the Wisłok River and the Wisłoka River."

The Hungarian Armed Forces and its geography were described in the annex to the said note, at the end of which the summary was briefly summed up: "Despite the fact that Hungary pays enough attention to the issues of engineering equipment of the border with the USSR, it still remains poorly developed. But, given the mountainous nature of the terrain, which presents great difficulties for the actions of the troops, the engineering fortifications erected by the Hungarians can have a serious obstacle for the troops. " The assertion turned out to be prophetic – the Red Army in 1944 tried to break through the Carpathians for six months, and the Honvéds withdrew only because of the enemy's offensive in other operational directions in order to avoid encirclement.

Particular attention was paid to the obstacles on the way to the hydrocarbon heart of Hitler's New Europe – the Ploiesti oil fields.

Simultaneously with the Red Army, the NKVD also conducted espionage in the adjacent territory.

As you know, the Lubyanka department, to a greater extent than the military, monitored the political situation in other countries. However, the tasks that were set for the Chekist foreign agents were not aimed at studying the possible directions of the Wehrmacht's strikes and not at determining the timing of Germany's aggression.

The population is waiting for the speedy arrival of the Red Army

The headquarters of the border troops of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR regularly compiled reports on what was happening on the other side of the cordon. Among the standard documents is the "Memorandum No. 2 on Military Measures in the Border Strip of Germany and Hungary" dated April 21, 1941 for the period from April 10 to April 20:

"On the territory of the General Government, workers are recruited and sent to Germany. The population is hiding because of the reluctance to go to work. Political discontent among the population towards the Germans is growing strongly – especially among the Polish population. There are emigration sentiments of young people. The population is waiting for the speedy arrival of the Red Army.

Questions to be explored:

It is necessary to continue reconnaissance: areas of concentration and points of deployment of headquarters.

Areas of airfields, landing sites.

political moods and the political and economic state of the border contiguous side".

The Pannonian Lowland was of some operational interest.

In a similar memorandum No. 3 of April 26, the list of tasks was the same, except that the requirement to find the location of pillboxes and warehouses was added. The border troops carefully "probed" the future theater of operations.

Since the hidden total mobilization affected the entire population of the country to one degree or another, the corresponding "anti-Soviet conversations" began to be recorded by vigilant people with cool heads and long arms.

Prisoner of war Surmai spreads provocative rumors about the preparation of the USSR for war with Germany

This is evidenced, in particular, by the memorandum written on January 3, 1941 by the deputy head of the Special Department of the NKVD KOVO Yakunchikov to the People's Commissar of internal affairs of the Ukrainian SSR I. Serov "On the mood of prisoners of war in connection with the law", that is, the strengthening of the regime of detention. On the territory of Ukraine, prisoners of war, that is, a priori disloyal to the system of people, were used to build roads:

"Prisoner of war Surmay spreads provocative rumors about the preparation of the USSR for war with Germany, that the USSR, allegedly, announced a general mobilization, digs trenches, etc. "The Soviets are thinking of going to Warsaw," Surmay said.

Provocative rumors about the imminent war of Germany with the USSR are spread by a freelance paratrooper Kuran.

Impressed by Kuran's conversations, the prisoner of war Tomchin told him, "... At least to meet you in battle: you are in the ranks of the Red Army, and I am polish-German, what have you done to me?"

The prisoner of war Malist, who was present at the conversation, stated:

"... Kuran would have turned his machine gun in the opposite direction and fired at the red troops..."

Kuran supported Malista, adding:

"... I would not be the only one who would do this, but also all the other residents of the western regions who are now drafted into the Red Army."

Something similar happened in June and July 1941.

will be at war with them this year

Let's conclude the article with a quote from the document that was placed at the very end of the collection by its compilers. This material does not require comments, and so vividly showing both the spirit of the hovering war and the psychology of the employees of the "organs". This is a special message from the deputy head of the 4th department of the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR, Lieutenant GB Surygin, to the People's Commissar of the Gb of the Ukrainian SSR Meshik:

"On June 20, 1941, during the processing of outgoing international correspondence, the 4th Department of the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR revealed a document coming from the Stanislav region, Pechinizhinsky district of the village of Peresev from Khmara Vasily to Germany, Christianopol, Gorbyshevsky district of the Lublin Voivodeship, Semenyuk Mikhail". Then the content of the letter, complaints about life in the USSR and curses against the Soviet authorities are transmitted. The message ends with troubling questions: "There are rumors that they (i.e. the Soviets. – A. G.) want to go to Warsaw, and maybe further. Concentrate under the border, tell everyone, but don't let them read, I don't know your circumstances. Write about spring. Anyway, write: (b) there will be a war with them this year, r. – they will break, as heard, A. Can there be a war in Africa here or when it ends there. The address is the same. Burn all the letters. Don't tell anyone what you're writing to me."

Document "K" together with a copy of this special message was sent to the head of the 3rd department of the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR for operational use. "

Of course, Aloizich bit the plans of his friend of his youth Stalin and struck first. But the obtuse communists of the Red Army, even after an unforeseen blow, including the NKVD, acted according to pre-planned plans by communist inertia. Maps from Mikhail Mints' dissertation "The Future War in the Representations of the Military-Political Leadership of the USSR in 1927–1941"

Similar messages were intercepted by the Ukrainian Chekists in the first half of 1941 in packs. But this NKGB report is notable for one detail. It is dated June 23, 1941.

https://telegra.ph/Cumshot--18-06-21

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