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On April 28, , a fishing trawler intercepted an oil tanker in the Gulf of Oman, a day after the tanker had left Dubai for Greece. Three men climbed aboard the tanker and spent the night packing hundreds of small sacks of heroin, weighing at least two metric tons in total, into its ballast boxes. After they finished, two of the men sailed back to the coast. One stayed behind. Early on the morning of June 6, it nosed into Elefsina, a grimy port just west of Athens. The truck was supposed to move most of the heroin to a port in northwest Greece, then across the Adriatic by ferry to Italy. From there, it would be distributed to the street corners of Belgium and the Netherlands, kicking back hundreds of millions of euros to its owners. All the pieces were in place, in other words, for a latter-day Mediterranean sequel to The French Connection. But as was the fate of that famed heroin transaction, the Noor One deal quickly unraveled. Four days after the oil tanker reached the port at Elefsina, a figure on the fringe of the operation, unnerved by the idea of trafficking heroin, entered a police station. He explained that somewhere outside Athens a huge haul of drugs was being prepared for export. On June 11, Katsoulis sent five of his men to observe the squat cinderblock warehouse where the heroin was supposed to be held. The next evening, at around 9 p. They just started convulsing and barking violently. Inside the warehouse were six Kurds and Greeks, kilograms of uncut heroin, and a handgun. At approximately the same time, another coast guard squad raided a mansion in the lush Athenian suburb of Filothei and found another half-ton of heroin stacked in its garage. Over the next several days, the plotline shifted from The French Connection to The Wire : Greek intelligence services picked up one member of the operation after another and flipped them. To hide the identity of the original informant, the police also arrested him or her; at the same time, they allowed others with known ties to the operation to escape. In Elefsina, thanks to a tip from a different source, they swarmed the Noor One and arrested its crew members. Another source eventually led them to Dubai. By August, 33 people were in custody. Greek authorities had disrupted the largest known movement of heroin in European history. But that was just the beginning of the story. The seizure of the drugs shipped on the Noor One has triggered a long series of seismic aftershocks in Greece and around the world. The planners of the smuggling operation have turned on one another in a war of retribution that has left at least 17 people dead on three continents. Phone records are exposing scores of police whom the smugglers bought off, from Turkey to the United Arab Emirates. In Greece, an investigation into the Noor One captivated the national press—and then spurred a new wave of public interest in the case via a preliminary criminal trial and the rise of a new media magnate. And an ongoing investigation into who funded the Noor One threatens to ensnare Greek oligarch Evangelos Marinakis, one of the most powerful figures in global shipping and soccer. They began three months after the Noor One was seized. Early on in the criminal investigation, authorities in Greece had allowed the most crucial figure in the operation to escape: the driver of the black SUV that had picked up the heroin when it arrived in Elefsina in June An Iranian Kurd, he sometimes went by the name Mohammed Diesel. Fearing arrest, Diesel had flown to Istanbul and pleaded with a childhood friend named Naji Sharifi Zindashti to smuggle him to safety into Dubai. Thirty years earlier, Zindashti and Diesel had been sentenced to execution in Tehran on heroin trafficking charges. Together they broke out of Evin Prison by killing a guard. Diesel fled for Pakistan, Zindashti for Istanbul. Over time, Zindashti came to occupy a remarkable place in the maelstrom of Turkish politics. It is widely believed that in the mids he brokered ties with a political cell called Ergenekon. Zindashti was imprisoned again for heroin trafficking in , but was released early for allegedly informing against the most prominent members of Ergenekon. Other figures who owned stakes were Diesel and at least four other Kurdish gangsters—men based in Dubai, Amsterdam, and Brussels. At least 20 million euros cash was paid to Iranian or Afghan producers. They entrusted their product to a Greek oil broker whose incentive for the job—perhaps a large fee, perhaps a cut of the cargo—remains a mystery. They also knew that someone with a history of informing existed in their ranks: Zindashti. The barely concealed threat in this message was anything but idle. Two weeks after Zindashti received that email, his white Porsche was rolling down an Istanbul boulevard when rounds of bullets ripped through its doors, killing the driver and passenger. Zindashti himself was not in the car. The driver was his nephew, the passenger his daughter; both were on their way to classes at Istanbul University. The body count continued to rise. Days after the killing, United Arab Emirates authorities informed their Canadian counterparts that the assassins had flown to British Columbia. A week after that, a farmer was strolling through his blueberry patch an hour east of Vancouver when he stumbled upon the body of one of those alleged assassins, chewed through with bullets. Days later, the body of the other was found in a burnt-out car several miles away. In January , Dutch newspapers reported the shooting of a cocaine trafficker with ties to a Noor One funder in Panama City. Two years later, the brother of the gangster killed in Dubai was kidnapped from his house in Tehran and executed in a dog pen in southeastern Turkey. Nine months after that, the prominent attorney of another funder was gunned down with an Uzi while out to breakfast with his family in Istanbul. By April , 13 people connected to the Noor One had been assassinated. Four others had died in suspicious circumstances. Despite these claims, Zindashti has never been successfully convicted for a single murder. Police were regular visitors to his Istanbul villa as the killings were being carried out. Greece, where the Noor One remained docked all this time, was to be the most consequential source of conflict over the deal once the bloodletting started to abate. Whenever the Noor One appears about to fade from national headlines, the story seems to will its way back into the fore. News flutters in of another strange murder, another inexplicable resignation of a prosecutor, another bomb in the mail. Such, at any rate, was the dominant impression left by the official Greek investigation into the Noor One deal. From the outset of the inquiry in the fall of , police efforts in Greece were dogged by a bizarre series of disruptions. Three weeks after the seizure, a year-old Dutch national, Ebru Tok, arrived in Piraeus and visited the Kurds in prison, claiming to be their legal counsel. But Greek investigators know one thing for sure: After this visit, anything the accused Kurds told police—about the critical question of who owned the heroin, for instance—could no longer be trusted. Within a year, some of the accused could no longer tell the police anything: They, too, began to die off, albeit in less overtly violent fashion. In July , one of the Kurds who had unloaded the heroin from the Noor One was transferred from the prison where he was held to an Athens hospital, where he died of heart failure; the autopsy attributed his death to a stroke resulting from a pulmonary edema. Prison authorities did not open any investigation. That autopsy also indicated heart failure. What was happening? In October , the trial began against the 33 defendants arrested in connection to the Noor One , with charges ranging from drug trafficking to evidence tampering. Weeks into the trial, the presiding judge was forced to step down. Soon enough, the maelstrom stretched beyond procedural matters into the realm of physical threats. In May , a prosecutor on the case was granted round-the-clock security after a couple of men were spotted on security cameras breaking into her apartment building and secretly observing her comings and goings. Several members of the judiciary and coast guard received letter bombs or bullets in the mail. In June , the police informant who had pointed Greek authorities to Dubai was killed in a suspicious car crash. It also seemed that Greek journalists reporting on the story had been targeted. In June , the charred remains of Panagiotis Mavrikos, a reporter investigating the ship, were found in his burnt-out Porsche on a highway north of Athens. In March , an unidentified assailant pulled a handgun on another journalist in the Hilton Athens as he arrived for an interview about the Noor One. Gradually, one key figure came to occupy a central role in all the intrigue. For two years following the bust, Greek investigators and prosecutors dug into the backstory of an Athenian named Efthymios Yiannousakis, who had begun leasing the Noor One in A swaggering oil broker who owned a fleet of convertibles, Yiannousakis had inherited a handful of nightclubs from his father, who had been beaten to death outside his own bar in Two years later, Yiannousakis relocated to Dubai. Weeks after acquiring the Noor One , he outfitted it with a Togolese flag—thereby granting the ship and anything that happened aboard it immunity from most international jurisdictions—and had it sailed from Piraeus to the Persian Gulf. In August , Yiannousakis received a life sentence on drug trafficking charges. They started doing jobs together. Yiannousakis would dispatch the Noor One to Iran, where it would pick up contraband fuel from fishermen; he sold this fuel to Diesel, who found additional buyers at higher prices. In early , after a year devoted to the fuel scheme, they decided to move into heroin trafficking. That same year, the relatives of a funder in Belgium set up additional front companies to buy the marble dust and Pakistan White Sugar bags. The next spring, Yiannousakis hired a crew of Indian men whom he arranged to pay through a network of shipping agencies. At these confabs, Yiannousakis said, the partners arranged to divide the profits and to distribute the heroin across Western Europe from its Greek landing point. Despite claims to the contrary, Yiannousakis was no stranger to the heroin business, as investigators into the Noor One case soon learned. Indeed, by that time, Greek investigators could demonstrate that at least one other person—apart from Zindashti and the members of the operation who were subsequently jailed or assassinated—had known about the Noor One before it departed Dubai for Greece. This figure was one of the richest and most influential men in Greece. Evangelos Marinakis is a huge man, encircled almost everywhere he goes by bodyguards clad in black. A gallery owner in downtown Athens once told reporters the story of a valuable painting Marinakis wished to purchase from her. She claimed not to have it for sale. Two days later, a group of men stormed the gallery with cups of yogurt, which they tossed on her. He bought up blocks of its real estate. He sponsored food drives for refugees disembarking at its quays. He adorned its streets with statues of Greek heroes. He put himself forward as the patron of its working class. A collection of newspapers he purchased in lauded its leadership. As his clout continued to grow, Marinakis has emerged as a global financier to be reckoned with. Marinakis denies any wrongdoing, and the trial surrounding the scandal is still ongoing. Marinakis also made allies in Beijing, which in acquired the port of Piraeus for a pittance as part of its Belt and Road Initiative, designed to further loop global trade flows through China. Overnight, Marinakis presided over one of the largest tanker contingents on Earth. But at just the time all this had been happening—the acquisition of soccer teams and the amassing of armadas and the clinching of lucrative oil contracts—authorities back in Piraeus were investigating Marinakis and three of his associates on claims they set up a criminal organization that financed the trafficking and sale of narcotics. Marinakis also denies these charges. And if he had been in on the ground-floor planning for the Noor One deal, he managed to profit off the Noor One where so many others lost their fortunes or lives. But outside the slow-moving legal inquiry into the Noor One deal, a new, even more damning story was told about Greece. But its shipping magnates—Marinakis foremost among them—had just reaped greater profits than ever. On the contrary, his power and influence have only continued to grow—and in such a way as to make any lasting legal reckoning improbable. Outside Greece, it became difficult to believe that a man with enough credibility to buy soccer teams and oil tankers seemingly at will could ever be connected to the world of men like Zindashti. In August , Kotsonis received a suspended year prison sentence for having set up a Sharjah, UAE, front company in to absorb potential drug profits. The next link was Yiannousakis. Marinakis has never confirmed or denied knowing the man who now sits in prison for life on drug trafficking charges. But according to Yiannousakis, they were business partners. Yiannousakis claims that Marinakis came to visit him in Dubai the summer before the Noor One left for Greece; they convened at the Burj al Arab hotel in Dubai, together with the oil sheiks to whom Yiannousakis and Mohammed Diesel were selling contraband fuel. Around the time of that alleged meeting, Greek investigators learned, Marinakis began wiring large sums of cash to Yiannousakis. As evidence of these meetings and major cash infusions came in, an obvious question presented itself. If Marinakis knew Kotsonis and Yiannousakis, the two Greeks who seemed poised to profit most from the Noor One operation, did he also know about the operation itself? A potential answer came from an entirely separate investigation. Marinakis was swept up in the surveillance net—as was a phone registered to Fataul Haque, the Pakistani identity Marinakis uses for some of his communications. Get what thing started? In July , 17 of the 33 defendants in the Noor One trial were acquitted on grounds that they had no idea the tanker was trafficking heroin. But the evidence collected over the past two years—the cash infusions, the meetings in Dubai, and the phone calls referencing big future plans—was enough to put a new question front and center. Why had Evangelos Marinakis taken such interest in Yiannousakis and his contraband ship? Throughout the inquiry, Marinakis has denied any links to drug trafficking and claimed in a statement posted on his personal website that the allegations against him were politically motivated. That investigation remains ongoing. Meanwhile, five of the men imprisoned in the trial are appealing their verdicts. Among them is Yiannousakis. If he was a front man, if he was working for someone more powerful, now is his time to start talking. Twice a month, the former oil broker struts down a Korydallos Prison hallway that is spattered with dog shit, into a bare courtroom mounted with an icon of Jesus on the cross. He wears a pair of aviator sunglasses and moves in a cloud of cologne. From his left hand, below a fat gold watch, purple worry beads protrude through his knuckles. Patches of his hair have fallen out. Yiannousakis is in solitary confinement at Korydallos after stints in prisons across Greece. At all his prior stops in the system, he claims, other inmates have made attempts on his life. In October , Yiannousakis was temporarily admitted to Dafni psychiatric hospital, where he attempted to kill himself by smashing a bed plank into his forehead. At a September 16 hearing for his appeal, he entered the courtroom and sat alone in the back, as he has over the five-year course of the case. Unaware that he was being recorded, during an interview with a Greek journalist, Yiannousakis swiftly upended everything that prosecutors believed they knew about the Noor One. He had never trafficked two tons of heroin into Europe, he said; there had been three. Far from being a bust, the Noor One had profited someone. And according to Yiannousakis, that person was Marinakis. The place to look, he maintained, was Crete. As the Noor One was approaching the island on its way to Elefsina, he said, a smaller vessel had swung past it, picked up a ton of its heroin, then went up the Adriatic toward ports near Serbia. This ton belonged to Marinakis personally, Yiannousakis claimed. As with so much of what Yiannousakis has said over the last six years, there were plenty of reasons to doubt this latest sensational allegation. There were additional reasons to take his claims seriously. Witnesses interrogated in Istanbul years earlier had baffled authorities by also insisting that three—not two—tons of heroin had been trafficked into Europe, according to Turkish police documents unearthed by a journalist who asked not to be named. And inside the Noor One itself, a month after authorities claimed it had been searched, a handwritten note had been found referencing a curiously similar transaction to the one revealed by Yiannousakis. Please give us a date and a meeting point in South Crete. Please contact us. Master Jack. Through his newspapers, Marinakis has countered that the Seychelles Prelude note is a forgery, citing the fact that the vessel was sailing near Liverpool at the time of the supposed transaction. But if the note is indeed a forgery, another fraught conundrum presents itself: Why was the fake document planted in the Noor One at all? Upon arrival, he was asked to open his suitcase. The dispute is at the heart of the ongoing investigation in Piraeus. Meanwhile, the long-running Turkish inquiry into the Noor One has converged on the Greek case. Marinakis had nothing to do with the Noor One , he rushed to explain. The report of a third ton of heroin successfully trafficked through the Balkans had been a fabrication. Across the Aegean, Turkish authorities appeared to comply. The next Sunday, Marinakis publicly pronounced his innocence. This was self-satisfaction masquerading as vindication. Turkish prosecutors had never made any claim that Zindashti was the mastermind behind the Noor One. He was arrested for allegedly murdering the lawyer of a murdered Noor One funder. Either way, the Turkish action ultimately proved to be another dead end in the case. Three arrests followed; Zindashti was not among them. Will the Noor One tell a similar story about Greece? The investigation into Marinakis might yield an answer—but in the meantime, the case has already morphed into a proxy conflict within the Greek political system. For those on the left, Marinakis and the Noor One seemed to represent everything that they had voted Syriza into power in to destroy: above all, the interlocking directorates of power that conjoin political dynasties and oligarchic capital. Nor is my best man someone who is awaiting trial for smuggling a couple tons of heroin. The next summer, Kammenos sparked another media furor when he was photographed in Monaco alongside the prosecutor who had launched the investigation into Marinakis. What about Marinakis himself? He denies any connection to the Noor One whatsoever. He likens himself instead to Socrates—a wise man condemned by a state that fails to appreciate his services. Marinakis declined to be interviewed for this article. But Zindashti was willing to talk. For months, he wrote me emails from an undisclosed Middle Eastern country about his life, his friend Mohammed Diesel, and what he knew about the ship whose arrival on Greek shores, he insists, led to the murder of his daughter. It was a meeting about the Noor One , scheduled to depart weeks later. Yiannousakis confirmed this meeting for me, including the date when Zindashti said it happened, and its locale. However, Yiannousakis claimed not to know anyone who went by the name Shishko. The photo he sent back was the one of Marinakis. Late last summer, I visited the Noor One. It can still be found in Elefsina, meters from where it came to rest six years and 17 deaths ago. It slumbers down an unlit dirt road in a lonely bay. The slip where the ship is now located is flanked on one side by cement stacks belching white smog; on the other is the tumbledown sanctuary where the ancient Athenians once celebrated their religious mystery rites. The march of rust and the lap of the sea are slowly eating away at its hull; the Noor One lists into the water, as though doing its best to disappear from sight entirely. There are no buyers. The reporting for this story was funded in part by a grant from the Robert B. Silvers Foundation. You are using an outdated browser. Please upgrade your browser and improve your visit to our site. Alexander Clapp.
The Lowdown on Drugs in Athens
Crete buying Heroin
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit. The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law. The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing. The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities. The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market. The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market. The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach. The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership. Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups. The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities. A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime. The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities. Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs. Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime. Greece is a source, transit and destination country for human trafficking. Refugees, as well as migrant women and children, are at particular risk of being trafficked. Their vulnerability and susceptibility to exploitation has intensified during the COVID pandemic, with an increase in the number of unaccompanied children being smuggled into Greece. Three types of organized-crime groups are involved in human trafficking in Greece: local groups that are systematically integrated; foreign actors who target Greece as their destination country; and transnational groups that operate both domestically and abroad. Multinational groups made up of foreign and Greek nationals control the market. According to local sources, Albanian nationals operate about half of the female-trafficking networks in Greece and exert control over the escort services in the country. Labour exploitation also occurs in Greece, mostly in the agricultural and tourism sectors. Greece is largely a transit country for human smuggling and one of the most significant smuggling hubs in the world. With the Balkan route closed off, the most utilized smuggling route now begins in Turkey, traverses Greece and crosses the Mediterranean into Italy. Those who are smuggled originate predominantly from Syria. Since , human smuggling has become the largest criminal market in Greece. People seeking asylum from the Middle East and Turkey have been exploited by criminal smuggling networks, who have adapted to policy and law-enforcement shifts in recent years by using new land, air and sea corridors. Firearms are also trafficked to Greece from North Africa and the Levant via air, sea and land corridors. These illicit arms are often unloaded in Gavdos, having been trafficked from Libya, Lebanon, Israel and Egypt. Greece is also a transit country for illicit arms on their way to other destination countries such as Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Libya, as well as to the European Union. Suppliers are typically organized-crime groups involved in a variety of criminal activities. Independent actors work on an ad-hoc basis with criminal groups in need of weapons. There have been seizures of arms shipments found on vessels transiting Greek territorial waters; and there are also reports of arms being packaged alongside legal products and delivered through private courier companies from Crete to other Greek islands. Beyond these traditional channels, the darknet is also commonly used to purchase illicit firearms. Greece is a source and transit country for fauna-related crimes. Songbirds are the most frequently poached wildlife in the country. The market is fuelled by domestic demand in cities like Athens and Thessaloniki. There is no evidence of a well-developed criminal market for flora in Greece. Austerity measures and rising fuel prices have resulted in a considerable increase in illegal felling for fuelwood. Firewood is of great value to the inhabitants of remote regions in Greece, who seek a cheap and accessible heating solution. As a result, illegal logging is perceived as socially acceptable in these areas. Reports suggest that Albanian organized-crime groups are heavily involved in this criminal activity. The Epirus region is the most vulnerable due to its geographical proximity to the Albanian border. Greece is known as a transit country for a variety of non-renewable resource crimes, including petroleum and aluminium smuggling. The opening of the Skouries mine in has increased concerns about potential non-renewable-resource crimes. Greece is a transit, destination and source country for cannabis, which is the most widely trafficked and consumed drug in the country. Albania supplies cannabis to most European countries via the Greece-Italy route. High numbers of cannabis seizures take place within the areas of Thesprotia and Ioannina, both of which border Albania. Many of the organized-crime groups in Greece who are involved in the cannabis trade are also involved in arms trafficking, human smuggling, money laundering and forgery. Greece is also a transit and destination country for the heroin trade, which is operated mainly by local organized-crime groups, who collaborate with transnational crime groups. The country serves as an entry point for the Balkan route, which links trafficking corridors from areas with the highest production of opioids in the world with consumer countries in Europe. Law-enforcement officials have noted an increase in the use of an alternative route from Turkey to Greece and into Bulgaria, Albania or North Macedonia. Domestically, Attica, Thessaloniki, Epirus, the Ionian Islands and Crete have all been highlighted as heroin-trade hotspots. Heroin is transported across land, air and sea corridors, with the drug crossing borders illegally via commercial flights, air couriers, postal services and small boats. Greece is a transit and, to a lesser extent, destination country for shipments of cocaine arriving directly from South America or indirectly via Spain and Italy. Cocaine is usually smuggled in container ships transporting legal imports. The Greek port of Piraeus, one of the largest container ports in Europe, is the primary entry point for cocaine being smuggled into the country. Greece acts as a gateway for Latin American organized-crime groups to gain access to European markets. The majority of organizations in the cocaine trade are poly-drug groups that traffic mainly cannabis. Demand for cocaine within Greece is concentrated in the larger cities like Athens, Thessaloniki and Piraeus. Greece is primarily a transit country for synthetic drugs travelling from the Netherlands or Bulgaria to Turkey. Greece is also increasingly becoming a destination country for synthetic drugs, particularly for consumption by young people and tourists. Reports suggest that the main actors involved in this market are independent low-level dealers, although larger organized groups are also implicated. Mafia-style groups in Greece are known to be involved in arms and drug trafficking. Local groups are reported to control the illicit cigarette, alcohol and fuel markets. The most prominent domestic mafia-style groups in Greece are the so-called Godfathers of the Night — local business owners, usually of nightclubs or establishments associated with the tourism industry, who run criminal network from their properties. These groups actively engages in extortion as one of their primary activities, particularly at bars and nightclubs. Mafia-style groups in Greece have access to weapons, and the many violent altercations between mafia-style groups have included the use of firearms. Although traditional organized-crime groups in Greece employ a strict hierarchical structure, a more flexible model has recently been developed within the smaller networks, focusing more on particular operations. Loose criminal networks are prevalent in the country and are involved in every major criminal market. These networks often engage in retaliatory assassinations with multiple causes, such as turf wars or revealing information about rival groups after being apprehended. Operations undertaken to dismantle organized-crime groups have identified police officers as members. Many groups have maintained strong relationships with political elites and magistrates, evident by the lack of prosecutions for crimes such as drug trafficking. There is also evidence of corrupt politicians awarding public-procurement contracts to companies from which they have received bribes. Foreign mafia-style groups in Greece are involved in various criminal markets, including the trafficking of humans, arms and drugs. Foreign actors operate mainly along Greece's border with Albania and, more recently, Turkey, as well as on the Aegean Sea as a whole. The two largest urban centres in the country, Athens and Thessaloniki, have been epicentres of illicit activity carried out by foreign criminal actors, particularly heroin and cocaine trafficking. However, its anti-crime policy seems to focus more on street crimes, which are more visible and involve lower-level actors, than on large criminal organizations. The government has also targeted white-collar crime and nepotism as part of its anti-crime initiative. Nevertheless, it remains common to bypass bureaucracy and take part in corruption by offering bribes to public servants — for example, for swifter processing of paperwork. While some progress has been made in recent years, many problems remain, including the absence of a strong legal framework to counteract corruption, inefficient administrative controls and penal investigations, and the lack of a culture of accountability and meritocracy in the public sector. Greece has signed and ratified all relevant international treaties and conventions applicable to organized crime, including the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. It has also signed multiple bilateral treaties pertaining to extradition and mutual legal assistance. Greece has an organization that recovers assets and funds derived from cross-border crimes and cooperates with the relevant departments of other EU member states. Greek law enforcement usually cooperates with other countries to conduct investigations and seizures related to organized crime. Legislative reforms in recent years include the criminalization of acts committed by individuals for the benefit of smugglers and traffickers. However, a report on organized crime drafted by the Greek police did not refer to fauna, flora or non-renewable-resource crimes, despite information suggesting that Greek organized-crime groups were involved in these criminal markets. The independence of Greece's courts is perceived to be lacking. The judicial process is frequently delayed for considerable periods of time and is prone to political influence and corruption, while irregular payments and bribes are often made in return for favourable judgments. No prisons in Greece have the technology to detect drugs or weapons. The Greek prison mafia dominates the prison system and continues its operations in and out of the prison system. The Greek police work towards combating all forms of crime, especially organized crime and terrorism. However, owing to an increase in criminality attributable to the economic and migrant crisis, and the failure to revise the police-training system since , they struggle to carry out functions not officially prescribed in their policing duties. Given its vast coastline and islands, Greece has numerous remote and porous entry and exit points that are vulnerable to criminal activity. Due to its geographic position, the country offers an ideal gateway to Europe for traffickers and smugglers from other parts of the world. The Greek coastguard is faced with the challenge of identifying the ever-changing entry and exit points used by smugglers and traffickers. The weakest point is found along the Aegean coast, between Greece and Turkey. In response to the increase in irregular migrants, there has been an effort to improve patrols along the Greek-Turkish border. Another weak spot is Greece's border with Albania. Anti-money-laundering initiatives exist in Greece, and are enforced by governmental and quasi-governmental bodies. Different entities for each sector in which money laundering takes place are regulated by the appropriate structure. The use of financial intelligence by the Greek authorities has been described as effective, and they have been known to investigate complex organized-crime groups that partake in money laundering. Greece has identified the risk of money laundering as medium-high, particularly in the legal sector, real estate, money and value-transfer services, and nightlife institutions. The European Semester for economic policy coordination monitors economic policies and developments in Greece. They are also assessed in terms of the enhanced surveillance framework established by the EU. Excessive bureaucracy and regulations hamper business expansion. Nevertheless, since Greece's return to the international financial market in , the government has been able to attract new investors and businesses to the country. Victim support in Greece is inaccessible but efforts for improvement are made, especially in human trafficking victims support. The country operationalized a national referral of mechanisms for victims to support services. In addition, training programmes on human trafficking for police officers have increased, cooperation with civil-society organizations has improved, and there are a number of multilingual helplines that operate around the clock. However, there have been reports of illegal, violent pushbacks on part of the Greek coastguard against refugees at sea, which allegedly have become standard practice since While witness protection legislation exists, the treatment of protected witnesses within the criminal justice system has been problematic. Significant gaps in the coverage of whistle-blower protection legislation have been identified, most notably that the whistle-blower status can be revoked at any given point in time. National anti-organized crime efforts in Greece focus mainly on repressive measures, rather than on developing social crime prevention strategies. Private companies and NGOs have implemented publicity campaigns aimed at making civilians more aware of organized crime. However, the highly politicized and semi-military nature of the Greek police has negatively affected prevention efforts. On the whole, civil society in Greece is weak, but there are several NGOs, some of which are supported by the state, that tackle issues such as human trafficking and illegal drugs. There have been some positive developments in media freedom in recent years, including support from parliament to bolster media diversity and the passing of legislation to reform the television-licensing industry and increase competitiveness. Nevertheless, there is a lack of critical commentary on issues of importance. The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel. A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index. We're constantly working to improve the Index. By participating in this survey, you will be providing us with insights and suggestions that will help us make the Index an even better resource. This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State. The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State. Capital Athens. Income group High income. Population 10,, Geography type Coastal. Criminal markets 4. An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type. Human trafficking 5. Human smuggling 7. Arms trafficking 3. Flora crimes 2. Fauna crimes 2. Non-renewable resource crimes 3. Heroin trade 6. Cocaine trade 3. Cannabis trade 5. Synthetic drug trade 2. Criminal actors 5. An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society. Mafia-style groups 3. Criminal networks 6. State-embedded actors 7. Foreign actors 6. Political leadership and governance 5. Government transparency and accountability 5. International cooperation 6. National policies and laws 6. A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime. Judicial system and detention 4. Law enforcement 5. Territorial integrity 5. Anti-money laundering 5. Economic regulatory capacity 5. Victim and witness support 4. Prevention 5. Non-state actors 5. Analysis Download full profile english. People Greece is a source, transit and destination country for human trafficking. Environment Greece is a source and transit country for fauna-related crimes. Drugs Greece is a transit, destination and source country for cannabis, which is the most widely trafficked and consumed drug in the country. Criminal Actors Mafia-style groups in Greece are known to be involved in arms and drug trafficking. Criminal justice and security The independence of Greece's courts is perceived to be lacking. Economic and financial environment Anti-money-laundering initiatives exist in Greece, and are enforced by governmental and quasi-governmental bodies. Civil society and social protection Victim support in Greece is inaccessible but efforts for improvement are made, especially in human trafficking victims support. Read the analysis Listen the podcasts View all events. Next Skip. How to measure organized crime? Read more on globalinitiative. Give us feedback We're constantly working to improve the Index.
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