Buying Heroin Uzbekistan

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Buying Heroin Uzbekistan

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Prices, purities and offences. Retail markets. Actions to address current threats and increase preparedness. However, this decline is registered from a relatively high baseline, as in the number of seizures reported in the EU was at its highest level recorded 31 The number of seizures remained largely stable until around 28 , gradually declining thereafter and reaching 18 in This decline in the number of seizures may be due to a number of factors, one of which is a deprioritisation of law enforcement actions against retail-level interdiction. In , there was a stable number of heroin seizures but a considerable drop in the quantities seized, reflecting a temporary reduction in trafficking and a reprioritisation of law enforcement activities during the COVID crisis. Despite the marked decline in the number of seizures between and , the quantities of heroin seized in the EU more than doubled in this period from 4. This indicates that large quantities of heroin are trafficked in individual shipments and reflects a reprioritisation of wholesale-level rather than retail-level interdiction. Over 9. Furthermore, a record quantity of The source data for this graphic is available in the source table on this page. This suggests that large quantities of the drug are still reaching consumer markets. Historically, the trafficking of heroin to the EU from Afghanistan and neighbouring countries — Iran and Pakistan in particular — has been concentrated along a few established routes. However, the intensity of use of particular routes has varied over time and the combinations of routes used by traffickers appears to be increasing. This is driven by a range of factors, such as geopolitical, social and economic conditions, including the level of perceived or actual risk of interdiction along the routes, the volume of migration flows, the state of the transportation infrastructure, the level of corruption vulnerability and market size. Four routes are commonly documented for heroin trafficking from Afghanistan to Europe see Figure Indicative heroin trafficking routes :. Since late , two major political and security changes have occurred that have implications for the production and trafficking of opiates to Europe. The collapse of the Afghan government and the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in August and the subsequent ban on opium cultivation announced in April may significantly influence the production of opiates in Afghanistan and, by extension, the availability of heroin on the EU market see Section Key developments in the opiate trade in Afghanistan. On this route, heroin usually enters the EU at land border crossing points in Bulgaria or Greece. This is an established corridor for the trafficking of heroin to the EU and of acetic anhydride in the opposite direction see Section Acetic anhydride: the key chemical used for the production of heroin. Preliminary data for , however, indicate a sharp drop to 7. A proportion of the heroin smuggled along the southern and central branches may be diverted for local consumption or temporarily stored in warehouses in the Western Balkans region, before being transported to the EU markets EMCDDA, a. As a gateway to the EU, Bulgaria is particularly important for this trafficking route. Until recently, law enforcement authorities have regularly reported sizeable amounts of heroin at border crossing points, particularly at the Kapitan Andreevo crossing National Customs Agency of the Republic of Bulgaria, a,b, a,b, b-d. In , the National Customs Agency in Bulgaria reported 10 seizures amounting to 1 kilograms. In addition to using the established land entry points to the EU, trafficking groups appear to be increasingly transporting heroin to Turkish ports on the Mediterranean Sea, where ferries and cargo vessels carry the consignments onward to EU ports in Croatia, Italy and Slovenia. The apparent reasons for the shift to trafficking via maritime transportation include a lower perceived risk and the increased cost-effectiveness of this modus operandi, particularly for large shipments. Exploiting this existing intramodal shipping infrastructure allows traffickers to smuggle larger quantities of heroin in single shipments than they could in the historical modus operandi of moving smaller consignments through concealment in vehicles on other land routes. This apparent recent shift in trafficking also increases the complexity of monitoring and disrupting illicit heroin flows to the EU. Over the past decade, the importance of the Southern route for the EU heroin market has grown. This can be seen in the large quantities of heroin departing from ports on the Iranian or Pakistani sides of the Makran Coast, such as Chabahar and Bandar Abbas Iran and Gwadar Pakistan. These heroin consignments are either transported by traditional sailing vessels dhows or, increasingly, concealed in maritime containers from commercial ports. Overall, a range of modi operandi and transhipment points are combined on the Southern route to smuggle heroin to Europe. The growing importance of the Southern route is driven by several factors. First, increased use of maritime containers allows more efficient transportation of large quantities of heroin. The main commercial maritime routes from east to west are exploited for these purposes. In addition, intensified trafficking along the Southern route may be due to the perception or reality of stricter border controls on the Balkan route. The Netherlands continues to be a hub for the consolidation and distribution of heroin for EU consumer markets, including for maritime heroin consignments trafficked along the Southern route see Section Heroin trafficking within the EU. Similar to other drugs, heroin shipments are stored in distribution and wholesale centres in the Netherlands before being broken down and smuggled to criminal networks that supply other EU Member States and the United Kingdom see Box Transhipment of heroin in containerised shipments to the United Kingdom. Heroin may be shipped to the EU using the various branches of the Southern route, all departing from Iran or Pakistan. The first branch of the Southern route appears to have seen increased activity since , facilitating containerised trafficking of large consignments of heroin to the EU. This can be seen in a number of large heroin seizures shipped in maritime containers, originating from ports in Iran and Pakistan and bound for the European market see Box Large-scale direct heroin shipments to European ports. While the ratio of consignments that are successfully delivered to those that are seized is unknown, this development presents a clear threat of increased access to heroin in Europe. Large shipments of heroin along the second branch of the Southern route have also been observed see Table Examples of large maritime heroin seizures in the EU, Based on the available information, the UAE in particular appears to have emerged as a hub for heroin transhipment to Europe, and possibly a storage point where the origin of the drugs may be obscured. Seizures indicate that heroin consignments trafficked from key source countries on one route are in some cases switched to another route at transhipment points. This provides greater flexibility for traffickers and allows them to exploit new opportunities. Heroin trafficked along the third branch of the Southern route departs from the Makran Coast, typically in dhows, and is unloaded in several countries along the east coast of Africa. From there, the drugs are transported overland to South Africa or to other countries in East or West Africa. However, it appears that heroin is also increasingly being transported in container ships, which, unlike the dhows, can sail directly from the Makran Coast to South Africa. In addition, some of the drugs trafficked along this route are destined for local consumption, owing to sustained demand for heroin and other opioids in some African countries Cousins, ; Harker et al. This established heroin trafficking route appears to be increasingly exploited for the co-trafficking of methamphetamine to global markets, including the EU GITOC, This may be due to the recent surge in methamphetamine production in Afghanistan see Methamphetamine module. Routes used for further transportation from the East African coast to other countries in Africa and to Europe are complex. Note: This graph is based on the frequency of reports and not on heroin seizure quantities. Given that the data are incomplete, this graph does not present a ranking of countries. There is also evidence of large quantities of heroin arriving in the EU from countries in Africa by sea. In May , 2. Other methods employed to bring heroin from Africa to the EU include postal and parcel services and the use of air passengers as drug couriers. Several large heroin seizures on this route in recent years confirm that it is used to smuggle large amounts of opiates from Iran to Europe via Armenia or Azerbaijan and Georgia Customs. A number of recent seizures in Azerbaijan have involved heroin trafficked in trucks with legal goods from Iran. Iranian authorities also routinely report seizures of heroin in liquid form near the borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan, some of which appear to have been intended for onward trafficking IRNA, This phenomenon warrants awareness, including in the EU, where heroin seizures in liquid form have not been reported. Heroin trafficked on this route appears to be destined mainly for consumer markets in Central Asia, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine Bobokhodzhiev, Significant heroin seizures have recently been reported by countries along the Northern route, such as kilograms seized by Kyrgyzstan in This suggests that criminal networks active on this route may be able to smuggle large quantities of heroin towards consumer markets in Russia and beyond Kadyrov, EU Member States rarely seize heroin trafficked via the Northern route. Nonetheless, a proportion of the heroin shipped on the Northern route may eventually enter the EU from Russia and through Poland and the Baltic countries, and from Ukraine to Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. Some heroin seized in Belarus, Romania and Ukraine in recent years was reported as having originated from Central Asia and being intended for Western European markets. The analysis shows that large heroin consignments arrive in the EU through various entry points and that the established trafficking routes are flexible and fluid, as are the methods of transportation and concealment. An example of this is the growing practice of combining trafficking routes, whereby criminal networks move heroin consignments from one means of transport to another at transhipment points see Box Key transhipment points for heroin trafficking. When heroin is trafficked by land, it is typically hidden in concealed compartments or among legal goods. While typically trafficked in powder form, traffickers also dissolve heroin in liquids to conceal it and minimise the risk of checks. In recent years, heroin trafficking by maritime routes appears to have increased see Section Southern route. Roll-on roll-off ferries and pleasure boats also appear to be used in some places, although this method is not well understood. One of the most frequently used methods for trafficking heroin by sea involves concealment in maritime containers and among legal goods through the use of fake labelling, documentation or packaging. Heroin is also trafficked by air, albeit in smaller quantities than in other modes of transport. While limited data are available on trafficking using private aircraft, heroin is regularly trafficked to Europe by couriers travelling on commercial flights from African countries see Box Heroin trafficked from Africa by air couriers. Another method employed to bring heroin into the EU is through mail consignments. The online trade relies heavily on post and parcel shipping, including through express courier services, and criminals take advantage of the large volume of parcels passing through mail distribution centres. As in the case of other drugs, criminals exploit the services of parcel delivery providers operating across the world to smuggle heroin. While the data available are limited, there is evidence of heroin trafficking through the postal system both within and to the EU from Africa and the Middle East see Box Heroin trafficked through mail consignments. Trafficking routes connect heroin production and consumer markets in the EU and may vary over time due to various factors. Importantly, criminal networks seek to maximise profits while minimising costs see Box Comparison of heroin markups on selected European wholesale markets. Based on the present analysis, three factors of particular importance emerge. First, globalisation has facilitated rapid connection and transportation between heroin production and consumer markets. Continuing international developments in transport infrastructure, such as the Chinese-led Belt and Road Initiative, courier services and containerised shipping, offer a range of new opportunities to traffickers to conceal heroin consignments while hampering the efforts of law enforcement. Ongoing developments in this area can influence changes in the relative preference for different routes. Second, changes in law enforcement activity and the availability and use of new sources of information on criminal activity, such as intercepting encrypted communications, may cause traffickers to adapt their modi operandi. Overall, law enforcement knowledge on heroin trafficking has improved considerably over recent years, with information being obtained from the lawful interception of encrypted communication platforms, such as Sky ECC. However, decryption and the translation and analysis of information present an ongoing challenge for law enforcement in the EU. It is also important to note that changes in law enforcement approaches and priorities may result in the discovery of trafficking routes and methods that have been in existence for some time rather than newly established routes and methods. Third, unexpected events, such as global crises, instability and armed conflicts, and significant political or economic changes, may affect drug trafficking. Criminal networks will strive to adapt to these events, both to overcome any difficulties they create and to exploit opportunities they present. For example, armed conflicts often lead to the displacement of populations and a breakdown of social structures, which can lead to vulnerable populations becoming more susceptible to exploitation for drug trafficking or use. Understanding how drug trafficking continuously adapts to global or regional crises can help to anticipate changes in trafficking patterns. Once smuggled into the EU, heroin is then distributed to consumer markets across Europe. Therefore, large quantities of heroin are likely to be trafficked to these countries to meet local demand. Consumer markets for heroin appear to remain stable, with only limited fluctuation in the number of users in the short term. However, there are several caveats that might suggest that recent changes in heroin use are not fully captured in current monitoring systems see Section The consumer market. The market for illicit synthetic opioids in the EU is supplied by both medicines intended for therapeutic purposes diverted from the legal market and a broad range of illicitly manufactured opioids. Synthetic opioids intended for therapeutic purposes enter the illicit drug supply chain in a number of ways. For example, they may be stolen or diverted from the legitimate supply chain including from manufacturers, wholesalers and pharmacies ; from healthcare systems from hospitals or through corrupt healthcare professionals or forged prescriptions ; or from licit use stolen directly from patients or when users sell or give away a proportion of their prescribed opioids. The illicit production of synthetic opioids in the EU remains uncommon see Section Synthetic opioid production in Europe: a marginal phenomenon. Generally, synthetic opioids are produced outside the EU and enter Europe through key logistics hubs. Typically, producers and traffickers of these substances ship small quantities anonymously through freight forwarders and postal or express courier services. Darknet markets, e-commerce and social media platforms are also exploited by sellers. Because of their potential presence in very small quantities, synthetic opioids may be difficult to detect using routine analytical methods and techniques currently employed by forensic laboratories. Another issue is the emergence of new synthetic opioids that are not controlled by international drug control agreements, as these may also pose particular difficulties in terms of detection see Box Detections and seizures of new synthetic opioids. This therefore remains an area requiring vigilance and some precautionary measures. Falsified or counterfeit opioid-containing medicines are a growing cause for concern as they are associated with high public health risks. Falsified medicines contain different quantities of the active substances than claimed, or different active substances entirely. Counterfeit medicines have the composition that is claimed but they infringe trademark rules European Medicines Agency, n. Overall, more information is needed on the diverse sources of these medicines. To gain a better understanding of this situation would require both forensic analysis of reported seizures to determine their source, and consistent reporting of the number of seizures and quantities seized. Based on reports to the EMCDDA from the Reitox national focal points, which do not necessarily contain results from forensic analyses, it has been possible to analyse seizures of some synthetic opioids in the EU. However, the number of reporting countries has varied from year to year, limiting the comparability of results see Table Seizures of selected synthetic opioids in the EU, The trafficking of fentanyl and its derivatives, such as carfentanil, is a particular concern for the EU. These extremely potent substances have high associated morbidity and mortality, posing serious and complex public health and law enforcement challenges. Information made available to Europol indicates that parcels containing fentanyl, some of which were connected to sales on darknet markets, have been sent to the EU from the United States. Although the problem of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids in the EU is much less severe than the opioid crisis in North America, the high potency of some of these substances means that small-scale suppliers can have a significant harmful impact. As with other synthetic opioids, fentanyl derivatives are produced mainly in clandestine laboratories outside the EU. Their distribution, primarily to the Baltic and Nordic countries, occurs in two strands. In one strand, fentanyl derivatives are distributed by criminal networks operating in EU destination countries, although there is an intelligence gap regarding their composition and nationalities. In the other strand, they are purchased directly by consumers and retail-level distributors via online platforms on the surface web and the darknet. On the Estonian market, fentanyl has replaced heroin as the main opioid consumed since An increase in the availability of fentanyl derivatives was also seen in neighbouring markets, especially Latvia, Lithuania and Sweden, until around , after which it declined. New fentanyl derivatives not covered by fentanyl controls were also detected in Europe in and New non-fentanyl synthetic opioids, including benzimidazole nitazene opioids, have also appeared on the drug market in the EU, posing concerns. Isotonitazene has been detected on the market in Latvia and Estonia, substituting for other opioids that are in short supply LSM. Ten EU Member States consistently provide seizure data on fentanyl derivatives. Only Austria reported an increase, from four seizures in to 11 in see Figure Number of seizures of fentanyl derivatives in 10 EU Member States, However, due to the low number of seizures, caution should be exercised in interpreting this increase. While the data give strong evidence of a decrease in the number of seizures of fentanyl derivatives, less data are available to draw firm conclusions regarding quantities seized see Table Seizures of selected synthetic opioids in the EU, Although the quantity reported by weight seized in was lower than in previous years, a wide range of fentanyl derivatives were reported to have been seized. This included carfentanil in combined seizures with fentanyl, and sometimes with methadone reported by Latvia in and Lithuania in , and remifentanil and alfentanil reported to have been seized in Slovakia in Furthermore, following a significant drop in the reported number of tablets seized, from 19 in five reporting countries to 91 in four reporting countries , the number rose to 5 in five reporting countries. These changes in the reported number of tablets seized were almost exclusively driven by Sweden. The overall decline in the number of seizures of fentanyl derivatives is probably driven by two key factors. These are the targeting, both offline and online, of fentanyl derivative distribution networks by law enforcement in affected EU Member States and controls placed on new psychoactive substances in China. Other European countries have systematically targeted criminal networks involved in the distribution of these substances. Despite the notable decrease in the number of seizures in the 10 EU Member States that consistently provided data between and , there is evidence of continued trafficking of fentanyl derivatives. For example, Estonian police reported the seizures of grams and grams of carfentanil in two operations near the Latvian border in April and May , respectively. The drugs were trafficked from Latvia by Latvian nationals, allegedly for distribution on the Estonian market see Photos Carfentanil seized in two operations in Estonia, April and May Efforts at national level have been boosted by the generic control measures on fentanyl derivatives imposed in in China, historically one of the main source countries for new psychoactive substances. This measure covers the illicit production, export and sale of all fentanyl derivatives. In , the INCB noted that this legislation had led to a sharp drop in the quantity of fentanyl-related substances of alleged Chinese origin being seized globally INCB, a. However, traffickers and producers appear to have adapted by using new methods, such as the use of non-scheduled chemicals and chemically masked fentanyl precursors, to circumvent the ban INCB, a. The long-term impact of these developments on Europe needs to be monitored. A number of other synthetic opioid medicines, including methadone, buprenorphine, tramadol and oxycodone, continue to be seized in the EU. In addition to illicit production both outside and inside the EU, medicinal products containing synthetic opioids are also diverted from legitimate supplies. Synthetic opioids are key active pharmaceutical ingredients in many medicines prescribed and sold in the EU and come in a variety of forms, including tablets, patches, sprays and lozenges. Fentanyl-containing medicines diverted from legal supply are most commonly seized as patches, sprays and lozenges see Box Operation Chimera: diversion and trafficking of fentanyl and other opioids in Romania. In some countries, such as France, the diversion of opioid medicines, such as methadone and buprenorphine, is reported to be the main source for their illicit drug markets. Some of the opioid medicines seized in the EU are intended for use outside the region. For example, seizures of tramadol reported in a number of EU countries appear to have been in transit to the Middle East and Africa. Despite high availability in the EU, tramadol currently has a low rate of misuse across European countries with the possible exception of France; see Section Overdose deaths related to heroin and other opioids Iwanicki et al. This is in contrast to data from some countries in Africa and Middle East, where no other prescription opioids are available and where rates of non-medical tramadol use have been rising UNODC, ; WHO, Of concern is the recent increase in oxycodone seizures in the EU. Developments have also been seen in the illicit buprenorphine trade. The misuse of buprenorphine in some EU Member States is considerable. For example, buprenorphine has been the main opioid misused in Finland for a number of years, with France being consistently reported as the source. It appears that relatively large buprenorphine shipments are moved from France via Germany, Sweden and Estonia to Finland. Following an increase in the number of seizures between and , a drop was noted in The decline was driven by fewer seizures reported by Austria, Finland, Greece and Sweden. However, this analysis is hampered by a lack of data from France and Germany see Figure Number of buprenorphine seizures in 11 EU Member States, Fourteen EU Member States consistently provide methadone seizure data. This large increase was driven mainly by seizures in Spain, where methadone seizures amounted to less than 10 kilograms per year between and , but increased to kilograms in The number of reported methadone tablets or capsules seized remained stable in this period, based on reporting from five EU Member States. Consult the list of references used in this module. Homepage Quick links Quick links. GO Results hosted on duckduckgo. Main navigation Data Open related submenu Data. Latest data Prevalence of drug use Drug-induced deaths Infectious diseases Problem drug use Treatment demand Seizures of drugs Price, purity and potency. Drug use and prison Drug law offences Health and social responses Drug checking Hospital emergencies data Syringe residues data Wastewater analysis Data catalogue. 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Introduction Introduction Key findings and threat assessment Key findings and threat assessment Global context Global context Production Production Trafficking and supply Trafficking and supply Criminal networks Criminal networks Prices, purities and offences Prices, purities and offences Retail markets Retail markets Actions to address current threats and increase preparedness Actions to address current threats and increase preparedness. Search within the book Operator Any match. Exact term match only. Main subject. Target audience. Publication type. EU Drug Market: Heroin and other opioids — main page. On this page.

Uzbekistan

Buying Heroin Uzbekistan

Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit. The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands. The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits. The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law. The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing. The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities. The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market. The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market. The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach. The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance. Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership. Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups. The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities. A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime. The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities. Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs. Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime. Uzbekistan is a source and destination country for human trafficking. Despite a notable decrease in forced labour during the annual cotton harvest, instances of nationals subject to this practice persist in several areas. Local officials in some districts continue to impose cotton production quotas, incentivizing recruitment. In the past few years, however, the government has made progress in reducing forced child labour in the cotton fields. Uzbek victims are locally exploited in other ways, including brothels, clubs and private residences. Over half of Uzbek migrant workers avoid the complex bureaucratic processes required to obtain proper documentation in Russia, which makes them vulnerable to human trafficking. Additionally, many migrant workers from Uzbekistan face high risks of trafficking within Russia itself, where migrants are charged high work permit fees that make them vulnerable to debt-based coercion. Corrupt, low-level officials are said to be involved in this market. Uzbekistan is a source of migrant labour to other countries and presumably has a considerable human smuggling market. Given demand for cheap labour in Russia, some Uzbeki nationals are known to migrate to the country irregularly with the help of smugglers. Although the recent economic uncertainty in Russia might push Uzbeki nationals to look for other countries to migrate to. Uzbek nationals travel to Turkey, proceed to Central America and then Mexico to reach the southern US border, along widely used migratory routes. In the days after the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, hundreds of Afghans arrived in Uzbekistan via land and air. Since Uzbekistan is not a signatory to the UN refugee convention, many of those Afghan refugees face the risk of deportation and are vulnerable to crime and corruption in the country. Uzbekistan reports sporadic and unorganized extortion incidents targeting local businesses. Uzbekistan has low levels of illicit arms trading. One contributing factor is the strength of the border monitoring with Tajikistan and Afghanistan, significantly restricting the movement of people. Negative cultural attitudes towards firearms inherited from Soviet times is believed to be the reason behind the low level of privately owned firearms. Trade in counterfeit goods is prevalent in Uzbekistan, especially food products, household chemicals, cosmetics and medicines that can be found in domestic markets. High level of corruption facilitates this illicit trade. The illegal sale and purchase of alcohol and tobacco products is a ubiquitous issue in Uzbekistan, especially in the Fergana region. To fight against the illicit trade in excise goods, the government banned the sale of non-labelled products. Illicit logging appears to be the most prolific flora crime in Uzbekistan. This issue is exacerbated by the need for wood to heat homes and cook food in autumn and winter, when natural gas supplies in many regions are cut off to households and businesses. The government has made efforts to preserve valuable tree species by extending the moratorium on cutting down certain protected species that are not part of the state forest. Despite the prevalence of such illicit activities, there is sporadic evidence highlighting the involvement of organized crime groups in this market. Poaching, illicit trade and possession of protected animals, as well as illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, occur in the country albeit on a smaller scale. The criminal market for fauna-related crime is transnational in nature, which would suggest profits are accrued by domestic and foreign actors alike. Wildlife smuggling also happens along existing drug trade routes. The illicit extraction, smuggling, and mining of natural resources, including gold and other commodities, are common occurrences in Uzbekistan. Although private gold mining was legalized in , illegal mining continues to be prevalent. Given that gold is seen as a safe investment during financial turmoil, the global financial crisis in the wake of the COVID pandemic might have provided more incentives for people to continue with illegal gold extraction. This criminal market is transnational in nature and profits are accrued to domestic and foreign actors alike. Uzbekistan is a transit country for Afghan heroin bound for Russia, and for heroin precursors bound for Afghanistan. The Uzbek market is relatively modest compared to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. This is largely due to tighter controls over the borders with Tajikistan and Afghanistan, which has shifted a significant part of opiate trafficking to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The heroin trade involves more foreign actors than domestic criminal organizations. While corruption is widespread in Uzbekistan, collusion between drug trafficking groups and law enforcement is not pervasive. Furthermore, COVIDrelated issues like less disposable income, lower quality of drugs, an increase in the price of drugs and a decrease in the supply of opiates, have resulted in an overall decrease or at least a change in drug use in Uzbekistan. Cocaine is not widely consumed in Uzbekistan due to the high price of the drug and low purchasing power in the country. Its consumption is limited to wealthy urban residents who use cocaine recreationally. Similarly, cannabis use and cultivation seem to be limited, although the country does act as a transit point for drugs trafficked from Afghanistan to Russia. The consumption, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs, especially tramadol, are all on the rise in Uzbekistan. Organised crime groups are involved in the production of these drugs, which are mostly sold online. In the last year, internet access rates have improved across the country, and the cost of mobile broadband has decreased. This has led to a rise in cyber-dependent crime, with several high profile cyberattacks occurring in During the reporting period, hackers targeted 11 regional authority websites, encrypted databases in a large ministry, and attacked the systems of two insurance companies and one private bank. Even though the government is trying to enhance the security of personal data, certain initiatives are lacking. Financial crimes, especially embezzlement, fraud and the misuse of public funds, committed by both public and private actors are widespread in the country. Uzbekistani political elites and business groups have allegedly been involved in fraudulent practices. Uzbekistan is currently undergoing a series of economic reforms that promote private investment and the privatization of the economy, but this process is accompanied by accusations of corruption and kickbacks. Cases of financial fraud are prevalent in the country. These cases are often related to deceptive offers of work abroad; selling or buying real estate or plots of land; and applying for fake university courses or jobs, among others. It is difficult to distinguish between loose networks, mafia-style groups and state-embedded actors in Uzbekistan since all are intertwined. State-embedded actors are known to be involved in illicit activities and corrupt practices especially in certain industries, including cotton production and the natural gas sector, resulting in significant losses to state resources. That said, collusion between drug traffickers and law enforcement is not common. The influence of loose criminal-style networks has been on the rise in recent years. This increase can be attributed to the growing numbers of these criminal networks, driven by the economic crisis resulting from the COVID pandemic. These networks operate with transnational links to other foreign networks. They tend to operate in major criminal markets like human trafficking, flora crimes, non-renewable resource crimes, the heroin trade and the synthetic drug trade, and they are known to perpetrate medium to high levels of violence. Private sector actors, specifically those who are politically exposed, often launder the proceeds of crime. Business groups with connections to the political elite have expanded at an exponential rate, through preferential commercial relationships with the state or with state-owned entities. Private commercial banks continue to be operated by politically exposed people, shadowy oligarchs and — perhaps most worryingly — individuals implicated in money laundering and corruption scandals. Additionally, former mafia-style groups remnants of the Soviet period have been integrated into the business community where they combine legal and illicit activities and benefit from the protection afforded by certain government representatives. These groups engage in a variety of crimes such as money laundering, extortion, bribery and robbery. Foreign diasporas do not exert control over any of the organized criminal markets in Uzbekistan, and the level of interaction with foreign criminal actors within the country is minimal to moderate. The Uzbekistan government encourages cooperation and interaction among the special services of each of the counties in the Commonwealth of Independent States CIS , including exchange of information and joint activities to combat drug trafficking and organized crime. However, public perception of the Uzbek state itself is poor, as it is perceived to be corrupt and unreliable. Additionally, the democratic process is not independent and not protected from criminal influence. Although the country has low levels of state legitimacy, governance and the efficiency of political leadership have improved steadily over the last decade. Uzbekistan has little state transparency. Public resources are misused to benefit those close to the ruling elite. Corruption is widespread and affects the daily lives of citizens. Legal and institutional reform is needed to ensure meaningful separation of powers and adequate public accountability of government bodies. That being said, the government has a number of anti-corruption and organized crime policies in place. Recent reforms include the development of a database in that contains the names of former corrupt government officials, to prevent their re-employment within the government; and the creation of a national anti-corruption council that includes civil society representatives. Additionally, in , the government launched an electronic platform where public organizations can monitor and evaluate anti-corruption activities. Despite these efforts, however, there are still numerous reports of corruption in the country, especially at a local level. Uzbekistan has ratified most of relevant international treaties related to organize crime, except the Arms Trade Treaty of , and two UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime UNTOC protocols — against the smuggling of migrants and against the illicit manufacture and trafficking in firearms. Though Uzbekistan promotes international cooperation to combat organized crime, its efforts are undermined by corruption and insufficient institutional capacity. Forced labour violations are considered administrative in nature for first offense, with fines levied by the labour inspectorate; repeat offenses are considered criminal. The Uzbek government adopted its first laws related to cyber-security in , but the implementation of these regulations remains ineffective. In line with the entire political system in the country, the judicial system in Uzbekistan is highly corrupt. It is not independent either, despite constitutional provisions. Judges usually act together with prosecutors and the police to produce convictions. As a result of corruption and lack of training, courts do not adequately protect victims of various human rights violations, nor do they bring perpetrators to justice. However, under the new political leadership, the country has embarked on a process of judicial reform: a supreme judicial council has been established to put an end to external pressure and strengthen the system as a whole. Corruption in law enforcement remains rampant through the entire chain of command, including among senior officers. Police detain people on false charges in an attempt to intimidate whistle-blowers and prevent them from exposing corruption. In theory, the state security service and the department responsible for combating corruption, extortion and racketeering have mandates to deal with economic crimes and corruption, but reports suggest that law enforcement authorities are used to implementing corrupt schemes to undermine political and business rivals, and to detain and prosecute business executives, as an integral part of their extortion and expropriation mechanisms. Police violence is also common in the country. In terms of drug control, law enforcement in Uzbekistan continues to focus mainly on the smuggling of narcotics from Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The government has cyber-security and environmental policy divisions in place to keep related criminal activities in check. Given its geographic location in the heart of Central Asia, Uzbekistan is a major transit point for most organized criminal markets. The country is located along major trafficking routes, such as the opium and heroin markets of Afghanistan, which exacerbates its vulnerability to criminal flows. The mountainous terrain on the borders with Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan presents an additional challenge. However, due to the perceived dangers of a spill-over of Islamist insurgency in recent years, protection along the borders with Afghanistan and Tajikistan has increased. The issue of cyber-security is poorly formulated in the strategy, however, and lacks a holistic national approach. Uzbekistan has anti-money laundering AML measures in place, and an interdepartmental commission has been established to adhere to international Financial Action Task Force FATF recommendations to combat money laundering, the financing of terrorism and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The country has made some credible efforts to conduct financial investigations related to organized crime, and during it continued to improve its anti-money laundering framework. In the same year, parliament adopted regulations related to AML information-sharing; it passed a decree on the development of an AML strategy; and it amended legislation on bank secrecy. Despite these efforts, the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing remains quite high, and the long-term effects of prevention efforts are yet to be observed in practice. The capacity of the government to ensure that legitimate businesses are able to operate free from the influence of criminal groups has improved over the past two decades. The state has taken measures to simplify the procedure for registering new businesses, reduce interference by regulatory authorities in business activities, and abolish currency controls. Although the current economic environment allows for businesses to expand, there is still lots of red tape that business owners have to reckon with — in addition to land and property rights not being effectively upheld. The COVID pandemic and its subsequent effects on the global economy have impeded the progress of many governmental reforms and led several private businesses to bankruptcy. The state places some focus on treating and caring for victims of organized crime, but non-state actors are more active in this area. The government has operated as many as centres to assist victims of violence and trafficking, but some of these centres did not provide adequate protection when research was conducted. There have also been ongoing delays with registering NGOs, which has constrained efforts by civil society to monitor and assist victims. The government requires victims to file a criminal complaint with their community authorities to be eligible for government-provided rehabilitation and protection services. However, the majority of identified victims were reluctant to contact or cooperate with law enforcement because of their distrust for the system, and because they feared for their own safety or the safety of their families. The government also lacks a standardized process to identify victims from vulnerable populations and refer them to protective services, especially those subjected to internal trafficking. This has led to potential victims being penalized, particularly those involved in sex work. Despite these negatives, the Uzbekistan government has made some efforts in recent years to increase protection for victims of human trafficking. As of , the government managed around 20 centres for drug treatment and rehabilitation, but these are reported to have limited capabilities. The Uzbekistan government has campaigns in place to ensure that all citizens are aware of their labour rights. With respect to human trafficking, Uzbekistan has maintained its prevention efforts. Prevention efforts against systemic child labour and forced labour in the cotton harvest industry have resulted in a notable decrease in these crimes. Still, cotton production quotas imposed by local officials of some districts inevitably lead to some adults entering into forced labour. The government continued activities under its National Commission on Trafficking in Persons and Forced Labour, even during the pandemic, but there remains a lack of communication and coordination between the commission and civil society, along with an absence of funding. This has led to an overreliance on assistance from NGOs and other international groups. There are whistle-blowing mechanisms in place for certain crimes, such as illicit logging and the distribution and sale of synthetic drugs, but the whistle-blowing role is mainly carried out by journalists, bloggers and environmental activists. Civil society organizations CSOs and independent human rights activists have played an active role in recent years, such as drawing the attention of the international community to the problems of government-compelled forced labour among adults and children during the annual cotton harvest. The government is not open to criticism and officials perceive some CSOs to be hostile. However, there are some instances of cooperation between the government and CSOs, especially in areas related to organized crime. When it comes to non-governmental organizations NGOs , the government has controls in place. While the law allows for freedom of association, the government restricts this by requiring NGOs to obtain permission for their activities from the Ministry of Justice. Media freedom is extremely limited, but there has been some progress on this front: imprisoned journalists have been freed, access to censored websites has been granted, and the process of media registration has improved. Despite this, criticism of government remains out of the question. The state exercises control over all media coverage and requires all media to be registered with the authorities — and to provide copies of publications to the government. The same restrictions extend to independent online media. The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel. A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index. We're constantly working to improve the Index. By participating in this survey, you will be providing us with insights and suggestions that will help us make the Index an even better resource. This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State. The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State. Capital Tashkent. Income group Lower middle income. Population 34,, Geography type Landlocked. GINI Index Criminal markets 4. An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type. Human trafficking 7. Human smuggling 6. Extortion and protection racketeering 4. Arms trafficking 3. Trade in counterfeit goods 4. Illicit trade in excisable goods 5. Flora crimes 3. Fauna crimes 3. Non-renewable resource crimes 7. Heroin trade 6. Cocaine trade 1. Cannabis trade 4. Synthetic drug trade 4. Cyber-dependent crimes 3. Financial crimes 6. Criminal actors 5. An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society. Mafia-style groups 5. Criminal networks 5. State-embedded actors 6. Foreign actors 5. Private sector actors 4. Political leadership and governance 3. Government transparency and accountability 3. International cooperation 4. National policies and laws 4. A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime. Judicial system and detention 3. Law enforcement 3. Territorial integrity 4. Anti-money laundering 3. Economic regulatory capacity 5. Victim and witness support 4. Prevention 5. Non-state actors 3. Analysis Download full profile english. People Uzbekistan is a source and destination country for human trafficking. Trade Uzbekistan has low levels of illicit arms trading. Environment Illicit logging appears to be the most prolific flora crime in Uzbekistan. Drugs Uzbekistan is a transit country for Afghan heroin bound for Russia, and for heroin precursors bound for Afghanistan. Financial Crimes Financial crimes, especially embezzlement, fraud and the misuse of public funds, committed by both public and private actors are widespread in the country. Criminal Actors It is difficult to distinguish between loose networks, mafia-style groups and state-embedded actors in Uzbekistan since all are intertwined. Leadership and governance The Uzbekistan government encourages cooperation and interaction among the special services of each of the counties in the Commonwealth of Independent States CIS , including exchange of information and joint activities to combat drug trafficking and organized crime. Criminal justice and security In line with the entire political system in the country, the judicial system in Uzbekistan is highly corrupt. Economic and financial environment Uzbekistan has anti-money laundering AML measures in place, and an interdepartmental commission has been established to adhere to international Financial Action Task Force FATF recommendations to combat money laundering, the financing of terrorism and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Civil society and social protection The state places some focus on treating and caring for victims of organized crime, but non-state actors are more active in this area. 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Buying Heroin Uzbekistan