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In , the area under cultivation was around 23, hectares, while the previous year's figure was some 25, The UNODC Representative in Bolivia, Antonino De Leo, whose office has been jointly producing the annual survey with the Bolivian Government since , underlined that 'this decline confirms a downward trend over the last three years, during which period coca cultivation dropped by 26 per cent'. He added that 'in , Bolivia recorded the lowest area under coca cultivation since '. Satellite images and surveys on the ground showed reductions in the two main areas of cultivation. Yungas de La Paz and the Cochabamba Tropics - which together make up 99 per cent of the coca cultivation area - had reductions of 7 and 12 per cent, going from 16, to 15,, and from 8, to 7, hectares, respectively. The rest of the surveyed area, in the Norte de la Paz provinces, saw an even sharper decrease of 28 per cent, from to hectares. Government-led eradication contributed to the 9 per cent reduction in the total area of cultivation. Eradication efforts increased 3 per cent nationwide, from around 11, to some 11, hectares. At the provincial level, around 7, hectares were eradicated in the Cochabamba Tropics region, 3, in the Yungas and Norte de la Paz areas, and almost hectares cleared in the Santa Cruz province. This figure represents a 0. Compared to , seizures of coca leaf decreased by 36 per cent to tons, cocaine base paste by 37 per cent to 20 tons, and cocaine hydrochloride by 62 per cent to 1. Also, between and the number of cocaine paste factories destroyed rose 34 per cent to 5,, cocaine hydrochloride laboratories 81 per cent to 67, and chemical precursors recycling facilities 32 per cent to Mr De Leo hailed Bolivia's continuing reduction of the area under coca cultivation, which is on track to reach 20, hectares, the objective set by the national strategy against drug trafficking and coca leaf surplus reduction. While speaking to the press, De Leo underlined that in order to achieve the goal of sustained reduction of illicit crop cultivation, good practices show that 'eradication efforts should be combined with comprehensive, participatory, long term development programmes in cultivation areas, as well as regional and international cooperation'. The Bolivia Coca Survey can be accessed at: www. Welcome to the United Nations. United Nations. Information Service Vienna. Site Search Search the site. Media Press Releases.

Rethinking Alternative Development in Bolivia

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They identify three principal problems: an uncoordinated strategy that operates outside existing community organizations and local governments; the inflexible conditioning of assistance on eradication; and a large, expensive bureaucracy. Agency representatives state that, despite enormous challenges, this program has seen steady success—each year, more legal crops are exported, licit income of participating farmers has increased, and more families are incorpo-rated into the program. They point to increased private sector investment, including tourism in-frastructure and roads, and note that the Chapare has the best rural infrastructure in Bolivia as well as the largest international assistance program. Our intent is not to attempt to reconcile this longstanding and seemingly unbridgeable gulf between the views of coca growers and those of USAID officials, but rather to propose that strengthening alternative development programs offers the single best option for consolidating coca eradication successes and de-escalating conflict in the Chapare region. Until forced eradication programs virtually eliminated coca production in , 85 percent of the coca grown for cocaine in Bolivia was cultivated in the Chapare region, east of the highland city of Cochabamba. Replanting has occurred steadily since , along with a steep increase in production in the Yungas, east of La Paz, which historically has grown most of the domestically consumed coca leaf. The ecosystems of both these areas are considered fragile, with significant biological diversity and very high annual rainfall. Forest covers most of the land. Agriculture is characterized by small land holdings using mostly manual production, and a family-based labor force. Most coca-growing families are indigenous peasants who were encouraged by the Bolivian government to migrate to the Yungas and the Chapare in the s because of extreme poverty in their home communities. The largest Chapare population boom was in the s, mirroring both the surge in demand for cocaine in the north, and the severe drought and economic crisis in Bolivia. When approximately 45, hectares of coca were eradicated from the Chapare between and , alternative development was unable to keep pace. These events undermined the U. The U. State Department estimates that between June and , production in the Chapare increased by 23 percent even as the Bolivian government eradicated 17, hectares of coca. While many of the difficulties of alternative development are common to all large-scale development projects planned and administered by outsiders, whether these are foreign or national professionals, U. Recognized development practice calls for the fullest possible involvement of the local populations, organi-zations and governments in program design, implementation and evaluation. In the Chapare, however, USAID has consistently refused to work directly with the campesino small indigenous farmer unions representing the coca producers, which have played the role of local government since colonization in the s. This distrust predates the drug war, originating in various attempts by Bolivian governments since the s to create parallel campesino organizations which could control rural populations. However, this assis-tance has generally been slow in coming and insufficient, compounded by the greater costs asso-ciated with producing licit crops compared to coca. Forcing farmers to give up their most reliable source of cash income without having reliable alternatives in place has contributed to the resis-tance on the part of the growers, severely limiting the ability to reduce coca production. While ostensibly aimed at the kingpins of the cocaine trade, much of these actions are directed at coca-growing families, resulting in human rights abuses and constant harassment. In addition, coca-growing families are unlikely to differentiate between U. There exists reasonable doubt that the goals of AID in the Chapare bear any relation to economic development at all, as almost every U. Commercial agriculture in a landlocked coun-try with weak road infrastructure and semi-subsistence peasants is a difficult proposition, and to date has produced few tangible rewards for most Chapare farmers. As none of the USAID-assisted private companies are headquartered in the Chapare and most of their processing facilities are located near Sacaba, a town just outside the city of Cochabamba, they provide regional benefits but little direct positive impact on coca growers. These companies have been accused of misappropriation of funds, inadequate accounting practices and conflicts of interest. USAID also works to some extent in providing training to coca grower-controlled municipalities in the Yungas. However, in a country with a weak regulatory structure and a long history of governmen-tal corruption and inefficiency, working with these municipalities, formed only in , is not a panacea for the enormous challenge of alternative development. Nonetheless, studies of munici-palities in Bolivia demonstrate that those in the Chapare have comparatively good administrative capability and capacity. The European Union has been actively involved in strengthening them since , with programs perceived by coca growers to have achieved far more, and with con-siderably less money, than USAID. In the Chapare, municipal spending has been balanced between projects serving the urban and rural populations, and emphasizes school and secondary road construction as well as water and urban electrical systems improvements. Some of the problems faced by the Chapare municipalities are common to all the new local administrations in Bolivia. The elaborate plans, for example, cannot be carried out on schedule because of delays in public fund disbursements. And, as in other areas, there is still not enough public oversight. Just as in other parts of Bolivia, the government-mandated oversight committees are largely unskilled, and often depend on the town hall for their livelihoods. During the past two years, several members of the U. Congress have expressed con-cern about the social costs of the drug war in Bolivia and have recognized the potential of alter-native development in reducing negative impacts. They recommended that programs prioritize sustainable human development and poverty alleviation, which will in turn reduce dependence on the cultivation of coca. Below are abbreviated conference recommendations drawn from the combined experience of these experts which provide a useful framework for strengthening U. In Bolivia, USAID can follow the above guidelines by expanding its work with local, indigenous organizations to achieve sustained economic and social development. Continuing on its current course by forming parallel organizations which are not trusted by the local population and conditioning development assistance on eradication will only serve to nourish the current low-intensity conflict. While USAID may not be in agreement with the economic development approach of local organizations and governments, we contend it is more effective and less expensive to engage with these predominantly democratic organizations and seek points of com-monality. USAID initiatives to work through municipalities in the Yungas and the Chapare should be supported and expanded as these represent a potential major reorientation in U. Working with the municipalities offers an excellent option for USAID, as newly-formed local governments bring public investment to im-poverished rural areas throughout the country for the first time. Bolivian public opinion of the United States has plummeted because the negative eco-nomic impacts of U. Shifting alternative development strategies to focus on economic development rather than pri-marily on coca eradication will go a long way in contributing to a far more constructive and positive relationship between the United States and Bolivia. WOLA facilitates dialogue between governmental and non-governmental actors, monitors the impact of policies and programs of governments and international organizations, and promotes alternatives through reporting, education, training, and advocacy. Founded in by a coalition of religious and civic leaders WOLA works closely with civil society organizations and government officials throughout the hemisphere. As of September , CONCADE had provided direct technical assistance to 12, families in the form of crop manage-ment instruction or certified planting material. Outside ob-servers generally put this figure lower——between 10 and 15 percent—but acknowledge that even the lower figure represents a significant improvement over past performance. IV-7; 1March Economic collapse in Argentina has meant that many of the one million Bolivians working there of a total population of nine million are returning home; the U. This work had two significant results. Second, the U. State De-partment suspended its funding in July for the Expeditionary Task Force, an irregular force implicated in human rights violations. Skip to content. AIN Posts Coca. Jan 31, Possibilities for policy change During the past two years, several members of the U. A complete strategy should include alternative crop production and off-farm opportunities, and also incorporate non-economic improvements. While the initial focus should be on immediate expressed needs, long-term strategies should promote education and training, crop diversification, and off-farm opportunities, all with a focus on long-term sustainability. This must take into account the macroeconomic context, socioeconomic, cultural and gender differences as well as environmental concerns. Recommendations In Bolivia, USAID can follow the above guidelines by expanding its work with local, indigenous organizations to achieve sustained economic and social development. Popular Protest Brings Down the Government. You missed. Apr 12, Andean Information Network. Nov 11, Andean Information Network. Nov 9, Andean Information Network. Sep 14, Andean Information Network.

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