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The country rattled by war and conflict still has a long way to go to develop an adequate framework to implement the articles of both chapters of the UNCAC. Since , Yemen has taken many steps to expand and develop its anti-corruption system by issuing a series of laws and regulations, establishing oversight bodies and encouraging society to participate in the fight against corruption. Despite all this, Yemen is ranked among the top 10 most corrupt countries in the world by the Global Corruption Perceptions Index. Anti-corruption efforts stagnated from to , with not a single case being referred to the Public Fund Prosecutionin , and judgments were made against the decision to form the Supreme National Authority for Combating Corruption SNACC Council, which negatively impacted its work. Issues with the governmental experts list has delayed the review process as only 10 experts were appointed instead of 15, and their qualifications and professional accreditations were not disclosed. NGO participation has been limited to one human rights organization, which is not specialized in anti-corruption, while the private sector was not involved in the review. Read the full civil society report in English here and in Arabic here. Yemen was able to harmonize the majority of its legislation with the UNCAC through the issuance of new laws, taking measures to prevent corruption, joining regional and international agreements, initiatives and partnerships, and engaging civil society in developing legislation and anti-corruption strategies. There are still many shortcomings in Yemeni legislation though. Yemen has launched two national strategies to combat corruption, but the level of implementation of the first strategy was very weak. However, their independence is not adequate, they have many legal flaws and face major problems in implementation. The electoral system in Yemen is still traditional as the authorities have failed to establish an electronic electoral register, while the participation of civil society in monitoring of elections is very limited and they have no access to any information about political financing. Yemen has issued laws and government decisions regarding job rotation, the appointment system in the public service, and financial disclosures. However, the biggest legal obstacle in Yemen is a controversial law regarding procedures for accusing and prosecuting the employees of the Supreme Executive Authority, and there are no special criteria in Yemeni legislation for appointments in public jobs that are most vulnerable to corruption. Therefore, the level of implementation of this policy area is very weak as some laws have never even been enforced. Reporting incidents of corruption is mandatory according to Yemeni law, but there is no explicit text to criminalize covering up corruption, or to encourage individuals and public officials to report on such cases. Yemen was able to achieve good compliance with regard to public procurement with a solid level of both legislative compliance and implementation. Nevertheless, all of these achievements did not sufficiently limit the spread of corruption that is rampant in this sector. The financial law issued in is still the main legal framework for the management of public finances and has not been updated as required by the provisions of UNCAC. Legislative compliance with this article is not sufficient as the transparency of public finances is still absent from Yemeni laws. Until , the Ministry of Finance has been preparing and publishing annual public budgets, but has stopped since In terms of its commitment to transparency and public participation in preparing the general budget and final accounts, it is weak, especially since , while monitoring and evaluation levels have declined significantly since , especially parliamentary oversight. According to the Yemeni constitution and legislation, the judiciary enjoys financial, administrative and technical independence. The Judicial Authority Law is the legal framework, which ensures the integrity of the judiciary and prosecution through the proper selection and appointment of staff, acceptable measures to prevent conflicts of interest and the disclosure of property, and the issuance of a code of judicial conduct. However, the implementation of this law was poor as the actual independence of the judiciary in Yemen has not been sufficiently achieved, and there are legislative and executive deficiencies in the judicial code of conduct, and a lack of commitment to competency standards in the selection of administrative staff. There is a range of national legislation related to preventing the spread of corruption in the private sector and corporate transparency in Yemen, but it is outdated and has not been reviewed. Legislation has never addressed beneficial ownership transparency and there is no explicit legal provision prohibiting the deduction of bribes and expenses incurred in promoting corrupt conduct from the private sector tax base, and to ensuring corporate governance. Corruption and a lack of transparency in the private sector is still rampant, despite attempts of the Yemeni authorities to encourage corporate governance and the establishment of commercial courts, as well as the efforts of the General Organization for Standardization and Metrology and the Ministry of Industry and Trade in monitoring the private sector, granting and renewing permits to accountants, legal auditors, auditors and auditing companies, and launching an electronic service on its website to facilitate access to information about trade names. Yemen has made good progress in this policy area since Yemen passed the Law on the Right to Information and established an office of the Commissioner-General for Information. Moreover, provisions in the Anti-Corruption Act support the right of society to access information, and the second chapter was devoted to community participation in anti-corruption and awareness-raising of its risks. Civil society has made an acceptable contribution to anti-corruption since , until its role was significantly reduced by the war, alongside the suspension of the Office of the Commissioner-General for Information. Stakeholders have taken acceptable measures to detect and track suspicious financial operations, to verify customer identity, and to establish national banks or branches of foreign banks, exchange companies, enforce sanctions, and issue annual and periodic reports. However, the level of processing and following-up of suspicious transaction reports remains weak as a result of the current conflict. Yemen has amended the Anti-Money Laundering Law to allow States Parties of the UNCAC to file a civil case before the Yemeni judiciary to claim their right to recover proceeds of corruption and demand compensation for the damages caused by these crimes. However, there is no explicit legal provision for dealing with foreign countries as a special category before the Yemeni public prosecutions and courts, and the anti-corruption law did not adequately cover international cooperation for direct recovery of property. The implementation of the law is much worse, as no other State Party has submitted official requests to Yemen in this regard, and Yemen has not yet joined any forum for exchanging financial information. The Anti-Money Laundering Law was amended so that the proceeds of corruption can be confiscated without criminal conviction NCB , and to allow national courts to confiscate or freeze any assets of foreign origin, expand the list of offences related to money laundering and double criminality. However, Yemen has not established a fund for expropriated assets and there have been no confiscations on the basis of foreign money laundering offences related to corruption in Yemen or NCB. Yemen has not yet been able to recover any looted and smuggled public property or finances from outside Yemen and the authorities have not frozen or confiscated any foreign assets under rulings from courts in other States Parties. Fullscreen Mode. Main findings The following are some of the main findings according to topic: Preventive anti-corruption policies and practices Yemen was able to harmonize the majority of its legislation with the UNCAC through the issuance of new laws, taking measures to prevent corruption, joining regional and international agreements, initiatives and partnerships, and engaging civil society in developing legislation and anti-corruption strategies. Codes of conduct, conflicts of interest and asset declarations Yemen has issued laws and government decisions regarding job rotation, the appointment system in the public service, and financial disclosures. Reporting mechanism and whistleblower protection Reporting incidents of corruption is mandatory according to Yemeni law, but there is no explicit text to criminalize covering up corruption, or to encourage individuals and public officials to report on such cases. Public procurement Yemen was able to achieve good compliance with regard to public procurement with a solid level of both legislative compliance and implementation. Management of public finances The financial law issued in is still the main legal framework for the management of public finances and has not been updated as required by the provisions of UNCAC. Judiciary and prosecution services According to the Yemeni constitution and legislation, the judiciary enjoys financial, administrative and technical independence. Private sector transparency There is a range of national legislation related to preventing the spread of corruption in the private sector and corporate transparency in Yemen, but it is outdated and has not been reviewed. Access to information and the participation of society Yemen has made good progress in this policy area since Asset recovery Yemen has amended the Anti-Money Laundering Law to allow States Parties of the UNCAC to file a civil case before the Yemeni judiciary to claim their right to recover proceeds of corruption and demand compensation for the damages caused by these crimes. Fullscreen Mode Fullscreen Mode. We use cookies to support the functionality of this website and to monitor its use, as well as to facilitate our outreach. When you click 'accept', you consent to all cookies. 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Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit. The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law. The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing. The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities. The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market. The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market. The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach. The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership. Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups. The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities. A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime. The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities. Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs. Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime. Human trafficking is a growing phenomenon in Yemen. Many trafficking networks are based in Ethiopia or Somalia and operate with local partners. En route to Saudi Arabia, individuals are exploited, kidnapped, or even killed. Furthermore, organ trafficking from Yemen to Egypt is worsened by poverty and extortion. Profits are shared by hospitals, networks and mediators, and some Yemeni hospitals secretly conduct organ transplants. Yemeni children are also victims of trafficking, forced into temporary marriages, commercial sex tourism domestically and in Saudi Arabia, and used as child soldiers. Children collected by Saudi gangs are sent under military escort to the Gulf, and subjected to involuntary domestic service, begging, or drug smuggling into Saudi Arabia. Yemen is also a source, transit and destination for human smuggling. The irregular movement of Yemeni nationals for work in other Gulf countries also occurs. Smugglers are bound by strong social links, and Yemeni networks include Somali and Ethiopian facilitators. Smugglers are paid twofold when contracted by Yemen to return individuals to Africa. Migrants who seek the services of smugglers often subsequently face intimidation, threats, physical violence and extortion. Yemen has widespread gun ownership and one of the largest arms-trafficking markets in the world, with weapons redirected from military stores or acquired from foreign actors. Ongoing conflict has resulted in an increase of light and medium weapons such as Turkish pistols and silencers, but tanks, ammunition, grenades, machine guns and light armoured vehicles are also sold in open-air arms markets. Small arms sale, including coalition weaponry, thrives on social media, and the military, security forces, navy, and coast guard are accused of illegal arms shipments and facilitating black-market smuggling. The Houthis an Islamic armed political movement , STC, and IRG have historically collaborated on arms trafficking, and battlefield exchanges or sales between factions have occurred. Before the conflict, Yemen was a transit hub for East African and Gulf weapons, and weapons are now smuggled via Yemen into Palestine, Sudan and Somalia. An active weapons trade also exists between al-Qaeda factions, and Iranian weaponry, including drone technology, is smuggled to the Houthis. With regard to fauna, Yemen is a transit country for African wildlife, such as cheetahs, destined for wealthy consumers in the Arabian Peninsula. Deer, hyenas, monkeys and other fauna are also illicitly sold in the country. Yemen is a source and transit hub for endangered and other vulnerable species, including pangolins, Arabian leopards, golden sparrows, blue baboon spiders, Yemen veiled chameleons, falcons, and large cats primarily bred in Yemeni villages for Gulf markets. The market is enabled by corruption and bribery, with traders importing specimens from Djibouti, Somalia and Eritrea. Additionally, illegal, unreported and unregulated IUU fishing depletes fish stocks; although illegal, the market is largely socially accepted. IUU fishing overlaps with more lucrative criminal activities, particularly arms trafficking from Eritrea via fishing boats. Moreover, the illicit trade of stolen oil is on the rise in Yemen, and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula AQAP , which once controlled various facilities, has now turned to smuggling. Meanwhile, intra-coalition fighting in southern Yemen focuses on extraction or storage-facility control. Gangs use ground tanks and oil tankers to store and transport oil from government to Houthi areas, resulting in systematic crude-oil looting from state-owned company fields. Illegal oil and gas sales transpire with Houthi and IRG facilitation, with cross-faction collaboration and military-commander involvement. Yemen is a transit country for drugs from the Gulf, Pakistan and Iran, with heroin from Afghanistan sometimes transiting Aden international airport into Egypt. Meanwhile, cocaine shipments have been apprehended in deliveries to government agencies, and opportunistic gangs transiting cocaine to Gulf and Arab countries primarily utilize sea routes. Yemen is also a transit country for cannabis from Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa. Sana'a has seen unprecedented cannabis and hashish activity, and seizures are increasing. The Houthi secretly coordinate hashish smuggling with affiliates, in order to preserve their image. However, cannabis may be sidelined by Yemeni-produced khat, which although legal, invites organized-criminal activities and may utilize forced labour. The same networks facilitate khat and small-arms smuggling into Saudi Arabia, and Yemen exports khat to countries with Somali or Yemeni diaspora, the proceeds subsequently being laundered into Yemen through the hawala money broker system. Synthetic drug use is also increasing and inexpensive drugs, primarily prescription drugs and Captagon pills, are the most readily available. In Yemen, drugs are used to control and encourage youth involvement in conflict or in political smear campaigns. Although government-affiliated media claim that Houthi funding comes primarily from the drug trade, the Houthi militia have facilitated the disposal of Lebanese Hezbollah drug products, including Captagon. Large Yemeni tribes engage in banditry, kidnapping, and have significant weapons arsenals, allowing them to act with impunity and dictate their own governance. In northern and eastern Yemen, goods cannot cross territory without tribal permission. Oil- and arms-smuggling networks collaborating with Houthi, IRG, and STC actors share similar mafia-style characteristics, and military brigade commanders provide them with protection or documentation. Gangs and mafias linked to the Houthi militia are involved in arms, oil, drug, and human trafficking, looting, robbery, home raids, and kidnapping. Victims are subjected to violence and are kept in secret prisons while mafia members work as brokers. The Houthi also control cigarette smuggling, and oil companies are owned by Houthi officials or their relatives. Overlapping tribal, government and security membership makes it difficult to surmise the extent of collusion, and state actors involved in peace negotiations may have links to criminal markets, ignoring illicit practices to ensure constituent loyalty. Loose criminal networks involved in arms trafficking, human trafficking and human smuggling may also have mafia ties. With regard to the latter two, individuals from Somalia and Ethiopia act as facilitators and brokers, while Saudi members, as well as Saudi-residing Somalis and Ethiopians, receive victims. Meanwhile, Yemeni criminal networks connected to state actors interact with Egyptian organ-harvesting networks. The black market now encompasses everyday items, and criminal networks are violent and widespread. Yemeni networks with ties to militia and the Horn of Africa collaborate with Saudi traffickers, and these networks are often formed to carry out terrorist activities. State institutions, plagued by corruption, bribery, and cronyism, lack capacity and rely on UN funding. The war has damaged infrastructure and facilitated organized crime, and although the supreme national authority for combating corruption was established before the conflict, even then it lacked capacity. The security sector has long suffered from corruption, including ghost soldiers, preferential treatment, and the distribution of military commands for political gain. A decision facilitating oil trade by commercial companies affiliated with Houthi loyalists, resulted in financial losses for the state oil company, oil derivative purchases by fictitious companies, black-market expansion, and economic crisis. While access to information is fairly robust, monitoring, compliance, anti-corruption and transparency efforts have stalled. Yemen is party to international and regional agreements regarding organized crime, corruption, drug and arms trade, wildlife crime, and terrorism financing, also covered by domestic law. Despite expressing reservations regarding arbitration and extradition, Yemen has an extradition agreement with Egypt and a judicial cooperation agreement and protocol with Tunisia. Due to the fragile political situation, the government has faced internal security threats, weak institutions, law-enforcement and economic challenges, and systemic corruption. Although the penal code criminalizes slavery and child sex trafficking, it excludes sex trafficking as understood within international law, and despite efforts to combat trafficking and protect victims, laws are not enforced. Yemen lacks a comprehensive justice system, adequate courts, judges, staff and training, and no units focus specifically on organized crime. There is no monitoring mechanism and the transition to a paid system has increased corruption. Data is further skewed by the stigma regarding the arrest of women and the categorization of most violent crimes as politically motivated. The government lacks control over the court and prison systems, and by law, parties may settle informally outside of court. Most prisoners are pre-trial detainees, and conditions do not meet international standards due to overcrowding, lack of prison staff training, ineffective case management, underfunding, poor sanitation, inadequate access to justice, the intermingling of pre-trial and convicted inmates, and deteriorating infrastructure. While the Houthi militia arrests critics and subjects some to forced migration, others are held in secret UAE jails in Yemen and tortured. The military characteristics and criminal opportunism of policing structures has resulted in decreased public trust. Due to the conflict, resources have shifted, and military capabilities have been exhausted. Despite abetting crime, security officials benefit from impunity, and officers responsible for investigating organized crime have been involved in repressing peaceful demonstrations. Polarization and multiple loyalties exist, based on party, sectarian, regional and tribal affiliations. Territorial integrity is challenged by the conflict between the North and the South, ongoing counterterrorism campaigns against AQAP, tribal issues, extensive borders, and US drone attacks. The interior of the country is difficult to police, but as a result of a Yemeni—US—Saudi initiative, the border guard situation has improved, particularly in performing checkpoints, patrols, advanced methods of inspection, and confiscation. Yemen is one of the most at-risk countries for money laundering and terrorist financing. Although laws and institutions exist to combat both, efforts are hindered by conflict, poor financial policies and low commitment to international standards. Control of the Central Bank has been fought over by the Houthis and the government of Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, and the hawala system lacks formal oversight and is used for both legitimate and illegitimate transactions. Yemen's economy has been dependent on the oil sector since the mids, but the sector faces declining productivity. While mineral ore reserves are still significant, the sector lacks investment, and Yemen depends heavily on aid. The Houthis have also enacted a tax regime, resulting in a continued stream of income. A pattern of arbitrary arrests and enforced disappearances has occurred in Yemen. Those targeted suffer torture, ill treatment, are denied access to lawyers and their family, and many detainees are held in secret. The killing of several preachers prompted others to flee, and Houthi militants are accused of hostage-taking, torture, and abuse. The government lacks capacity to protect trafficking victims, who are often incarcerated or deported. Furthermore, Yemen lacks specialized centres for drug-addiction treatment or meaningful crime-prevention measures. The non-governmental organization community within Yemen suffers due to the ongoing conflict, but some organizations have sought to shed light on organized crime. Tribes are involved in security provision, rule of law and justice, but their role in countering rather than enabling organized crime is ambiguous. Press freedom has been curtailed by all parties, and the Houthis have blocked online access, with several online newspapers being restricted to disseminating information via social media. Journalists are subjected to abduction, incarceration without trial, arbitrary detention, threats of kidnapping, arrest, torture, the blocking of news sites, and salary suspension. The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel. A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index. We're constantly working to improve the Index. By participating in this survey, you will be providing us with insights and suggestions that will help us make the Index an even better resource. This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State. The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State. Capital Sanaa. Income group Low income. Population 29,, Geography type Coastal. Criminal markets 5. An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type. Human trafficking 8. Human smuggling 7. Arms trafficking 9. Flora crimes 2. Fauna crimes 4. Non-renewable resource crimes 7. Heroin trade 2. Cocaine trade 2. Cannabis trade 3. Synthetic drug trade 4. Criminal actors 7. An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society. Mafia-style groups 8. Criminal networks 7. State-embedded actors 6. Foreign actors 8. Political leadership and governance 2. Government transparency and accountability 2. International cooperation 3. National policies and laws 2. A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime. Judicial system and detention 1. Law enforcement 2. Territorial integrity 2. Anti-money laundering 2. Economic regulatory capacity 2. Victim and witness support 1. Prevention 2. Non-state actors 2. Analysis Download full profile english. People Human trafficking is a growing phenomenon in Yemen. Trade Yemen has widespread gun ownership and one of the largest arms-trafficking markets in the world, with weapons redirected from military stores or acquired from foreign actors. Criminal Actors Large Yemeni tribes engage in banditry, kidnapping, and have significant weapons arsenals, allowing them to act with impunity and dictate their own governance. Criminal justice and security Yemen lacks a comprehensive justice system, adequate courts, judges, staff and training, and no units focus specifically on organized crime. Economic and financial environment Yemen is one of the most at-risk countries for money laundering and terrorist financing. Civil society and social protection A pattern of arbitrary arrests and enforced disappearances has occurred in Yemen. Read the analysis Listen the podcasts View all events. Next Skip. How to measure organized crime? Read more on globalinitiative. Give us feedback We're constantly working to improve the Index.
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The drug trade also has close ties to the Yemeni conflict. Reportedly, in Houthi-controlled areas, narcotics are very prevalent and can even be found in grocery.
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Most Yemenis chew khat to get through their hungry, war-ravaged days. But that demand doesn't help the country address its food crisis.
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