Webcache Schoolgirls 69 Mu Advv

Webcache Schoolgirls 69 Mu Advv
A.P.H. Publishing Corporation, 2017
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Mar 8, 2009

Club:
Nottingham Forest FC

Yeah!
It seems that Sindelar as the Wunderteam #9 take a bit further the "withdrawning" of the centreforward as it was in the old-fashioned Pyramid CF (pre offside rule change).
That role played by that type of CF it seems a precursor of the role that made worldwide famous stars as Hidegkuti or Di Stefano, but the curious is that actually other player as the austrian in the video looks able to did the further step (not so badly it seems) between the Sindelar role and the Deep Lying CF, before Hidegkuti/Di Stefano made their impact.
I mean the inter-phase between the goalscoring playmaker (striker who can create, lead the offensive) and the role of the omnipresent centreforward (playing at attack, midfield and defense)

La-Máquina , Gregoriak and peterhrt repped this.

This is more about tactics and nominal playing positions (hence no Di Stefano at all, and reference to Hidegkuti and Charlton, but with Kocsis made boldfaced) than great players but maybe good to share.

The last paragraph concludes with:

And with the zone ... But football bites the tail and the two 'mezzeali', separate, come together in the 4-4-2, defensive evolution of the original 4-2-4 brazilian, or 4-3-3 , Which is the mediation of the two modules. The classic director disappears, take over by the universal. Nobody is as great as Johan Cruijff, the prophet of the new coming from Holland. But in their own way, they are also universal Michel Platini, Diego Maradona and Zico, inventors, leaders and executors. And Lothar Matthaus, the constant of a Germany perpetually at the top. The number ten wizard, with all the necessary corrections, continues to be undismayed. His latest interpreter is Roberto Baggio, with another Roberto, Mancini, and with Gianfranco Zola, the brightest talent of the current Italian generation.
The Pyramid

The next great change in football tactics was a move to the formation which would endure for over 50 years, and in some nations much longer. While the Scottish formation provided greater balance than the chaos which went before, it still saw the attack overloaded and resulted in each attacker having little space to play in.

In the 1878 Welsh Cup final Wrexham faced Druids and for them EA Cross (previously a centre-forward) was deployed as a centre-half. By withdrawing one of the forwards into the half-back line, a team could bolster its defensive strength and provided a better balance to the team. Wrexham were vindicated for their innovation, as they defeated Druids 1-0 to claim the cup and before long other teams were following them.

Wrexham v. Druids 1878

------------------Phennah

-------------Murless--ETW Davies

---------A Davies--Cross-- E Evans (Snr)

Edwards--J Davies--Price--Lonham-- E Evans (Jnr)

The newly created centre-half soon became the most important player in the team. Acting as the focal point of the side, the centre-half was expected to link the defence with attack and was consequently involved in the game probably more than any other player.

The addition of the centre-half also radically changed the roles of the other players behind the forward line. As the centre-half slotted in, the right and left-halves (wing-halves) were pushed wider from a previously central role. When out of possession the wing-halves were expected to defend against the opposing wingers, as modern defenders would do. With the wingers covered by the wing-halves, the full-backs were now only expected to defend against the two inside-forwards and the remaining centre-forward.

As passing increasingly came to be accepted there was a gradual change in the role of the forwards. The outside-forwards became more and more providers for the centre-forward, who in British football would be expected to challenge keepers for headers and, if necessary, charge them into the goal. Wingers such as Billy Meredith of Wales, a prolific goal scorer, were increasingly the exception to the rule.

Inside forwards also became more creative as well, and were less and less relied on for goals. Great dribblers such as Nuts Cobbald remained admired, but the new style of inside-forward was more like that famous passer GO Smith than his predecessor.

What the game also began to see more and more was movement to aid the passing. Even under the classical Scottish passing style most players were static when the gave and received the ball. In the early 20th century that style was built on as teams played in triangles, constantly moving into a better position to receive the ball and then play it on. The first team to do it well were Sunderland whose “infernal triangle” would see the trio of Buchan, Mordue and Cuggy gradually progressing further up the pitch by passing the ball between them. Spurs in turn improved on the system, but it was overseas that it was taken to the highest level.

The Uruguay team which dominated world football in the 1920s added even greater movement to the passing style and used their half-backs to dictate periods of possession. With half-backs like Andrade, Gestido and Fernandez they had the most capable players and used inventive inside forwards Scarone and Cea to leave the opposition constantly trying to win back the ball.

Such was the success of the pyramid that it remained in place the world over until the 1930s. In nations such as Austria and Uruguay it remained the system of choice into the 1950s and it was only in the 1960s that printed formations were no longer often shown in that style.
As I am about to create a ranking of the greatest German players since 1900, I am currently in the process of researching the best players in Germany between 1900 and 1930.

There's a vagueness regarding the definition of some players' actual tactical role in a modern view.

When looking at the pyramid and the text describing the tactical roles, I wonder if players that were described as "full backs" in, say, 1912, would be more equivalent to central defenders from today's perspective?

Are pre-WM tactical roles roughly equivalent to the following modern interpretation of tactical terms?

Pre-WM term -> modern equivalent
Full Back -> Central Defender
(Right Back -> Right Central Defender)
(Left Back -> Left Central Defender)
Centre-Half -> Central Midfielder (not Central Defender as in WM)
Half Back -> Full Back
(Right Half Back -> Right Back)
(Left Half Back -< Left Back)
Another question this time regarding the WM of the 1930s:

With the centre-half withdrawing to a central defensive position between the two full backs, these two were moving more lateral as a consequence. But were they so lateral that they should be considered "full backs" in a modern sense? Meaning, they were responsible of dealing with the wingers from that point on (not the half backs) or were they now shadowing the inside right and inside left, thus still being more similar to central defenders than modern full backs?

And if they were tasked to mark the two inside forwards, were they following them when the inside forwards were dropping back (which they probably did far more often than playing in the penalty area). In that case, wouldn't the two "full backs" be more akin to defensive midfielders and not central defenders? Or was it now the half backs that took over marking the inside forwards and thus eschewing the wingers? In that case, one could reason that within the 1930s WM, the half backs were not acting as quasi-modern-day-full backs but as defensive midfielders?

Mar 8, 2009

Club:
Nottingham Forest FC

In short, yes.

But I think that the wing-halves (left and right) were also expected to contribute going forward when in possession.

I know the comparison has been made before but I see them a little bit like how Pep Guardiola sometimes used his full-backs (particularly Alaba and Lahm) at Bayern, stepping into central midfield when in posession and thus allowing the purer wingers (Ribery and Robben) down the flanks.

He also used Kolarov and Zabaleta in that role for Manchester City last season with rather less success.

Mar 8, 2009

Club:
Nottingham Forest FC

I think the full-backs in the 30s were mainly dealing with the wingers, the centre-half (now the centre-back) covered the centre-forward and the wing-halves dealt with the opposing inside-forwards.

That though would vary though and I think in reality sides were simply less rigid in their structure than those we might be used to. In particular of course you had the variance between an inside-forward (like Alex James) who dropped deep and the other inside-forward who remained more of a goal thread, foreshadowing to a degree the switch to 4-2-4.

Oct 21, 2015

Club:
Leeds United AFC

In Germany my understanding is that national coaches Otto Nerz and Sepp Herberger employed WM enthusiastically and encouraged German clubs to follow suit. Most did so, but the most successful club of the 1930s, Schalke 04, ignored their advice and continued with a version of the old system nicknamed kreisel (spinning top). Their coach Gustav Weiser was Austrian, and the Austrians preferred to stay with their short passing game, considering WM too restrictive.

A similar thing happened in England at Wolverhampton Wanderers, who rejected WM and carried on with the old 2-3-5.
Are pre-WM tactical roles roughly equivalent to the following modern interpretation of tactical terms?

Pre-WM term -> modern equivalent
Full Back -> Central Defender
(Right Back -> Right Central Defender)
(Left Back -> Left Central Defender)
Centre-Half -> Central Midfielder (not Central Defender as in WM)
Half Back -> Full Back
(Right Half Back -> Right Back)
(Left Half Back -< Left Back)
I also agree,

For HBs, just considering the offensive minded half backs, could be labeled as Central Mids.
For example: JL.Andrade (40% Right Back, 60% Central Midfielder, in modern times) meanwhile the defensive minded Half backs were (70% Right Back, 30% Central Midfielder).

Those are roughly % estimated, I mean for the HBs it's just a case-by-case analysis.

For the Pyramid FullBacks, the % doing the work of a modern CB is more clear in all cases, roughly could be said they were 75% of the time, doing the work of a central defenders.

Mar 8, 2009

Club:
Nottingham Forest FC

Another way to describe it.

In the WM , most of the time, not always, but frequently, it was a 1v1 :
Right Back vs Left Winger;
Centerback vs Centreforward;
Left Back vs Right Winger;
Right Mid vs Inside Left
Left Mid vs Inside Right

In the Pyramid , it was played with zonal marking; that's mean defenders used to mark an opposing player depending the zone on which they moved.
Defender vs Frequent adversary
Right Full Back deal with: 1st-Centreforward; 2nd-Inside Left; 3rd-Outside Left
Left Full Back deal with: 1st-Inside Right; 2nd-Centreforward; 3rd-Outside Right
Right Half Back deal with: 1st-Outside Left; 2nd-Inside Left; 3rd-Centreforward
Centre Half Back deal with: 1st-Both Inside Forward; 2nd-Centreforward; 3rd-Centre Halfback
Left Half Back deal with: 1st-Outside Right; 2nd-Inside Right; 3rd-Centreforward

But also, the halfbacks had an offensive task when in possesion. It seems that the common of the halves were defensive ones (the destructive type) hardly going further than the central line. Among the international class halves it was easier to found balanced players, and among the elite Half Backs it was easier to found offensive ones (the constructive type), those who thanks to his skills/fitness didn't need to occupy much of his time in the defensive phase to own his rivals and then were more involved in the elaboration of the offensive play, especially when those halves possesed good vision/passing or were fast.
Nice post.

I guess it depended a bit on the set-up and attributes of the attacking players of the opposition. In England I guess a GO Smith would play centre-forward in a different way to later Dixie Dean. European centre-forwards Sindelar, Nejedly I think, Sarosi when playing there, Meazza (pre-Metodo) would not be playing a la Hidegkuti or Pedernera, but still were coming deeper than the inside forwards to construct play more often I think? So in those cases the centre-half and centre-forward might be close together most often (but just in a different way to in WM) and the right-back might primarily/firstly/predominantly mark the inside left, but in a zonal system? I think you have said before though that right backs often acted like the sweeper and last line of defence (Nasazzi for example)?

Fighting for legitimacy: The Zonal Marking Controversy among Spanish Football Managers in the Nineties

Carlos García-Martí
Facultad de Ciencias de la Actividad Física, UPM Madrid

ABSTRACT: In recent years, there has been renewed interest for the sociological and historical frame-work of sports coaching. This paper aims to improve the knowledge about how tactical matters and training methods evolve over time and how national coaching cultures change because of foreign influence and social factors. In particular, we focus on how the introduction of Arrigo Sacchi ‘s ideas about zonal marking and the training methods imported by Dutch managers changed working practice and the professional culture of managers in Spain in the late eighties and nineties. In order to do so, 23 semi-structured interviews were carried out, 10 with former managers and 11 with former footballers from the Spanish first and second division at the time. Spanish football managers in the eighties relied heavily on physical training methods imported from Sports Science and popularized by Eastern Europe managers in the late seventies, but proved their specific football expertise by choosing through intuition the right marks in a man-to-man defense, leaving any other tactical matters to the players. The adoption of Arrigo Sacchi’s complex zonal marking forced them to develop a thorough tactical work which included automation of collective movements and behaviors through new tactical exercises, which in turn forced them to integrate physical, technical and tactical training in ball-centered exercises, inspired by the newly appointed Dutch managers. This modernization process made them adopt a more abstract and rationalized approach to football and reduce the players’ free will, but also made them dependent on players consent and comprehension, which again made them develop communication and pedagogical skills. Tactical ideas evolve and disseminate over time, changing not only how teams perform on the pitch, but also their social relations and professional profiles.

1. INTRODUCTION
The focus of this research is the shifting in
the late eighties and early nineties from man-to-
man marking to zonal marking and the impact
this had among the Spanish professional foot-
ball managers’ community, how they reacted to
it, how they fought against its implications and
how finally they came to terms with it, an evolu-
tion that somehow changed their coaching rou-
tines, their tasks and responsibilities and their
identity. This research is based on two different
approaches. First, it studies the football profes-
sional culture, and second, it addresses the idea
that tactics are part of this professional culture,
that is to say, that they determine social rela-
tionships inside a team.
The professional culture of football has
been described as dominated by a traditional
masculinity and based on spirit, violence, pain
acceptance, obedience, authoritarianism and
patronage, what for British scholars is the shop
floor culture, that is to say, that football teams
reproduce the factory social relations between
the workers and the foreman (Bertrand, 2009;
Cushion & Jones, 2006; Kelly & Waddington,
2006; Llopis, 2008; Parker, 1996; Roderick
2003). Moreover, there is also the craftsman-
ship side of coaching, the privileging of prac-
tical knowledge, and learning by doing, and
the rejection of theoretical notions, studies and
diplomas (Day, 2011; Kelly, 2008). The idea that
football knowledge comes from the football
playing experience, and therefore having been
a footballer is mandatory to become a manager.
Finally, the studies by Potrac and colleagues
(Potrac, Jones and Cushion 2007; Potrac &
Jones, 2009) try to show that coaching is not
only about authoritarianism and verbal abuse,
but also about negotiation and seducing the
various forces inside a club, since the manage-
rial position is always weak and unstable, having
to satisfy the board members, the media, the
public and also the players. There is then a tra-
ditional authority role, based on a patriarchal
relationship and the admitted practical exper-
tise of managers, an authority that must, how-
ever, deal with different pressures and actors in
an unstable position.
As for the tactics, there is not much pub-
lished work but we can highlight Parlebas’
insights about how the same sports are played
differently in each country, giving birth to
the notion of sociogénesis to explain the differ-
ent tactics and national ethos for a same sport
(2003). Also, some authors have mentioned the
relationship between tactics and work organiza-
tion, such as the Marxist Brigauer (1981), the
Spanish Verdú (1980) and, in more contem-
porary work, the chapter by Giulanotti (2000)
dedicated to the matter in his work Football:
A Sociology of the Global Game . Both Verdú and
Giulianotti have reflected on how the tactic evo-
lution mirrors that of work organization, point-
ing out that the WM man-to-man tactics would
be the implementation of Fordist ideas such as
specialization, simplification of tasks and sepa-
ration of manual from intellectual labour, and
that the Dutch Total Football would be the equiv-
alent of post-Fordist organization. Therefore,
the main hypothesis behind this work is that
tactical organization is at least partially socially
determined, and at the same time it determines
the social relationships established inside a
team.

2. METHODS
Using the research team’s professional
acquaintances, a convenience sample was devel-
oped through a snowball technique where the
interviewees were asked to offer a new possi-
ble contact. Sampling maximum variability
was sought, assuring a wide range of biogra-
phies, on-field and off-field status, age and posi-
tions on the field. Information was gathered
through 23 semi-structured interviews with pro-
fessional managers, a physical trainer and foot-
ballers. 13 were face-to-face interviews, while
9 took place through a phone call and another
one by videoconference. Interviews had a min-
imum length of 21 minutes and a maximum
of 110. There were 10 interviews with profes-
sional managers, their ages ranging from 66 to
76 years old, all of them having worked in the
top level Spanish football league, La Liga , the
Spanish Seco
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