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This day was proclaimed on December 7, by the UN General Assembly as a sign of its determination to strengthen activities and cooperation to create a world society free from drug abuse. The decision was taken on the basis of the International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking recommendation, which adopted a comprehensive multidisciplinary action plan to combat drug abuse. Drug addiction and related crime has affected all countries of the world. According to the roughest estimates of experts, from 3 to 4 percent of the world's inhabitants use drugs. These are mainly young people aged 18 to 30, every fifth of them is a woman. Unfortunately, the situation with the distribution of drugs in the world continues to deteriorate. The schemes of their production and sale, transport and financial networks of drug trafficking are improving, the speed and scale are constantly growing. The structure of drug consumption is also changing - new synthetic drugs appear, their formulas are constantly being updated. National laws often fail to respond to these changes. Therefore, the problem of drug addiction is a global threat to the health of the world's population. After all, this is not only the tragedy of an individual or a family. This is also one of the reasons for the demographic crisis, the birth of sick children, the decline in the general health of the nation, as well as the increase in the crime rate around the world. The global quarantine due to the coronavirus has disrupted the drug trade, however, temporary relief is fraught with problems in the near future, when the drug traffic recovers. People will increasingly take illegal work to compensate for the loss of legitimate income. In many countries in all parts of the world, the UN has noted a shortage of entire classes of drugs, rising prices, declining quality and the transition of consumers to synthetic drugs or substitution therapy. In the short term, instability in the drug market could lead to an increase in dangerous drug use and new strategies for drug trafficking groups to overcome the obstacles that have arisen. Drug users are expected to increasingly use the darknet to overcome the effects of personal control, and mail-order drug delivery is expected to become even more popular. Web and dark net markets, social media and secure encrypted communication applications will play a more prominent role in drug users' search for drugs. For individual transactions, home delivery will be popularized, the number of personal transactions and dependence on cash as a form of payment will decrease significantly, and it is possible that such behavioral changes will persist for a long period of time. It is quite obvious that all the innovations of the drug mafia will remain, because they are much more convenient for doing business. No one can say with certainty about the end of the coronavirus pandemic. And therefore, in the fight against drug addiction and drug trafficking, we must be prepared for the following development of events:. Unfortunately, it is impossible to liquidate the drug mafia. But it is possible to restrict her activities. What should we react to and how? The operational environment of the so-called 'new normalcy', although full of challenges for law enforcement agencies, provides an opportunity to intensify investigations of dangerous organized crimes. The task of all law enforcement agencies is not to reduce the activity in the development of high-risk organized crime groups and their leaders, who are engaged in large-scale production and trafficking of drugs. Since the establishment of CARICC, as an interstate body for coordinating the efforts of the competent authorities of the participating States in combating transnational drug-related crime, it will be 14 years. During this period, a lot has been done within the framework of its mandate, but more remains to be done. The Center is a permanent organizer, coordinator and participant of such operations as 'Reflex', 'Substitution', 'Channel' and 'Web'. The use of its own and international information resources enables the Center to be an effective instrument of inter-network cooperation in the international fight against drugs. For the collection, processing and analysis of information in the field of illegal drug trafficking, CARICC has created a Centralized Data Bank, which currently has more than thousand objects. The center carries out a strategic and operational analysis of the drug situation in the region, conducts a number of studies, prepares and distributes regular analytical products. The total number of published bulletins, overviews and newsletters has already exceeded issues. The number of addressees receiving them is also increasing. Various events are held at the Center's sites, bilateral and multilateral meetings are held to exchange information and coordinate joint operational investigative actions between the CARICC member states and the Center's partners. Also, the activation of interaction is facilitated by the annual working meetings of the liaison officers of the CARICC member states, observer states and partners of the Center. CARICC - as an international organization, together with the UNODC, other international organizations and partners, as well as the competent authorities of the participating States and law enforcement agencies of other countries will continue to intensify offensive activities on drug addiction and drug trafficking - a regional and global threat. The future of the whole world and mankind depends on this. Section II, Chapter 1, Article 5. Selection of employees for CARICC is aimed at providing it with highly qualified personnel with high professional level, efficiency and reliability, as well as with the highest standards of morality and ethics. Moreover, the principle of equal representation of citizens of CARICC Member States is taken into account when selecting employees, along with consideration of personal qualifications and professional skills. Section II, Chapter 3, Article As a rule, when announcing a vacancy for a position, several most promising candidates are selected from a multitude of applications submitted for consideration and invited to an interview to the Selection Panel and then are to be tested using special equipment psychophysiological study. However, due to restrictions associated with the pandemic of COVID coronavirus infection this year, candidates could not arrive in the Republic of Kazakhstan to undergo a competitive selection process. Lists of candidates were generated based solely on their professional suitability, achievements and merits. In total, 13 vacancies were reviewed, including 2 vacancies for heads of units of the Centre. It should be noted that this event was well organized. This is a completely new format, but despite this, there were no failures in competitive selection. In accordance with developed schedule, members of the Selection Panel conducted interviews with candidates during three weeks in October. At the end of October all candidates for vacant positions were determined. Initial contract with selected employees is signed for two years with a six-month trial period. Subsequently, the contract may be extended by CARICC Director in agreement with the sending country for one year, but not more than twice in a row taking into account initial contract, the total period of service is not more than four years. We are hopeful that a new page in the history of the Centre will be full of exciting prospects, work will be fruitful, and all planned actions will be implemented. The Centre house headquarters for coordinating operations in 5 Central Asian states. A report was presented according to results of the operation in July in Bishkek. During the operation participants seized a total of more than 55 tons of drugs. CARICC provided assistance in 10 short-term anti-drug operations in , of which 6 were successfully implemented. At the same time, about Extensive work was carried in preparation for organization of a regular training controlled supply of Afghan drugs from Central Asia a country of Western Europe. Based on the study of experience of competent authorities of Afghanistan, China and Iran, recommendations have been developed in the field of countering clandestine drug labs. A comparative analysis of data for opposed to provided by the Counter Narcotics Police of the Ministry of Interior Affairs of Afghanistan was conducted in order to determine trends in production and seizure of opiates in Afghanistan. An analysis of information on cases of interdiction of drug supplies along the Balkan and southern Afghan opiate traffic route was conducted to determine factors indicating a possible reorientation of Afghan drug supply channels. During it, the Centre presented recommendations on informal operational procedures for interaction between international and regional focal points and other related organizations. Following the meeting, an agreement was reached on provision of list of banned amphetamine-type stimulants and NPS from observer states, as well as results of forensic chemical examinations of synthetic drugs for subsequent inclusion in a database created by the Centre. The Centre proactively prepared requests, for which 35 responses were received. This analysis aroused great interest among the National Security Committee of Kazakhstan to existing analytical capacity of the Centre. In , 10, objects were created in the CDB, of which cases related to drug-related crimes by competent authorities, and information from open sources - objects. As part of implementation of a set of measures to create an information and communication system for CARICC, working meetings were held with officers of the DPN of the MIA of RK, and existing architecture of information system of the Centre and the DPN of the MIA of RK were discussed, as well as technical task of the project, analysis and evaluation of technical capabilities for compatibility and identity of communication systems. An autonomous electronic database on revealed methods of concealing drugs has been created. It contains information on drug concealment, accompanied by photos, in the amount of entries. As of December 31, the number of subscribers is 20 people, 98 tweets are published. On the social page of the Centre on Facebook, informational messages were published, the number of subscribers is users. Materials of the meetings of working group of experts were sent to State Parties for further coordination of drafts. The accession procedure is agreed with all states except Tajikistan. The Russian Federation provided suggestions and comments regarding reformatting the draft Agreement into an international non-contractual act, excluding from its text legally binding provisions as well as language inherent in international treaties. Answers from Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan were not received. With regards to financial and logistical support, a number of tasks were carried out for the first time in 10 years of the existence of CARICC, namely: - renovation of the roof above the conference hall and facade of the building with the installation of an electrical heating system for the storm and sediment sewerage of the roof of the building; - replacement of official vehicles; - equipment of premises in accordance with requirements of organization of secret office work; - maintenance of fire alarm systems and purchase and refilling of carbon dioxide and powder fire extinguishers; - preventive testing of electrical equipment and electrical installations of the building. One of the tasks that member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization CSTO , which unites Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan, set for itself, is to conduct special operations to combat transnational drug crime. To organize an effective opposition to this drug threat, it is necessary to more deeply uncover its causal relationships. We have to admit that it was precisely the instability and armed confrontation of the last years that created in distressful Afghanistan ideal conditions for an unprecedented scale of drug production. Thus, the conclusion is obvious that the main cause of global Afghan drug production is the ongoing geopolitical tensions in Afghanistan caused by growing rejection from the population, especially Pashtun tribes, the presence of more than thousand foreign troops in this long-suffering country, inevitably giving rise to many hotbeds of resistance and military microconflicts. The perennial confrontation makes it impossible for the population to survive on traditional agricultural production, forcing peasants to grow unpretentious opium poppy demanded by international criminal groups. That is why Russian and foreign analysts agree that eradication of the drug economy in Afghanistan is possible only when main part of peasants switch to cultivating useful crops, which, unlike the opium poppy, imperatively requires a peaceful life as a condition for more expensive and time-consuming labor, functioning irrigation systems, developed infrastructure and systems for processing, storage, transportation and sales of products, i. Despite a slight reduction in drug production in Afghanistan in caused by drought, there are enormous stocks of opiates produced in previous years in its territory. This undermines demographic potential, delays resources to counter drug crime, treat, rehabilitate and re-socialize people who allow non-medical drug use. Actualization of anti-drug measures of states parties to the Collective Security Treaty began from the moment this document was signed in However, a real breakthrough in the field of practical fight against illicit drug trafficking within the CSTO occurred only ten years later, when a package of relevant decisions was adopted at the session of the Collective Security Council CSC held on April 28, in Dushanbe. The Organization was tasked with strengthening foreign policy integration and expanding areas of counteraction against international terrorism, extremism, organized transnational crime, illegal migration and drug business. The Council made a separate decision on coordination of activities in the anti-drug sector, in accordance with which an Action Plan was developed to combat external drug threat. An international coordination headquarters was established to guide and manage the operation, consisting of representatives of competent authorities of the six CSTO states, national and regional interdepartmental headquarters, operational groups of relevant ministries and departments of the CSTO member states. Competent agencies of Iran, China, Uzbekistan, Ukraine and Turkmenistan were also informed about preparation of the operation, its main tasks, ways of solving them and timing of the operation. The effectiveness of the operation carried out in was recognized as successful, and the United Nations International Narcotics Control Board subsequently recognized it as the largest and most effective in countering Afghan drug trafficking. As a result of these activities, law enforcement agencies of the CSTO member states and observers seized tons of narcotic drugs, psychotropic and potent substances, including Its planning was carried out on the basis of results of preparatory phase, during which an analysis of operational situation was conducted, a set of operational search measures were developed aimed at identifying and blocking channels for smuggling of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, in particular, through the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and exchange of necessary information between interacting authorities was also conducted. As a result of coordinated actions of law enforcement bodies of the participating countries, more than 11 tons kg of drugs were seized, of which 6 tons kg of opium, kg of hashish, 1 ton kg of marijuana, 88 kg of heroin, kg of synthetic drugs, 2 tons kg of other species, including 1 ton kg of morphine and more than 33 kg of psychotropic and potent substances. All this demonstrates broad international recognition of the effectiveness of the CSTO efforts in countering global threat of drugs and indicates high professionalism of structures and special services of the states constantly tackling this most serious challenge to their national security. This document has incorporated all positive experience accumulated on the anti-terrorist track. With its main goal, the Strategy outlines a set of measures aimed at a drastic reduction by of the scale of illicit drug trafficking as well as their non-medical consumption. It is planned to achieve this goal by stemming illegal production and trafficking of drugs, by curtailing cultivation of drug-containing plants and their production in Afghanistan, and also by strengthening border regime, undermining economic foundations of drug-related crime, by combating trafficking of new types of drugs, and uncontrolled psychoactive drugs. The CSTO anti-drug strategy was the first regulatory legal act of its kind adopted in by an international regional organization. After the CSTO in , a similar document was adopted by the SCO, participants of which are no less concerned about the drug threat emanating from Afghanistan and turned into a serious security challenge throughout the Eurasian space. Combining efforts of these two organizations will allow Eurasia to ensure a systematic comprehensive approach to improving architecture of international security undermined by destructive global drug trafficking and to create a powerful barrier to transnational drug crime. Before that, police could surveil distributors as much as they could, identify their connections, caches, etc. The law did not allow us to do this. It was necessary to 'take' the seller, even with a minimum dose. Or let go. This was used by criminals and, checking, they often brought fake or insignificant quantity of prohibited substance to the meeting - barely enough for forensic examination. Over the years, criminals have become accustomed to such an algorithm of investigators. But not for long — crime soon learned to conduct its 'counter-intelligence activities'. So, it is in the 'who is smarter' mode that police operational services worked for many years. Today, many unique methods have appeared on their arsenal, increasing efficiency by several times. One of the most productive, in my opinion, is the study and analysis of risk profile used in tracking large trucking companies, sea containers, railway and air cargo. I will not disclose the method itself here for obvious reasons. In an operation, the results of which I want to share, whole arsenal of police forces and equipment was involved, operatives of several countries worked together to solve the case. For some time interests of Moroccan hashish distributors and Belgian drug cartels supplying synthetic materials to the black market have come together in the Pyrenees. Traffic volumes, methods of transportation and strictest conspiracy of the drug business was astonishing! Anasha was delivered from North Africa into Europe on small boats via Gibraltar. This route was previously well known to border guards and customs. But usually smugglers preferred to work alone, not uniting in gangs. But this time it was different. Number of smuggler was massive and they were organized. Under the cover of night or in fog, dozens of motorboats not controlled by radars went out into the sea, each having a personal route, unloading point was determined with trucks waiting for consignment. Product was instantly overloaded and immediately went deep into the continent. It is clear that all operations were ordered, coordinated and controlled from one center. The final destination of the potion delivery was Russia At the beginning, using risk profile analysis, we determined means of drugs transportation. Gradually, we found out that each batch was sent to Russia on cars filled with briquettes with hashish mixed with synthetic drug. Such a 'brick' weighed from thirty to one hundred and fifty kilograms. Each consignment contained tons of deadly cargo. Ingenious caches In the process of equipping them, not only car trims were filmed. Body elements, technological cavities were opened, gas tanks were altered. The shipment became almost invisible and intangible: when it was treated with chemicals specially developed for drug cartel, it became inaccessible to service dogs. Only thorough, layered, inch by inch, X-ray As if in mockery, narcotic cargo was packed in bright marking materials with the emblems 'Porsche', 'Audi', and Euro. Controlled deliveries made it possible to track routes, transshipment points, identify specific individuals involved in drug trafficking, and establish operational surveillance of them. The apotheosis of the operation was the seizure of five tons of Moroccan hashish and a particularly large load of Belgian synthetics, as well as weapons and ammunition. Following this joint group of police from Spain, Moldova, Belarus, Russia and other countries arrested throughout Europe and in the Russian open spaces already well known to the investigation The leader is clearly facing life sentence Afghan security officials are sounding the alarm. In addition to traditional poppy fields and heroin, the country is rapidly being drawn into the production of synthetic drugs - methamphetamines 'meth' , in no way connected with opium. The situation, in general, was easily predicted: the country that had been fighting for 40 years soon and turned into an international drug nursery was simply doomed to a new round of narconomics and drug expansion. The absence of firm power, transformation of drugs into the main source of income for terrorists, and geopolitics, finally, are not only accompanying, but also factors that specifically determined this course of events.. In , cannabis products from the country were exported in coffins, with a 'load of '. Then the opium poppy bloomed here, soon the drug business reoriented to heroin, and now, a new round - amphetamine-type stimulants and psychoactive substances. And the precursors necessary for their production, obviously, go through the same channels through which they were supplied for heroin laboratories. Spices and other new psychoactive substances, along with methamphetamines, are becoming more and more popular in the global black drug markets. And our country, unfortunately, is no exception. Night Club February seizure of 20 kg spikes in Orto-Sai. Special services operation, which allowed to neutralize an international drug group, - details are still classified Afghanistan, with its highly developed narcostructure and narco-economy will be able to produce tons of new types of drugs, constantly improving this process. In the early s, opium expansion began in the same way, then heroin. I remember first seizures: 5 kg, 15, in a week - already 50, and further, like a snowball. Which for many years believed in their impunity. So, at least at the beginning of the change in the drug price, the former drug infrastructure will be used, the same ways and methods of supply, etc. Mainly, old proven ones, including drug channels implicated in corruption, will be used, and short-term border clashes are not excluded. A certain part of drug smuggling will settle in our country. In this regard, I would like to highlight 3 main points related to this situation to our security forces:. Perhaps, in this regard, we should recall the experience of creating mobile task forces, which include representatives of SBNON, customs, border guards, a specially trained four-legged member of such a mixed crew. Result is more important. Log in Login Username. Remember Me. Log in Log in with Facebook. Legal Basis. Competent Agencies. News Reports Events Articles. Drug situation. Articles 7. Rate this item 1 2 3 4 5 0 votes. And therefore, in the fight against drug addiction and drug trafficking, we must be prepared for the following development of events: - with the opening of state borders, drug traffic is likely to increase; - the main channel for the sale of drugs will remain the darknet, which will tend to increase; - due to the growth of unemployment and lack of opportunities, the chances of poor and disadvantaged people will increase who will turn to illegal activities related to the production or transportation of drugs, thereby increasing the number of drug addicts in the world; Unfortunately, it is impossible to liquidate the drug mafia. Read times. Read more Rate this item 1 2 3 4 5 1 Vote. Section II, Chapter 1, Article 5 Selection of employees for CARICC is aimed at providing it with highly qualified personnel with high professional level, efficiency and reliability, as well as with the highest standards of morality and ethics. Section II, Chapter 3, Article 22 As a rule, when announcing a vacancy for a position, several most promising candidates are selected from a multitude of applications submitted for consideration and invited to an interview to the Selection Panel and then are to be tested using special equipment psychophysiological study. Monday, 11 February Collective Security Treaty Organization - framework of a common safe home. Wednesday, 26 December Pyrenean break. Alexander Zelichenko, Bishkek, December Friday, 27 April Afghanistan: new drug disaster How does this threaten Kyrgyzstan? This includes training of service dogs, mainly focused on detection of opiates and cannabis products. In addition to the main Osh-Bishkek highway, along which the main drug traffic flowed before, one should pay attention to an alternative road passing through the Naryn and Issyk-Kul regions. Its construction is almost complete, it is urgent to create and equip inspection posts, checkpoints. To stop the drug smuggling along an alternative route, it is necessary to immediately select and train specialists - today, for example, only officers of the SBNON are serving in the Naryn region. Study international experience. Although, hand on heart, I am afraid, we will have to rely here mainly on ourselves

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan buying Heroin

Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit. The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands. The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits. The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law. The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing. The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities. The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market. The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market. The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach. The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance. Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership. Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups. The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities. A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime. The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities. Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs. Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime. Uzbekistan is a source and destination country for human trafficking. Despite a notable decrease in forced labour during the annual cotton harvest, instances of nationals subject to this practice persist in several areas. Local officials in some districts continue to impose cotton production quotas, incentivizing recruitment. In the past few years, however, the government has made progress in reducing forced child labour in the cotton fields. Uzbek victims are locally exploited in other ways, including brothels, clubs and private residences. Over half of Uzbek migrant workers avoid the complex bureaucratic processes required to obtain proper documentation in Russia, which makes them vulnerable to human trafficking. Additionally, many migrant workers from Uzbekistan face high risks of trafficking within Russia itself, where migrants are charged high work permit fees that make them vulnerable to debt-based coercion. Corrupt, low-level officials are said to be involved in this market. Uzbekistan is a source of migrant labour to other countries and presumably has a considerable human smuggling market. Given demand for cheap labour in Russia, some Uzbeki nationals are known to migrate to the country irregularly with the help of smugglers. Although the recent economic uncertainty in Russia might push Uzbeki nationals to look for other countries to migrate to. Uzbek nationals travel to Turkey, proceed to Central America and then Mexico to reach the southern US border, along widely used migratory routes. In the days after the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, hundreds of Afghans arrived in Uzbekistan via land and air. Since Uzbekistan is not a signatory to the UN refugee convention, many of those Afghan refugees face the risk of deportation and are vulnerable to crime and corruption in the country. Uzbekistan reports sporadic and unorganized extortion incidents targeting local businesses. Uzbekistan has low levels of illicit arms trading. One contributing factor is the strength of the border monitoring with Tajikistan and Afghanistan, significantly restricting the movement of people. Negative cultural attitudes towards firearms inherited from Soviet times is believed to be the reason behind the low level of privately owned firearms. Trade in counterfeit goods is prevalent in Uzbekistan, especially food products, household chemicals, cosmetics and medicines that can be found in domestic markets. High level of corruption facilitates this illicit trade. The illegal sale and purchase of alcohol and tobacco products is a ubiquitous issue in Uzbekistan, especially in the Fergana region. To fight against the illicit trade in excise goods, the government banned the sale of non-labelled products. Illicit logging appears to be the most prolific flora crime in Uzbekistan. This issue is exacerbated by the need for wood to heat homes and cook food in autumn and winter, when natural gas supplies in many regions are cut off to households and businesses. The government has made efforts to preserve valuable tree species by extending the moratorium on cutting down certain protected species that are not part of the state forest. Despite the prevalence of such illicit activities, there is sporadic evidence highlighting the involvement of organized crime groups in this market. Poaching, illicit trade and possession of protected animals, as well as illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, occur in the country albeit on a smaller scale. The criminal market for fauna-related crime is transnational in nature, which would suggest profits are accrued by domestic and foreign actors alike. Wildlife smuggling also happens along existing drug trade routes. The illicit extraction, smuggling, and mining of natural resources, including gold and other commodities, are common occurrences in Uzbekistan. Although private gold mining was legalized in , illegal mining continues to be prevalent. Given that gold is seen as a safe investment during financial turmoil, the global financial crisis in the wake of the COVID pandemic might have provided more incentives for people to continue with illegal gold extraction. This criminal market is transnational in nature and profits are accrued to domestic and foreign actors alike. Uzbekistan is a transit country for Afghan heroin bound for Russia, and for heroin precursors bound for Afghanistan. The Uzbek market is relatively modest compared to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. This is largely due to tighter controls over the borders with Tajikistan and Afghanistan, which has shifted a significant part of opiate trafficking to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The heroin trade involves more foreign actors than domestic criminal organizations. While corruption is widespread in Uzbekistan, collusion between drug trafficking groups and law enforcement is not pervasive. Furthermore, COVIDrelated issues like less disposable income, lower quality of drugs, an increase in the price of drugs and a decrease in the supply of opiates, have resulted in an overall decrease or at least a change in drug use in Uzbekistan. Cocaine is not widely consumed in Uzbekistan due to the high price of the drug and low purchasing power in the country. Its consumption is limited to wealthy urban residents who use cocaine recreationally. Similarly, cannabis use and cultivation seem to be limited, although the country does act as a transit point for drugs trafficked from Afghanistan to Russia. The consumption, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs, especially tramadol, are all on the rise in Uzbekistan. Organised crime groups are involved in the production of these drugs, which are mostly sold online. In the last year, internet access rates have improved across the country, and the cost of mobile broadband has decreased. This has led to a rise in cyber-dependent crime, with several high profile cyberattacks occurring in During the reporting period, hackers targeted 11 regional authority websites, encrypted databases in a large ministry, and attacked the systems of two insurance companies and one private bank. Even though the government is trying to enhance the security of personal data, certain initiatives are lacking. Financial crimes, especially embezzlement, fraud and the misuse of public funds, committed by both public and private actors are widespread in the country. Uzbekistani political elites and business groups have allegedly been involved in fraudulent practices. Uzbekistan is currently undergoing a series of economic reforms that promote private investment and the privatization of the economy, but this process is accompanied by accusations of corruption and kickbacks. Cases of financial fraud are prevalent in the country. These cases are often related to deceptive offers of work abroad; selling or buying real estate or plots of land; and applying for fake university courses or jobs, among others. It is difficult to distinguish between loose networks, mafia-style groups and state-embedded actors in Uzbekistan since all are intertwined. State-embedded actors are known to be involved in illicit activities and corrupt practices especially in certain industries, including cotton production and the natural gas sector, resulting in significant losses to state resources. That said, collusion between drug traffickers and law enforcement is not common. The influence of loose criminal-style networks has been on the rise in recent years. This increase can be attributed to the growing numbers of these criminal networks, driven by the economic crisis resulting from the COVID pandemic. These networks operate with transnational links to other foreign networks. They tend to operate in major criminal markets like human trafficking, flora crimes, non-renewable resource crimes, the heroin trade and the synthetic drug trade, and they are known to perpetrate medium to high levels of violence. Private sector actors, specifically those who are politically exposed, often launder the proceeds of crime. Business groups with connections to the political elite have expanded at an exponential rate, through preferential commercial relationships with the state or with state-owned entities. Private commercial banks continue to be operated by politically exposed people, shadowy oligarchs and — perhaps most worryingly — individuals implicated in money laundering and corruption scandals. Additionally, former mafia-style groups remnants of the Soviet period have been integrated into the business community where they combine legal and illicit activities and benefit from the protection afforded by certain government representatives. These groups engage in a variety of crimes such as money laundering, extortion, bribery and robbery. Foreign diasporas do not exert control over any of the organized criminal markets in Uzbekistan, and the level of interaction with foreign criminal actors within the country is minimal to moderate. The Uzbekistan government encourages cooperation and interaction among the special services of each of the counties in the Commonwealth of Independent States CIS , including exchange of information and joint activities to combat drug trafficking and organized crime. However, public perception of the Uzbek state itself is poor, as it is perceived to be corrupt and unreliable. Additionally, the democratic process is not independent and not protected from criminal influence. Although the country has low levels of state legitimacy, governance and the efficiency of political leadership have improved steadily over the last decade. Uzbekistan has little state transparency. Public resources are misused to benefit those close to the ruling elite. Corruption is widespread and affects the daily lives of citizens. Legal and institutional reform is needed to ensure meaningful separation of powers and adequate public accountability of government bodies. That being said, the government has a number of anti-corruption and organized crime policies in place. Recent reforms include the development of a database in that contains the names of former corrupt government officials, to prevent their re-employment within the government; and the creation of a national anti-corruption council that includes civil society representatives. Additionally, in , the government launched an electronic platform where public organizations can monitor and evaluate anti-corruption activities. Despite these efforts, however, there are still numerous reports of corruption in the country, especially at a local level. Uzbekistan has ratified most of relevant international treaties related to organize crime, except the Arms Trade Treaty of , and two UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime UNTOC protocols — against the smuggling of migrants and against the illicit manufacture and trafficking in firearms. Though Uzbekistan promotes international cooperation to combat organized crime, its efforts are undermined by corruption and insufficient institutional capacity. Forced labour violations are considered administrative in nature for first offense, with fines levied by the labour inspectorate; repeat offenses are considered criminal. The Uzbek government adopted its first laws related to cyber-security in , but the implementation of these regulations remains ineffective. In line with the entire political system in the country, the judicial system in Uzbekistan is highly corrupt. It is not independent either, despite constitutional provisions. Judges usually act together with prosecutors and the police to produce convictions. As a result of corruption and lack of training, courts do not adequately protect victims of various human rights violations, nor do they bring perpetrators to justice. However, under the new political leadership, the country has embarked on a process of judicial reform: a supreme judicial council has been established to put an end to external pressure and strengthen the system as a whole. Corruption in law enforcement remains rampant through the entire chain of command, including among senior officers. Police detain people on false charges in an attempt to intimidate whistle-blowers and prevent them from exposing corruption. In theory, the state security service and the department responsible for combating corruption, extortion and racketeering have mandates to deal with economic crimes and corruption, but reports suggest that law enforcement authorities are used to implementing corrupt schemes to undermine political and business rivals, and to detain and prosecute business executives, as an integral part of their extortion and expropriation mechanisms. Police violence is also common in the country. In terms of drug control, law enforcement in Uzbekistan continues to focus mainly on the smuggling of narcotics from Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The government has cyber-security and environmental policy divisions in place to keep related criminal activities in check. Given its geographic location in the heart of Central Asia, Uzbekistan is a major transit point for most organized criminal markets. The country is located along major trafficking routes, such as the opium and heroin markets of Afghanistan, which exacerbates its vulnerability to criminal flows. The mountainous terrain on the borders with Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan presents an additional challenge. However, due to the perceived dangers of a spill-over of Islamist insurgency in recent years, protection along the borders with Afghanistan and Tajikistan has increased. The issue of cyber-security is poorly formulated in the strategy, however, and lacks a holistic national approach. Uzbekistan has anti-money laundering AML measures in place, and an interdepartmental commission has been established to adhere to international Financial Action Task Force FATF recommendations to combat money laundering, the financing of terrorism and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The country has made some credible efforts to conduct financial investigations related to organized crime, and during it continued to improve its anti-money laundering framework. In the same year, parliament adopted regulations related to AML information-sharing; it passed a decree on the development of an AML strategy; and it amended legislation on bank secrecy. Despite these efforts, the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing remains quite high, and the long-term effects of prevention efforts are yet to be observed in practice. The capacity of the government to ensure that legitimate businesses are able to operate free from the influence of criminal groups has improved over the past two decades. The state has taken measures to simplify the procedure for registering new businesses, reduce interference by regulatory authorities in business activities, and abolish currency controls. Although the current economic environment allows for businesses to expand, there is still lots of red tape that business owners have to reckon with — in addition to land and property rights not being effectively upheld. The COVID pandemic and its subsequent effects on the global economy have impeded the progress of many governmental reforms and led several private businesses to bankruptcy. The state places some focus on treating and caring for victims of organized crime, but non-state actors are more active in this area. The government has operated as many as centres to assist victims of violence and trafficking, but some of these centres did not provide adequate protection when research was conducted. There have also been ongoing delays with registering NGOs, which has constrained efforts by civil society to monitor and assist victims. The government requires victims to file a criminal complaint with their community authorities to be eligible for government-provided rehabilitation and protection services. However, the majority of identified victims were reluctant to contact or cooperate with law enforcement because of their distrust for the system, and because they feared for their own safety or the safety of their families. The government also lacks a standardized process to identify victims from vulnerable populations and refer them to protective services, especially those subjected to internal trafficking. This has led to potential victims being penalized, particularly those involved in sex work. Despite these negatives, the Uzbekistan government has made some efforts in recent years to increase protection for victims of human trafficking. As of , the government managed around 20 centres for drug treatment and rehabilitation, but these are reported to have limited capabilities. The Uzbekistan government has campaigns in place to ensure that all citizens are aware of their labour rights. With respect to human trafficking, Uzbekistan has maintained its prevention efforts. Prevention efforts against systemic child labour and forced labour in the cotton harvest industry have resulted in a notable decrease in these crimes. Still, cotton production quotas imposed by local officials of some districts inevitably lead to some adults entering into forced labour. The government continued activities under its National Commission on Trafficking in Persons and Forced Labour, even during the pandemic, but there remains a lack of communication and coordination between the commission and civil society, along with an absence of funding. This has led to an overreliance on assistance from NGOs and other international groups. There are whistle-blowing mechanisms in place for certain crimes, such as illicit logging and the distribution and sale of synthetic drugs, but the whistle-blowing role is mainly carried out by journalists, bloggers and environmental activists. Civil society organizations CSOs and independent human rights activists have played an active role in recent years, such as drawing the attention of the international community to the problems of government-compelled forced labour among adults and children during the annual cotton harvest. The government is not open to criticism and officials perceive some CSOs to be hostile. However, there are some instances of cooperation between the government and CSOs, especially in areas related to organized crime. When it comes to non-governmental organizations NGOs , the government has controls in place. While the law allows for freedom of association, the government restricts this by requiring NGOs to obtain permission for their activities from the Ministry of Justice. Media freedom is extremely limited, but there has been some progress on this front: imprisoned journalists have been freed, access to censored websites has been granted, and the process of media registration has improved. Despite this, criticism of government remains out of the question. The state exercises control over all media coverage and requires all media to be registered with the authorities — and to provide copies of publications to the government. The same restrictions extend to independent online media. The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel. A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index. We're constantly working to improve the Index. By participating in this survey, you will be providing us with insights and suggestions that will help us make the Index an even better resource. This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State. The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State. Capital Tashkent. Income group Lower middle income. Population 34,, Geography type Landlocked. GINI Index Criminal markets 4. An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type. Human trafficking 7. Human smuggling 6. Extortion and protection racketeering 4. Arms trafficking 3. Trade in counterfeit goods 4. Illicit trade in excisable goods 5. Flora crimes 3. Fauna crimes 3. Non-renewable resource crimes 7. Heroin trade 6. Cocaine trade 1. Cannabis trade 4. Synthetic drug trade 4. Cyber-dependent crimes 3. Financial crimes 6. Criminal actors 5. An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society. Mafia-style groups 5. Criminal networks 5. State-embedded actors 6. Foreign actors 5. Private sector actors 4. Political leadership and governance 3. Government transparency and accountability 3. International cooperation 4. National policies and laws 4. A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime. Judicial system and detention 3. Law enforcement 3. Territorial integrity 4. Anti-money laundering 3. Economic regulatory capacity 5. Victim and witness support 4. Prevention 5. Non-state actors 3. Analysis Download full profile english. People Uzbekistan is a source and destination country for human trafficking. Trade Uzbekistan has low levels of illicit arms trading. Environment Illicit logging appears to be the most prolific flora crime in Uzbekistan. Drugs Uzbekistan is a transit country for Afghan heroin bound for Russia, and for heroin precursors bound for Afghanistan. Financial Crimes Financial crimes, especially embezzlement, fraud and the misuse of public funds, committed by both public and private actors are widespread in the country. Criminal Actors It is difficult to distinguish between loose networks, mafia-style groups and state-embedded actors in Uzbekistan since all are intertwined. Leadership and governance The Uzbekistan government encourages cooperation and interaction among the special services of each of the counties in the Commonwealth of Independent States CIS , including exchange of information and joint activities to combat drug trafficking and organized crime. Criminal justice and security In line with the entire political system in the country, the judicial system in Uzbekistan is highly corrupt. Economic and financial environment Uzbekistan has anti-money laundering AML measures in place, and an interdepartmental commission has been established to adhere to international Financial Action Task Force FATF recommendations to combat money laundering, the financing of terrorism and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Civil society and social protection The state places some focus on treating and caring for victims of organized crime, but non-state actors are more active in this area. 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Uzbekistan buying Heroin