Ukraine ‘oper­a­tion’ is forced self-defence

Ukraine ‘oper­a­tion’ is forced self-defence

Ukraine was merely chosen by the West as an arena of proxy war

BY RUSLAN GOLUBOVSKIY, Con­sul-Gen­eral of Rus­sia in Cape Town

In 1961, at the height of the Cold War between the USSR and the USA, Yevgeny Yevtushenko, one of the most internationally acclaimed Russian poets of the 20th century, wrote his famous verse “Do the Russians Want War?”. 

The idea to create that poem imbued with the spirit of pacifism arose during his foreign trip abroad, when Yevtushenko experienced firsthand how Russians abroad were considered aggressors and instigators of armed conflicts.

Therefore, the author suggests turning to the Russians themselves for an answer to the question of whether they want war. "Ask those soldiers lying under the birch trees. And their sons will answer you whether the Russians want war," the poet notes. Only 20 years have passed since the start of the World War II, which claimed in the USSR more than 26.6 million lives, and memories of those tragic events are still fresh in people's minds. Therefore, Yevtushenko is convinced that war is an evil that should be avoided. At the same time, the poet emphasizes that Russians really know how to fight and are ready to defend their homeland. 

History teaches us that the most ironic thing about peace is that, more often than not, you have to fight for it. There’s an old Japanese saying that goes “It’s better to be a warrior in a garden than a gardener in a war.” 

With so drastically different at times opinions among political observers about the Special Military Operation (SMO) Russia is conducting in Ukraine all agree at least that after February 24, 2022, when it was started, international politics will never be the same as it used to be before. 

Fortunately, more and more people across the globe begin to realize that the tough decisions taken by the leadership of Russia on that day are an outcome of a long-standing systemic confrontation imposed on Russia by NATO, the culmination of a line of conflict that had been consistently built up over decades.

After the end of the Cold War, Russia did everything possible to build relations of partnership and trust with the West. We voluntarily reduced our military potential, withdrew troops from Eastern Europe, supported the reunification of Germany, and agreed to a new system of international relations based on cooperation rather than bloc confrontation. We were told about the “end of history,” about a united Europe, about a new world without dividing lines. Yet very soon it became clear that these promises were merely a beautiful façade concealing old geopolitical instincts.

NATO’s eastward expansion, which began in the late 1990s, became the first significant signal that the West did not intend to take Russia’s interests into account. Contrary to all assurances, the Alliance moved step by step closer to our borders. Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, then the Baltic states, Romania, Bulgaria - the list expanded, and with it grew the military infrastructure of the bloc. Under the guise of “defensive measures,” bases were deployed, exercises were conducted, and elements of missile defense systems were created. 

Back in 2007, during the Munich Security Conference, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated: “It is obvious that NATO expansion has nothing to do with the modernization of the Alliance or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust.” At the same time, NATO officials repeatedly assured that all of this was “not directed against Russia,” although the facts suggested otherwise.

Moscow repeatedly proposed to stop this dangerous process. We put forward initiatives to create a unified security system in Europe, to provide legal guarantees against the deployment of strike weapons, and to establish equal dialogue. Our proposals remained unanswered. Instead of serious discussion, we received only moralizing lectures about the need for Russia to “accept the rules” that were being developed without participation of our country. Thus, an atmosphere of distrust and strategic uncertainty gradually took shape, in which the interests of one of the world’s largest nuclear powers were simply ignored.

A turning point, a kind of final “dropping of masks,” came with the events in Ukraine in 2014. The coup d’état in Kiev, supported from abroad, radically changed the political course of what had once been a brotherly country and turned it into an instrument of pressure on Russia. The new authorities placed their bet on breaking historical ties, on aggressive nationalism, and on the accelerated incorporation of the country into NATO’s military orbit. For millions of people in Donbas, this resulted in tragedy: shelling, blockades, and deprivation of basic rights. For eight long years, Russia kept calling for the implementation of the Minsk agreements, for the search for compromise, and for respect for the interests of the residents of southeastern Ukraine. But Kiev and its Western patrons chose a different path.

Today it is openly acknowledged by the West that the Minsk agreements were regarded merely as a temporary pause to rearm Ukraine. For example, former French President François Hollande stated in an interview with Ukrainian media: “Since 2014, Ukraine has strengthened its military potential… the Ukrainian army has become different… It is better trained and equipped. This is the merit of the Minsk agreements, in that Kiev received such an opportunity.” The country was deliberately being turned into a military bridgehead, saturated with modern weapons systems, and prepared for a forceful solution to the “Donbas question.” Increasingly loud were the statements about the possible deployment of foreign bases on Ukrainian territory, about joining NATO, and about revising its nuclear-free status. For Russia, this meant the emergence of a time bomb right on its borders—a direct threat, which could be activated at any moment on command from Western capitals.

Under these circumstances, Moscow had no choice but to act. The Special Military Operation became a forced measure of self-defense, aimed at preventing an even larger-scale conflict, protecting the people of Donbas, and eliminating the military risks created by years of NATO expansion policies. Any attempts to portray the SMO as “unprovoked aggression” do not withstand scrutiny of the facts. It became the consequence of the very line of confrontation that the West had stubbornly and consistently pursued.

Four years into the SMO, it has become absolutely clear that what is taking place is not a regional crisis, but a full-scale confrontation between Russia and NATO. Ukraine was merely chosen by the West as an arena of proxy war, in which the resources of the entire Western world—weaponry, finances, intelligence data, information technologies—are being used. Unprecedented sanctions pressure, attempts at economic blockade, and a campaign of international isolation all confirm the strategic nature of the conflict.

However, calculations aimed at weakening and isolating Russia have not been justified. Our country has endured, adapted to new conditions, strengthened its economic sovereignty, and expanded cooperation with the countries of the Global South. The world has turned out to be far more complex and multifaceted than the architects of the unipolar system imagined. More and more countries see in what is happening not a struggle “for democracy,” but an attempt to preserve global dominance by a narrow group of states that are rapidly losing their colonial legacy, built over centuries of open plunder of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

The fourth anniversary of the SMO is also a time to take stock of interim results. Russia has managed to protect its key security interests, to defend its right to an independent foreign policy course, and to prove that it is impossible to speak to it in the language of ultimatums and sanctions. Millions of people who for years lived under shelling and pressure have gained the opportunity to look to the future with hope. A profound process of rethinking the entire system of international relations has taken place, in which the concepts of sovereignty and equality have acquired real substance—not in words, but in deeds.

It is important to emphasize: Russia has never closed the door to diplomacy. However, dialogue is possible only on the condition of respect for the legitimate interests of our country and the rejection of policies of military, financial, or any other form of pressure. A world built on ignoring Russia’s security cannot be either stable or just.

Today it is becoming increasingly obvious that the era of unipolarity is receding into the past. A new, more balanced world order is taking shape, in which every country has the right to its own path of development. It is precisely for this right that Russia is fighting—not only for itself, but also for principles that are important to the overwhelming majority of states on the planet.

I would like to conclude with a quote from Vladimir Putin dated December 20, 2025, from the program “Results of the Year,” combined with the Direct Line and the annual press conference: “We would also very much like to live in the coming [2026] year in conditions of peace and without any military conflicts. And I repeat once again: we would very much like this, we are striving to resolve all contentious issues through negotiations.”

The Russians do not want war. But sometimes you need to fight for peace. 





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