Ukraine War Artillery Warfare Considerations 

Recently some interesting information appeared on the various Russian veterans channels about the battery war.

They stated that the shortage of ammunition and the alleged refusal of artillery support from the Ministry's forces to Wagner was not such, or at least only partially.

The Ministry did not refuse to support the Sturm-Z assault detachments, it simply could not, and this was not because of ammunition, but simply because the Ukrainians would not let them.

By this time it had been more than half a year since the Ukrainians had received a huge and varied arsenal of Western artillery, SPGs and MLRS (including the HIMARS). They had completed training and were beginning to gain experience with them on the battlefield.

This put the Russians, with their generally antiquated artillery at a huge disadvantage, while in the early periods of the war they were able to create "moonscapes", i.e. to lay down guns and incessantly bombard AFU positions, now this was simply impossible. When they tried to do so, they were quickly detected and neutralized by the AFU artillery. 

Once an artillery unit has been fixed, fire is used to suppress the enemy and support friendly troops. Artillery units typically remain in their firing position shifting rapidly from one target to another. This is known in Russian doctrine as ‘maneuver by fire’.

In this situation the Russian artillery had to adapt and be much more mobile, avoiding the use of the same positions for extended periods as well as night fire unless necessary to avoid being located by the thermal and light signature of the flash of the gun, the command structure, with “lines” of guns forming a battery, was broken down into individual guns (this lesson could have been learned from day one from the artillery units of the republics) that operate most of the times independently.

At the level of the now independent guns there were many changes in day-to-day operations, instead of being in the aforementioned "gun lines" in the middle of the field, all guns were moved to the tree lines, where special care was taken to camouflage the gun according to the weather conditions.

Ammunition is stored several hundred meters away, or in the region of 1km, in the event that the roads are impracticable due to the conditions, the ammunition has to be brought in by hand (1 x 152mm ammunition is around 50kg).

Gunners also, now under drone threat, have to pay attention to camouflage their own thermal signal at night, and dig, dig a lot to have a number of positions to alternate or relocate to. The crew generally lives hundreds of meters away from the weapon emplacement, as if they are spotted they will be attacked.

This posed a problem for the Russian assault troops, who were used to a huge volume of fire from both mobile guns and a number of towed guns. At this stage of the war, they simply could not unleash their potential, either through neutralization or suppression of the guns by enemy fire or because the mitigation tactics and strategies adopted made impossible to deliver the previous volumes of fire, they simply could not unleash their potential and support the Sturm-Zs.

Add to this the fact that in late 2022, early 2023, when the battle for the city took place, Russia lacked precision systems on a widespread basis, the pre-war ones had probably been worn out and the industry had not yet made a solid transition to a war production mode.

In other words, in order to cover their advances, they needed volumes of fire that the Russian Army could not provide.

The difference between the amount required and the amount needed was simply paid in blood, using the MediaZone website we can see that even today, at the end of January 2024, 20% of the total identified casualties of the war (40,000) are prisoners and members of PMCs, obviously this number in 2023, closer to the battle, was a higher % of the statistic, since the bulk of the deaths of both groups is in the first 4 months of 2023, which is when the capture of Bakhmut takes place.

We can also see how the prisoner deaths peak in the first two months, while those of the PMC are more in the last two months, probably reflecting the fact that once access to the city was consolidated, it was left to Wagner's highly trained soldiers to fight street to street, in which the enemy artillery could not play such a large role due to the obstacles of the environment. At the same time, the conditions of the pocket created, allowed Russia to deploy its artillery covering the approaches and entrances to the city very effectively and without having to deal with enemy artillery.

The sacrifice of these men, and Ukraine's stubbornness to defend the city at all costs, served the MoD to reorganize its army, acquire new material and troops.

Thus we see how the anecdotal use of the Lancets begins to gain momentum precisely in the last two months of the battle, doubling.

Of course this evidence, that of the published videos is partial (since we don't know how many were actually used), but it clearly speaks of an upward trend in the use of the Lancet family.

Here Russia acquired its first serious and effective counter-battery weapon and the results began to show almost immediately as the AFU artillery could not simply sit back and fire from out of the range of most of its Russian counterparts.

On the other hand, the famous Универсальный Модуль Планирования и Коррекции also known as "Orthodox JDAMs" began to make an appearance in January, replicating the Lancet trajectory of use in small numbers, and then scaling up.

Thus the Russian VKS became active again and greatly increased the ability to attack the Ukrainian rear.

Thus Russia now had precision elements at its disposal.

Counter-Attack

As is well known, the battle of Bakhmut was followed almost immediately by the Ukrainian counter-attack, although we do not know the details, it is logical to think that the AFU attempted some kind of attack with a mixed doctrine of Soviet heritage and new NATO ideas and systems. That means a hybrid that uses volume like the Russian one at the beginning of the war, but including elements of NATO based on precision, especially when it came to suppressing the Russian batteries firing on the advancing troops.

Here, the Ukrainians were very successful, as evidenced by the resignation of Maj Gen Ivan Popov, commander of the 58th army, precisely because of the problems in the artillery war.

However, this Ukrainian advantage was canceled out by other advantages available to the Russians such as a solid network of defensive systems, infantry with ATGMs, the appearance of FPV drones en masse, the use of helicopters to hunt armored columns as well as the use of VKS to accurately attack the rear.

The lancets for their part helped reduce the Ukrainian artillery advantage, the AFU still had the lead, but Russia was closing the gap.

Having summarized the year 2023, it seems appropriate now to talk about the systems.

We have talked about the HIMARS, the Russian counterpart in terms of caliber and role in the military structure would be the Uragan, however unlike the bigger Smerch this one had not received any modernisation plan, it did not have precision munitions or modern communications, control and firing systems. They were slower and inaccurate and not suitable for modern warfare as often even with proper firing solutions they were unable to eliminate the enemy system, either it was gone due to the time it took to aim the weapon or they simply bombarded the area but did not affect the system.

Malka/Pion (203mm): using the ЗОФ44 rocket assisted type ammunition (Активно-реактивный снаряд (АРС)) they can hit at 47500 meters, in general this is a sufficient range to take care of a large part of NATO guns, although at these distances the accuracy is affected (as with the max range of any non guided ammunition be it Russian or NATO), in addition to the fact that the number of 203 mm guns is lower compared to equal or superior NATO systems, we should add that being a larger and older weapon the whole firing process is generally slower. This weapon would be in a good position to engage 39 calibre guns even with Excalibur ammunition, but would be at a disadvantage against 52 calibres such as the Archer and CEASAR unless they were on a fire mission aimed at the Russian rear and therefore closer to the front.

2S5 Hyacinth-S (152 mm): having 2A37 rifled guns with increased pressure limit in the bore channel, are able to fire the standard ЗОФ59 HE without rocket assistance at a range of 30500m, with the rocket-assisted munition ЗОФ30 "Баклан" are capable of reaching up to 33000 metres. As is to be expected, systems are inferior to NATO counterparts for the most part, resulting in longer reaction times. In case of using Krasnopol-M the range does not exceed 20km and with the use of Krasnopol-M2, we obtain a range of 26km.

2S5M (152mm)

In the early 2000s, a Russian upgraded version of the Hyacinth SPG with the 2S5M index and 2A37M gun appeared, which has a slightly higher mass of 28.2 tonnes and a range of 37 km with ЗОФ60 projectile with rocket assistance.

The range of Krasnopol M y M2 remains the same in the original complex.

In addition, the 2S5M version is equipped with the advanced automated fire control system "Mekhanizator-M" with more advanced means of information exchange between the gun software and the head vehicle of the battery's senior officer, which significantly reduced the time required to prepare the SPG for firing at a target.

2S19 Msta-S (152mm): 

It makes use of the 2A64 canon, which provides operation with non assisted shells like the ЗОФ64 or ЗОФ71 at a range of 24700 meters,the rocket assisted ЗОФ61 was developed to increase the range up to 29000 meters.

Upgraded Msta-S under the 2S19M2 Msta-SM2 designation (152mm):

The modernization focused on updating the systems, it received a modern automated guidance and fire control system "Успех-С", greatly reducing reaction times. 

At the same time  the gun received an increased rate of fire of up to 10 rounds per minute. The big but is that it retained the same 2A64 gun, and therefore the 2S19M2 has the same ballistic qualities as the 2S19, providing a firing range of no more than 20 kilometres with Krasnopol-M, 26km with the Krasnopol-M2 shells and the max range of 29km being achieved the unguided, rocket assisted ЗОФ61.

2S43 Malva (152 mm):

In principle the concept is easy, it is a quick, simple and important improvement, but there are no spectacular goals here.

The idea is to mount the 2A64 gun of the "Msta" series on a wheeled truck, the truck is also equipped with an automated guidance and fire control system which helps with reaction times, and of course, the evacuation of the system after a fire mission  is much faster than that of a towed system.

It could be considered a cheap system as it introduces no new capabilities in terms of range, but it will greatly increase the survivability of Russian towed guns as well as reduce reaction times.They will move away from using towed 2A64s to fit them on this chassis to a big extent, since it is a truck wheeled platform, it also cheaper and less resource intensive to produce and maintain than the tracked Msta.

The first serial production batch is reported to have been delivered at the end of October 2023.

To sum up, the longest ranges are provided by the 203 mm ЗОФ44. 

In the more common systems we find a range of 37km if the ЗОФ60 is fired from the 2A37M gun of the upgraded 2S5M Hyacinth and at best 33km for the normal Hyacinth.

For the 2A64 gun at best we will have a range of 29km with the use of the ЗОФ61.

As is well known, Ukraine has received enormous amounts of military aid. In almost all fields the largest assistance programme since the Second World War.

In the case of NATO, due to greater standardization it is quite convenient to group the long artillery in two groups (52 and 39 Calibers) as the NATO weapons of the same Calibers have similar performance characteristics. 

With the Russians we have: 

• L47 on the 2A64 gun of the Msta and on the on the 2A37 gun of the Hyacinth
• L/56.2 on the 2A44 gun of the Pion

We should also add all the Soviet systems inherited or delivered as aid, but as their range is generally similar or inferior to the Russian ones, which have more modern versions of it, I will not add it in the count for the sake of simplicity.

L52:

Caesar

PzH-2000 

Archer

ShKH Zuzana 2

AHS Krab

Units: 160

L39:

AS-90

M109

Units: 200+

In general, we can say that Russia until 2024 was able to deal in counter-artillery "duels" with Soviet or Soviet-line systems and with NATO systems of L39 Calibers, having big problems with L52 calibers.

Of course this is a simplification, but it is fairly indicative.

The max range of L39 weapons is between 30 and 40km, but as with Russian systems (the same physics at work) this depends on the parameters of the barrel, projectile, etc.

For example we find that the FH70 (L39 towed) can use rocket assisted HE ERFB/BB projectiles at a distance of up to 40,800 metres, similar to an Excalibur being fired from the L39 of an M109.

Overall, L39s may have a slight superiority over the current Russian 152mm depending on the models, but the advantage is not overwhelming in the sense that the conditions necessary for Russian guns to defeat NATO L39s can often be met (depending on the particular and relative geography between guns, ammunition used etc.).

Krinki

Earlier in the article I repeated that the Lancet was one of the few effective counter-battery weapons at Russia's disposal until now, and this seems to me to be worth studying in detail.

As I expressed in my channel on December 15th one of the possible reasons for the fixation of the AFU command with Krinki, is not the locality itself, since once the surprise element was lost, it was impossible to join with the AFU forces north, and therefore impossible to develop the beachhead into an operation deeper inside the Russian lines, but the sense of the operation became:

1 - To tie down Russian forces

2 - Destroy Russian materiel

This in turn serves us to observe the course of artillery warfare over the course of the operations in the area. 

As usual, to compare the losses I will use on the one hand the analysis previously done by LostArmour and the Telegram channel "creamy_caprice".

And on the other hand I will use for the analysis of the Russian casualties the source:

https://ukr.warspotting.net/

My criteria for this are 2:

1 - date (1 November to 16 January)

2 - geolocation

With these two data per unit destroyed, the margins of accuracy are high, in stark contrast to sources with unreliable methodologies such as the famous Oryx, with a large error and leading to a huge deviation in statistics and conclusions.

From the Russian analysis we have that:

• 7 episodes were geolocated at a distance of 5-10km from Krinly
• 14 at a distance of 10-15km 
• 7 episodes over 15km.

A total of 28 systems were confirmed destroyed.

The Lancet being responsible for 60.7% of the recorded episodes with confirmed destruction.

In total we have 51 recorded events with either destruction or damage as result.

Interactive map:

https://lostarmour.info/minusov-net#map

Of these only 13 were artillery fire.

The remaining 38 being Lancets

Of the casualties identified, only two were L52s, two Zuzana 2s.

Of the L39 NATO systems destroyed we have:

7x M109 (L39)

5x M777 (L39)

The rest being Soviet line systems, (2S1 and 2S3) and a Czech ShKH vz. 77 

Interestingly both L52 systems were destroyed not by the Lancet but by artillery (likely laser guided Krasnopols), this means they got close to the Russian artillery and came under fire while attempting a fire mission in the Russian rear. So favorable situations still arise for the Russians even against the much superior L52 tier systems. 

I think that in general this confirms the thesis that I have been expressing during the article about the Lancet being the most effective anti-battery weapon available to the Russians, at least in terms of its range, which allows it to be used on more occasions, on the other hand it is remarkable either the resistance of the Lancet to electronic warfare or the lack of it in the AFU.

On the other hand, while the Lancet is in 75% of the total episodes, it is only in 60% of the confirmed destructions, pointing to the known fact that copecages and other mitigation and shielding systems are effective, as well as the relatively low explosive payload of the complex.

We have a discrepancy when comparing the data as the Russian team focused on the Krinki area in particular by establishing a radius around the location.Since there is no such organization in the source for Russian losses, I will select the losses in the same period of time in the entire Kherson oblast. I will count on the one hand the casualties in the whole oblast and on the other hand those within a similar radius to the one drawn by the Russian team.

As for the towed artillery:

1 damaged system

1 destroyed 

Inside Radius: 1

Outside Radius: 1

SPGs:

6 destroyed

Inside Radius: 3

Outside Radius: 1

Unknown: 2

MLRS

(Excluding TOS, as they are not artillery weapons per se)

3 damaged

8 destroyed

Inside Radius: 3

Outside Radius: 8 (4 rear attacks)

Tanks-Artillery

(For more than a year now Russia has been using old tank models, such as the T-62 as artillery, so they should be counted as losses)

2 system damaged

2 destroyed 

Inside Radius: 4

--------------------------------

Total: 23

Destroyed: 17

Damaged: 6

Inside Radius: 11

Outside radius: 10 (4 rearguard attacks)

Unknown: 2

There are several interesting conclusions to be drawn from this:

1 - the % of destruction is higher, in effect, the accuracy of the HIMARS and 155mm artillery of Western systems coupled with a higher explosive charge than the Lancet means that, in the event of a close arrival or impact, the chances of destruction versus damage are much higher. 

Compare 74% destruction vs. 55% destruction by the Russians.

2 - HIMARS remains a formidable system for accurately attacking the rear of the battle line. Here it is worth noting that the battle "line" is about 60km deep, say, if a brigade is fighting in X area, only a small % of it will be in the trench, the rest of the unit scattered in a multitude of locations awaiting rotation to the front line or providing services and support to the combatants, different sources say that the depth of this line is usually up to 60km, which is well within the range of HIMARS.

3 - On the other hand, the most apparent conclusion is that this is one of the first artillery battles Russia has won in a long time.

There is no apparent reason for this in terms of attack systems, so there are two possible culprits:

A - Geography may have helped the Russians, as there was a water barrier that the Ukrainians had to get around this may have been a factor for the Russians, who, for example, could have tried to avoid approaching the river line to hit enemy troop concentrations on the other side and simply bombarded the beachhead from a relatively safe distance. Only a few pieces were destroyed quite close to the front line (T-62s for the most part). 

In turn, this may have forced the AFU to use larger numbers of artillery units than usual in an effort to support the battered troops in the landing zone.

B - The only known new system that has been introduced in the area that we know of is the 1k148 Yastreb counter battery radar, the Russians announced its commissioning around the 2nd of January and the next day the Ukrainians released a video of it being damaged, it was first presented to the world at the 2022 military forum, In general it is unlikely that the system was operational only the day it was announced and most likely it was operating for some time, it is likely that before it was damaged, the system was involved in locating many of the Ukrainian systems that were attacked.

One interesting thing about this system is that it has a range of 40000+ meters compared to 23000 meters for the Zoo-1M radar. And given the close location of the location of its destruction it is almost certain that the introduction of this system alone was largely responsible for the first Russian artillery victory in over a year.

On the other hand, one of the complaints of Russian artillery operators in 2022 was the lack of reconnaissance UAVs of the Orlan-10 and Orlan-30 type, that problem was overcome and those are generally old news, now being a great variety of similar systems. Sometimes the Ukrainians talk about the Russians having come to dominate in this sphere, but it is impossible to know. What it is known with certainty, is that the Ukrainians also have quite a few reconnaissance UAVs and unlike the Russians, they have the capabilities to convert target detection and identification into rapid fire missions at longer ranges.

This is due, as I have been saying, to Russia's lack of medium-range precision strike capability by artillery and rocket forces, so that links to the next part of the article.

Turning the Tide

At the end of September 2023, Putin at a meeting with representatives of the Russian military-industrial complex in Izhevsk made special emphasis on the need to increase production in everything related to counter-battery warfare. This occurred in the context of the end of the counteroffensive and the resignation of Major General Ivan Popov over the same issue (lack of counter-battery capability).

Mainly the tasks to be solved, excluding such systems as detection and localisation radars and speaking purely about the attack are two:

1 - Commissioning of the 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV with 2A88 guns of L52, a task that was solved (coincidentally) shortly after the meeting. 

For example, while the Krasnopol-M2 ammunition can be fired up to around 26000 meters by the guns in service, the range increases to 37000 - 40000 meters if fired from the 2A88.

2 - Acceptance and production of the much improved 152mm Krasnopol-D guided ammunition (which can be guided by laser as previous versions but also via GLONASS.). Fired from the 2A88 has a range of over 65000 meters and from the Russian Army's 2A64 L47 guns used in the Msta a range of 43000-50000 meters is achieved. 

2S35 Koalitsiya-SV

2S35 Koalitsiya-SV with the new liquid cooled 2A88 gun is capable of firing Krasnopol-M2 shells at 37000-40000 meters, Krasnopol-D at 65000+ meters and unguided rocket assisted ЗОФ30 Baklan at 45000 meters, common munitions can be launched up to 35000 - 40000 meters. The initial speed of the munitions is over an impressive 950m/s.

As you can imagine, all systems are modern, it received a modern automated guidance and fire control system, which ensures that the guns can be brought from the marching position to the combat position with preparation for firing within seconds, greatly reducing reaction times, the robotic turret is capable of a rate of fire of 12 to 16 rounds with the implementation of the "fire raid" mode.

Another interesting part of the machine's systems are the characteristic "boxes" on the sides of the main weapon.

These are PESA radar modules, whose main function is to accompany artillery shells after they leave the barrel channel and enter the ascending branch of the trajectory.

Operating in the centimeter X/Ku or millimeter Ka wavelengths, these radars provide accurate determination of flight trajectories in both single mode and "fire raid" mode.

As a result, the crew is able to correct the trajectory in advance (before the first projectile arrives) by adjusting the gun in azimuthal and angular planes. This feature contributes to the reduction of the SPG's stay in the firing position times during a counter-battery “duel”, which, together with the other new systems like the data transfer and targeting system, turns the Koalitsya-SV into a unique counter-battery tool.

Although, in general I am focusing on the cannons, I have also mentioned the role of the HIMARS in counter-battery duties. The Koalitsya will be able to hunt RM-70s and Grads without too much difficulty, which is quite interesting taking into account their common use in Belgorod.

Krasnopol-D

The "Krasnopol-D" has been mentioned throughout the text, and will now be discussed in more detail.

As of 25 December 2023, Alexander Shigin, a representative of the Tula Instrumentation Design Bureau, in an interview with Alexey Egorov, host of the Military Acceptance programme, stated that The company's specialists are close to the final stage of development of several types of long-range 152-mm rocket assisted projectiles based on the ЗОФ39M Krasnopol-M 

It is clear that he is talking about the Krasnopol-D with an inertial navigation unit and GLONASS correction, ammunition will be rocket assisted.

The INS unit provides the projectile with flight trajectory optimisation, while the rocket assistance prolongs the retention of high mean trajectory velocity and kinetic energy. Combined with the high muzzle energy of the 2A88 guns of the Koalitsiya-SV, the range of these guided artillery shells for that SPG can reach well beyond the 65000 meters.

The new shell will as well have semi-active laser homing heads like those present on existing Krasnopol-M/M2, which will allow engaging maneuvering targets with illumination by laser range finders placed on a wide array of UAVs.

As I have been saying throughout the article, Russia has no or extremely limited ground based medium-range precision strike capability, and although there has been progress in this regard, the Russian disadvantage is still quite large.

The Koalitsiya and Krasnopol-D will close this gap to a large extent. Also I think it is worth remembering about what I said in my channel on the 16 of January: 

That we will probably see the use of ammunition analogous to the HIMARS GMLRS but being North Korean, solving the integration problems with a mix of original launchers as well as the recently announced "Revival" modular platform, you can read more about this platform and the original idea to integrate the Korean ammunition into the Russian logistics in these posts in the channel:

https://t.me/the_Right_People/28520

https://t.me/the_Right_People/28521

As well as some additional information about the systems that in theory should have been the HIMAR counterparts, the Uragan MLRS, but whose modernization (Uragan-1M) was for all we know canceled:

https://t.me/the_Right_People/28524

https://t.me/the_Right_People/28525

In either case I believe that during the course of the year we will see:

1 - Increase in the detection capability of enemy systems, with the introduction of a variety of new ground or air based systems and/or an increase in the number of them in the troops, this seems to be the cause or at least partially for what was seen at Krinki.

2 - Russia's increased ability to attack the depth of the battlefield (remember that we can consider the battlefield to be 60km deep in this war) with increased accuracy, many AFU systems that could work relatively calmly will not be able to do so.

3 - The Lancet will cease to be such a prominent counter-battery weapon, partially returning the role to systems more suited to the task and ensuring that a greater % of attacks result in the total destruction of the enemy.

This will mean the loss of one of Ukraine's few remaining advantages, which is the ability to provide significant fire support to troops with artillery and rockets, not that it will simply disappear but that it will be more complicated and the effects for Ukraine will be similar to when Russia lost the ability to deploy its artillery to simply bombard. This in turn will mean more oxygen for Russia to relieve the pressure on its artillery to be able to deploy large volumes of fire again. In other words, Russia does not need to deploy the same number of L52 analogue systems, but enough to prevent them from doing their counter-battery work quietly, thus allowing the older Russian systems to work with their shorter ranges on enemy static defensive positions or on possible offensive units.

Considerations on the possible Ukrainian and NATO response:

It is of special note that due to the superiority of Russian electronic warfare, to date the AFU does not have any Lancet-like systems despite having received in the early stages of the war a large variety and quantity of similar systems such as the Switchblade. 

Western systems in this respect fell easy prey to Russian electronic warfare, which rendered them useless, and the solutions proposed to improve noise resistance have proved incredibly expensive, making the system simply unviable for its intended role. The Lancet strikes the right balance between price, capabilities and requirements. Overall, it is unlikely that Ukraine will be able to acquire a similar system.

As mentioned above, NATO's L39 systems are inferior to the L52.

An interesting characteristic here is that the USA, which of the NATO countries has the largest army, as well as the largest industrial and civilian base, does not have any L52s in service.

Therefore, as the course of the next two years (at least) unfolds, it is entirely up to the European industry to match the Koalitsya as well as to make up for lost L52s. 

This is already a systemic problem and one that cannot be easily solved without a wartime or pre-war economy, as these systems are slow and expensive to produce. In fact as with the German Leopards many European units have simply lost their equipment, in the case of the SPG L52, we have for example the Polish Krab.

Clearly there is an upward trend, as is to be expected.

Soviet-Ukrainian equipment disappears as well as equipment donated by Warsaw Pact countries from the Soviet line (hundreds of T-72M1 for example).

At one point, probably by 2024Q4 around 2/3 of the equipment used by the AFU will be Western, after the buffer of donated stocks disappears by 2025, this will mean that everything on the front line will have to have been produced in the period of the conflict.

In other words, it is necessary for NATO to go into war economy mode to keep pace.

Poland donated 18 and Ukraine signed a contract with Huta Stalowa Wola SA for the purchase of 56 Krabs (in the total L52 count, we used the total number), however the annual production capacity is between 20 and 30 at the absolute maximum. As the Polish army has so far received between 8 and 16 Krabs each year. 

It is possible to transfer more systems to Ukraine, but they would come directly from regular army formations.

As of late 2021, 82 AHS Krab howitzers had been produced out of the initial batch of 122.

These dwindling stocks and units, in the Polish case, had an additional source from which to draw in order to maintain the army's capability, namely Korean industry.

But as we have seen with the recent cancellation of Poland's huge procurement programme due to the impossibility of meeting the payments for the systems, this is no easy task, especially if arms procurement is negotiated like any other good under the laws of the free market.

In this sense, it is likely that North Korea's belligerent rhetoric since the alliance with Russia became public is an effort to put its southern neighbour on alert, preferring to stockpile ammunition and systems rather than send them to Ukraine or to Europe to replenish the systems that are sent to Ukraine.

In other words, of the total number of 160 L52s I mentioned, many have not arrived and others have been destroyed, i.e. Russia does not have to manufacture 160 homologous systems to be on an "equal footing", but an undetermined but certainly much smaller number. 

These calculations can be extended to all types of weapons and to all NATO countries, in fact it is no secret that most of the money from American arms packages stays in the US, to replenish the stock sent.

Here I would like to point out that Western guns are generally made to fire a smaller number of rounds before they lose accuracy or become unsafe to fire. 

In other words, the idea behind their design is to fire small but accurate shots. In the current scenario where most of the fire support is provided by artillery and not by aircraft or tanks, this poses problems. Especially when compared to the durability of Soviet line guns made to fire much more ammunition to provide volume.

In battery warfare it is essential to have better systems in terms of technical characteristics, but when it comes to supporting troops, as we have seen in Krinki, the ability to fire a lot of ammunition is very important, as often you are simply attacking an area rather than a particular identified target.

As I said, increasing the production of these systems requires a huge effort in which money is not even that important, as it would be a matter of bringing the industry into a state of war that would have anti-market measures, such as state price fixing in military contracts.

Moreover, the response should be European-wide and coordinated because of the interconnectedness of their industries and economies, as well as political and social structure.

Over the years Europe has failed to coordinate a response and with the more than guaranteed Hungarian and Slovakian refusal, as well as the growing economic damage in Germany, where the congress recently voted with a large majority NO to the delivery of Taurus missiles, it is unlikely that this coordination and all the necessary changes will take place on a scale that is capable of catching up with the increase in Russian production.

Conclusion

There has been a lot of talk in or near military circles about the strengths and weaknesses of Russian and Western doctrine. 

Opposing the well-known characteristics of volume vs. pressure, speed vs. armor etc. And their load on the industrial system, prices as well as the ability to maintain each doctrine over a long period of time.

As in so many other areas of life, a balanced approach offers the best of both worlds.

During the second half of 2022 and first half of 2023 Ukraine was able to use this mixed approach quite successfully. 

But due to the introduction of new Russian systems, matching or surpassing the best Ukrainian systems, the disappearance of Ukrainian volume-based systems inherited from the Soviet Union, as well as the West's ability to provide volume to Ukraine, Ukraine's artillery capabilities will gradually weaken.

At the same time Russia will be able to use higher quality systems to obtain "gaps" in the Ukrainian order, once these gaps are created, they can be exploited with large volumes of ammunition as in the early stages of the war.

As always, I have tried to keep the text short but informative. I hope you like it and don't forget to subscribe to my telegram channel: https://t.me/the_Right_People