Turkish Arabian Iranian Azeri Armenia Pussy Licking

💣 👉🏻👉🏻👉🏻 ALL INFORMATION CLICK HERE 👈🏻👈🏻👈🏻

Could Turkish involvement in Yemen free Saudi Arabia?
The Muslim Brotherhood and sources close to the Turkish government are arguing that Saudi Arabia could find a face-saving exit from the Yemen conflict it has been looking for by cooperating with Turkey.
Could Turkey help out Saudi Arabia in Yemen? Just 28 months ago, as seen here on Nov. 11, 2018, Turks were chanting slogans and holding posters in protest of Saudi Arabia's actions in Yemen outside the Saudi Consulate. The October 2018 murder of journalist and Saudi critic Jamal Khashoggi inside the consulate had helped push attention to the war in Yemen. - Chris McGrath/Getty Images
In part as a result of the Biden administration’s shifting policies toward Iran and Washington's decision to temporarily freeze and review weapons sales to Saudi Arabia over the Yemeni war, Ankara is aiming to turn Saudi Arabia’s growing international isolation to Turkey's advantage.
Some Syrian opposition sources claim Turkey might transfer Syrian fighters to Yemen to fight alongside the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthi rebels. The immediate interpretation of these claims might be that Turkey is extending an olive branch to Saudi Arabia following a yearslong frostiness in relations.
The second interpretation might be that Ankara is signaling to Tehran Turkey's disgruntlement over Iranian military activities in Iraq and Syria. Iran believes Russia made too many concessions to Turkey on Syria and has overtly expressed its opposition against Turkish military operations in Iraq, prompting diplomatic bickering between Ankara and Tehran.
Possible Turkish involvement in the Yemeni war might provide Saudi Arabia the face-saving exit from the conflict that Riyadh has been looking for. Reportedly, Turkey’s support might also include Turkish armed drones that have been game changers in the Libyan and Azeri-Armenian conflicts.
The Yemeni Al-Islah Party — the Yemeni branch of the Muslim Brotherhood — has been asking Turkey to step into the fray. However, the United Arab Emirates has long opposed the Al-Islah Party’s cooperation in the conflict, while Saudi Arabia has only reluctantly accepted cooperation to date. 
Saudi officials have reportedly been advised to improve ties with Turkey after a chilliness with the Biden administration developed as a result of the administration's positive messages on the Iranian nuclear deal, the release of a CIA report exposing Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s role in the Jamal Khashoggi murder and the decision to lift the Houthis from the US list of foreign terrorist groups. The pro-government Turkish media has also trumpeted a narrative that Riyadh "desperately needs" Turkey.
While the idea of sending Syrian fighters to Yemen may be mere speculation, there have been a number of claims about the matter. Citing a source from the Syrian armed group Sultan Suleiman Shah, the North Press Agency reported that the Syrian National Army, a rebel group backed by Turkey, “has been working for weeks to prepare dozens of militants to send to Yemen.” According to the report, fighters have been offered salaries up to $2,500 a month and were told they were going to be positioned on the Yemeni-Saudi border and not participate in the clashes. It's worth mentioning that Syrian fighters who were sent to Azerbaijan had also been told that they did not have to participate in the fighting, only to find themselves on the front lines.
Similarly, the Violations Documentation Center in Northern Syria said Turkey's intelligence agency assigned an opposition commander to recruit fighters to be sent to Yemen. According to the report, the fighters were offered $2,500 monthly; $100 of this amount would be deducted for document expenses, fighters would receive $400 in cash initially and the remaining $2,000 would be paid to their families after the move to Yemen.
Journalist Lindsey Snell shared a voice recording that reportedly belongs to a Sultan Murad Brigades commander in which he seeks identification documents from his fighters who “wish to go to Yemen.” Snell said in a tweet accompanying the recording, “This happened in the couple weeks before Azerbaijan, too.” This was in reference to the transfer of Syrian fighters to the Azeri-Armenian conflict. Social media is abuzz with similar claims. 
Meanwhile, a Turkish armed drone was downed by Houthi rebels in al-Jawf region, further fanning claims about possible Turkish involvement in the conflict. Houthi military spokesman Col. Yahya Saree said the downed drone was a Turkish-built Vestel Karayel aircraft. 
Yet Saudi Arabia acquired these drones as part of a contract worth $200 million that Vestel Defense signed with Riyadh last year. According to the Saudi General Authority for Defense Industries, Riyadh is aiming to build up to 40 armed drones in five years, with six of them planned to be built in 2021.  
Despite rife speculation, there is no official confirmation that Baykar Makina, the manufacturer of the Bayraktar drones used in Libya and the northern Caucasus, will play a role in the Yemen conflict. 
According to Deutsche Welle Arabic, the Al-Islah party, might have played a mediator role in the recent Saudi Arabia-Turkey rapprochement. Citing former Yemeni Transportation Minister Saleh al Yemeni’s remarks to local Yemeni media, Deutsche Welle Arabic reported that an alliance between Turkey and Saudi Arabia in Yemen was “imminent” after disagreements surfaced between UAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Riyadh. The UAE media, meanwhile, paints these news reports as Muslim Brotherhood propaganda. 
According to the London-based Al Arab newspaper, Turkey, Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood network are relying on increasing concerns of the Saudi side following the US policy shift on the Yemeni war and Houthi rebels’ advances toward the oil- and gas-rich Marib region. The newspaper said the first call for Saudi-Turkish cooperation in Yemen came from one of the Al-Islah Party leaders who lives in Istanbul. Hamid al-Ahmar told Al Jazeera that Saudi Arabia turned to Turkey for advanced weapons after the US weapons freeze.
The UAE, like Egypt, is insisting that Turkey should cut its support to the Muslim Brotherhood to mend relations with Abu Dhabi. However, the Emiratis’ diminishing support for Khalifa Hifter in Libya and its decision to pull back from a military base in Eritrea that was key to Yemeni operations could be a manifestation of a downgrade in the UAE's regional ambitions.
Muslim Brotherhood groups’ desire to draw Turkey into the Yemeni conflict, meanwhile, seems quite clear. Al Jazeera commentator Faisal al Kasim trumpeted that the balance of power on the ground in Yemen would change as soon as “Turkey has started to step into the Yemeni file.” Turkish-based Egyptian journalist Jamal Sultan claimed that Turkish-built Bayrak drones were spotted in Yemeni skies.
Pro-government Turkish media outlets sing a similar tune. The Yeni Safak daily, a governmental mouthpiece, claimed that Saudi Arabia was left alone in the Yemeni conflict. “Saudi Arabia has lost its fear of Turkey,” the paper wrote, “Turkey is the only country that could save Saudi Arabia from the mess it is in.”
Burhanettin Duran — a member of a foreign policy board advising the president and head of the pro-government think-tank SETA — argued that Gulf policies to restrain Iran and Turkey have failed. The Saudis “now need Turkey to fight off Iran’s expansionist policies in the region including in Yemen,” according to Duran. 
The Iranian media also appears to take claims of Turkish involvement in the Yemen conflict seriously. Iran’s official news agency IRNA reported that Saudi authorities have decided to put aside differences with their Turkish counterparts to cooperate with Ankara on the Yemen file.
Although mutual Turkish Saudi interests could spell a new beginning in Ankara-Riyadh ties, the lack of any official acknowledgment is an indication of reluctance and caution on both sides. Defusing a confrontation of some seven years between Turkey and Arab countries requires comprehensive consideration as the “Arab skepticism” that was fanned by Turkey’s expansionist ambitions in the region still is in play and appears to shape Arab countries’ approach to Turkey.
Can Erdogan seize on Israeli-Palestinian crisis to make diplomatic gains?
Fehim Tastekin | Turkey | May 14, 2021
Gazze’den Erdoğan’a gelen diplomasi pası işe yarar mı?
Fehim Tastekin | Turkey | May 14, 2021
Mısır yolunda Türkiye’yi uzun bir test sürüşü bekliyor 
Fehim Tastekin | Turkey | May 7, 2021
Al-Monitor Staff | U.S. | May 17, 2021
Rasha Abou Jalal | Palestine | May 14, 2021
Ali Hashem (Iran Pulse) | Palestine | May 17, 2021
Amberin Zaman | Turkey | May 17, 2021
Mustafa Sonmez | Turkey | May 17, 2021
Amberin Zaman | Turkey | May 18, 2021
Mustafa Sonmez | Turkey | May 17, 2021
Mustafa Sonmez | Turkey | May 17, 2021
Amberin Zaman | Turkey | May 17, 2021
© 2021 Al-Monitor, LLC. All rights reserved.

Iran–Turkey relations refer to the bilateral relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Turkey. The two states' relationship is complex and characterized by periods of both tension and cooperation, as both Iran and Turkey are fighting for influence in the Middle East through supporting opposing proxies as part of the Iran–Turkey proxy conflict.[citation needed] The two countries are also major trade partners and are perceived as mutually interdependent due to geographical proximity as well as historically shared cultural, linguistic, and ethnic traits. Notably, the Kurds, an Iranic ethnic group, and the Iranian Azerbaijanis, a Turkic ethnic group, comprise the second-largest ethnicities of Turkey and Iran, respectively.
Historically, the region has shared empires and conquests by the Parthians, Achaemenids, Sassanids, Seljuks, Safavids, Afsharids, Ottomans, and Qajars. As a Persianate society, the Ottomans in particular were very heavily influenced by Persian culture. This legacy has persisted in modern Turkish culture. Iran and Turkey have long been at odds over conflicts such as those in Syria, Libya, and the Caucasus. However, they also have shared common interests in some instances, such as the issue of Kurdish separatism and the Qatar diplomatic crisis.
Turkey has an embassy in Tehran and consulates in Mashhad, Tabriz and Urmia, while Iran has an embassy in Ankara and consulates in Istanbul, Erzurum and Trabzon.
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei
President Hassan Rouhani
First Vice President Eshaq Jahangiri
$1.471 trillion ($17,662 per capita)
$2.464 trillion ($29,326 per capita)
Numerous times throughout the millennia-long history shared by the two neighboring nations, parts of the territory of Anatolia (or Asia Minor) were conquered by the various empires based in modern-day Iran, including the Median Empire, the Achaemenid Empire, the Parthian Empire, the Sassanian Empire, the Safavid Empire, and the Afsharid Empire, amongst others. In ancient times, the Asia Minor formed one of the core regions of the Achaemenid Empire, with the cities of Sardis and Smyrna in western Anatolia being the most notable. Igdir Province, in what is now Eastern Anatolia, formed part of Qajar Iran up to the outcome of the Russo-Persian War (1826-1828) and the ratified Treaty of Turkmenchay.
Various empires based in what is now Turkey made inroads into what is now Iran, such as the Byzantine Empire, and the Ottoman Empire.
Iran's second major ethnic group is the Azerbaijanis, a Turkic people; there are also other Turkic peoples in Iran such as Turkmens and Qashqai people. Turks and Iranians share a common cultural heritage, known as the Turko-Persian tradition, which was a prominent characteristic of the Ghaznavid (977–1186), Seljuk (1037–1194), Sultanate of Rum (1077–1307), Ottoman (1299–1923), Timurid (1370–1507), Kara Koyunlu (1374–1468), Ak Koyunlu (1378–1501), and Safavid (1501–1736) Empires.
On 22 April 1926, the First "Treaty of Friendship" between Iran and Turkey was signed in Tehran. The basic principles included friendship, neutrality and non-aggression towards each other. The agreement also included possible joint action against groups who would try to disturb peace and security or who would try to overthrow either country's government. This policy was indirectly aimed at the internal problems both countries had with their Kurdish minorities.
On 23 January 1932, the first definitive frontier treaty between Turkey and Iran was signed in Tehran. The border between Turkey and Iran is one of the oldest in the world and has stayed more or less the same since the Battle of Chaldiran in 1514, and the Treaty of Zuhab. The 1932 treaty thus formalized a centuries-old status quo. On the same day, the countries signed a new Treaty of Friendship, as well as a Treaty of Conciliation, Judicial Settlement and Arbitration.
Between 16 June and 2 July 1934, Reza Shah Pahlavi visited Turkey with several high-ranking officials, including General Hasan Arfa (at the invitation of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk). Several regions in Turkey were visited and attempts at close friendship and cooperation between the two leaders were made. Reza Shah was reportedly impressed by the republic's modernization reforms and he saw this as an example for his own country.
On 8 July 1937, a non-aggression pact was signed between Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan, which later became known as the Treaty of Saadabad. The purpose of this agreement was to ensure security and peace in the Middle East.
In August 1955, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), a mutual security pact between Iran, Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan and Britain was established.
In July 1964, the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), aimed at joint economic projects between Iran, Turkey and Pakistan, was established.
A period of coldness passed after the 1979 Iranian Revolution which caused major changes in Iran and the Middle Eastern status quo. Today, Iran and Turkey closely cooperate in a wide variety of fields, such as fighting terrorism, drug trafficking, and promoting stability in Iraq and Central Asia. However, the two countries have competed for influence since the 1990s; this has been escalating since the 2010s in various fronts across MENA and South Asia.
In May 2010, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan made an unscheduled trip to Tehran in coordination with Brazilian President Lula da Silva to make an agreement to outsource Iranian uranium enrichment to his country to avoid further sanctions on Iran.[1] After the agreement, in support of Iran, Erdogan turned the question back on the international community: "In fact, there is no nuclear weapon in Iran now, but Israel, which is also located in our region, possesses nuclear arms. Turkey is the same distance from both of them. What has the international community said against Israel so far? Is this the superiority of law or the law of superiors?"[2]
The decision of Turkey to host a radar system to track missiles launched from Iran has been seen by the Iranians as a serious break in relations.[3]
In a 2012 Pew Research Global Attitudes Survey, 54% of Turks oppose Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons, 46% consider a nuclear-armed Iran somewhat of a threat and 26% support the use of military force to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons.[4] 37% of Turks believe that Iran is not a threat at all, the highest percentage between surveyed countries.[4] Only 34% of Turkey's population approves of tougher sanctions on Iran, compared to 52% of Turks disapproving of sanctions.[4]
Turkey, the largest NATO member in the region, hosted the establishment of a NATO missile shield in September 2011 which has caused a crisis between Turkey and Iran. Iran claimed that the missile shield is a US plot to protect Israel from any counter-attack should Israel target Iran's nuclear facilities. In addition, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stated that Turkey should rethink its policies over Syria, the missile shield, and promotion of secularism over the Arab world following the Arab Spring.[5]
Iranian Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi also expressed his opinion over the situation: "the behaviour of Turkish statesmen towards Syria and Iran is wrong and, I believe, they are acting in line with the goals of America," adding that "if Turkey does not distance itself from this unconventional political behaviour it will have both the Turkish people turning away from it domestically and the neighbouring countries of Syria, Iraq and Iran reassessing their political ties."[5]
Turkey stated that the NATO missile system neither causes a threat or targets any particular nation.[6][7] Turkish Minister of National Defense, İsmet Yılmaz, insisted that the system's aim is to secure Europe, as well as for the security of Turkey.[8]
On October 23, 2011, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned Iran over the United States' presence in Turkey, saying that "Iran would be badly miscalculating if they did not look at the entire region and all of our presence in many countries, both in bases and in training with NATO allies, like Turkey.”[9]
In November 2011, the head of the Iranian Guard's aerospace division threatened to strike Turkey if other countries attacked Iran.[10]
In the past, Turkey's ties with Israel have caused various disagreements between Ankara and Tehran. However, Turkey's neutral stance with regards to the disputes between Israel and Iran has secured the maintenance of friendly bilateral relations. The growing trade between Turkey and Iran indicates the two countries’ willingness to strengthen mutual ties.
Turkey's relations with Israel have deteriorated since the Gaza War (2008–09), the Gaza flotilla raid (2010) and the 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict. From 2010 to 2016, Turkey had no diplomatic relations with Israel at the ambassadorial level. However, on 28 June 2016, Turkey and Israel signed an agreement to normalize relations, which included a $20 million compensation fund from Israel to Turkish families affected by the Gaza-bound flotilla attack, an eventual return of ambassadors and initial talks of a natural gas pipeline.
Iran's relations with Turkey have occasionally soured over the Turkish AKP government's active involvement in regional disputes between Shia and Sunni groups since the dawn of the Arab Spring.[11] Iran firmly backs the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad (formed mostly of Alawites), while the AKP government in Turkey (which has its roots in political Islam) supports the Syrian opposition (formed mostly of Sunni Muslims).
Both Turkey and Iran supported the Egyptian revolution of 2011 and the subsequent Mohamed Morsi government, and condemned the 2013 Egyptian coup d'état.[12][13]
During the 2015 military intervention in Yemen, Iran and Turkey supported rival groups (Shia and Sunni, respectively), which led to official arguments between Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Mohamm
Latin Beat
Deep Hole Machining
Korean Sexy Dance
Hidden Holes
Doggy Handjob
Turkey and Iran: frenemies in the Middle East | The Strategist
Could Turkish involvement in Yemen free Saudi Arabia? - Al ...
Iran–Turkey relations - Wikipedia
Nagorno-Karabakh: The Armenian-Azeri 'information wa…
Old Azeri - Wikipedia
Azerbaijan to buy armed drones from Turkey
While Turkey Encourages Karabakh Violence, Iran Has Mu…
Korg Pa800 Set Armenian - University of Missouri
Turkish Arabian Iranian Azeri Armenia Pussy Licking