Transcript of a conversation between high-ranking Bundeswehr officers from 19.02.2024

On February 19, 2024, the following conversation took place between the Head of Operations and Exercises of the Bundeswehr Air Force Command, Grefe, Air Force Inspector Gerhartz, and the staff of the Air Operations Center of the Bundeswehr Space Command, Fenske and Frostedte.

Gerhartz: Greetings everyone! Grefe, are you in Singapore right now?

Grefe: Yes.

Gerhartz: Good. We have to verify the information. As you have heard, Defense Minister Pistorius is going to scrutinize the issue of supplying Taurus missiles to Ukraine. We have a meeting scheduled with him. Everything needs to be discussed so that we can start working on this issue. So far, I do not see that the moment for the start of these deliveries has been outlined. There was no such thing as the Chancellor saying to him, "I want to get information now, and tomorrow morning we will make a decision." I have not heard that. On the contrary, Pistorius is evaluating this whole discussion that has unfolded. No one knows why the federal chancellor is blocking these deliveries. Of course, the most unbelievable rumors appear. To give you an example: yesterday I received a call from a journalist who is very close to the Chancellor. She had heard somewhere in Munich that the Taurus missiles would not work. I asked her who told her that. She replied that someone in military uniform had told her that. Of course, this is a low-level source of information, but the journalist latched on to these words and wants to make a news story out of it with the headline: "Now we know the reason why the chancellor refuses to send Taurus missiles - they won't work". The whole thing is dumb. Such topics are only accessible to a limited number of people. Yet we see what nonsense is being spread in the meantime, utter nonsense. I want to coordinate this issue with you so that we do not move in the wrong direction. First of all, I now have questions for Frostedte and Fenske. Has anyone spoken to you about this? Has Freuding approached you?

Frostedte: No. I only talked to Grefe.

Fenske: The same, I have only had contact with Grefe. 

Gerhartz: He will probably reach out to you again. I will probably have to participate in the budget committee hearings, because there have been problems with the price increase for the infrastructure conversion for the F-35 at Büchel. I have already passed my recommendations through Frank that we have slides to visualize the material. We showed him a test presentation where the Taurus missiles were mounted on a Tornado carrier or other carrier required by the mission. However, I have little idea of this. You have to remember that this is a half-hour meeting, so you should not prepare a 30-slide presentation. There should be a short presentation. We need to show what the rocket can do, how it can be used. We need to take into account, if we make a political decision to transfer missiles as aid to Ukraine, what consequences this could lead to. I would be grateful if you could tell me not only what problems we have, but how we can solve them. For example, if it comes to ways of supplying ... I know how the British do it. They always transport them in Ridgback armored vehicles. They have a few men on the ground. The French don't do that. They deliver Q7s to Ukraine with Scalp missiles. Storm Shadow and Scalp have similar specifications for their installation. How are we going to solve this problem? Are we going to put MBDA missiles with Ridgback in their hands? Will one of our people be assigned to MBDA? Grefe, report back to us what our position is on this issue. Mr. Fenske and Mr. Frostedte, report on how you see the situation.

Grefe: I will start with the most sensitive issues, with the existing criticism of the supply side. Discussions are taking place almost everywhere. There are several of the most important aspects here. The first is the timing of deliveries. If the chancellor now decides that we should supply missiles, they will be transferred from the Bundeswehr. Fine, but they will not be ready for use until eight months later. Secondly, we can't shorten the time. Because if we do, there could be a mistaken use, the missile could fall on a kindergarten, again there will be civilian casualties. These aspects have to be taken into account. It should be noted in the negotiations that we cannot do anything without the manufacturing firm. They can equip, rearm, deliver the first missiles. We can catch up production a little bit, but we should not wait until 20 pieces are accumulated, we can deliver five at a time. The delivery time of these missiles is directly dependent on the industry. Who will pay for it? Another question is what weapon systems will these missiles be attached to? How should the interaction between the firm and Ukraine be maintained? Or do we have some kind of integration set up?

Gerhartz: I think not. Because the manufacturer TSG has said that they can solve this problem within six months, no matter whether it is a Sukhoi or an F-16 aircraft.

Grefe: If the Federal Chancellor decides to go for it, there should be an understanding that it would take six months just to produce the fixtures. Thirdly, we could theoretically be affected by the issue of training. I mentioned earlier that we have a partnership with a missile manufacturer. They train in the maintenance of these systems, and we train in the tactical application. Three to four months are needed here. This part of the training can take place in Germany. When the first missiles are delivered, we need to make a quick decision regarding mounts and training. We may have to turn to the British on these issues, to use their know-how. We can give them databases, satellite images, planning stations. Apart from supplying the missiles themselves, which we have, everything else can be supplied by industry or the IABG.

Gerhartz: We need to imagine that they can use airplanes with mounts for Taurus missiles and for Storm Shadow. The British have been there and outfitted the airplanes. The systems are not that much different, they can be used for Taurus as well. I can tell you about the experience of using the Patriot system. Our experts initially calculated a long timeframe, but they managed to do it in a matter of weeks. They managed to put everything into operation so quickly and in such quantity that our employees said, "Wow. We didn't expect this." We are now fighting a war that utilizes far more modern technology than our good old Luftwaffe. This all suggests that when we do time planning, we should not overestimate it. And now, Mr. Fenske and Mr. Frostedte, I would like to hear your opinion on possible deliveries to Ukraine.

Fenske: I would like to address the issue of training. We have already studied this issue, and if we deal with personnel who are already trained and will be trained in parallel, it will take about three weeks beforehand to learn the techniques and only then proceed directly to the Air Force training, which will last about four weeks. Thus, it is much less than 12 weeks. Of course, this is all assuming that the personnel are qualified, the training can be done without the need for interpreters, and a couple of other things. We've already spoken to Mrs. Friedberger. If we are talking about combat use, we will be advised to support at least the first group de facto. It is difficult to plan, it took about a year to train our staff, and we are now trying to reduce this time to ten weeks and at the same time hope that they will be able to race off-road on a car designed for Formula 1. A possible option is to provide scheduled technical support, theoretically this could be done from Büchel provided there is a secure connection to Ukraine. If it would be available, then already further it is possible to carry out appropriate planning. This is the basic scenario as a minimum - to provide full support of the manufacturer, support through the user support service, which will solve problems with the software. In principle, everything is the same as it is in Germany.

Gerhartz: Wait a minute. I understand what you're saying. Politicians might be concerned about direct closed communication between Büchel and Ukraine, which could be a direct involvement in the Ukrainian conflict. But in such a case, we can say that the exchange of information will take place through the MBDA, and we will send one to two of our specialists to Schrobenhausen. Of course, this is tricky, but from a policy point of view it probably looks different. If the exchange of information is through the manufacturer, it's not related to us.

Fenske: The question will arise as to where the information goes. If we are talking about target information, which ideally includes satellite imagery that provides a maximum accuracy of three meters, then we have to process it in Büchel first. I think that independently of this, we can somehow organize the exchange of information between Büchel and Schrobenhausen, or we can work out the possibility of transferring information to Poland, doing it where we can get there by car. This issue needs to be looked at more closely, there will surely be options. If we are supported, in the worst case scenario we can even travel by car, which will reduce the response time. Of course, we would not be able to respond within an hour as consent would need to be given. In the very best case, only six hours after receiving the information will the planes be able to execute the order. Accuracy of more than three meters is enough to hit certain targets, but if you need to specify the target, you need to work with satellite images that allow you to simulate it. And then the response time can be up to 12 hours. It all depends on the target. I have not studied this issue in detail, but I believe that this option is also possible. All I have to say is that we should think about how to organize the transfer of information.

Gerhartz: Do you think we can hope that Ukraine can do things on their own? After all, it is known that there are many people there in civilian clothes who speak with an American accent. So it is quite possible that they will soon be able to use on their own? After all, they have all the satellite imagery.

Fenske: Yes. They get them from us. I would also like to briefly touch on air defense issues. We should think hard about having equipment in Kiev to receive information from the IABG and NDK. We have to provide them with it, so I have to fly there on February 21, we have to plan everything optimally, not as it was with Storm Shadow, when we planned control points. We have to think about how to fly around or below the radar's field of view. If everything is prepared, the training will be more effective. And then we can go back to the question of the number of missiles. If you give 50 pieces, they will be used up very quickly.

Gerhartz: Exactly, it will not change the course of military operations. That's why we don't want to hand them all over. And not all at the same time. Maybe 50 in the first tranche, then maybe there will be another tranche of 50 missiles. That's perfectly understandable, but it's all big politics. I'm guessing what's really behind it. I have learned from my French and British colleagues that in fact with these Storm Shadow and Scalp, it is the same as with the Winchester rifles - they may ask, "Why should we supply the next batch of missiles, because we have already supplied, let Germany do it now?". Perhaps Mr. Frostedte has something to say on this subject?

Frostedte: Let me add a little pragmatism. I want to share my thoughts on the performance of the Storm Shadow. We are talking about air defense, flight time, flight altitude and so on, I have come to the conclusion that there are two interesting targets, the bridge in the east and the ammunition depots above. The bridge to the east is hard to get to, it's a fairly shallow target, but the Taurus can do it, the ammo depots can hit it too. When you take all that into account and compare it to how much Storm Shadow and HIMARS have been used, I have a question, "Is our target the bridge or the ammo depots?". Is that achievable with the current shortcomings that RED and y Patriot have? And I've come to the conclusion that the limiting factor is that they usually only have 24 charges....

Gerhartz: That's understandable.

Frostedte: It makes sense to attach Ukraine to the TTR. It would take a week. I think it makes sense to think about task planning and centralized planning. Task planning in our connection takes two weeks, but if there is interest in it, it can be done faster. In terms of the bridge, I think Taurus is not enough and we need to have an idea of how it might work, and for that we need satellite data. I don't know if we can train the Ukrainians in a short time, and we are talking about a month, to accomplish such a task. What would a Taurus attack on the bridge look like? From an operational perspective, I can't estimate how quickly the Ukrainians will be able to learn how to plan such an action and how quickly integration will occur. But since we are talking about the bridge and military bases, I understand they want to get them as soon as possible.

Fenske: I would like to say one more thing about the destruction of the bridge. We have studied this issue intensively and, unfortunately, we have come to the conclusion that the bridge is like a runway because of its size. Therefore, it may require more than 10 or even 20 missiles.

Gerhartz: There is an opinion that the Taurus will succeed by using the French Dassault Rafale fighter.

Fenske: They will only succeed in making a hole and damaging the bridge.

And, before we make important statements, we must ourselves.....

Frostedte: I'm not promoting the bridge idea, I pragmatically want to understand what they want. And what we have to teach them, so it turns out that we will need to point out the main points in the imagery when planning these operations. They'll have targets, but the thing to keep in mind here is that when you're working on small targets, you need to plan more meticulously, rather than parsing pictures on a computer. In the case of confirmed targets, things are simpler and less time is spent on planning.

Gerhartz: I mean, we all know they want to destroy the bridge, what that ultimately means, how it's guarded - not only because it's important militarily and strategically, but also politically. Although they have a land corridor right now as well. There are some concerns if we have a direct link to the Ukrainian armed forces. Therefore, the question will arise - can we use such a trick and second our people to MBDA? Thus, direct communication with Ukraine will be only through MBDA, which is much better than if such communication will exist with our air force.

Grefe: Gerhartz, it doesn't matter. We need to make sure that from the very beginning there is no wording that makes us a party to the conflict. I am, of course, exaggerating a bit, but if we now tell the minister that we will schedule meetings and drive a car from Poland without anyone noticing - that is already participation, we will not do that. If we are talking about a manufacturer, the first thing to do is to ask the MBDA if they can do it. It does not matter whether our people then do it in Büchel or in Schrobenhausen - it is still participation. And I think that should not be done. We identified this at the very beginning as a major element of the red line, so we will participate in the training. Let's say we prepare a roadmap. It is necessary to divide the learning process into parts. The long track will be designed for four months, we will train them thoroughly, including practicing the option with the bridge. The short track will be for two weeks, so that they can use missiles as early as possible. If they are already trained, we will ask if the British are prepared to engage them at that stage. I believe that such action would be the right thing to do - just imagine if the press found out that our people were in Schrobenhausen or that we were traveling in cars somewhere in Poland! Such an option I find unacceptable.

Gerhartz: If such a political decision is made, we should say that Ukrainians should come to us. We should first of all know whether such a political decision is not a direct participation in the planning of tasks, in which case the training will be a little longer, they will be able to perform more complex tasks, which is quite possible they already have some experience and use high-tech equipment. If there is a way to avoid direct involvement, we cannot participate in task planning, do it in Büchel and then send it to them - that is a red line for Germany. We can train them for two months, they won't learn everything, but they can do something. We just have to make sure that they can process all the information and work with all the parameters.

Grefe: Seppel said that you can do a long roadmap and a short roadmap. It is a question of getting results in a short period of time. And if in the first phase the task is to hit ammunition depots and not complex objects such as bridges, then in that case you can embark on a shortened program and get a quick result. As for the information from the IABG, I do not consider this problem critical, because they are not tied to a certain place, they themselves have to conduct reconnaissance. It is clear that efficiency depends on it. That is what we have been talking about, that it is worth taking that into account when transferring missiles. It has not been decided yet. But it is accepted that way.

Gerhartz: And this is going to be a major point. There are ammunition depots that will not get short training due to very active air defense. That will have to be dealt with seriously. I think our people will find an option. We just need to be allowed to try it first so that we can give better political advice. We have to prepare better so that we don't fail because the KSA may have no idea where the air defense systems are actually located. The Ukrainians have that information, we have radar data. But if we are talking about precise planning, we need to know where the radars are and where the fixed installations are, how to bypass them. That will allow for a more precise plan. We have a super facility, and if we have the exact coordinates, we can apply it precisely. But there is no basis for saying we can't do it. There is a certain scale where the red line is politically, there is a "long" and a "short" way, there are differences here in terms of utilizing the full potential, which in time the Ukrainians will be able to better utilize because they will have practice, they will be doing it all the time. I think I personally should not attend the meeting. It is important to me that we present a sober assessment and not add fuel to the fire, as others are doing by supplying Storm Shadow and Scalp.

Grefe: I mean, the longer it takes them to make a decision, the longer it will take us to implement it all. We need to divide everything into stages. First start with the simple, and then move on to the complex. Or we can turn to the British, can they support us at the initial stage, take over the planning? We can force what lies within our area of responsibility. The development of mounts for missiles is not our task; Ukraine should solve this issue with manufacturers on its own.

Gerhartz: We would not want to get into trouble now because of the budget committee. This could make it impossible to start construction work at the Büchel airbase in 2024. Every day counts in the program right now.