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Syria is central to the current shape of Turkey-Russia relations. It offers a model of partnership for both countries in a context where their interests are competitive. However, the Syrian-centric cooperation between Turkey and Russia is also special and is thus unlikely to be replicated elsewhere due to structural constraints and contextual nuances. The limits of the Syrian-style model of cooperation between Ankara and Moscow can be observed in Libya as well as Nagorno-Karabakh. However, if the current shape of relations endures much longer, these personalised relations will gain structural foundations. A major problem for Turkey in its relations with Russia remains the asymmetry, even if interdependent, in favour of Moscow. Yet, the nature of asymmetry is dynamic and subject to change, as Turkey has engaged in what can be termed dependency reduction on Russia, both geopolitically and structurally energy-wise. Developments at the broader international level, a new administration in the US, and rising tension between Ukraine and Russia indicate that Turkey would face more constraints and higher costs for its hitherto geopolitical balancing act between the West and Russia. The close relations in recent years between Ankara and Moscow also point to the need for Turkey and the West to redefine the nature of their relations, as the Cold War framework of Turkey-US relations and the accession framework of Turkish-European relations increasingly appear to be ill-suited to the present realities. Not in My Backyard. Turkey is recalibrating its foreign and regional policy at a time when the Middle East is undergoing a major transformation and restructuring. Likewise, Russia appears to be reformulating its place in the international system at a time when the nature and contours of the post—Cold War system are becoming less and less recognisable. Therefore, both Turkey and Russia are redefining their regional and international roles at the same time. From Syria to Libya, and Iraq to the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey is pursuing a highly active and interventionist foreign policy. What drives Turkish-Russian relations? How to account for their increasingly close relations in the Middle East and beyond? How have their engagements on regional conflicts reshaped their bilateral relations? And how are these relations likely to evolve? This research paper examines these questions through the lenses of the conflicts in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. It offers a model of partnership for both countries in a context where their interests compete. In other words, through the Syrian conflict, Ankara and Moscow have discovered the value and effectiveness of bilateral engagements and limited regional multilateralism as a form of dealing with conflicts in which both actors are involved. The limits of the Syrian-style model of cooperation between Moscow and Ankara can be observed in Libya as well as Nagorno-Karabakh. Broadly speaking, there are three dominant explanatory accounts for why Turkey is seeking cooperation: p olitical discontent with the West , systemic, and personality-centric frameworks. The boundaries between these different accounts are not clear-cut. All of them shed light on important aspects of these ties, however none of them alone can provide an overarching account of these relations. Different accounts are better suited for explaining the different stages of these relations. No single issue has shaped Turkish-Russian relations in recent decades as much as the crisis in Syria. In other words, though the Syrian crisis is centrally responsible for the present shape of Turkish-Russian relations, it is also a unique crisis, and the dynamics of these relations are unlikely to be easily replicated in other contexts. Russia came to Syria with the lessons learnt from the Libya intervention in Russia believes that the West misused this resolution for the purpose of regime change — a mandate that Russia contended was not provided by this resolution. These events convinced Russia that a similar scenario should not be allowed to occur in Syria. Yet, the developments on the ground did not turn out the way Turkey wanted. The more the major powers began to approach Syria through the lens of the war on terror, the more the YPG gained international prominence and control over territory in the northern part of the country bordering Turkey. During the early stages of the Arab uprisings, Turkey appeared to be on the winning side, whereas Russia was seen to be on the losing side. In this regard, two dates are important to demonstrate how the fortunes of the Arab uprisings, their proponents, as well as their opponents have changed. In , the region was believed to be on the verge of a new regional order — a proto-regional order was in the making through regime changes in several Arab states as a result of the waves of protests. The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria was also seen as imminent in Turkey. In this scenario, Turkey regarded Russia and Iran as being on the losing side of the regional transformation. Yet, this picture dramatically changed in To put it starkly, if represented the emergence of a proto-regional order that was Turkey-friendly, represented the unravelling of this proto-order. With this awareness, Turkey and Russia mended their ties in mid to set aside the tension that had ensued from the jet incident — this incident reduced the room for manoeuvre by Turkey and its allied Syrian opposition groups in the Syrian theatre. This participation has also reduced the burden and costs of the civil war for Russia, as these processes restructured the war in a way that made it easier for the Assad regime to recover more territories from the opposition with relatively low cost. In this respect, on 20 December , the foreign ministers of Turkey, Russia, and Iran met in Moscow to launch a trilateral process on Syria, which later came to be dubbed the Astana process. In other words, in the case of Idlib, the Astana trio has been largely replaced by the Astana duo. Therefore, Turkish-Russian engagements in Syria have occurred through structured trilateral and bilateral processes. Despite these cooperative frameworks, Turkish-Russian policies in Syria have remained inherently competitive and prone to conflict — both actors support different sides in the conflict. Turkey has thus far failed to honour this pledge. Moreover, instead of counter-terrorism, Ankara appears to be pursuing a de-radicalisation and transformation agenda with this group. Neither side, but particularly Russia, has shied away from drawing red lines when their interests were being threatened. The most obvious case in point was when the Russia-Syria regime killed 36 Turkish soldiers on 28 February during the confrontation over Idlib. First, both actors have pursued a policy of military consolidation or driving up costs for the other side on the ground. Finally, Russia has maintained an overall upper hand in its engagement with Turkey in Syria. In other words, through the Astana and Sochi processes, Turkish-Russian engagements in Syria have restructured the war in a way that has led to the Syrian opposition losing legitimacy and territory and the Assad regime recovering more territory. Corollary to this, Russian-Turkish engagement in Syria has had spillover effects on other areas, hence paving the way for the deepening of overall bilateral relations. This purchase has become one of the major points of friction between Turkey and the US. In fact, the US has removed Turkey from the F fighter jet programme in response. They tried this for the Libyan conflict, though less successfully and skilfully. Finally, Turkish-Russian cooperation in Syria has helped both sides to achieve some of their major goals and aspirations as well as increase their influence and ability — along with that of Iran — in charting the course of the civil war. In return, this has decreased the role and influence of the Western powers in Syria. Similarly, the Astana and Sochi processes have hollowed out the UN-led and Western-supported Geneva process — however, as the Astana process has largely run its course by now, the Geneva track might regain more relevance for the political process. To give an example, through the Astana process, Russia has largely taken the de-escalation subject off the table in Geneva. After Syria, the second regional context in which Turkey and Russia explored a structured engagement was the Libyan imbroglio. Unlike in Syria — where Russia has maintained an overall upper hand with Turkey — in Libya, there was no such asymmetry in relations. In addition, as Russia often points out, there is a formal invitation by the UN-recognised Syrian regime to legitimise its presence in Syria. In fact, Ankara then saw the benefit that it would have a say in the decision-making process of a NATO intervention, as opposed to a French-British-US intervention, in which it would have had either limited or no say. Ankara, in particular, tried to jump on the bandwagon and align itself with this Western policy of regime change in Tripoli. However since the toppling of the Qaddafi regime, the appetites of both the US and Europe for engagements in Libya have significantly decreased. Financially, Turkish companies particularly construction firms were highly active during the Qaddafi era in Libya 31 — for instance, prior to , there were around 25, Turkish workers in Libya. The question of who controls Tripoli is decisive, particularly as to whether Turkey will get these contracts and payments. Moreover, the regional political and geopolitical divides that were born out of the Arab Spring are on full display in Libya, where Turkey is engaged in a fierce rivalry with the anti-Arab Spring forces such as the UAE, Egypt, and to a lesser degree Saudi Arabia. Plus, Libya is also the site of a geopolitical confrontation between Turkey and France, as both actors support different sides in the conflict — whereas Turkey supports the GNA, France supports the LNA and projects influence in Libya, the Mediterranean, and North Africa. Through its Libya policy, Ankara is trying not to lose ground in these multi-layered power struggles. With its Libya policy, Turkey is trying to disrupt and undermine this emerging framework. Even worse for Turkey, there have been a growing number of voices from within the US establishment advocating that the US support this new framework. This, in return, has further contributed to the belief in Ankara that Turkey has to operate as a less risk-averse actor while exercising more hard power and taking a more heavy-handed approach in order to protect its interests in this region. There were key developments for Turkish-Russian relations in Libya that took place in Faced with the danger of the GNA falling, which would have removed Turkey from the Libyan scene and undermined its interests not only in Libya, but also in the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey stepped in to scale-up its military support to the GNA. With the former, Turkey sought to disrupt the emerging security and energy framework in the Eastern Mediterranean, while with the latter, Ankara effectively committed itself to the protection of the GNA, upon which Turkey believes its interests in Libya rest. These factors motivated Turkey to scale-up its profile in the Libyan imbroglio. Another set of factors incentivised Turkey to engage with Russia to explore ways to chart the course of the Libyan conflict. Second, the unwillingness of the US to get involved deeper, coupled with the disunity of the European powers in Libya — particularly the divide between France and Italy — has increased the prominence of the UAE, Egypt, Russia, and Turkey in the conflict. Turkey believed that these European initiatives were not taking its interests into account sufficiently. As a sign of its displeasure with the Italian diplomatic effort, Turkey withdrew from the Palermo Conference of on Libya 38 after it emerged that Egypt was trying to convene a meeting on the subject within the framework of the Palermo Conference, which did not include Turkey, nor did it feature in the official agenda of the event according to the Turkish side. Before there was any diplomatic engagement between Moscow and Ankara on Libya, both sides sought to change the military map of the conflict and military consolidation on the ground. It especially sought to establish the aerial superiority around Tripoli first, and then other parts of western Libya. These military changes have become particularly more apparent since April With the capture of cities in western Libya, such as the important coastal cities of Sabratha, Surman, and Al-Ajaylat, 41 the strategic al-Watiya airbase 42 which was in the hands of fighters loyal to Haftar since , and Tarhuna, 43 the GNA had almost established complete control over western Libya. In contrast, Russia, along with other external backers of the LNA, doubled down on its military presence in the country, flying fighter jets to Libya via Syria. In parallel to these military consolidation strategies on the ground, Moscow and Ankara have explored ways to launch a bilateral process that would aim to redesign not only the conflict maps, but also the political parameters of a resolution process as well. In fact, prior to the Berlin Conference of 19 January , 47 Moscow and Ankara sped up their efforts to broker a deal on Libya. Despite this failure to launch a bilateral process in Libya, Ankara and Moscow have not given up completely on their military consolidation on the ground, nor on their bilateral diplomatic engagements on approaches to Libya. Since the Berlin Conference, two new trends have increasingly become clear. Both of these developments have been advantageous for Turkey. The rationale for the former development is clear. However, in spite of these positive trends, there are limits to any Turkish-Russian engagement on Libya. First, in Syria: Putting aside the US, the Astana trio of Turkey, Russia, and Iran are the only external players with a capacity to change the military dynamics on the ground in any significant manner. At this stage, Turkey will focus on the consolidation of its presence and influence in the area that the GNA controls and on translating military gains into political, economic, and strategic gains as much as — and as soon as — possible. To that effect, Ankara has signed a plethora of agreements with the GNA in the areas of economy, finance, energy, business, and security — whether or not most of these deals will materialise is another matter. Likewise, it will push for its allies to maintain their roles and influence in any new power reconfiguration in Libya. At the strategic level, Turkey will continue to upgrade the capacity of its air al-Watiya and naval Misrata bases. On a parallel track, Turkey will also double down on its security-sector reform, institution-building, and army-building efforts in western Libya. Finally, for most of the Libyan imbroglio, Turkey and Russia have been playing the catch-up role, either with Western policy or due to developments on the ground. In this sense, their policies have been more reactive. However, in the latest phase of this conflict, both actors have tried to proactively redesign and redefine the conflict map, mainly militarily, but partially politically as well. And the increase in their influence has come at the expense of Western actors in the Libyan crisis. First, this crisis has illustrated how different subjects and conflicts, irrespective of their geographic locations, have become closely intertwined in Ankara-Moscow relations. Second, this crisis has also shed light on how Russia has approached engagements with Turkey in the Middle East and the post-Soviet space differently in a qualitative manner. On 27 September , fighting broke out between two former Soviet republics: Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh and its seven surrounding areas, which belong to Azerbaijan according to the UN, but they have been administered by Armenia since the early s. This conflict has put Russia in a tight spot, as it is unfolding between Armenia, which is a member of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation, and Azerbaijan, another close partner of Moscow. To that effect, Turkey threw its full and active support behind Azerbaijan. This support has taken several forms. At the military level, as Azerbaijan has executed heavily dronised warfare, Turkey has been one of the major suppliers, alongside Israel, of military hardware and drones to Azerbaijan. The presence of foreign fighters in this conflict and in the South Caucasus in general would be highly threatening to Russia, given the proximity of the area to the country. Third, according to several reports, Turkey kept a number of F warplanes in the Azeri city of Ganja as a deterrence following a joint exercise in July and August of At the diplomatic level, Turkey was isolated. It reached out to Russia to launch a bilateral track, similar to the Astana process, on this conflict. Turkey would have preferred this to gain primacy over the Minsk Group of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 57 which was set up to find a peaceful resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and is co-chaired by the US, Russia, and France — the Minsk Group was completely sidelined during this latest fight and the diplomatic process that followed. Azerbaijan would be grateful for Turkey, and its influence in the country would grow 58 — this is largely what happened. Meanwhile, for Turkey, de-freezing and upsetting the status quo were the preferred options, as Ankara saw the previous status quo inimical to its interests. For Turkey, the victory would not have solely meant military gains, it would have also meant political parity with Moscow in the conflict. To that effect, from early on in the conflict, Turkey strived to work with Moscow to deal with it. For instance, on 26 October , Russian fighter jets attacked a training camp that belongs to the Faylaq al-Sham group of the Turkish-created Syrian National Army in the Jabal Duwayli area of Idlib, which is only 10 kilometres from the Turkish border. By putting pressure on Ankara through Syria, Moscow was trying to balance its vulnerabilities with Ankara. Moreover, by pointing to the reported transfer of Syrian mercenaries to the scene of conflict, Russian officials were indirectly accusing Turkey of bringing the menace of terrorism to the region. Moscow was therefore clear with its red lines and displeasure with Turkish policy. Prior to the ceasefire deal, 68 Moscow and Ankara had established a parallel bilateral track on the conflict. By pointing to the existence of a parallel Turkish-Russian track and the ensuing ceasefire, many drew correlations between this ceasefire and the multiple ceasefire deals that Turkey and Russia had signed over Idlib. However, the Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire deal and the multiple Idlib deals are instead marked by their differences. This is in line with Russian interests. However, the more the conflict thawed and the more the old status quo was undermined, the better the situation became for Turkey. Turkey is not a signatory to this agreement. Third, unlike in Idlib, peacekeeping missions military patrols will be solely conducted by Russia — there will be no joint patrols, hence no Turkish boots on the ground. Turkey will only send observers. The details and mechanism of this observation mission are not clear yet and will be sorted out bilaterally between Turkey and Russia. Thus, asymmetry and hierarchy mark this deal — in favour of Russia — in terms of the roles of Turkey and Russia in the diplomatic resolution of this conflict, as manifested through the Moscow ceasefire agreement. The parallel track that Moscow and Ankara established for the conflict reflects this. Likewise, despite the structured engagements on Syria, talks on Libya, and non-structured modus vivendi on Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkish-Russian relations are built on mistrust and geopolitical rivalries. From the Black Sea to the Caucasus, and the Middle East to the Balkans, there is not a single issue or crisis for which Turkey and Russia are on the same side of the table. In other words, although the levels of engagement and interdependencies in Turkish-Russian relations are fast increasing, there is no sign of a decrease in the incompatibilities of their geopolitical aspirations, nor in the inbuilt deficit of trust in this relationship. The features of these relations, in return, elicit questions about the nature of this interdependency and the a symmetry in these relations. It is implied that Turkey is more dependent on Russia in this relationship. This exit cost analysis is not solely informed by the geopolitical repercussions of a rupture, but by the economic ones as well. To clarify, in Turkish-Russian economic exchanges, Turkey provides Russia with vegetables, textiles, construction business, and other finished goods. In return, it gets natural gas and oil, nuclear reactors, millions of tourists, and recently the S missile systems from Russia. Indeed, this is what is happening. These are the two countries with which Turkey has competitive regional aspirations. Through its energy exploration activities in the East Mediterranean and Black Sea regions, Turkey wants to further reduce its natural gas dependency on its rivals. Similarly, the share of liquefied natural gas LNG , which Turkey imports from sources as diverse as Qatar, the US, Algeria, and Nigeria, in its overall level of gas imports is rapidly increasing. These trends in the Turkish energy market are set to continue. This has resulted in a lopsided Turkish foreign policy when it comes to its relations with major powers. In fact, instead of making Turkey strategically more autonomous — as pro-government pundits claim in Turkey — the way that Turkish-Russian relations are being conducted is making Turkey strategically more vulnerable. First, Turkish-Ukrainian relations are fast expanding. Both countries signed a military cooperation agreement on 16 October Given the trajectory of recent years, it is plausible to anticipate that Ankara-Kiev relations will continue to improve. Second, in Libya, Turkey appears to be continuing with its double-track policy with the US and Russia. Turkey is likely to avoid pursuing a policy that would antagonise the US at this stage. Second, unlike in Syria, Turkey has better working relations with the US particularly the Africa Command as well as several European countries such as Italy. Russia can threaten Turkey using Syria and drive up the costs for Turkey there, the same way Turkey tried using Nagorno-Karabakh against Russia. If the Central Asian vector of Turkish foreign policy gains more prominence in the new period, this will have a similar effect on Turkish-Russian relations. However, the dismal state of Turkish-Western relations makes this task harder to achieve. First, as discussed in the specific cases above, Turkish-Russian relations are already facing limitations. Third, the structural limitations of these relations are highly likely to be more visible and pronounced going forward. What is perplexing is not that Russia would want to form closer relations with Turkey regionally or bilaterally; the benefits of such engagements for Russia is clear. The list of benefits that Russia has accrued from its engagements or cooperation with Turkey goes on. In contrast, from being removed from the F fighter jet programme to the CAATSA sanctions to the deepening crisis in its relations with the West, Turkey has to pay a heavy price for its close relations with Russia and purchasing the Russian-made S missile systems. These explanatory paradigms shed light on the different dynamics of these relations, but none is suited to provide a comprehensive picture. When it came to Donald Trump, there were two effects of his regional policy on Turkey. These factors have also created extra incentives for Turkey to seek better relations with Russia and alternative realignments. But a level of caution is warranted here. Likewise, foreign and security policy elites, but not solely them, have played decisive roles in sustaining these relationships. The roles and outlooks of these actors and institutions have undergone major changes in Turkey. This means that Turkey will attain its goals much more effectively through a balancing act between different centres of power. Turkey is partially trading its dependency on the West with dependency on Russia and China, over which it has even less leverage. This reading sees the global order as being destined to be multipolar, which in return provides regional powers such as Turkey with more room for manoeuvre. From this perspective, Turkish interests will be better served through a geopolitical balancing act between different centres of powers. Several systemic changes in global politics, but more importantly in the Middle East, have further strengthened these readings and assumptions. First, Turkish-Chinese relations are not yet at the same level as Turkish-Russian relations. In any case, the government appears to see more opportunities than threats in the rise of China. This partial US withdrawal has created a power vacuum in the MENA region and the Mediterranean, which has led to fierce power rivalries among regional and international actors. Similarly, the role of regional powers in shaping regional affairs has also relatively increased. Not only powers such as Turkey, Iran, and Israel, but also countries such as the UAE and Qatar have scaled-up their presence and prominence in regional politics. All these systemic changes were fully on display in the three conflict zones Syria, Libya, and the Nagorno-Karabakh where Turkey and Russia were involved. To be more precise, the US was not willing to get involved deeply with these conflicts. Russia, in contrast, was willing to play a much more forceful role in the same conflicts. Policy-wise, this distinction does not mean much at present — in the end, these two actors are the ultimate decision-makers in their respective countries. However, this distinction, or lack thereof, is important in projecting the future course of Moscow-Ankara relations. The difference is that, whereas Turkey mainly seeks parity with the major European powers Germany, France, and Britain and a redefinition of its relationship with the US, Russia seeks parity with the US. Moreover, regarding itself as part of the broader cultural West, 94 Russia seeks a redressing of its relationships with the West. Being part of the institutional West, Turkey is pursuing a redefinition of its place largely within the West, not solely in relation to the West. This last point is also crucial to understand what Turkey, at least under the current government, is giving up and what it is holding onto in its relations with the West. Instead, it aspires to redefine its role and position within these institutions and the broader Western framework. Instead, they are premised on historical mistrust and consciousness. Many analyses on current Turkish-Russian relations are disproportionately informed by the engagement in Syria. Undeniably, Syria is central to the present shape of these relations. On top of Middle Eastern-specific factors, Moscow-Ankara relations are also encumbered by a set of broader strategic constraints. Despite its policy on behalf of certain actors in the Middle East — with arguably the exception of the Assad regime — Russia in effect entertains no special relationship with any actors in the region. Russia keeps the doors open to all Middle Eastern leaders and countries — for instance, in Libya, even though it is the main backer of the LNA, it has also established relations with the GNA. Russia therefore escapes becoming part of the camp politics in the region. It established strong relations with the pro-Arab Spring actors and political Islamic groups in the region. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain were strongly opposed to these uprisings — with the exception of the Syrian uprisings, which they supported in its early phases — and strived to turn the clock back to the pre—Arab Spring period in the region. This divide drove wedges between Turkey and the anti—Arab Spring camp in the region. Third, the natures of the political economies of Turkey and Russia are also constraining factors in bilateral relations. Russia pursues policies that will reflect the interests of a major energy-exporting country, whereas Turkey represents a major energy-importing country in its regional policy. Furthermore, Russia appears to have carefully calculated the scale and depth of its regional involvement. Its targeted, low-cost, and limited-level engagements have proved to be effective thus far. Russia is therefore short-termist, transactional, and uncommitted — with no special relationships with any party albeit with the possible exception of the Syrian regime — and this puts a certain cap on what Russia can do and achieve in the region. Turkey, in contrast, sees the Middle East primarily through national and regional lenses. In the last decade, this region has sapped most of the energy, time, and resources from Turkish foreign policy. The meaning and significance of the Middle East has undergone several changes for its foreign policy. Prior to the Arab uprisings, Turkey had a largely economy-focused foreign policy — premised on soft-power tools — for the region. Moreover, Turkey pursued a more active and higher profile policy within the multilateral institutions of the region, such as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Arab League. During this time, Turkey expanded the scope of its regional policy dramatically. Its foreign policy discourse and activism acquired a region-wide scale. The Kurdish issue, in particular, has significantly shaped the contours and content of its regional policy, especially towards its immediate Middle Eastern neighbourhood. In the broader region, the political and geopolitical divide between Turkey and a set of anti—Arab Spring countries such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt has had a major impact on Turkish foreign policy. As a corollary, Turkey sees the Middle East predominantly with a security-centric perspective. It will continue to play an influential role in its immediate neighbourhood in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean in particular. Finally, Turkey and Russia have had different standings on the regional status quo. At the regional level, after the Arab uprisings, Turkey operated as a revisionist power. It supported the overthrow of authoritarian regimes and the establishment of a new regional order, developing closer relations with the pro-change forces in the region. Despite the fact that in recent years, Turkey has adopted a much more cautious stance on the continuing waves of protests in the Middle East, this does not change the overall picture. In contrast, Russia has operated as a status quo power in the region, displaying clear preferences for regional authoritarian strong men such as Sisi and Assad. It was suspicious towards the Arab uprisings and supported the incumbent regimes. First, these bilateral relations have historical roots, including amities, rivalries, and enmities, and they have never been confined to just one specific context, such as Syria or Libya. This is particularly the case today. Yet, these relations are not sufficiently institutionalised, lack elite ownership particularly in bureaucratic and political terms , and are fraught with strategic incompatibilities from the perspectives of both powers. Third, Turkey and Russia have had different standings on the international status quo. It is particularly seeking changes to the post—Cold War international order and parity with the US. Going forward, these developments, in turn, will trigger more calls both in the West and in Turkey to redefine the framework and meaning of Turkish-Western relations, as the Cold War framework between Turkey and the US as well as the accession framework of Turkish-European relations increasingly appear to be ill-suited to the present realities. However, d evelopments at the broader international level, a new administration in the US, rising tensions between Ukraine and Russia, and the partial reinvigoration of European and UN diplomacy on the Libyan crisis indicate that Turkey will face more constraints and higher costs for its hitherto geopolitical balancing act between the West and Russia. Cambridge: Polity Press, Later, this alliance fell apart. Utilising primarily its presence within the state, the group engaged in a fierce power struggle with the government. This process reached a climax when the group engineered a coup attempt, which failed, to topple the government on 15 July This bill commits the US to support the emerging energy and security architecture in the Eastern Mediterranean. Galip Dalay and E. Fuat Keyman, Turkish-U. Major European political figures have talked in the recent past about the need to expand relations between Europe and Russia, saying that Russia is part of Europe. Geographically and, most importantly, culturally, we are one civilisation. French leaders have spoken of the need to create a single space from Lisbon to the Urals. He does not wag his tail. If he thinks something is good for his country, he goes for it. Some scholars contest this official historiography. They are also subject to fact-checking and copy-editing. Direkt zum Seiteninhalt springen. Not in My Backyard 4. Issues and Conclusions Turkey is recalibrating its foreign and regional policy at a time when the Middle East is undergoing a major transformation and restructuring. Context Russia came to Syria with the lessons learnt from the Libya intervention in Drivers behind Turkish engagement with Russia in Syria During the early stages of the Arab uprisings, Turkey appeared to be on the winning side, whereas Russia was seen to be on the losing side. Mechanism of cooperation and competition in Syria With this awareness, Turkey and Russia mended their ties in mid to set aside the tension that had ensued from the jet incident — this incident reduced the room for manoeuvre by Turkey and its allied Syrian opposition groups in the Syrian theatre. Mechanism of cooperation and competition in Libya Before there was any diplomatic engagement between Moscow and Ankara on Libya, both sides sought to change the military map of the conflict and military consolidation on the ground. Implications and projections Despite this failure to launch a bilateral process in Libya, Ankara and Moscow have not given up completely on their military consolidation on the ground, nor on their bilateral diplomatic engagements on approaches to Libya. Nagorno-Karabakh: Cooperation? Context On 27 September , fighting broke out between two former Soviet republics: Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh and its seven surrounding areas, which belong to Azerbaijan according to the UN, but they have been administered by Armenia since the early s. Mechanism of non cooperation For Turkey, the victory would not have solely meant military gains, it would have also meant political parity with Moscow in the conflict. The missing part in the ceasefire deal Prior to the ceasefire deal, 68 Moscow and Ankara had established a parallel bilateral track on the conflict. Figure 1. Geopolitical dependency reduction on Russia Figure 2. Outlook Many analyses on current Turkish-Russian relations are disproportionately informed by the engagement in Syria. All rights reserved. SWP Research Papers reflect the views of the author s. Figure 2.