The Problem with "Allow All" Rules in VPN Configuration

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It’s that simple: setting up a VPN is critical for remote access and secure communication, but slip up on the configuration, and you’re basically handing the keys to your network to any opportunistic attacker willing to look. You know what’s funny? Too many IT teams still use “allow all” rules on their VPN firewalls, leaving their network wide open – a classic example of security undone by convenience.

Over-Permissive VPN Rules: The Root of Many Network Nightmares

Anyone who’s spent time in network security, me included, quickly learns that the biggest risks aren’t always advanced persistent threats or exotic zero-days—they’re basic mistakes repeated at scale. Overly permissive rules, especially in VPN configurations, are a glaring vulnerability. Setting a firewall rule to “allow all” inside a VPN gateway means everything coming through the VPN tunnel can talk to any device on the internal network without restriction. This defeats the entire purpose of segmentation and controlled access.

Think about what this looks like in practice:

A remote employee connects using a VPN client. The VPN’s firewall rule says “allow all” from the VPN subnet to the LAN. That employee’s device can now scan, attack, or move laterally across any asset on the network it can reach. If the laptop is compromised—say, by ransomware or malware—the attackers gain broad access to internal resources.

Ever notice how ransomware outbreaks often trace back to one infected endpoint moving unchecked inside the network? That’s no coincidence. Overly permissive firewall policies on VPNs are a favorite playground for lateral movement and escalation by threat actors.

Real-World Consequences: When “Allow All” Rules Break Your Network

Let me share some blunt examples you won’t read in glossy IT marketing brochures but pop up in breach post-mortems regularly:

Ransomware Spread: A company using SonicWall VPNs had an “allow all” rule between the VPN subnet and critical servers. Once ransomware hit a remote user’s device, it spread unchecked, encrypting multiple file shares and halting business operations for days. Data Exfiltration: An organization configuring Ivanti VPN solutions left default firewall rules in place, trusting the VPN client alone for security. A compromised endpoint silently extracted sensitive data over the VPN before detection. Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) Movement: Firms relying heavily on Check Point Software gateways who didn’t enforce “deny by default” policies saw attackers pivot inside their network, leveraging trivial access through VPN “allow all” paths to conduct espionage.

These aren’t fringe scenarios. They’re exactly what happens when usability trumps security every damn time.

The Security vs. Usability Tug of War

IT teams get it: VPNs are vital. Users need easy, reliable access to internal resources. But that’s never an excuse to cut corners on security. That “allow all” shortcut might seem like a godsend to prevent remote users from calling the help desk repeatedly—but it’s a ticking time bomb waiting to explode. Here’s what often happens:

Default Settings Are Left Alone: Many network admins deploy VPN solutions and accept factory-default firewall rules, assuming the vendor’s presets “must be secure.” Spoiler: They’re not. Over-Permissive Access Masks Actual Needs: Teams set broad access because they don’t want to micromanage network segments or figure out who actually needs access to what. Complexity Is Feared: Granular firewall rules take time and expertise—two commodities in short supply. So, the “allow all” rule stays live indefinitely.

Sound familiar? If yes, you’ve just identified the roots of your VPN security problem.

Why Deny-by-Default Is Your Best Friend

Here’s the kicker: Firewall rule best practices revolve around the principle “deny by default.” This means network traffic is blocked unless explicitly permitted. Your VPN firewall rules should be:

Explicit – only include rules allowing exactly what users need on a least-privilege basis. Segmented – separate sensitive internal resources from each other and from VPN clients. Monitored – logging and alerts for unusual VPN access attempts.

Using tools like Incogni for data breach monitoring or endpoint detection platforms helps, but can’t fix poor baseline VPN rules.

Good VPN Firewall Rule Practices: Don’t Let Convenience Kill Your Security

Bottom line: Your VPN firewall configuration is either your first line of defense or your biggest vulnerability. Avoid these common traps:

Common Mistake Why It’s Dangerous How to Fix “Allow All” VPN Rules Enables attackers to freely move laterally across entire networks. Implement least privilege with explicit allow rules. Deny all else. Using Vendor Default Firewall Settings Defaults are often overly permissive to avoid support calls. Review and customize firewall policies for your environment. Ignoring Segmentation A breach on a VPN user can compromise entire network without segmentation. Use VLANs and subnet restrictions to isolate critical assets. Neglecting Firewall Rule Audits Stale or unintended wide rules remain active indefinitely. Regularly audit and prune firewall policies. Closing Thoughts: Don’t Let VPN Simplicity Become Your Network’s Weakest Link

So what’s the takeaway here? VPNs are critical infrastructure, but their security depends on disciplined configuration and ongoing management. Overly permissive firewall rules set on VPN gateways—whether cybersecuritynews.com SonicWall, Ivanti, Check Point Software, or any other platform—are invitations for compromise.

The conflict between security and usability will always exist, but it’s your job as an IT manager to tip the scales the right way: deny by default, allow by exception, and never trust the “allow all” easy way out.

Like my collection of old firewalls in the garage reminds me every morning as I sip hard black coffee, great security isn’t sexy, but it’s always effective—until the breach calls roll in.

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The Problem with "Allow All" Rules in VPN Configuration

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