Talas where can I buy cocaine

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Talas where can I buy cocaine

Measures implemented by governments to curb the COVID pandemic have led to drug trafficking routes by air being disrupted, along with drastic reduction or increased interdiction in trafficking routes over land. Some drug supply chains have been interrupted and traffickers are looking for alternative routes, including maritime routes, depending on the types of drugs smuggled. Synthetic drugs, such as methamphetamine tend to be trafficked across continents by air more than other types of drugs. Restrictions on air travel are, therefore, likely to have a particularly drastic effect on this illegal cargo. The bulk of cocaine is trafficked by sea and large cargos have continued to be detected in European ports during the pandemic. So far, heroin has mostly been trafficked by land. But due to the pandemic, maritime routes seem to be increasingly used now to traffic heroin as shown by seizures of opiates in the Indian Ocean. Trafficking in cannabis, however, may not be affected in the same way as that of heroin or cocaine, given that its production often takes place near consumer markets and traffickers are thus less reliant on long, transregional shipments of large quantities of the drug. Several countries have reported drug shortages at the retail level. This can lead to an overall decrease in consumption, but mainly of drugs mostly consumed in recreational settings. In the case of heroin, however, a shortage in supply can lead to the consumption of harmful, domestically produced substances — heroin shortages have been reported by countries in Europe, South West Asia and North America and some countries in Europe have warned that heroin users may even switch to fentanyl and its derivatives. An increase in the use of pharmaceutical products such as benzodiazepines has also been reported, already doubling their price in certain areas. Another harmful pattern resulting from drug shortages is the increase in injecting drug use and the sharing of injecting equipment. The risk of drug overdose may also increase among those injecting drugs and who are infected with COVID Restrictions resulting from lockdown could hinder the production of opiates with the key months of harvest in Afghanistan being March to June. Cocaine production also appears to be impeded in Colombia, as producers are suffering from a shortage of gasoline. While in Bolivia, COVID is limiting the ability of state authorities to control coca bush cultivation, which could lead to an increase in coca production. In Peru, however, a drop in the price of cocaine suggests a reduction in trafficking opportunities. This may discourage coca bush cultivation in the short-term, although the looming economic crisis may lead more farmers to take up coca cultivation in all the major cocaine producing countries. A decline in international trade in the current pandemic could also lead to shortages in the supply of precursors, vital for the manufacture of heroin as well as for synthetic drugs. A limited supply in Mexico, for example seems to have disrupted the manufacture of methamphetamine and fentanyl, while in Lebanon and Syria it is affecting the production of captagon. Czechia on the other hand expects a shortage of metamphetamine for the same reasons. In the long-run, the economic downturn caused by the COVID pandemic has the potential to lead to a lasting and profound transformation of the drug markets, which can be fully understood only after more research is done. The economic difficulties caused by COVID may affect people who are already in position of socioeconomic disadvantage harder than others. The project implements actions in central parts of Athens and Thessaloniki and provides information services, harm reduction, referral to other agencies and organizations. It also intervenes to promote prevention, regular screening and safer sex and distributes leaflets, condoms and synergies for safer use for intravenous users. The Streetwork Project addressed the additional needs that emerged in the field during the pandemic, due to the restrictive measures. At the same time, the partial suspension of organizations and agencies providing support services to vulnerable populations has exacerbated the situation, as many of their homeless fellow citizens are already facing severe food problems. On Tuesday, March 31, , through the websites and social media of the clubs, they issued the first call to the public to strengthen this effort. The response was very moving. On Monday, April 27, , due to the growing needs, they started a crowdfunding campaign to raise more food, bottled water, juices, snacks, protective medical material masks, gloves, antiseptics and personal hygiene items. It will be available until May 30, Milutin emphasized that the civil society organisations from the region have done a good job before and during the first period of the outbreak. Irena emphasized that people who are on treatment are in an additional risk because they have to travel, sometimes daily, to get the treatment or social care. More than 60 representatives of civil society organisations, national drug agencies, international organisations and agencies and donor community participated. Here are updated documents, with some fresh information from countries, and the Minutes from the Conference. Source: Positive Voice. The building will accommodate 70 people providing the possibility of hosting up to people for up to 6 months. Users will receive the following services on a hour basis, with full respect for human rights:. Drawing on our life experiences we have had the opportunity to experience the 4-year war, the floods of , we can point out that we have very quickly adapted to the situation caused by the COVID 19 pandemic. Our operations are compounded by the funding problems of our services that you are already aware of. Our organization is the only one that has survived the provision of harm reduction services in all of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In accordance with the orders and recommendations of the Crisis Staff managing this health and social crisis, we had to close both Drop in centres Zenica and Tuzla and transferred all forces to the field. A rapid mapping of the terrain was carried out and interviews with a large number of clients enabled a new methodology of work, all in line with the recommendations on the method of contacts between people. We currently cover all our clients in two regions, covering about 1 million people and about 1. The material is delivered on the basis of the stated needs of our clients. In the period from March 1st to April 10th we distributed in both regions It should be noted that during this period about We have established 4 sex workers supply lines and have distributed a lot of materials over hygiene packages and unfortunately this is the only one they have received over the last three months. The biggest win at the moment is the involvement and commitment of our clients throughout this work process. In interviews with the inmates of the largest prison , we confirmed that they lack basic equipment such as mask gloves and disinfectants and the needs are quite high. The good situation is that all visits are suspended and there is very little opportunity for COVID to break into these facilities, although they need urgent help with these safeguards to improve the prevention system and reduce the possibility of infection. All of this work is done by 6 of our employees and we all do all the work and have very few resources at our disposal. The 6 of us have been volunteering for a long time and will work as long as we have materials to share with our clients. If this model of work continues, our supplies are sufficient by the end of June. After that we will be forced to close after 18 years of conducting harm reduction services in Bosnia and Herzegovina because we will no longer be able to do so. The European Youth Foundation EYF is launching a special call for local or national youth organisations that are looking for funding for activities which respond to local needs arising from the COVID crisis. You can apply for the EYF pilot activity grants. Priority will be given to pilot activities that aim at demonstrating solidarity and support to all persons affected by the COVID crisis, such as:. Further, applicant youth organisations are strongly encouraged to co-ordinate their activities with the competent authorities and to indicate such in their project proposal. Subsequent cut-off dates will be defined later in , and include June and September, to allow for the processing of applications and decisions on grants. Youth organisations can submit applications only if they are registered with the EYF. They dedicated special attention to those who recently returned from the areas with high epidemics — Italy, Germany and Austria — who either came to visit their families back home or returned from seasonal work especially sex workers. On 9 April they have tested interested people in Kragujevac, Central Serbia, while the day after they went to Novi Sad in the Northern province of Vojvodina. DPNSEE provided Duga with an amount of hygienic material, masks and food for vulnerable populations in their municipality. The meeting was scheduled to discuss the current situation related to outbreak of the coronavirus in South East Europe and plan future steps. Based on the information collected at conference calls with member organisations, the Board concluded that it is time to make some conclusions and decisions about what we can do in the forthcoming period to help member organisations and ensure their sustainability after the current crisis caused by the coronavirus. The Board also concluded that member organisations and the did a good job reacting in time, providing information to the communities, organising the work of our services in accordance with the situation and protecting our staff and, wherever possible, communicating with state officials and inviting them to protect vulnerable populations. Most of our users behave responsibly, even taking initiative and helping our organisations. The drug market is stable. The problems include lack of opportunity to start the treatment during the epidemic and lack of income to buy essential needs, bit also drugs. In most of the countries, we have problem to ensure enough protective material for our staff. The Board decided to call an on-line conference on protection of vulnerable populations in South East Europe for Thursday 23 April. Besides our members and other civil society organisations from the region and wider, we shall invite to the conference national drug agencies and health institutions, international organisations partners and donors. Skip to content UNODC press release Measures implemented by governments to curb the COVID pandemic have led to drug trafficking routes by air being disrupted, along with drastic reduction or increased interdiction in trafficking routes over land. Drug consumption trends Several countries have reported drug shortages at the retail level. Trends in drug production Restrictions resulting from lockdown could hinder the production of opiates with the key months of harvest in Afghanistan being March to June. So far, they have collected: 1, kit of sanitary material for injectable use 6, disposable gloves 4, protective masks 50 antiseptic wipes 25 sleeping bags 14, bottles of bottled water 2, juices 3, croissants 2, snacks breadsticks, nuts cookies, etc. Users will receive the following services on a hour basis, with full respect for human rights: Housing Individual care and hygiene Treatment programs Nursing Counselling Psychosocial support and interconnection with health services Legal assistance Providence Social and labour reintegration. Priority will be given to pilot activities that aim at demonstrating solidarity and support to all persons affected by the COVID crisis, such as: Reaching out to and supporting particularly vulnerable groups of people, including homeless, refugees and asylum-seekers, people with disabilities, people living in isolation or in remote communities; Support to health, social and educational services; Education and awareness-raising of the importance of human rights in responses to COVID crisis. Older posts.

Kyrgyzstan

Talas where can I buy cocaine

Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit. The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands. The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits. The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law. The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing. The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities. The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market. The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market. The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach. The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance. Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership. Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups. The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities. A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime. The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities. Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs. Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime. Human trafficking remains a considerable issue in Kyrgyzstan, which is a source, transit and destination country for this criminal market. Women, men and children are forced into labour domestically or in neighbouring countries — or elsewhere in Central Asia, the Middle East and Europe — in sectors like agriculture, construction, textile, domestic service and childcare. Male labour migrants are the most vulnerable to trafficking. Russian policies towards migrant workers and the threat of deportation have also made Kyrgyz migrants vulnerable to exploitation in forced labour and sex trafficking. In addition, children in Kyrgyzstan continued to be forced to participate in the drug trade, both locally and in neighbouring countries, as well as to engage in domestic servitude and begging. Kyrgyz women and girls are victims of sexual exploitation domestically and throughout the Middle East and Asia. There has been an increase in human trafficking incidents that target migrants from across Central Asia who transit through Kyrgyzstan towards other countries in the region, the Middle East and Europe. Growing numbers of bride kidnappings have also raised concerns in recent years — such practices may subsequently lead to sex trafficking and forced labour. Given that Kyrgyzstan is a transit, source and destination country for human trafficking, criminal actors involved in the domestic illicit market are linked to transnational criminal networks. Human smuggling is a consolidated criminal market with domestic and foreign actors operating together. In this respect, Kyrgyzstan is considered a source, transit and to a limited extent destination country for human smuggling. In a bid to improve their living conditions, Kyrgyz nationals irregularly travel to other Central Asian, European and Middle Eastern countries such as Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkey. Despite the visa-free regime with Kazakhstan and Russia, migrants seek out human smugglers to protect themselves from exploitation. Also, irregular migrants originating from South and South East Asia use the country as a transit point with an aim to reach Russia and Western Europe, although the scale of this flow is negligible. Despite limited official data pertaining to extortion and protection racketeering in Kyrgyzstan, there has been a reported increase in the volume of incidents involving racketeering of small businesses and street shops. There are also reports suggesting that criminal networks have assumed the role of mediator in disputes between business owners in areas controlled by the networks. Even though the arms trafficking market in Kyrgyzstan remains negligible, there has been a surge in the illegal circulation of firearms within the country, evidenced by the increased number of confiscations carried out by law enforcement. Rising rates of possession of illegal firearms within the population is linked to the illegal trade through the country and within its borders, and the regulatory loopholes pertaining to the registration of firearms. There are reports suggesting that Kyrgyzstan is a transit country for arms trafficked from Iran towards Afghanistan, demonstrating the transnational nature of this market. A further expansion in the arms trafficking market is expected following the takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban, as Kyrgyzstan is on one of the major arms trafficking routes from Afghanistan into Russia. Even though Kyrgyzstan is not considered to be a major producer of counterfeit goods, illegal trade in such goods has increased over recent years and the country seems to have become an intermediary between China and Russia. The Dordoi Bazaar, located in Bishkek, is the largest counterfeit market in Central Asia and a hub for the re-exportation of Chinese counterfeit goods to Europe and Russia. The country is also considered to be a transit point for the smuggling of tobacco products and alcohol within the Eurasian Economic Union; most of the products enter from Middle Eastern and European countries, and other Central Asian countries like Tajikistan. Even though poor flora management enables criminal activity to occur, the market remains limited and there is scant evidence that organized criminal groups are involved. However, there is evidence of illegal poaching and wildlife trafficking. There is a steady flow of wildlife products through Kyrgyzstan, especially from China, Afghanistan and Pakistan; Kyrgyzstan also serves as a source country for illicitly traded animals including Marco Polo sheep a subspecies of the argali sheep and saker falcons. This market is assumed to be driven by external demand since wildlife trafficking is mainly transboundary, involving foreign criminal groups collaborating with local actors. Since Kyrgyzstan has substantial deposits of gold, coal and rare-earth metals, among others, illegal mining is widespread. Coal is illegally mined in the south of the country, from where it is shipped to Uzbekistan. Illegal gold mining has been increasing due to high rates of unemployment in the country, specifically in the Naryn region. Kyrgyzstan plays a notable role as a transit country on the Northern Route for heroin trafficking — the drugs originate in Afghanistan and are destined for Russia and European countries. Heroin trafficking is facilitated by weak border controls and rampant corruption involving bureaucrats and law enforcement officials. Due to the transnational nature of the market, heroin trafficking is mainly controlled by foreign actors from transnational organized crime groups. The growth of the market in Kyrgyzstan has been attributed to the takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban, a group which is known to be heavily involved in the market. An uptick in heroin seizures during the same period confirms the existence of a steady drug trafficking network in the country. Despite this, however, official statistics show that domestic consumption continues to decrease, although the accuracy of these statistics is questionable. The cocaine trade remains insignificant in the country, mainly as a result of low income levels and an abundance of other types of drugs that are substantially less expensive. Regarding the cannabis trade, Kyrgyzstan is a source and transit country. There has been a significant surge in the illegal cultivation and trafficking of cannabis out of financial need, especially in the districts of Talas Oblast and other rural areas. Cannabis trade in the country is controlled by foreign actors who are members of transnational criminal groups, while local actors are involved in small-scale production. As a transit country for cannabis, the southern borders are prone to the trafficking of hashish from Afghanistan and Pakistan, which travels through Tajikistan. Kyrgyzstan is mainly a transit country for the trade of synthetic drugs that originate in countries like the Netherlands, Iran, Turkey, Russia, Kazakhstan and China. However, recent dismantling of clandestine laboratories producing synthetic drugs suggests a rising local production of such substances too, using precursors imported from China. Kyrgyzstan has not been immune to the rapid spread of synthetic drugs in the world, evidenced by increased seizures of synthetic drugs by Kyrgyz law enforcement during the last few years. Despite the growing production and transit of synthetic drugs, local demand for these substances remains low: amphetamine use in Kyrgyzstan is lower than use of opioids, cannabis and hallucinogens, among others. Cyber-dependent crimes are relatively common in Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan, among other Central Asian countries, has also become an attractive location for crypto-hackers who use software to take control of vulnerable computers and use their resources to mine cryptocurrency without permission. Despite all this, the effect of cybercrimes is modest, mostly due to a relatively low level of internet coverage in the country. Financial crimes — in the form of phone call frauds, phishing and charity scams — are widespread in the country and cause substantial losses to citizens. Criminal networks are using more and more cyber-enabled methods, the most common of which is phishing. Official statistics also indicate an increase in the number of Ponzi schemes targeting financially illiterate citizens in need of quick money. Tax evasion — with the collaboration of corrupt state officials — is also commonplace in Kyrgyzstan. State-embedded actors are heavily involved in organized crime and criminal organizations, and the apparatus of the state is intricately intertwined with both. State officials not only facilitate but also engage in criminal markets, especially in the drug trade. There have been major arrests of high-level politicians in recent years, with the aim of eradicating corruption within the state, though the underlying goal of these arrests has been questioned by observers. Organized crime in Kyrgyzstan is at a stage of fluid development. It mainly consists of networks of small groups engaged in localized criminal activities, servicing specific markets. There are also large organized criminal groups operating in the country. Mafia-style groups continue to exert influence on local populations and prisons, and operate in multiple criminal markets. Members of these groups have also infiltrated the Kyrgyz parliament and important public authorities. There are reports suggesting an increase in the activities of some mafia-style groups, specifically those involved in heroin trafficking. Numerous loose criminal networks and dozens of criminal gangs also operate in Kyrgyzstan — they primarily engage in the smuggling of illicit goods. While gangs in the southern region are mainly involved in drug trafficking, criminal networks in the north concentrate on racketeering and embezzlement of state assets, as well as the illicit smuggling of Chinese goods. Similar to mafia-style groups, criminal networks in Kyrgyzstan also have influence over the democratic process, although to a lesser extent. There is a strong collaboration between local criminal networks and foreign actors, especially in human trafficking, drug trafficking and non-renewable resource crimes, due to the transnational nature of these markets. Some local criminal groups also organize on the basis of foreign ethnicity: Uzbek, Tajik, Azeri, Chechen and Russian, for example. The drug trade is mostly controlled by foreign criminal actors. An increase in the influence of Chinese criminal actors in Kyrgyzstan has been noted. Private-sector actors are mainly involved in financial crimes like embezzlement, tax evasion and corruption. Major amendments to the Kyrgyz constitution followed. Through these constitutional amendments, the president and high-ranking officials were granted extensive executive authority, which has given them immense political power. Since the elections and following the concentration of power within the executive branch , reports indicate that the efficiency of the state has decreased in general — including the fight against corruption and organized crime. Overall, the Kyrgyz government remains vulnerable to criminal influence; the political system has been penetrated by organized crime; and corruption is pervasive in the executive branch. And even though the scope of anti-corruption actions continues to grow, such actions remain ineffective. Likewise, the work of organizations tasked with combating corruption is limited due to political influence. Kyrgyzstan has ratified most relevant conventions and treaties related to organized crime and has several extradition treaties in place. However, laws are ineffective and their implementation is lacking. Due to frequent political turmoil, Kyrgyzstan policy development has stalled and remains a major weakness. The Kyrgyz judicial system lacks a specialized unit focusing on issues related to organized crime. Additionally, the country's judicial system is deemed to be one of the most corrupt state bodies in the country, with widespread corruption and bribery among judges. The right to fair trial remains severely compromised, and coerced confessions through torture are commonplace, as are other practices like arbitrary convictions and withholding the right to an attorney. There are reports showing evidence of intimidation, threats and violence against defendants, attorneys and judges. The Kyrgyz judiciary is heavily influenced by organized crime. Many leaders of organized criminal groups have been released in recent years and politicians have prevented convictions against others. Concerns surrounding the independence of the judiciary have grown following the constitutional amendments made after the elections, which granting extensive executive authority to the presidential office, including the power to appoint almost all judges. Judgements made in recent political cases have largely involved fines instead of incarceration, which is thought to be a result of the subservience of the judiciary to the executive branch. Nevertheless, some efforts have been made to make the justice system more responsive, accountable and transparent. The most important needs have been identified and systems have been digitized. Conditions in prisons and detention centres in Kyrgyzstan are harsh, with overcrowding, limited access to food and medicine, and serious allegations of mistreatment. Organized criminal groups wield significant control in these spaces. Despite the presence of law enforcement units dedicated to fighting various forms of organized crime, performance has been poor due to high levels of corruption and political influence, a constant lack of resources and professionalism, and nepotism. Police officers reportedly engage in arbitrary arrests, politically motivated arrests, and they extort people by threatening prosecution. There are similar reports suggesting serious human rights issues including the use of torture by law enforcement officers and security services. As a result, there is limited public trust in law enforcement bodies. However, public trust has been bolstered somewhat by community-based policing systems, which enhance cooperation between police, local government, civil society and the media. A lack of infrastructure also prevents the use of vehicles in border regions, making the borders highly porous, especially in southern Kyrgyzstan where high rates of organized crime occur. The Kyrgyz—Uzbek and Kyrgyz—Tajik borders, in particular, are difficult to monitor due to widespread criminality and long-standing ethnic tensions in those areas. Border-control personnel are poorly paid and under-resourced, making them vulnerable to corruption. Kyrgyzstan has an extremely high risk of money laundering and terrorist financing, exacerbated by its proximity to terrorist groups in neighbouring countries and its position along major drug-trafficking routes. The existence of anti-money laundering legislation AML and a dedicated financial intelligence unit resulted in Kyrgyzstan being identified as not having any strategic AML deficiencies, but there are still major shortcomings in identifying risks and coordinating intelligence-sharing among law enforcement units. Investment legislation is liberal, without significant limits and prohibitions for national and foreign investors willing to do business, even though competition in the market has been weak due to the instability of institutions, inadequate rules and omnipresent corruption. This liberal approach has been changing following the presidential elections: regulatory legislation has been introduced banning foreign companies from future large mining projects in the country. Another major legislative reform is the implementation of a tax code aimed at bolstering the stability of the tax system, creating equal conditions for doing business, and reducing the shadow economy. Despite measures taken by the government to support victims of organized crime, Kyrgyzstan continues to lack sufficient victim protection and treatment services. The limited services available were decreased even further in recent years due to a lack of funding exacerbated by the post-COVID financial crisis. Gaps in identification procedures and the lack of a national referral mechanism impede the identification and assistance of victims. For example, protective orders requested by victims of bride kidnappings are not enforced. Reports also suggest threats, extortion and even rape of child sex-trafficking victims by law enforcement officials. There is a legal framework pertaining to proper treatment of witnesses, but the implementation of this framework is rare. Government action related to victims of drug trafficking is better: the government continues to promote programmes aimed at reducing the harm caused by drugs, as well as victim-support measures and drug-awareness campaigns aimed at the youth. These programmes are supported by international funding and partnerships. The government carries out prevention efforts related to organized crime, mostly through collaboration with civil society organizations. Most of these prevention programmes have been significantly reduced due to a lack of funding. Civil society organizations are active and effective, although they tend to focus on issues related to human and civil rights rather than organized crime. Although numerous NGOs work to combat high-level corruption and engage in legislative reform campaigns, civil society is hindered by inter-ethnic conflict and legal restrictions on the freedom of assembly and association — all of which have been exacerbated under the current regime. Although freedom of speech and freedom of the press are both provided for in law, these rights are severely restricted in practice. Self-censorship due to political pressure is common. Some journalists have been intimidated and harassed by political figures and subjected to arbitrary raids, arrests and cyber-attacks. Moreover, there are growing concerns about an attack on freedom of expression and association resulting from regulatory changes in recent years. These changes include the introduction of a false information law and a financial reporting scheme that has potential to be used as a tool for censorship and interference. The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel. A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index. We're constantly working to improve the Index. By participating in this survey, you will be providing us with insights and suggestions that will help us make the Index an even better resource. This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State. The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State. Capital Bishkek. Income group Lower middle income. Population 6,, Geography type Landlocked. GINI Index Criminal markets 4. An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type. Human trafficking 7. Human smuggling 5. Extortion and protection racketeering 3. Arms trafficking 3. Trade in counterfeit goods 5. Illicit trade in excisable goods 4. Flora crimes 2. Fauna crimes 3. Non-renewable resource crimes 6. Heroin trade 7. Cocaine trade 2. Cannabis trade 6. Synthetic drug trade 5. Cyber-dependent crimes 2. Financial crimes 6. Criminal actors 6. An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society. Mafia-style groups 6. Criminal networks 6. State-embedded actors 8. Foreign actors 4. Private sector actors 4. Political leadership and governance 3. Government transparency and accountability 2. International cooperation 4. National policies and laws 4. A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime. Judicial system and detention 3. Law enforcement 3. Territorial integrity 4. Anti-money laundering 3. Economic regulatory capacity 5. Victim and witness support 4. Prevention 5. Non-state actors 5. Analysis Download full profile english. People Human trafficking remains a considerable issue in Kyrgyzstan, which is a source, transit and destination country for this criminal market. Trade Even though the arms trafficking market in Kyrgyzstan remains negligible, there has been a surge in the illegal circulation of firearms within the country, evidenced by the increased number of confiscations carried out by law enforcement. Drugs Kyrgyzstan plays a notable role as a transit country on the Northern Route for heroin trafficking — the drugs originate in Afghanistan and are destined for Russia and European countries. Cyber Crimes Cyber-dependent crimes are relatively common in Kyrgyzstan. Financial Crimes Financial crimes — in the form of phone call frauds, phishing and charity scams — are widespread in the country and cause substantial losses to citizens. Criminal Actors State-embedded actors are heavily involved in organized crime and criminal organizations, and the apparatus of the state is intricately intertwined with both. Criminal justice and security The Kyrgyz judicial system lacks a specialized unit focusing on issues related to organized crime. Economic and financial environment Kyrgyzstan has an extremely high risk of money laundering and terrorist financing, exacerbated by its proximity to terrorist groups in neighbouring countries and its position along major drug-trafficking routes. Civil society and social protection Despite measures taken by the government to support victims of organized crime, Kyrgyzstan continues to lack sufficient victim protection and treatment services. Read the analysis Listen the podcasts View all events. Next Skip. How to measure organized crime? Read more on globalinitiative. Give us feedback We're constantly working to improve the Index.

Talas where can I buy cocaine