Swine flu 2.0

The way politics and the media deal with the corona virus is reminiscent of the fake pandemic in 2009.

Saturday, 21 March 2020, 13:33 - by Michel Chossudovsky

Think of the "fake" H1N1 swine flu pandemic in 2009: data was manipulated to justify a global public health emergency and mass sales of vaccines that were never needed. The American author and economics professor Michel Chossudovsky sees parallels between the current coronavirus pandemic and the swine flu hysteria of the time.

Introduction by the author

On 30 January 2020, the World Health Organisation (WHO) declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) with regard to the novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV), which is categorised as a viral pneumonia. The virus broke out in the city of Wuhan, a city in eastern China with over 11 million inhabitants.

In the weeks leading up to the decision on 30 January, the WHO Emergency Committee expressed "different views". Divisions within the commission were visible. On 30 January, a far-reaching decision was taken irresponsibly without the support of expert opinion at a time when the outbreak of coronavirus was confined to mainland China.

At its first meeting the Commission expressed different views on whether or not this event justified a PHEIC. At that time, the recommendation was that the event did not justify a PHEIC, but the Commissioners agreed on the urgency of the situation and suggested that the Commission should continue the meeting the next day, reaching the same conclusion.

This second meeting took place in view of significant increases in the number of cases and additional countries reporting confirmed cases (1 ).

There were 150 confirmed cases outside China when the decision was taken. 6 in the USA, 3 in Canada, 2 in the United Kingdom, and so on.

150 confirmed cases in a population of 6.4 billion (world population of 7.8 billion minus China's population of 1.4 billion). What is the risk of infection? Nearly zero. This is no justification to start a worldwide campaign of fear. With recent developments, the number of confirmed cases has increased, especially in South Korea, Iran and Italy.

WHO did not act to reassure and inform global public opinion. Rather the opposite: it was more likely to set off a "fear pandemic" than a Public Health Emergency of International Importance (PHEIC). Panic and insecurity were virtually encouraged by a carefully planned media disinformation campaign.

This led almost immediately to economic disruption, a trade and transport crisis with China that affected the main airlines and shipping companies. In Western countries, a hate campaign was launched against the Chinese ethnic group as a result of the collapse of the stock markets at the end of February, not to mention the crisis in the tourism industry. This would not have happened without the disinformation campaign combined with the US government's intention to undermine the Chinese economy.

What motivated the Director-General of WHO to act in this way? Who was behind the historic decision of the WHO Director-General, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, on 30 January?

Cui Bono?

But this was not the first time that WHO decided to act in this way. Remember the unusual circumstances surrounding the H1N1 swine flu pandemic in April 2009, when there was an atmosphere of fear and intimidation. The data was manipulated.

Based on the incomplete and scarce information, the Director-General of WHO nevertheless predicted with authority that "no less than two billion people could become infected over the next two years - almost a third of the world's population" (2).

It was a multi-billion-dollar goldmine for the major pharmaceutical companies, supported by WHO Director-General Margaret Chan.

In June 2009 Margaret Chan issued the following statement:

"Based on the expert opinions on the evidence, the scientific criteria for an influenza pandemic have been met. I have therefore decided to raise the level of pandemic influenza alert from level 5 to level 6. The world is now at the beginning of the 2009 influenza pandemic" (3).

Which "expert opinions"?

In a subsequent statement, it confirmed that: "Vaccine manufacturers could at best produce up to 4.9 billion pandemic influenza vaccines per year" (4)

This is a financial windfall for the major pharmaceutical vaccine manufacturers, including GlaxoSmithKline, Novartis, Merck & Co., Sanofi, Pfizer and others. The same major pharmaceutical companies are also behind the coronavirus pandemic.

Fake news, fake statistics, lies at the highest levels of government

The media were immediately in full swing (without the slightest proof). Fear and uncertainty. Public opinion was deliberately deceived.

"Swine flu could affect up to 40 percent of Americans over the next two years and no fewer than several hundred thousand could die if a vaccination campaign and other measures are not successful" (5).

"The US estimates that 160 million swine flu vaccines will be available sometime in October" (6).

More affluent countries such as the US and the UK will pay slightly less than $10 per dose (of the H1N1 vaccine). (...) Developing countries will pay a lower price" (About 40 billion dollars for the big pharmaceutical companies?) (7).

But the pandemic never happened. There was no pandemic that affected two billion people ...

Millions of vaccinations against swine flu have been ordered by national governments from the major pharmaceutical companies. Millions of vaccinations were destroyed afterwards: a financial bullseye for the big pharmaceutical companies, a cost crisis for the national governments.

There was no investigation into who was behind this billion-dollar scam. Some critics said that the H1N1 pandemic was a fake.

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, a watchdog for human rights, publicly investigated WHO's motives for announcing a pandemic. The chairman of its influential commission, epidemiologist Wolfgang Wodarg, declared that the "fake pandemic is one of the biggest medical scandals of the century" (8).

Und im Januar 2010 reagierte die WHO mit der folgenden Stellungnahme:

The Western media, which reported daily on the pandemic, remained silent (with a few exceptions) on the issue of financial fraud and disinformation.

I should stress that the current public health crisis regarding the novel coronavirus from China is of a completely different nature than the H1N1 crisis.

But there are some important lessons that we should learn from the H1N1 pandemic in 2009.

The fundamental questions we need to ask about both current and past public health emergencies:

• Can we trust the Western media?
• Can we trust the WHO?
• Can we trust the US government, including the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)?

Michel Chossudovsky, Global Research, 6 March 2020

The following article was published over ten years ago on 25 August 2009. It was awarded the Project Censored Award of Sonoma State University in 2009/10.

The H1N1 Swine Flu Pandemic: Manipulating Data to Enrich Drug Companies

by Michel Chossudovsky, 25 August 2009

"Over the next few months, with the help of our partners in the private and public sectors and at every level of government, we will aggressively move forward to prepare the nation for the possibility of a more serious outbreak of the H1N1 virus. We will do everything we can to plan for different scenarios. We ask the American people to take active steps to prepare and prevent it. It is a responsibility that we all share" (US government warning, 9).

A worldwide public health emergency is spreading in an unprecedented way. 4.9 billion H1N1 swine flu vaccinations are planned by the World Health Organization.

A report by President Obama's Science and Technology Council "considers the H1N1 pandemic to be 'a serious threat to health'; for the US - not as serious as the Spanish flu in 1918, but worse than the swine flu outbreak in 1976:

"It is not that the new H1N1 pandemic strain is more lethal than other flu threats, but probably infects more people than usual, since so few people are immune" (10).

Preparations for vaccination of millions of people in the Americas, the European Union, South-East Asia and worldwide are progressing in accordance with guidelines established by the WHO. Priority is being given to health workers, pregnant women and children. H1N1 vaccination will be compulsory in some countries.

In the United States, state governments are responsible for these preparations in coordination with federal agencies. In the state of Massachusetts, legislation has been introduced that imposes stiff fines and prison sentences on those who resist vaccination (See Mandatory Vaccination in America?).

The US military should take an active role in the public health emergency. Schools and colleges throughout North America are preparing for mass immunization (11).

In the UK, the Home Office planned to build mass graves in response to an increasing number of deaths. The British Home Office reports calls for "increased mortuary capacity". There is an atmosphere of panic and uncertainty (12).

Reliability of the information

The spread of the disease is measured by means of nationwide reports of confirmed and probable cases.

How reliable are these data? Does this information justify a worldwide public health emergency, including a $40 billion vaccination program benefiting a handful of pharmaceutical companies? In the US alone, the cost of preparing for H1N1 is $7.5 billion (13).

As a result of the outbreak of H1N1 swine flu in Mexico, data collection was from the outset poor and incomplete, as confirmed by official statements (14 ).

The Atlanta-based Center for Disease Control (CDC) confirmed that what was collected in the United States were figures of "confirmed and probable cases". However, no breakdown was made between "confirmed" and "probable". In fact, only a small percentage of reported cases were "confirmed" by laboratory testing.

Based on this scarce nationwide information, the WHO declared pandemic level 4 on 27 April. Two days later, pandemic level 5 was declared without supporting evidence (29 April). Pandemic level 6 was declared on 11 June.

There was no attempt to improve the process of data collection in relation to laboratory confirmations. Rather the opposite. Following the announcement of Pandemic Level 6, both the WHO and the CDC decided that data collection on individual confirmed and probable cases was no longer necessary to determine the spread of swine flu. On 10 July, one month after the announcement of pandemic level 6, WHO stopped collecting confirmed cases. It did not ask Member States to send in figures on confirmed and probable cases.

WHO will no longer publish the global tables with the figures of confirmed cases for all countries. Nevertheless, as part of the ongoing efforts to document the global spread of the H1N1 pandemic, regular updates will be provided to describe the situation in newly affected countries. WHO will continue to require that these countries report the first confirmed cases and, where feasible, provide weekly case numbers and a descriptive epidemiology of early cases (15).

On the basis of incomplete and scarce information, WHO nevertheless makes an authoritative prediction that "no less than two billion people could become infected over the next two years - almost a third of the world population" (16).

The statements of the WHO are obviously contradictory. While creating an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty and pointing to a global public health crisis, the WHO also confirmed that the underlying symptoms are moderate and that "most people recover from swine flu within a week, just as they do with seasonal flu forms" (17).

The WHO guidelines of 10 July created the conditions for a structure of scarcity and inadequacy in terms of data collection at national level. National governments of WHO Member States were not asked to demonstrate the spread of AH1N1 swine flu through laboratory testing.

The WHO table below provides a breakdown by geographical region. As confirmed by WHO, these figures are no longer based on documented cases, as governments are no longer required to "test and report individual cases" since 11 July.

In an absolutely twisted logic, the WHO postulates that "the number of reported cases remains below the number of actual cases", as the governments of WHO member countries are not asked to test and report individual cases to determine the spread of the virus (see note below the table). The question is: what is reported by the countries? How do you determine whether the reported cases are H1N1 as opposed to seasonal flu?

CHART

As countries are no longer asked to test and report individual cases, the number of cases reported remains below the actual number of cases. Source: WHO | Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 - Update 62 (revised on 21 August 2009)

The WHO confirms that the above data are based on qualitative indicators:

"The monitoring of qualitative indicators: the global geographical spread of influenza, trends in acute respiratory disease, the intensity of respiratory disease activity and the impact of the pandemic on public health".

According to the WHO, these qualitative indicators are as follows:

Geographical spread

Geographical spread refers to the number and distribution of places reporting influenza activity.

• No activity: No laboratory confirmed cases of influenza or evidence of increased or unusual respiratory disease activity.
• Local: Limited to one administrative unit (or reporting agency) in the country.
• Regional: Occurs in several but less than 50 percent of the country's administrative units (or reporting agencies).
• Widespread: Occurs in more than 50 percent of the country's administrative units (or reporting agencies).
• No information available: No information available for the previous week's period.

Trend

Trend refers to changes in respiratory disease activity compared to the previous week.

• Increasing: Evidence that respiratory disease activity is increasing compared to the previous week.
• Unchanged: Proof that respiratory disease activity is unchanged compared to the previous week.
• Sinking: Proof that the respiratory disease activity decreases compared to the previous week.
• No information available.

Intensity

The intensity indicator is an estimate of the proportion of the population with acute respiratory disease, covering the spectrum of diseases from influenza-like illness to pneumonia.

• Low or moderate: A normal or slightly increased proportion of the population is currently affected by respiratory disease.
• High: A large proportion of the population is currently affected by a respiratory disease.
• Very high: A very large proportion of the population is currently affected by respiratory disease.
• No information available.

Impact

The impact refers to the degree of health care disruption caused by the acute respiratory disease.

• Low: The demands on the health care system are no greater than usual.
• Moderate: The demands on the healthcare system are greater than usual, but still below the maximum capacity of the healthcare system.
• Serious: The demands on the health care system exceed the capacity of the health care system.
• No information available.

Source: WHO | Annex 4 of the WHO Preliminary guidance on surveillance of human infection with the A(H1N1) virus

The whole construct contains an illogical conclusion.

Further down in the text are the qualitative indicators used. What has been recorded is 1. the spread of influenza, 2. the spread of respiratory diseases and 3. the impact on health care activity.

The spread of H1N1 swine flu is not being studied by any specific indicator. An examination of the maps (see links in text box 2 in the original text, translator's note) does not reveal any specific pattern or trend that could determine the spread of H1N1. For many of the reporting countries the information is not available or does not indicate a specific trend.

The question is: how can this information be used reasonably to determine the spread of a very specific type of flu, namely AH1N1?

(...)

"Confirmed and probable cases" in the U.S.

After WHO decided on 10 July to switch from quantitative to qualitative assessments and no longer require governments to determine data through laboratory testing, the Atlanta-based CDC also announced on 24 July that it had discontinued the data collection procedure for "confirmed and probable cases":

"How many cases of the novel H1N1 flu infection have been reported in the United States? When the outbreak of the novel H1N1 influenza was first identified in mid-April 2009, the CDC began working with states to collect, compile, and analyze information regarding the H1N1 influenza outbreak, including numbers of confirmed and probable cases.

Between 15 April 2009 and 24 July 2009, States reported a total of 43,771 confirmed and probable cases of the novel A (H1N1) influenza infection. Of these reported cases, 5,011 people were hospitalized and 302 people died. On 24 July 2009, the census of confirmed and probable cases was stopped. Summarised national reports of hospitalisations and deaths continued at that time' (18).

Instead of collecting data - which would have provided empirical support for an assessment of the spread of the H1N1 virus - the CDC announced that it had developed a model to "try to determine the true number of novel H1N1 influenza cases in the United States".

"The model took the number of cases reported by the states and adjusted the number to calculate the known sources of underestimation (for example, not all people with the novel H1N1 flu seek medical attention and not all people seeking medical attention have samples collected by their healthcare provider).

Why did the CDC stop reporting individual cases? Individual case counts were used in the early stages of the outbreak to track the spread of the disease. As the novel H1N1 influenza spread, individual case counts represented an increasingly inaccurate representation of the disease burden.

This is because many people probably contracted the novel H1N1 flu easily and never sought treatment; many people may have sought treatment but were never officially tested or diagnosed; and as the outbreak intensified, testing was limited, in some cases, to hospital patients only.

This means that the official case count represented only a fraction of the true burden of the novel H1N1 influenza disease in the United States. The CDC recognized early in the outbreak that once the disease was widespread, it would be more appropriate to move to a standard surveillance system to assess illness, hospitalization, and deaths. On 24 July 2009, the CDC discontinued official notification of individual cases' ( 19 ).

Distorted predictions

How accurate are the data sent by the states to the CDC? The CDC calls for the transmission of "aggregated national reports of hospitalizations and deaths".

If the information is conceptually incorrect or incomplete from the outset, predictions and/or simulations are inevitably distorted. Without systematic laboratory information, it is impossible to determine the nature of the virus, as the symptoms of H1N1 are very similar to those of a common flu. In other words, do the data submitted by the States to the CDC confirm cases of H1N1 swine flu or do they show the spread of seasonal flu?

The CDC postulates that the data sent to it by the states are "understated". Then it pulls up these figures of "unconfirmed" cases, many of which are seasonal flu. The "corrected numbers" are then inserted into the model:

Using this approach (CDC model), an estimated one million people in the United States contracted the new H1N1 flu between April and June 2009. The details of this model and the model study will be submitted for publication in a prestigious journal (20).

The model will then be used to predict the spread of swine flu and justify a national health emergency.

"Swine flu could affect up to 40 percent of Americans over the next two years and no fewer than several hundred thousand could die if a vaccination campaign and other measures are not successful" (21).

Anyone familiar with modeling and computer simulation is well aware that if the data and assumptions fed into the model are incorrect from the outset, the results will inevitably be biased.

What we are dealing with is a process of statistical manipulation that has far-reaching implications and which could potentially create an atmosphere of panic, especially when combined, as in the UK, with announcements that "mass graves are being built to cope with an increasing death rate".

Vaccination

The simulations and predictions of the Atlanta-based CDC regarding the spread of H1N1 swine flu will then be used to implement a nationwide vaccination program.

Based on the model's predictions, a mass vaccination of half of the U.S. population will be required, with possible quarantine regulations under civil and/or military jurisdiction. In the case of the United Kingdom, the government predicted, as confirmed by British press reports, an increasing number of deaths, which would require the creation of mass graves.

According to these reports, the US government expects 85 million doses of the new vaccine by the end of October. In total, the US government ordered 195 million doses of the vaccine from the major pharmaceutical companies.

"Recommendation: Priority groups to obtain a new H1N1 vaccine

On July 29, 2009, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) - an advisory committee for the CDC - recommended that the new H1N1 influenza vaccine should be made available to the following five groups initially (press release):

• Pregnant women,
• Healthcare workers and rescue workers,
• People who care for children under 6 months
• Children and young people from 6 months to 24 years
• People between 25 and 64 years with previous illnesses (e.g. asthma, diabetes)

Together, these groups represent approximately 159 million people' (22 ).

According to WHO, western countries have already ordered one billion units of the vaccine.

"Northern hemisphere countries have so far ordered more than one billion doses of the swine flu vaccine, the World Health Organization said on Tuesday to warn of shortages," Agence France-Presse reported. While some countries, such as Greece, the Netherlands, Canada and Israel, have ordered enough vaccine to vaccinate their citizens, "others, such as Germany, the US, the UK and France, have placed orders that would cover between 30 and 78 percent of the population" (23).

The WHO made similar predictions: "Vaccine manufacturers could at best produce up to 4.9 billion pandemic influenza vaccines per year," said Margaret Chan, WHO Director-General (24).

The United Kingdom: "suspected cases" versus "confirmed cases

Even before the WHO decided to stop reporting and collecting confirmed cases, data collection from the UK revealed some highly unusual patterns.

"There are large gaps in the United Kingdom's swine flu data, many due to the fact that nowhere else do so few cases of H1N1 appear to be virologically confirmed. But virology is important - and if more tests had been carried out we might begin to understand why the number of people in hospitals due to swine flu is so much higher in England than in Scotland" (25).

In Scotland, data collection was based on 'confirmed cases' (laboratory tests), while in England it was based on 'suspect cases' (no laboratory tests). Both cases are hospitalisations. For the same period, England had 3,906 hospitalizations for "suspected cases of swine flu" compared to Scotland with 43 "confirmed H1N1", according to the study.

About ten times more people live in England than in Scotland. On a per capita basis, there are nevertheless 9.1 times more people in England with "suspected H1N1 flu" than in Scotland on a "confirmed cases" basis: 43 confirmed cases in Scotland, 3,906 in England (suspected cases), a ratio of more than 1 to 9.

Has the H1N1 epidemic "developed differently in scale and/or timing between Scotland and England"? There is no evidence of this effect. Or is the 9 to 1 deviation partly the result of bias in the data for England based on "suspected cases"? (26).

It is on the basis of these "suspected cases" that unfounded and irresponsible statements are made by senior health officials. This implies that the above-mentioned hospital-based data on "suspected cases", which were already the source of the bias, will no longer be collected by health professionals.

Self-assessment

In the UK, the collection of "suspect cases" (known as biased) has been abandoned in favour of a system that requires neither diagnosis by a health professional nor testing of laboratory samples.

Since the WHO decision of 10 July with new guidelines for data collection, the UK authorities no longer focus on hospital-based "suspect cases", but now collect data through "dedicated call centres".

They have set up a national service where you can call specially equipped call centres for flu-like symptoms or check online whether you have swine flu. So you don't need to go to your GP, you can get quick access to antivirals without having to drive around and infect others (27).

In the UK there has been a shift from "confirmed cases" (laboratory confirmation) to "suspected cases" (detected by health professionals, without testing) to "self-assessment". As the pandemic progresses, the procedure for collecting data is becoming looser and less professional. Normally, one would expect the opposite, that after the announcement of a global pandemic level 6, the data collection procedure would be further developed and improved to produce a public health action plan.

The data collection procedure under the National Pandemic Influenza Service is now based on "self-assessment". Anyone who thinks he or she has swine flu symptoms can contact the National Pandemic Influenza Service by phone or via the Internet and obtain a prescription for an antiviral drug (for example Tamiflu) without the intermediate step of going through a health professional and without even seeing a doctor. This can be done over the internet or by calling the telephone hotline:

"The (UK) National Pandemic Influenza Service is a self-treatment service that assesses your symptoms and if necessary issues an authorisation number that can be used to pick up an antiviral medication from a local collection point. For those who do not have access to the Internet, the same service can be obtained by telephone."

According to sources within the UK health care system that have been provided to the author, people who receive a prescription for Tamiflu by phone through the National Pandemic Influenza Service or the National Health Service Hotline are classified and recorded as "suspected cases" of H1N1 swine flu.

From the guidelines of the National Pandemic Flu Service:

Typical symptoms: Sudden fever (38°C or higher) and sudden cough.

Other symptoms include:

• Tiredness and chills
• headache, sore throat, runny nose and sneezing
• upset stomach, loss of appetite, diarrhoea
• aching muscles, limbs or joints

Source: NHS and BBC.

The moment you enter your name via the Internet or telephone into the system that allows you to pick up an antiviral drug (for example, Tamiflu), you can be classified as a suspected or probable H1N1 case (28).

As discussed in the analysis of the comparison between England and Scotland, there is already a 9 to 1 difference between "suspected" and "confirmed" cases, both of which are hospital-based. The system of data collection in the United Kingdom through "self-assessment" has no scientific basis. It is absolutely meaningless, as H1N1 has exactly the same symptoms as seasonal flu. (However, we have not been able to determine at this stage the extent to which the self-assessment information is tabulated and used to identify trends in pandemic H1N1 influenza)

The pattern in other countries differs from the one presented for the UK. In the United States, a state-level testing system still prevails.

Concluding statement

Reports from Great Britain by well-known doctors (to the author) indicate that doctors and epidemiologists are being threatened in the United Kingdom. They run the risk of being dismissed by the National Health Authorities if they speak out and expose the falsehoods underlying the government's data and opinions.

It is essential that doctors, epidemiologists and health professionals speak out through their respective associations and challenge the opinions of government health officials, who are acting tacitly on behalf of the big pharmaceutical companies, and denounce the manipulation of data. It is also important to warn the public about the dangers of untested H1N1 flu vaccines.

We are dealing with a big lie. A procedure to collect false data, which is then used to justify a nationwide vaccination programme. The political and corporate interests behind this global public health emergency must be the target of citizens' initiatives.

This public health emergency does not serve to protect humanity.

The world is at the crossroads of a major economic and social crisis. The global public health emergency serves to divert public opinion from the real crisis affecting the world's population. This crisis is characterized by rising poverty and unemployment and the collapse of social services, not to mention the multibillion dollar high-tech "war without borders", which includes the preventive "first strike" use of nuclear weapons.

The dramatic causes and consequences of the "real crisis", which literally threaten the future of humanity, must go unnoticed. Both the economic crisis and the war in the Middle East and Central Asia are the object of routine and ongoing falsification and camouflage by the media. In contrast, the H1N1 swine flu - despite its relatively mild and benign consequences - is portrayed as a major "save the world" undertaking.

Author and Professor of Economics Michel Chossudovsky is the Director of the Centre for Research on Globalization, Montreal, Canada. He has taught at universities and academic institutions in North America, Western Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Pacific. He has also worked as a consultant on public health and health care costs for the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the United Nations Population Fund and the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. He has also served as a consultant to governments of developing countries.

Telegraph main page with overview of all articles: Link

Visit our Telegram Channel for additional news & information: Link

Chat with like-minded in our Telegram Chat Group: Link

Please support to keep this blog alive: paypal

Sources and notes:

(1) Extracts from the WHO Commission report, 30 January 2020

(2) World Health Organisation as reported by the Western media, July 2009

(3) Margaret Chan, Director-General WHO, press conference 11 June 2009

(4) Margaret Chan, Director-General WHO, quoted by Reuters, 21 July 2009

(5) Official statement by the Obama administration, Associated Press, 24 July 2009

(6) Associated Press, 23. July 2009

(7) Business Week, July 2009

(8) Forbes, 10. February 2010 Why The WHO Faked A Pandemic

(9) CDC flu.gov: Vaccinations, vaccine distribution and vaccine research 

(10) Get swine flu vaccine ready: U.S. advisers -)

(11) See CDC H1N1 Flu | Resources for schools, childcare providers and colleges

(12) Fear, Intimidation & Media Disinformation: U.K Government is Planning Mass Graves in Case of H1N1 Swine Flu Pandemic

(13) See CDC flu.gov: Vaccinations, vaccine distribution and vaccine research 

(14) Is it the “Mexican Flu”, the “Swine Flu” or the “Human Flu”?

(15) WHO, Instructional note, 2009  Changes in reporting requirements for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus infection

(16) World Health Organization as reported by the Western media, July 2009

(17) WHO statement, quoted in The Independent, 22 August 2009

(18) See CDC, CDC H1N1 Flu | Questions and answers on the online reports of the CDC

(19) Ebenda, highlighting added

(20) Ebenda

(21) Official statement of the US government, Associated Press, 24 July 2009

(22) See Flu.gov: Tests, vaccinations, medicines & masks 

(23) AFP, 19. August 2009

(24) quoted by Reuters, 21 July 2009

(25) Where have all the virologists gone?

(26) Ebenda, see also call for more H1N1 data | Straight Statistics

(27) Most rapid spread of H1N1 virus in UK

(28) see the guidelines of the National Pandemic Influenza Service, Annex 1 at the bottom of the original page on GlobalResearch

Translated & reblogged Version - Original here