Statement by Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov on the agenda item 9 of the session of the IAEA Board of Governors «Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine»

Dear Mr. Chairman,

For more than two years now, we have been constantly talking, including in this very room, about the provocations and crimes of the Kiev regime aimed at creating the most serious threats to nuclear safety. We insist that these provocations and crimes should not go unnoticed and unpunished. We have repeatedly emphasized that shielding Ukraine, hushing up its actions and unwillingness to call a spade a spade, in fact, is an encouragement to continue shelling nuclear facilities. Kiev is thus effectively given carte blanche to take any, even the most reckless steps that could lead to a nuclear catastrophe.

Our calls have remained unanswered all this time. And now everyone can see what this has led to. On August 6 Ukrainian formations invaded the territory of the Kursk Region with the main objective of breaking through to the Kurskaya NPP and using it for nuclear blackmail. At the same time, in order to create panic, the NPP's employees and residents of its satellite city of Kurchatov began to receive numerous calls from Ukrainian special services with messages about the imminent capture of the NPP and an offer to evacuate. Only thanks to the actions of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation was the advance of Ukrainian attack aircraft and foreign mercenaries in the Kursk Region stopped. At the same time, Kiev does not abandon its plans regarding the Kurskaya NPP. Over the past month, Ukrainian formations have carried out several provocations against this facility. On August 8 they used missiles that were shot down by Russian troops, and the debris fell near the radioactive waste processing complex. On August 9 the Ukrainian Armed Forces disabled a transformer substation in Kurchatov and left the city without electricity. On August 14 a launched Ukrainian drone exploded near an open switchgear of the Kurskaya NPP. On August 16 and 22 more Ukrainian drones were suppressed.

At the moment, the nuclear safety situation at the plant remains stable. Unit 3 is in operation, Unit 4 has been shut down for scheduled maintenance. Measures to ensure protection of the Kurskaya NPP have been significantly strengthened. However, we remind you that the design of the RBMK reactors located there does not provide for a protective shell. Missile or drone strikes on the reactor halls of the plant could trigger a nuclear accident that would be felt across a significant part of Europe and could become a second Chernobyl in scale.

On August 27 the IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi visited the Kurskaya NPP. He was familiarized with the consequences of the attacks on the plant. We are grateful to the head of the Agency for this visit. We hope that the statements he made following this event will cool the hot heads of the Ukrainian authorities. At the same time, we cannot help but note that the reaction to Kiev's ongoing nuclear provocations must be tougher and more clear - from both the IAEA Secretariat leadership and the Board of Governors. After all, we are talking about the threat of a nuclear catastrophe.

Dear Mr. Chairman,

Now about another Russian nuclear facility - the Zaporozhskaya NPP (ZNPP). We have carefully studied the latest report of the IAEA Director General «Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine», as well as the public report on the results of two years of the Agency's presence at the ZNPP.

We remind you that this plant came under Russian jurisdiction as a result of a referendum held in the fall of 2022. We fundamentally disagree with the wording of the IAEA reports, which contradict this objective reality.

We emphasize once again that Russia is taking all necessary measures to ensure and strengthen the safety of the Zaporozhskaya NPP, as well as all its other nuclear facilities, in accordance with national legislation and existing obligations arising from relevant international legal instruments.

We are in constant dialogue with the Secretariat on all technical issues related to strengthening the safety of the Zaporozhskaya NPP. We carefully analyze the Agency's recommendations for the possibility of their implementation, taking into account the specifics of the situation around the plant.

In this context, the latest IAEA reports raise serious questions for us. In the public report, Russia's contribution to strengthening the nuclear safety and security of the Zaporozhskaya NPP, to normalizing the functioning of the plant and the work of its personnel is not mentioned at all. Not a single word. This is unacceptable. Instead, fictitious speculations about the alleged plundering and damage of the Chernobyl NPP infrastructure by Russian troops are reproduced, for some unknown reason.

Another report by Director General, which was prepared for the Board of Governors, gives a more objective picture. It directly addresses the improvement of the situation with nuclear safety, operating personnel, emergency preparedness and response, maintenance and supply chain logistics. It is clear that all this large-scale work is carried out by Russian agencies and organizations, as well as the plant personnel. At the same time, we cannot help but pay attention to the moment of the report, which clearly indicates double standards. When describing the situation at Ukrainian NPPs - Khmelnitskaya, Rovenskaya, Yuzhnoukrainskaya - Director General notes that the living conditions of their personnel remain difficult due to the armed conflict. They say that people are under stress because they regularly hear air raid sirens. However, we would like to ask - is this not true for Zaporozhskaya NPP? Nuclear workers living in Energodar not only hear sirens, but are also regularly subjected to suicide drone strikes. Ukrainian special services are conducting a massive campaign of blackmail and threats against residents via social networks. But the report is silent about the fact that these people are experiencing severe stress.

There are other oversights in Director General's report. For example, paragraph 28 states that the Zaporozhskaya NPP power units remain in a state of cold shutdown in compliance with a certain order of the Ukrainian nuclear regulatory authority. We remind you that when making decisions regarding Zaporozhskaya NPP, the Russian side is guided by its own assessments and guidelines, and not by the orders of organizations of other states.

There are other inexplicable oddities in the report. For example, it again mentions the placement of mines between the inner and outer perimeters of the plant. Meanwhile, the Secretariat itself has repeatedly admitted that these mines are located in such a way that they pose no threat to the personnel and facilities of the plant. They are dangerous only for rats, crows and saboteurs. It goes without saying that all safety considerations were carefully calculated when installing the mines.

The report «through a comma» addresses attacks on the Zaporozhskaya NPP and the presence of the Russian National Guard there. That is, those who attack and those who defend are put on the same level. This is unacceptable. By the way, the presence of the Russian National Guard at the Zaporozhskaya NPP is completely legitimate and justified. At the Kiev-controlled NPPs, the security function is carried out by the National Guard of Ukraine. Let the Ukrainian delegation correct me if I am wrong.

For some reason, the report also mentions the presence of military trucks at the plant, which is not prohibited at all. Let me remind you that in accordance with the «five specific principles» of Mr. Rafael Grossi, the plant should not have only heavy weapons - tanks, artillery and MLRS. Trucks used to transport people and food do not fall under this category. One gets the impression that some of the Secretariat employees involved in drafting the report were deliberately looking for at least some negativity so that the overall picture would not be too positive.

Taken together, it is impossible to shake the feeling that the main text of the report and its conclusion were written by different people. After all, the conclusions about the overall situation at the Zaporozhskaya NPP have not changed one iota. According to the Agency, it still remains precarious, and all seven pillars of nuclear safety and security during armed conflicts formulated by Director General are designated as fully or partially compromised. Such assessments can only partially have a right to exist due to the fact that the formations controlled by Kiev continue provocations and attacks on the Zaporozhskaya NPP and its satellite city of Energodar. Since our last meeting in June they have carried out several strikes on the Luch and Raduga substations, destroyed one of the radiation monitoring points, fired artillery at the checkpoint at the entrance to Energodar and the Vodozabor electrical substation, and attacked public and industrial areas of the city with drones. One of the Ukrainian drones that attacked Zaporozhskaya NPP was suppressed by Russian electronic warfare systems and detonated dangerously close to the perimeter of the site, right on the access road to the plant, where its personnel usually move.

In total 2 054 Ukrainian drones have been detected in the Zaporozhskaya NPP area over the past four months. The intensity of their flights ranges from 6 to 62 per day.

Finally, on August 11 the Ukrainian Armed Forces carried out two direct strikes using UAVs on the cooling tower 1 of Zaporozhskaya NPP. As a result, a fire broke out and the internal structures were seriously damaged. We do not agree with the assessment given in Director General's report that this incident did not create nuclear risks. If the cooling tower had collapsed, it could have destroyed the cooling pond dam. The outflow of water from there would have created a serious threat to the plant.

In this regard, both the cooling tower and the cooling pond dam are critical infrastructure of the plant. Therefore, an attack on these facilities should be regarded as a violation of the first of the five principles for the protection of the Zaporozhskaya NPP, formulated by Director General at the UN Security Council in May 2023.

After the attack on the cooling tower, Ukrainian propaganda immediately began spreading fake news that the fire was caused by Russians setting car tires on fire. IAEA experts who visited the cooling tower refuted these clumsy insinuations. However, this episode illustrates well the methodology of Ukrainian information and psychological operations. Unable to dispute the facts of the attack on the Zaporozhskaya NPP and its infrastructure, which are confirmed by IAEA employees, the Ukrainian side does not hesitate to claim that the strikes were allegedly carried out by Russia. They say that this is the Russians' favorite pastime - shooting at themselves. No sober-minded person will believe this.

Against this background, we are extremely disappointed that the IAEA leadership still does not dare to name the culprit of these attacks. We call on the Agency and IAEA member states that are truly concerned about nuclear safety issues to condemn the Ukrainian attacks. The time for this has long been coming. Delay will only lead to further escalation of nuclear provocations by the Kiev regime.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.