Srap Gizli

⚡ TÜM BİLGİLER! BURAYA TIKLAYIN 👈🏻👈🏻👈🏻

Srap Gizli
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
This article contains close paraphrasing of a non-free copyrighted source, http://militera.lib.ru/research/suvorov8/18.html ( Duplication Detector report ) . Relevant discussion may be found on the talk page . Please improve this article by re-writing it in your own words. ( December 2019 ) ( Learn how and when to remove this template message )
The lead section of this article may need to be rewritten . Use the lead layout guide to ensure the section follows Wikipedia's norms and is inclusive of all essential details. ( August 2014 ) ( Learn how and when to remove this template message )
This article contains too many quotations for an encyclopedic entry . Please help improve the article by presenting facts as a neutrally worded summary with appropriate citations . Consider transferring direct quotations to Wikiquote or, for entire works, to Wikisource . ( February 2019 )


^ Paterson, Tony (25 November 2004), "Berlin plaque pays tribute to "Schindler of Stourbridge" " , The Independent , archived from the original on 15 February 2008 , retrieved 14 February 2008

^ Rogov, ( GRU officer) A.S., "Pitfalls of Civilian Cover" , Studies in Intelligence , Central Intelligence Agency, archived from the original on February 13, 2008

^ US Department of the Army (September 2006), FM 2-22.3 (FM 34-52) Human Intelligence Collector Operations (PDF) , retrieved 2007-10-31

^ Beller, Patrick R., "The Life and Work of Stephan Haller" , Studies in Intelligence , Central Intelligence Agency, archived from the original on January 9, 2008

^ Jump up to: a b c Suvorov, Victor (1984), "Chapter 6, The Practice of Agent Work" , Inside Soviet Military Intelligence , MacMillan Publishing Company

^ US Department of Defense (12 July 2007), Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (PDF) , archived from the original (PDF) on 2008-11-23 , retrieved 2007-10-01

^ Carroll, Thomas Patrick (5 September 2006), Human Intelligence: From Sleepers to Walk-ins (PDF)

^ "R.F. Bennett" . Archived from the original on 2007-11-04.

^ U.S. Department of Justice,Commission for Review of FBI Security Programs (March 2002), A Review of FBI Security Programs

^ "Agent Radio Operation During World War II" , Studies in Intelligence , archived from the original on January 9, 2008

^ Jump up to: a b c Begoum, F.M. (18 September 1995), "Observations on the Double Agent" , Studies in Intelligence , archived from the original on January 9, 2008 , retrieved 3 November 2007

^ Jump up to: a b c Bekrenev, ( GRU officer) L. K., Operational Contacts , Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, archived from the original on January 9, 2008

^ Hall, Roger (1957), You're Stepping on my Cloak and Dagger , W. W. Norton & Co.

^ Decision Support Systems, Inc. "An Analysis of Al-Qaida Tradecraft" . Archived from the original on 2007-11-16 . Retrieved 2007-11-19 .

^ John Barron (1974), KGB: the secret work of Soviet secret agents , Readers Digest Press

^ Jump up to: a b David Kahn (1974), The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing , Macmillan, ISBN 0025604600

^ National Security Agency. "VENONA" . Archived from the original on 2007-10-28 . Retrieved 2007-11-18 .

^ The SSTR-6 and SSTC-502 - "Joan-Eleanor" , 2007 , retrieved 2007-11-17

^ Edward J. Campbell. "Soviet Strategic Intelligence Deception Organizations" .


The Clandestine HUMINT page adheres to the functions within the discipline, including espionage and active counterintelligence.

The page deals with Clandestine HUMINT operational techniques , also known as "tradecraft". It applies to clandestine operations for espionage, and a clandestine phase before direct action (DA) or unconventional warfare (UW). Clandestine HUMINT sources at certain times act as local guides for special reconnaissance (SR).

Many of the techniques are important in counterintelligence . Defensive counterintelligence personnel needs to recognize espionage, sabotage, and so on, in process. Offensive counterintelligence specialists may use them against foreign intelligence services (FIS).
While DA and UW can be conducted by national military or paramilitary organizations, al-Qaeda and similar non-state militant groups that appear to use considerably different clandestine cell system structure, for command, control and operations, from those used by national forces. Cell systems are evolving to more decentralized models, sometimes because they are enabled by new forms of electronic communications.

This page deals primarily with one's assets. See double agent for additional information adversary sources that a country has turned to its side.

This description is based around the foreign intelligence service, of country B , operating in and against country A . It may also include operations against non-state organizations operating in country B , with or without country B support. It may also involve offensive counterintelligence against country D assets operating in country B .

The basic structure here can be pertinent to a domestic service operating against a non-national group within its borders. Depending on the legal structure of the country, there may be significant, or very few, restrictions on domestic HUMINT. The most basic question will be whether criminal prosecution, or stopping operations, is the goal. Typically, criminal prosecution will be the primary goal against drug and slavery groups, with breaking up their operations the secondary goal. These priorities, however, are apt to reverse in dealing with terrorist groups.

If there are separate organizations with diplomatic and nonofficial cover, there may be two chiefs. Sufficiently large stations may have several independent, compartmented groups.

Nations vary as to how well hidden they choose to have all, part or none of their intelligence personnel under the guise of diplomatic immunity. Frequently, at least one individual is known to the host country, so there can be a deniable channel of communications. If the nations are allies, many of the intelligence personnel may be known and actively cooperating.

Certain diplomatic titles were often assumed to be cover jobs. With the United Kingdom, " passport control officer " was, much of the time, an intelligence position. [1] Today, it may be confusing that some passport control officers actually control passports. With other countries, "cultural attaché" was often a cover job, although, again, it might be legitimate. An intelligence officer covered as a cultural attaché might still do some cultural things.

An intermediate approach has the officers clearly working for their country but without diplomatic immunity and with a cover role that does not immediately suggest intelligence affiliation. For example, the Soviet GRU covered some intelligence officers under the TASS news agency, or as part of a trade or technical mission, or even as diplomats. The last might seem surprising but this was under a GRU assumption that military attaches would always be assumed to be intelligence officers, but that members of the civilian part of an embassy might actually be diplomats rather than intelligence officers. [2]

It was easier, of course, for the socialist USSR to assign people to state agencies. Western sensitivities tend to be much greater about using, for example, journalistic cover. [ citation needed ] The US has been emphatic in prohibiting any relationship between intelligence and the Peace Corps [ citation needed ] .

US military intelligence doctrine forbids a HUMINT specialist to pose as:

An example of civilian cover for an American officer involved a German refugee, with the pseudonym "Stephan Haller", who had widely ranging interests and special skills in mathematics and physics, as well as native language skill. His overt role, in 1949, was directing a program that paid subsidies to German scientists, part of a larger program of denying German talent to the Soviets. Initially, he was based in Pforzheim , (West) Germany . [4]


During two years in Pforzheim, with a well-established cover, he collected political and scientific intelligence from the scientists and also Germans that he knew in political circles before emigrating. In 1951, he moved to Berlin , directing overall "operations against scientific targets in the East Zone of Germany", while still managing the subsidy program. His new work included encouraging defection of key craftsmen working for the Soviets. He was considered a master craftsman,
He did not grow careless or conceited with success. Here remained a meticulous craftsman. Before he debriefed a source, he mastered the subject to be discussed. His agents were made comfortable not only by his cigars and beer but also by the easy flow of communication. And he did not end until he had every last scrap of useful information. He never failed, moreover, to remain alert for operational leads-- potential agents , counterintelligence indicators , propaganda possibilities . When Haller was finished, there were no more questions to be asked. And though he groaned over the chore of putting it on paper, his reporting became thorough-and more than thorough, illuminating-for he rarely failed to make interpretive comments. [quotation?] [citation?]
According to Victor Suvorov , the Soviet reaction to losing networks operated from diplomatic missions – after the countries in which those embassies were located were overrun in the Second World War – was to emphasize "illegal" (i.e., what the US calls non-official cover) stations (i.e., residencies) for HUMINT networks. The illegal residencies were preferred to be in safe locations, perhaps of allies such as the United States, Great Britain and Canada.

Soviet operations were tightly compartmentalized, with strict need-to-know an absolute rule. "Undercover residencies support illegals, but only on instructions from the Centre without having any idea for whom they are working. All operations in support of illegals are worked out in such a way that the officers of the GRU undercover residency do not have one crumb of information which is not necessary. Operations are planned in such a way that there is no possibility of the illegals becoming dependent on the actions of the undercover residency." A lesson learned from the loss of espionage networks was to keep them small, subdividing them, with independent reporting to Center, when more agents were recruited. [5]

Suvorov explained that new agents were separated from official Soviet institutions only after the agent has compromised himself by giving Soviet Intelligence a significant quantity of secret material; making it impossible for the agent to go to the police. The separated agent then occupies one of three guises: the separated acting agent, the agent group and the agent residency.

Greatest resources are devoted to these agents; which provide the most important material. Once the central headquarters assesses the materials as sufficiently valuable, the doctrine is to temporarily stop obtaining new material from the agent and improve their security as well as their knowledge of espionage tradecraft. This training is preferably done in a third country, from which the agent might or might not be moved to the Soviet Union. Typical cover for an agent absence would be taking a vacation or holiday.

Thence he will go back to his own country, but as an independently acting agent. He will be run exclusively by the Centre, in concrete terms the head of a section, even, in special cases, the head of a directorate and in extreme cases the deputy head of the GRU or the head himself. The running of such an agent is thus carried out exactly as the running of illegals is. [ citation needed ]
Less valuable than a separated acting agent but still of importance, was the agent group, which migrated from diplomatic or civilian contact, to the in-country illegal rezidentura (resident and infrastructure), to direct communications with the Center. The leader of such a group is called, in Soviet terminology, a gropovod , and is conceptually the only member of the group that communicates with Moscow. In reality, clandestine communications personnel may be aware of the direct contact, but newer electronics allow the leader to manage his or her only communications.

Suvorov makes the important point that "A group automatically organises itself. The GRU obviously considers family groups containing the head of the family and his wife and children to be more secure and stable. The members of such a group may work in completely different fields of espionage." The pattern of having groups that are self-organizing and have preexisting ties, making them virtually impossible to infiltrate, has survived the GRU and is common in terrorist networks.

Other agents recruited by residencies are gradually organised into agent groups of three to five men each. Usually, agents working in one particular field of espionage are put together in one group. Sometimes a group consists of agents who for various reasons are known to each other. Let us suppose that one agent recruits two others. ... Thus to a certain extent the members of agent groups are completely isolated from Soviet diplomatic representation. The agent group is in contact with the undercover residency for a period of time, then gradually the system of contact with the residency comes to an end and orders begin to be received directly from Moscow. By various channels the group sends it material directly to Moscow. Finally the contact with Moscow becomes permanent and stable and the agent group is entirely separated from the residency. With gradual changes in personnel at the residency, like the resident himself, the cipher officers and the operational officers with whom there was once direct contact, nobody outside the Centre will know of the existence of this particular group. Should it happen that operating conditions become difficult, or that the embassy is blockaded or closed down, the group will be able to continue its activities in the same way as before. [5]
When the GRU attaches one or more illegals (i.e., Soviet officer under an assumed identity), the residency changes from "an agent residency into an illegal residency. This process of increasing the numbers and the gradual self-generation of independent organisations continues endlessly." Suvorov uses a medical metaphor of quarantine designed to contain infection to describe separating agents for improved security.

The GRU kept certain officers immediately ready to go into illegal status, should the host nation intensify security.


These officers are in possession of previously prepared documents and equipment, and gold, diamonds and other valuables which will be of use to them in their illegal activities will have been hidden in secret hiding-places beforehand. In case of war actually breaking out, these officers will unobtrusively disappear from their embassies. The Soviet government will register a protest and will for a short time refuse to exchange its diplomats for the diplomats of the aggressive country. Then it will capitulate, the exchange will take place and the newly fledged illegals will remain behind in safe houses and flats. Afterwards they will gradually, by using the system of secret rendezvous, begin to establish the system of contacts with agents and agent groups which have recently been subordinated to the undercover residency. Now they all form a new illegal residency. The new illegals never mix and never enter into contact with the old ones who have been working in the country for a long time. This plainly makes life more secure for both parties. [5]
Again, Suvorov emphasizes that the process of forming new illegal residencies was the Soviet doctrine for imposing compartmentation. Western countries, especially those in danger of invasion, have a related approach, the stay-behind network. The US military definition, used by most NATO countries, is

Agent or agent organization established in a given country to be activated in the
event of hostile overrun or other circumstances under which normal access would be denied. [6]
In such an approach, both clandestine intelligence and covert operations personnel live normal lives, perhaps carrying out regular military or government functions, but have prepared documentation of assumed identities, safehouses, secure communications, etc.

Vilyam Genrikhovich Fisher , usually better known by his alias, Rudolf Abel, was a Soviet intelligence officer who came to the US under the false identity of a US citizen, Emil Robert Goldfus, who had died in infancy but was used by the USSR to create an elaborate legend for Fisher. On coming to the US, entering through Canada, Fisher/Abel took over the control of several existing Soviet HUMINT assets, and also recruited new assets. Key assets for whom he was the case officer included Lona Cohen and Morris Cohen , who were not direct intelligence collectors but couriers for a number of agents reporting on US nuclear information, including Julius Rosenberg , Ethel Rosenberg , David Greenglass , and Klaus Fuchs .

His role was that of the "illegal" resident in the US, under nonofficial cover . Soviet practice often was to have two rezidents , one illegal and one a diplomat under official cover . He was betrayed to the US by an alcoholic assistant who defected to the FBI.

That Fisher/Abel only had one assistant, with operational responsibilities, is not surprising. Unless a clandestine station has a strong cover identity, the larger the station, the larger the possibility it may be detected by counterintelligence organizations. Beyond the station chief, the most likely person to be associated with the station, not as a case officer, is a communicator, especially if highly specialized secure communication methods are used.

Some clandestine services may have additional capabilities for operations or support. Key operational agents of influence are apt to be run as singletons, although political considerations may require communication through cutouts. Useful idiots can be run by diplomatic case officers, since there is no particular secrecy about their existence or loyalty. Valuable volunteers, depending on the size of the volunteer group, may work either with case officers, or operations officers brought clandestinely into the area of operations.

Proprietaries, which can be large businesses (e.g., the CIA proprietary airlines such as Air America , which, in the interest of cover, often had the latest aircraft and flew commercial as well as secret cargo), often are not controlled from the local area, but by headquarters. Especially when the proprietary is a multinational company, and has some commercial business of its own, central control makes the most sense.

In looking at internal as well as external assets, remember the fundamental rule of clandestine operations: the more secure, the less efficient. Because espionage operations need rigorous security, they are always inefficient — they take a lot of time, energy, and money. Proprietaries can be an exception, but, even though they make money, they can require additional capital to be able to expand in the same way a comparable private business would do so. [7]

Another kind of resource could include foreign offices owned or operated by nationals of the country in question. A step farther is a proprietary , or business, not just individuals, under non-official cover. Both kinds of business can
Sikmeli Tecavüz
Japanese Lolita Citir Izle
Türkçe Sex Grup