Spain and NATO, Rutte - Sánchez meeting

Pedro Sánchez has reiterated on multiple occasions Spain's commitment to reach 2% of GDP in defense spending by 2029, in line with NATO agreements.

Spain has increased its military spending to 1.26% of GDP in 2024, approaching NATO's 2% target.

But President Sánchez stressed to the Secretary General that Spain contributes much more to NATO than the 2% that Rutte demands, acting more as a spokesman for the Trump government than as a spokesman for a military organization in which 30 countries are present.

Context of Spain's commitment to NATO

2% target: NATO countries agreed in 2014 to allocate at least 2% of their GDP to defence by 2024. Spain, however, has postponed compliance until 2029, something accepted by the Alliance.

In 2023, Spain allocated 1.26% of GDP to defence (about €18.5 billion).

By 2029, this would mean increasing spending by an additional €10 billion annually.

Geopolitical pressure: The war in Ukraine and global tensions have accelerated NATO's demands for allies to meet the target.

What would it mean to meet the 2% target by 2029?

Investment in the Spanish defence industry: Projects such as the FCAS (6th generation European combat aircraft) or the F-110 frigates. Military modernisation: Acquisition of drones, cybersecurity and intelligence systems. On this point, Sánchez and Rutte have shared the diagnosis that the European defence industry must be strengthened.

Strengthening NATO missions: Spain actively participates in missions in Latvia, Iraq and the Mediterranean.

But the Spanish government must face important challenges to get this increase in the contribution to NATO approved in the budget.

Political approval: Increasing military spending could generate tensions in the government coalition (PSOE-Sumar), where there are sectors critical of the military budget.

"Non-traditional" approach: Spain insists that part of its investment be allocated to "multidimensional security" (cybersecurity, climate change, migration).

The defence of Europe's southern flank: We cannot forget that the NATO umbrella does not protect the Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa.

And here we have an important point of disagreement between NATO and Spain.

According to Article 6 of the treaty, collective defence applies to member territories in Europe and North America. Ceuta and Melilla, being in North Africa, are not automatically covered by this article.

Although NATO could interpret the attack as a threat to the security of Spain (and by extension Europe), the activation of Article 5 requires unanimity among the 32 members. Some countries could question the legal obligation and others, such as the US or France, have Morocco as a high-priority military and economic partner in North Africa.

Let us not forget that at the NATO meeting in Madrid in June 2022, Spain requested that these cities be under NATO protection, but the Spanish government did not receive any guarantees, therefore Spain should think about its own interests since if the only possible point of military confrontation that Spain may have does not fall under NATO protection, perhaps it should consider the degree of effort it should put into this organisation.

Rutte, who is a liberal and admirer of Margaret Thatcher, Churchill and Reagan, undoubtedly came to Spain to pressure the government to increase its contribution to NATO. Rutte, when he was foreign minister and Dutch prime minister, has shown himself to be a tough political rival against the countries of southern Europe.

NATO and China

China represents a "systemic challenge" for NATO according to NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept. China is perceived as a threat to Euro-Atlantic security through cyberattacks, disinformation and alliances with Russia, as well as the militarization of the Indo-Pacific and pressure on Taiwan, as well as technological competition (5G, artificial intelligence).

However, Spain and China maintain priority economic relations:

Bilateral trade: China is Spain's main supplier outside the EU (electronics, textiles, machinery) and a key market for Spanish products (food, pharmaceuticals, tourism).

Chinese investments in Spain: Companies such as COSCO (port of Valencia), State Grid (electric network) or Huawei (5G infrastructure) reflect Chinese economic penetration.

Tourism: Before the pandemic, China was the third largest source market for tourists to Spain, one of its main economic activities.

Therefore, Spain has to seek balance in relations with NATO, EU and China.

The US and NATO urge Spain (and the EU) to limit technological cooperation with China (e.g. exclusion of Huawei in critical 5G networks). Spain has partially restricted Huawei, following EU and NATO guidelines.

The EU defines China as a "partner, competitor and systemic rival", promoting a strategy of reducing dependencies without decoupling. Spain supports this line, prioritizing multilateralism and avoiding aligning itself with the US-China confrontation.

Spain's strategic dilemma with China

Defense vs. Economy:

How to protect critical infrastructures (ports, energy) with Chinese investment without damaging trade relations with the Asian power?

Taiwan: Spain respects the "One China" policy, but NATO "keeps an eye" on the possible escalation in the Taiwan Strait, caused mainly by the actions of the US, UK and their allies AUKUS, supporting the Taiwanese government against Chinese interests.

In the future, Spain will seek, or rather will be pushed, towards greater NATO-EU coordination against China.

If Beijing supports Russia in Ukraine or increases pressure on Taiwan, Spain could be forced to toughen its stance.

Spain and the EU will seek autonomy in key sectors (microchips, clean energy), reducing dependence on China.

Spain will maintain trade ties with China, but prioritising Western collective security.

Conclusion:

Spain navigates a delicate balance

As a member of NATO and the EU, it must align its security with Western democratic values.

As an economic partner of China, it seeks benefits without compromising its strategic position vis-à-vis its NATO partners.

The challenge will be to manage the tensions between a West in confrontation with China and its own national interests. The EU will act as a buffer, but NATO pressure could tip the balance and force Spain to adopt tougher positions in the future.

Sánchez - Trump

As for the relations between Sánchez's government and Trump's government, they will follow a path of political rapprochement despite Sánchez openly supporting the policies of the US Democratic Party.

Trump, in reference to Spain, recalled that Spain is one of the countries that has not yet reached 2% of budgetary disbursement for NATO, and even called it "a friend or part" of the BRICS. I don't know if it is due to the natural geographical ignorance of the Americans, or as part of a policy of threats that forces the European members of NATO to increase their contribution to the military organization.

Specifically, he threatened Spain with increasing tariffs on Spanish products if it did not comply with the budgetary orders of the Trump government.

Trump's carrot and stick policy will be very active against the supposed partners of the US who do not comply with the "imperial orders" of the North American power.

- Santiago 🌍 Eureka News