STRATDELA Special #8: Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces in 2023

End of the year is a good time for an overview of Russia's strategic nuclear forces, and there has been some official information.

The nuclear factor has been mentioned quite often this year, on and off, and accordingly, we should note a quote from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief:

"In the conditions of the changing nature of military threats and the emergence of new military and political risks, the role of the nuclear triad, which ensures the balance of power, the strategic balance of power in the world, has significantly increased"

As usual, we cannot do without the percentage of "the level of weapons' modernity". In the Strategic Nuclear Forces as a whole - 95%, in particular, in the sea leg - "almost 100%" The mention of the Navy clearly indicates that in this case only missiles are taken into account, since the Delta-IV boats are in no way modern, unlike the quite modern R-29RMU2/2.1 Sineva/Lainer SLBMs.

The construction of infrastructure for nuclear-powered strategic weapon systems - "Burevestnik" unlimited range cruise missiles and "Poseidon" uncrewed underwater vehicles - continues - an extra reminder that the programmes are not dead. This is especially important for the Burevestnik, which, although according to statements by officials was successfully tested not so long ago, is still a rather mysterious product. 

Russia and the United States continue to notify each other about any planned launches of ICBMs and SLBMs at least a day in advance, and that is good.

Meanwhile, Russian Early Warning system has detected 78 ballistic missile launches and 168 launch vehicles in 2023 (to an unspecified date). Traditionally, no one has shown us the breakdown, and in general, more than two hundred launches of space rockets have already happened in the world this year. However, nothing new.

Now let's look at the individual "legs" of the nuclear triad.

For the Strategic Rocket Forces, the share of modern weapons "by the end of 2023" is 88%, with land-based ICBMs accounting for the largest number of launch vehicles and warheads in the nuclear triad, about 60% of the total "ceiling" under the suspended New START. This probably amounts to ~420 deployed launchers with ~930 nuclear warheads. The ratio of delivery vehicles in TELs and silos, i.e. in mobile and stationary groups, is approximately equal, but the latter have slightly more warheads. The last missile regiment with Topol TEL will be rearmed with Yars in 2023 - as usual, the specific modification (-C, -M, you get the picture) is not specified.

 "The rearmament with the modern Avangard missile system has been completed." Probably, we can assume the completion of the deployment of ICBM with hypersonic glide vehicle in the current form with the UR-100N UTTH as a "booster". By the way, the prospects for the emergence of HGVs on lighter TELs are quite directly indicated, the relevant R&D is underway. Let's wait.

"By the end of the year, 15 launchers of the Yars and Avangard missile systems will be put on combat duty in the Strategic Missile Forces" - apparently, it can be considered done by now.

It seems that they are not forgetting about the infrastructure for missile divisions and their combat duty, 592 "high-tech facilities" have been declared.

In 2024, the main task is to put the Sarmat heavy ICBM on combat duty in Uzhur, i.e. in the 62nd missile division. Whether it is on trial combat duty there, as was reported in the autumn, is unknown. Admittedly, we were expecting something symbolic already under this Christmas tree, well, activation of a regiment of command posts and a couple of silos, but it seems that we will be left without a reason for jokes.

The number of ICBM launches for 2024 has been announced again, namely seven. Let's count.

The promise is to finish equipping the 28th Missile Division with silo-based Yars by the end of 2025. The work near Kozelsk is proceeding slowly, but progressively. It should be noted separately that in the context of the ministerial visit to these guys the systems of active defence of missile launchers against high-precision weapons of the enemy were mentioned, but, apparently, for the time being it is only about electronic countermeasures and camouflage.

Apparently, from 2026-2027 we can expect the beginning of replacement of Topol-M ICBMs, which seem to be still in normal condition, but nothing lasts forever, especially if that something is a solid-fuel rocket motor. On the agenda, as you know, is the 60th missile division in Tatishchevo (silos) and two missile regiments with TELs from the Teikovo missile division. But what they will be rearmed with - modifications of the Yars or something new (remember the Osina, Kedr...Anchar...) - is the question. 

In general, at this stage there are no plans to change the ratio of TELs and silos, as well as the formation of new units. That's good.

Yes, it should be noted that "if necessary" the Strategic Rocket Forces can "as soon as possible" receive intermediate and shorter-range missiles. This probably answers the question to the subordination of at least IRBMs in Future Russia, but with SRBMs and GLCMs the question may remain open. #MoratoriumLive! 

As for the Long Range Aviation, four Tu-160Ms (apparently including modernised ones) have been delivered, which even exceeds the three aircraft announced in 2022.

In 2024, two Tu-160M (apparently, newly-built) are planned to be handed over. Also mentioned are "completely new aircraft, on new principles, with new aerodynamic and combat qualities". Here it is difficult to guess, PAK DA is unlikely to reach this stage, and it is not very what is new in terms of aerodynamics can be demonstrated by the Tu-160M and even Tu-22M3M. Also, let's not forget that MiG-31I Kinzhal carriers are also in the LRA, no one is particularly shy to talk about it.

As for the sea leg, everything is quite simple and progressive: the project 955A "Imperator Aleksandr III" was accepted, by the end of 2024 it is planned to hand over to the fleet the project 955A "Knyaz Pozharsky", so no surprises, except for the plan to return to combat service the Delta-IV K-117 "Bryansk" after the completion of medium repairs in November 2024.

To sum up: Russian strategic nuclear forces remain the most important element of strategic deterrence. The processes of rearmament and modernisation are progressing quite steadily, but not without rough edges. Sarmat and PAK DA are of primary concern, but we are not particularly worried about the new nuclear-powered toys. No new details about the command and control systems of the Strategic Nuclear Forces have emerged, which, in principle, is not surprising. Those need to be continuously improved - well, no one is arguing. It is true that our overseas counterparts have recently started to look more closely here - maybe they will please us with a new level of transparency. But obviously not today and not tomorrow.

Perhaps the main conclusion is that there is no desire for a quantitative increase. This is good, this is right, we have other things on our minds now. Anyhow, hardly anyone should have any doubts about the possibility of delivering a crushing blow in accordance with the Basic Principles of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the field of nuclear deterrence.

...and do not forget to subscribe to the STRATDELA newsletter: https://1dkv.substack.com/

Sources used:

[1] Theses of the report of the Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation at the enlarged meeting of the Collegium of the Ministry of Defence, 19 December 2023, https://mil.ru/files/files/itogi2023/files/%D0%92%D1%8B%D1%81%D1%82%D1%83%D0%BF%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B5%20%D0%9C%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B0%20%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%BD%D1%8B%20%D0%A0%D0%A4%20%28%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%BA%D0%B0%29%20RU.pdf

[2] Russia's strategic power is growing stronger. Interview with Colonel General Sergei Karakaev, Commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, 18 December 2023, http://redstar.ru/strategicheskaya-moshh-rossii/.

[3] The tasks have been set. We will fulfil them! Comments by participants of an extended meeting of the Board of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, 19 December 2023, http://redstar.ru/zadachi-postavleny-budem-vypolnyat/.

[4] Submarine strategist "Bryansk" will return to the Navy after repairs in November 2024 18 December 2023, https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/19566531.

[5] Vladimir Putin's speech at an extended meeting of the Collegium of the Russian Ministry of Defence, 19 December 2023, http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/73035

[6] Vladimir Putin took part in the XX Annual Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club. Transcript of the plenary session, 05 October 2023, https://ru.valdaiclub.com/events/posts/articles/vladimir-putin-prinyal-uchastie-v-xx-ezhegodnom-zasedanii-kluba-valda/