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Resistance in Ukraine: Putin’s dangerous miscalculation

Mar 3, 2022

Operation Josephine B: Sabotage of Pessac Power Station in France. June 1941

Feb 13, 2022

Victoria Cross awarded posthumously on the testimony from an enemy officer

Feb 10, 2022

The Nazi Euthanasia Programme

Feb 8, 2022

Eileen Nearne: SOE Wireless Operator in France who was forgotten and penniless after the war

Feb 7, 2022

The Mazabotto Massacre in Italy 1944

Feb 6, 2022

SS Panzer Division Das Reich and Der Führer: War Crimes in France after the Normandy Landings.

Feb 6, 2022

Denise Gilman SOE Agent In France.

Feb 6, 2022

German Spies Executed at the Tower of London During the Two World Wars

Feb 5, 2022

Sonia Olschanezky: The persecuted Jewish girl who joined the French resistance

Jan 30, 2022

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The Security Service of Ukraine, Sluzhba Bespeky Ukrayin (SBU) was formed in 1990, once part of the KGB its roots go back to the Cold War Period when Ukraine (Ukraine Soviet Socialist Republic) was integrated within the Warsaw Pact and under the firm control of the Kremlin.
Influence and control from the Soviet Union was clearly visible throughout all government departments and institutions and this was particularly true, as with all Warsaw Pact countries, when it came to maintaining the power and dominance of the Soviet Union throughout Ukraine’s’ military and intelligence services.
As the SBU is a direct descendant of the KGB, when Ukraine became independent in 1991 state security remained in the hands of officers who were trained by the Soviet Union and had gone through extensive vetting to ensure they were loyal to Moscow and not Ukraine.
According to Ihor Smeshko, former intelligence chief and adviser to the President of Ukraine, many of the newly formed SBU came from the former KGB 5th Directorate which was engaged in conducting intelligence and arresting domestic political dissents and loyalty to Russia remained entrenched within the organisation.
It has been widely reported that President Victor Yanukovych, prior to being removed from power and fleeing to Russia, ordered officials loyal to Russia to force their way into the SBU offices in Kiev and disrupt the organisation’s capability to function. Computer hard drives were destroyed and documents said to contain information of around 22,000 SBU officers, their sources and details relating to the cooperation between the SBU and their Russian counterpart, the FSB, were removed and now thought to be in Moscow.
In March 2015, the Director of the SBU, Valentyne Nalyvaichenko, told The Wall Street Journal, “Days after Ukraine’s pro-Kremlin regime fell, I faced a gutted institution… We entered the empty building, all the deputies had disappeared…” During the same period, one SBU officer, who is known to have defected to Russia, used his counter-terrorism knowledge to ship arms to pro-Russian separatists.
After receiving information regarding the location of Nikolayevich Bezler, one of the pro-Russian separatist leaders whose group controls the local police department in Horlivka, an operation was mounted by the SBU’s Alpha Unit. The intention was to engage the separatists and capture Bezler, but Bezler was warned and members of the Alpha Unit were captured. In a similar operation against Igor Ivanovich Strelkov, also known as Igor Vsevolodovic Girkin; a Russian citizen from Moscow, said to have played a key role in the GRU directed fighting in Donbass and also the organiser of the Donetsk People’s Republic, was also tipped off by an unknown SBU officer.
The high profile SBU officer Alaxander Khodaovsky, former head of their counter terrorist unit in Domestk has been implicated in a series of successful Separatist attacks. His knowledge of Donetsk Airport, in particular a little-known entrance designed for counter terrorist operations, allowed pro-Russian fighters to out flank and catch Government Forces off-guard. After leading his own battalion of separatist fighters, Khodaovsky is thought to be the Secretary of the so-called Domestk People’s Republic and the SBU Headquarters has become a command and control centre and prison.
In Kiev, senior SBU officers are continuing the mammoth task of what they call “de- KGB’isation” of the entire organisation.
Although the SBU has been penetrated at all levels, by the number of arrests and flow of high value intelligence, there are clearly some members of the SBU who are loyal to the government and continue to defend the sovereignty of their country
For instance, over the past two months or so, we have seen a number of arrests that have been as the direct result of good intelligence, skillful operational planning and execution. These include the arrests of fighters supporting Russian’s proxy war, a number of individuals with GRU connection, and what may be considered a high value unnamed GRU operative who was helping to supply weapons to pro-Russian fighters. The SBU also recovered an encrypted communications laptop. The de-‘KGB’isation’ of the SBU appears to be working but officials are cautious- there is still a very long way to go before the organisation is truly fit for purpose.
Recent reports, thought to have been released by the SBU, show a high possibility that Russian ‘operatives’ were involved in suppressing the Maiden protest and also encouraging violence against the state. Based on the information currently available, there may also be a link to the activities of Yulia Kharlamova, which I covered in a recent post, and another Russian citizen Myolayn Oblast.
After the SBU arrested the Russian saboteur Myolayn Oblast, officers established she was in Kiev at the same time Kharlamova was reported being seen directing women who were acting as agents provocateurs. This was during the civil unrest, and they were also seen outside the government administration building.
The following statement posted on the official SBU website is of particular interest. It supports the belief that GRU Spetsnaz Forces and operative have been in Ukraine throughout Russia’s preparation for war and continue to support proxy-forces. {Note- With documents translated to English the SBU use the term Security Service Ukraine (SSU)}
“March 14, 2014, a Russian citizen heading to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea was apprehended at 10 a.m. near a temporary checkpoint in Chonhar.
A personal search revealed that the man had the AKS-74 assault rifle with 5 magazines loaded with live ammunitions. He was wearing a black uniform of a special force officer without insignia.
The foreigner possessed several identity cards issued on different names. The Security Service of Ukraine acquired a document confirming that the detainee worked for the Military Intelligence of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
It is established that the Russian citizen was performing espionage and subversive tasks in Kherson region.
The SSU Office in Kherson region carries out urgent detective-investigative actions to identify his accomplices.
Relative documents have been referred to the European Court of Human Rights in addition to the evidence base of Declaration 209558/14, Ukraine vs. Russia, of March 13, 2014.
The SSU will ensure that all the facts of illegal and dangerous activities, which violate the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, are passed to the European Court of Human Rights and the UN Security Council.
Moles, Stay-behind Assets, Double Agents and Disruption
The Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine (SZU) remains tight-lipped to any suggestions that historical ties to their Russian counterpart may have undermined their capabilities. However, senior officers of the SBU remain vocal when it comes to the immense problems they are facing.
Apart from several senior SBU officers saying it’s going to be extremely difficult to overcome the disloyalty within their ranks, expressions of concerns over the large quantity of data thought to be in the hands of the FSB, and having an intelligence agency that one officer described as “Riddled with officers whose loyalties are unknown, at a time when Ukraine’s sovereignty is in danger from a Russian-proxy war which is increasing in intensity..” They are clearly making progress in uncovering the moles, Stay-behind Assets and Double Agents.
According to Nalyvaichenko, to date (12 February 2015) 235 SBU officers, including the former head of counterintelligence and his cousin have been arrested, and 25 high treason investigations are ongoing. All regional SBU Directors, along with half of their deputies have been replaced by those known to be loyal to the Ukraine government.
Apart from the problems of identifying individuals with extensive experience in counter-intelligence, the SBU source network may have been severely compromised.
The process of de-‘KGB’isation’ must also take into consideration that not only did the organisation inherited KGB officers and staff, they also inherited the same tradecraft, methodologies, processes, operational procedures and agent handling procedures – the SBU’s new adversary, the FSB, know the tricks of their trade and their capabilities.

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Earlier this year, the Czech Counterintelligence agency, the BIS, issued a bombshell report filled with detailed evidence proving that two Russian military intelligence officers from the infamous GU Unit 29155 were involved in explosions in a munitions warehouse in Vrbetice, Czechia, on 16 October 2014. Passport and other substantial information identify the men as the same two GU officers who carried out the 2020 Novichok poisonings of Russian defector Sergei Skripal and his daughter, Yulia, in Salisbury, England.
The Czech police identified Alexander Mishkin and Colonel Anatoliy Chepiga as the suspects that carried out the 2014 bombings. Mishkin and Chepiga are officers of the GU, formerly called the GRU, the Russian military intelligence service. (Mishkin and Chepiga had traveled under false names: Alexander Petrov and Ruslan Boshirov, respectively. Their true identities were first discovered by Bellingcat .)
The involvement of the GU in the Vrbetice explosions has resurrected another scandal that involved military intelligence operations, the Ali Fayad affair of 2015-16. This series of events reads like a spy thriller. It includes a shadowy arms-for-drugs merchant who works with drug dealers, Russian military intelligence, and Hezbollah; a dramatic DEA sting operation to capture him; high-level diplomatic pressure over his extradition or release; and a phony kidnapping in Lebanon to set up a false ‘hostage exchange’ to provide political cover for releasing him. In both the Vrbetice and Fayad operations the role of the Director of Czech Military Intelligence (VZ) Jan Beroun requires scrutiny.
Put simply, Jan Beroun is Czech president Milos Zeman’s trusted spymaster. Zeman himself is widely recognized as an agent of malign Russian and Chinese influence in Europe. Respected researcher Jakub Janda from the European Values Think Tank calls him “Putin’s Trojan Horse.”
Sources in Prague confirm that Beroun serves Zeman loyally. Czech investigative journalist Sabina Slonkova responded to an OpsLens inquiry about the relationship, stating, “I think Zeman is talking directly to Beroun. There is trust between them.” She added “And Beroun – [Prime Minister] Babis is afraid of him; Zeman trusts his service, unlike the BIS.” Indeed, Zeman has promoted Beroun to the rank of General, despite protests by influential cabinet members, and has awarded him several military decorations.
In contrast, Zeman has refused six proposals by the cabinet to promote the Director of the BIS Michal Koudelka to General. In fact, Zeman has done everything he can to undermine Koudelka. This is easy to understand, because the BIS is thwarting Russian and Chinese intelligence activities, which places Zeman in an uncomfortable position in front of his Russian and Chinese partners.
Why does Zeman value Beroun so highly? (And why would Prime Minister Babis fear him? But that’s a question for another time.) I believe it is because Beroun was involved with the GU in the Vrbetice and Fayad operations, and that the GU has protected him. Understanding this matter is vital for U.S. and allied national security.
In 2015 Lebanese arms dealer Ali Fayad was arrested in Prague by Czech authorities, in cooperation with the American DEA, in a sting that had been years in the making. Ali Fayad sold illegal weapons to drug cartels and terrorist groups for drugs and cash, and had plotted to assassinate U.S. government officials who stood in his way. His arrest was part of a major operation called Cassandra , designed to dismantle Hezbollah’s drugs-for-weapons network.
The story of his release reads like a John Le Carré plot. Recent events in Czechia suggest that it was organized by the GU, the Russian military intelligence service. Further investigation suggests that Jan Beroun, chief of the Czech military intelligence service, the VZ, cooperated with the GU to engineer Fayad’s release.
Cooperation Among Iran, Hezbollah, South American terrorists, Ukraine, and Russia
Jailing Ali Fayad would have brought huge advantages to the U.S. He had connections to the Iranian proxy terrorist organization Hezbollah, and to South American narcoterrorist groups. He was arrested trying to sell arms to the FARC, the Colombian guerilla group that controls much of the drug traffic coming out of South America. Fayad also had worked closely with the Ukrainian military complex, and traveled on a Ukrainian passport, during the time that Ukraine was closely allied with Russia.
He could have exposed the complex web of connections among Iran, South American drug traffickers, and Russia. He would have been a gold mine of operational intelligence, as he tried to avoid a very long sentence in an American prison.
The U.S. government requested Fayad’s extradition, but the Russian Federation got involved in the release of Fayad at the highest level of the Czech government. Czech media reported contacts between Milos Zeman and Vladimir Putin about the release. The Czech government delayed a decision for 21 months.
Supporters of Russia, such as President Milos Zeman, then-Finance Minister Andrej Babis, and Ministers who belonged to Babis’ ANO Party, opposed extradition. His Minister of Justice, Robert Pelikan, visited Fayad in prison to lend him his personal phone for calls to Lebanon, an event that was strongly criticized at the time as suspicious .
Phony Kidnapping for “Hostage Exchange”
While this battle over extradition was playing out, Jan Beroun’s military intelli
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