Russian Ambassador to Sweden: Mutual respect is the basis for restoring ties
Interview of Russia's Ambassador to Sweden Sergey Belyayev to TASS news agency (November 20, 2024)
Question: The Swedish government claims that Russia will pose a serious security threat in the near future. Why are they promoting these sentiments?
Sergey Belyayev: It is no secret that there have always been anti-Russia sentiments in Sweden. There is even a special word in the Swedish language that literally translates as “fear of Russians” (rysskräck).
However, both sides benefited when Sweden managed to step aside from its historical phobias and to develop relations with its eastern neighbour pragmatically.
I don’t think anyone can question the wisdom of Marshal Jean-Baptiste Jules Bernadotte, who, as King Charles XIV John, acted in the best interests of Sweden, launching talks with Emperor Alexander I, withdrawing Sweden, which was sustaining heavy military and economic losses, from the Napoleonic Wars on extremely favourable conditions, and formulated the basic principles of neutrality and military non-alignment, which Sweden honoured for 200 years.
Stockholm’s neutrality during the two world wars laid the foundation for the Swedish socioeconomic miracle. Throughout the Cold War and until recently, Sweden’s non-alignment policy strengthened its global prestige, including as an intermediary in international conflicts and an unbiased arbiter in economic disputes.
Regrettably, when the special military operation began, the Swedish political elite and media started acting in concert with Washington and Brussels’ instructions, fuelling anti-Russia hysteria in society. The idea of a “new axis of evil” consisting of Russia and its allies is being promoted in the country, with the omnipresent “Russian agents” automatically blamed for everything, from cyber attacks and railway accidents to inflation, all this in the futile attempt to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia in the military, political and economic spheres.
The obvious goal is to justify the anti-Russia policy of confrontation pursued by the governments of the collective West, including Sweden, which is by no means in the interests of their people.
Question: Is there any possibility to improve Russian-Swedish relations? What conditions are needed for that and above all in which spheres?
Sergey Belyayev: Regrettably, Sweden is currently an unfriendly country that sends weapons to the neo-Nazi Kiev regime, is active on the anti-Russia sanctions track, and has cut our political dialogue to a minimum.
It is clear that the resumption of relations in the normal regime is out of the question in this situation.
On the other hand, relations between Russia and Sweden rest on centuries of multifaceted ties, close links in the history of our peoples, and their geographical proximity.
We live in a common region of the Baltic Sea, Northern Europe and the Arctic. Tens of thousands of our compatriots are living and working in Sweden. Russia has been a Klondike for many generations of Swedish entrepreneurs, from the Nobel family to [the founder of IKEA] Ingvar Kamprad, whose biggest dream was to gain access to the Russian market.
People in Russia love and read Swedish classics and modern writers and listen to Swedish singers.
I firmly believe that the majority of Swedes do not share their politicians and officials’ policy of cancelling Russia, despite the rampant Russophobic campaign in the local media.
This is evidenced, in part, by the Swedish media’s coverage of the annual Baltic Sea Festival organised by our famous compatriot, Valery Gergiev. Unfortunately, the Russian conductor and his team have been unable to attend it for a third year because of the biased political campaign. Swedish art critics have pointed out that this key cultural event in the region has lost its glitter and should be discontinued.
What has Sweden gained from all this?
Here is another indicative example: 279 cruise ships entered Swedish ports in the pre-pandemic year (2019). Their number has dwindled by 60 percent to barely 120 this summer. The reason is that foreign tourists are not interested in buying Baltic Sea cruises that do not include a visit to the region’s biggest gem, St Petersburg. In the past, they also enjoyed the beautiful landmarks of Stockholm. Today, the Swedish travel industry is sustaining huge losses. Besides, the Baltic capitals look deserted without Russian tourists.
The main condition for restoring ties is mutual respect and a balance of interests, as well as readiness to understand each other rather than mentoring and lecturing others about the way they should live.
Question: How did Sweden’s accession to NATO influence its bilateral relations with the Russian Federation?
Sergey Belyayev:Russia has repeatedly assessed the utterly negative consequences of Stockholm renouncing its more than 200-year-old policy of neutrality and military non-alliance. Today, NATO and its newcomer, Sweden, have reverted to Cold War attitudes in their relations with the Russian Federation and are thinking in terms of Cold War logic. NATO’s doctrinal documents and the Swedish national security strategy have declared Russia the “most significant and direct threat.”
We record Sweden’s increased military activity in the wake of its NATO accession. We have repeatedly noted that the foreign policy mapped out by the current Swedish leaders follows the collective West’s guidelines implying the need to inflict a “strategic defeat” on Russia.
At the present time, the US-led alliance is building up its military potential on NATO’s eastern flank, with unprecedented military exercises being held on the Swedish soil that practice future military operations against Russia.
It was clear for us from the outset that Stockholm’s desire to join this military bloc can only entail a rise in tensions in the Baltic and Arctic regions, turning them from a cooperation zone to the sphere of potential military and political confrontation.
We follow closely the developments and are assessing potential risks and threats. The Russian military are drawing relevant conclusions. As you may know, the Leningrad Military District has been re-established to address challenges in the northern sector. Russia’s further security decisions will be geared to the situation unfolding. While threatening no one, Russia will not compromise on its own security, either.
Question: Sweden is advocating at the highest echelons for the closure of the Russian Federation's trade mission. Is there a genuine threat that this action will be executed?
Sergey Belyaev: The role of trade missions abroad represents one of the numerous mechanisms our nation employs to bolster and invigorate foreign economic relations.
We remain steadfast in our belief that the closure of the Russian Federation's trade mission in Sweden would not serve the advancement of constructive bilateral and global economic ties, both now and in the future. Stockholm actually self-identifies as a principal proponent of free trade, championing the dismantling of international barriers and tariffs.
Concerning the notion of a "threat," its actualisation is unlikely to impact the Russian side more than it would affect the Swedish side. Let us see if common sense will prevail in Stockholm.
Question: Have any trade relations between Russia and Sweden been sustained? What are the current imports from Sweden, and which Russian goods do the Swedes continue to rely on, notwithstanding anti-Russian sanctions?
Sergey Belyayev: Indeed, the sanctions have inflicted a severe blow on bilateral Russian-Swedish trade. As recently as the pre-pandemic year of 2019, trade turnover exceeded 6.4billion; in 2023, it dwindled to 928 million. Under intense political pressure, the majority of the at least 400 Swedish businesses that engaged with us have exited the Russian market.
The value of Russian commodity exports to Sweden in the first eight months of 2024 scarcely surpassed $40 million, with nearly half comprising liquefied natural gas (48%). Occasionally, we encounter strong political rhetoric advocating for the complete cessation of Russian LNG imports, yet Swedish business circles refrain from such sharp language – businesses are adept at financial calculations.
Aluminium scrap also remains a significant component of Russian exports to Sweden today. Meanwhile, Sweden has forfeited access to Russian fuels, uranium fuel, mineral fertilisers, metals, plywood, and raw materials for the chemical industry and agricultural fodder production, incurring substantial costs for establishing new logistical connections.
Regarding Russian imports from Sweden, the imposition of sanctions has resulted in a complete halt to the delivery of motor vehicles, electrical, and telecommunication equipment. The only category that has seen growth over the past two years is pharmaceuticals, including raw materials and substances for their production, now constituting over 95 percent of Sweden's commodity exports to our country.
However, according to Swedish statistics, the range of bilateral trade products, which diminished to a minimum last year, has begun to expand once more in 2024. In the first eight months of 2024, the number of commodity subcategories of Swedish imports from Russia increased by 50 percent, while Swedish exports to our country surged by 130 percent. We remain hopeful that this trend will continue to develop. After all, trade is often regarded as the "engine of history."
Question: The Swedish government identifies support for Ukraine as one of its principal foreign policy objectives, yet the cabinet refrains from discussing peace in that nation. How would you respond to this?
Sergey Belyayev: The Swedish leadership publicly communicates a resounding message regarding its commitment to "support Ukraine for as long as necessary." The total assistance provided by Stockholm to the Kiev regime is substantial, even by EU and NATO standards. Notably, a significant portion of these funds is allocated specifically for military purposes.
Furthermore, the Swedish government does not dismiss the possibility of increasing financial support for Ukrainian forces should US funding cease. Concurrently, Stockholm is urging its EU counterparts to intensify their efforts in this area, emulating the Swedish example.
This suggests that the Swedish authorities are unlikely to consider options for a political and diplomatic resolution to the conflict, opting instead to bolster the Ukrainian armed forces with weapons and ammunition in the hope of "containing" Russia through external means.
Question: What are the possible implications of Sweden’s defence cooperation agreement (DCA) with the United States? Will the United States deploy its nuclear weapons on Swedish territory?
Sergey Belyaev: This DCA is a standard document for most NATO members, including Sweden’s neighbours – Denmark, Norway and Finland. It regulates issues such as the legal status of the US military contingent, the storage of weapons and the access of US military personnel to the national military bases of the signatory state.
It is indicative that, unlike a number of Sweden’s colleagues in the alliance, the country deliberately refused to include in the DCA a clause on the non-deployment of nuclear weapons on its territory. This provoked a fierce but belated debate among politicians, experts, academics and journalists.
While the most radical representatives of local civil society fully supported the move and even openly called for the deployment of US nuclear weapons in Sweden, opponents of the current coalition government’s policy to militarise the country expressed serious doubts about whether such actions were proportionate to real threats from outside.
By implanting, wherever they can, the fully unsubstantiated “Eastern threat” narrative, the local public opinion leaders are thereby preparing the ground for smoothly pushing their dubious initiatives to force the militarisation of the once non-aligned country according to the standards of the Washington-led military alliance.
In general, one gets the impression that, coveting the neighbouring Finland’s “achievements,” the current Swedish leaders have negated the country’s entire historical experience of neutrality and non-alignment and sacrificed the interests of their own country and people. The de facto renunciation of sovereignty in the national security matters, the policies that augment the region’s confrontational potential, and the possibility of having nuclear weapons deployed on its territory are only a small part of the tangle of negative implications that ratifying the DCA with the United States will have.
Question: Sweden has terminated the Nord Stream attack investigation. Do you think this happened because the Swedish prosecutor’s office had figured out who actually perpetrated the act of sabotage, but preferred to hide the truth?
Sergey Belyayev: A few days after the terrorist attack, Russia took the matter up with the Swedish leadership, insisting on a comprehensive, open and credible inquiry. We requested Sweden’s legal assistance and proposed creating a joint investigation team.
The Swedish side, however, stubbornly ignored our initiatives or categorically rejected them citing some far-fetched national security issues. One would expect a different reaction to a flagrant act of sabotage in the immediate vicinity of the country’s borders, in its exclusive economic zone.
The results achieved by the Swedish prosecutor’s office in this case can be safely called a disgrace for the Swedish law enforcement. Instead of searching for the true culprits, they preferred to bury their heads in the sand, despite the extensive evidence proving that Western representatives were involved in this international terrorist attack.
Russia is not going to put up with this and will continue to insist that the incident be thoroughly investigated. This case can only be closed when both the perpetrators of the attack and the masterminds behind them are punished.
Question: How much have the working conditions of Russian diplomats deteriorated? What obstacles are being created?
Sergey Belyayev: I will not hide that the working conditions of the Russian missions in Stockholm have deteriorated significantly. The Swedish side is unreasonably expelling our diplomats, refusing to extend accreditations for Russian foreign missions’ employees and their families, and blocking our financial channels. In each specific case, we react harshly and take adequate retaliatory measures.
Such actions hardly benefit anyone. If our states maintain full-fledged diplomatic relations, then why invent ways to complicate each other’s lives? The relationship is indeed being maintained. Last year, the Swedish ambassador in Moscow was replaced, and this year, as you can see, the Swedish side agreed to the posting of a new Russian ambassador to the country.