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These assessments were generalizations and as new activity, such as cryptocurrency-focused units, emerged it blended the efforts from DPRK aligned cyber operators, and updates were needed for the now historic chart seen in Figure 1. Since , the DPRK cyber landscape has changed tremendously, and overlapping indicators, which would traditionally be tracked individually to these separate organizations, seemingly signal a growing adaptability and collaboration between the threat actors. Prior to the pandemic, the following groups and their assessed unit alignments represented the overarching DPRK cyber organization:. DPRK conducts offensive operations relying on their military units and proxies located inside and outside the Peninsula, however, the regime was forced to modify their operations in as the COVID pandemic hardened borders around the world; most notably within the Korean Peninsula and China. During this same time, Mandiant began discovering campaigns that indicated newly assembled groups, or task forces, consisting of tooling and suspected personnel from multiple groups being created. One such suspected operation was a temporary. Hermit activities, as well as an unverified link to Andariel signaling an unprecedented shift in collaborations. We believe that this reflected an increase in adaptability among the threat actors, moving resources to these task force-like groups in moments of necessity, much like the level of organizations from very mature cyber threat groups such as Chinese APTs. Figure 2: New organizational chart factoring in evolved, overlapped groups and removing Bureau alignment due to fluidity realignment of DPRK cyber organizations. Operators within these units quickly change their current focus and begin working on separate, unrelated efforts such as ransomware, collecting information on conventional weapons, nuclear entity targeting, blockchain and fintech targeting efforts, among various others. This flexible approach to tasking makes it difficult for defenders to track, attribute, and thwart malicious activities, while enabling this now collaborative adversary to move stealthily with greater speed and adaptability. Investigations regarding the cooperation between groups not assessed to be RGB continue to produce information, but are still largely unknown. At this time, it is unknown whether APT37 remains focused on MSS intelligence requirements or if its priorities have shifted. The MSS role in monitoring business dealings with the North Korean government and defectors, or entities outside of the country, suggest it is likely that the MSS would have some involvement in supervision of the forward deployed IT workers. In late March , public reporting described the exposure of a suspected APT37 GitHub repository containing samples, files, and additional tooling. The repository is reportedly linked to one member of APT37 and has been used for staging infrastructure since at least Also in March, Mandiant responded to a series of North Korean operations we track as UNC which overlaps with public AppleJeus reporting that leveraged software supply chain attacks against 3CX and Trading Technologies to steal credentials and gain access to multiple networks. We believe this activity was likely conducted by the same actor that has been publicly reported as TraderTraitor. Both UNC and UNC operations show a high level of sophistication and consistency targeting supply chain providers as a means to gain access to arbitrary networks to expand the potential foothold of their operators in order to select networks of interest. These most recent events suggest that DPRK operations may be evolving towards more aggressive and broader intrusions and that these threat actors are able to conduct multiple intrusions to multiple networks, leveraging the supply chain vector. Note: The groups that follow are referred to with their Mandiant designations UNC numbers alongside the names that have been used publicly to identify activity we attribute to the underlying group. While we believe that these definitions are largely congruent, differences in visibility and analytic tradecraft mean that an exact match is unlikely. Andariel UNC : This actor targets foreign businesses, government agencies, financial services infrastructure, private corporations, and the defense industry. UNC also engages in cyber crime as an extra source of income to fund their operations, including the ransoming of hospitals, using their own ransomware malware dubbed MAUI. However, their primary focus is on targeting military and government personnel. This cyber group stands apart from the other DPRK aligned groups and typically does not fall into the blending and targeting that the others may do. The targeting trends, such as nuclear, aerospace, high heat molds, etc. Hermit : TEMP. Hermit, is an actor that has been active since at least Their operations since that time are representative of Pyongyang's efforts to collect strategic intelligence to benefit North Korean interests. The group uses a variety of tactics, including spear-phishing emails and fake cryptocurrency trading software, to infiltrate target systems and steal cryptocurrency. Like TraderTraitor, this crypto-focused group appeared to emerge after the notoriety that came with the Bangladesh heist and issues with stealing and laundering traditional currency. Hermit, but is not focused on the same targeting profiles, potentially indicating shared resources. The group has been observed targeting a wide range of industries, primarily in South Korea. This organization is most closely aligned with the efforts of the MSS and its overarching cyber activities highlight the monitoring of defectors abroad and foreign elements interacting with DPRK. APT38 : APT38 is a financially motivated group, known for significant financial compromises and its use of destructive malware against financial institutions. The group has been attributed to sophisticated compromises targeting Interbank Fund Transfer Systems to steal millions of dollars at a time across multiple countries worldwide. Current activity from this group is conducted by associated subgroups. Mandiant identified a long hiatus of activity attributed to APT38, which may be indicative of modifications and regrouping of APT38 operators to other units aligned with new priorities and needs. The group combines moderately sophisticated technical capabilities with aggressive social engineering tactics, especially against South Korean and US-based government organizations, academics, and think tanks focused on Korean peninsula geopolitical issues. UNC is a cryptocurrency focused group that may include individuals or units previously tracked as APT38, and while it has minor overlaps with APT43, we belive it is distinct. This organization appears to maintain a revenue generation priority, like its overarching APT38 subunits, however on a much smaller financial scale. Hybrid Operations: Mandiant has observed operations that include tactics and tools from multiple groups, which suggests that in certain cases, operations may be undertaken by multiple groups that fluidly perform ad hoc tasks in support of another group, or due to temporary tasking. Mandiant assesses that UNC is one of the collections of activity supporting the aforementioned mission. UNC, like other seemingly ad hoc created efforts, appears to have changed or even expanded targeting to fulfill intelligence gathering efforts. Other clusters, such as UNC, have a similar composition and are focused on cryptocurrency theft among other seemingly ad hoc tasks. Over time, Mandiant perceived these operations shift from strictly COVID efforts to the targeting of defectors, defense and governments, bloggers, media, cryptocurrency services, and financial institutions. They are reportedly deployed both domestically and abroad to generate revenue and finance the country's weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. These workers acquire freelance contracts from clients around the world and sometimes pretend to be based in the US or other countries to secure employment. Although they mainly engage in legitimate IT work, they have misused their access to enable malicious cyber intrusions carried out by North Korea. The group sends these messages to employees, particularly those in system administration or software development roles, on various communication platforms, intended to gain access to these start-up and high-tech companies. TraderTraitor may be the work of operators previously responsible for APT38 activity. Hermit have historically been closely associated with each other and are assessed to be within the RGB. Sharing of resources is believed to be within the normal course of business for select factions that are likely in close proximity in Sinuiju, DPRK. However, the spike in overlapping infrastructure and tooling between these, and other groups, such as APT43, in addition to targeting overlaps amongst all groups, signals a shift in the DPRK cyber landscape. We believe that operators within North Korea may be co-located, or even sharing workstations, which can complicate attribution, as traditional tracking can potentially become misleading. Procurement of infrastructure and domain registrants are also likely shared, further complicating clustering. Andariel operators are now observed using the same infrastructure for exfiltration of pharmaceutical research and development, along with weapons development. All assessed RGB-aligned groups maintain at least some interest in the cryptocurrency industry. Andariel and APT43 appear to have the least amount of focus on cryptocurrency efforts and have been identified using it primarily as a means to an operational end. APT43 has targeted cryptocurrency and cryptocurrency-related services, using crafty and stealthy techniques to fund and sustain its own operations. Mandiant identified APT43 using cryptocurrency services to launder stolen currency. Associated activity included identified payment methods, aliases, and addresses used for purchases. APT43 operators also likely used hash rental and cloud mining services to launder stolen cryptocurrency into clean cryptocurrency. Throughout Mandiant identified Andariel using ransomware campaigns to fund additional malicious activity, especially cyber espionage operations. These activities are part of a larger ecosystem of money making schemes, including cryptocurrency targeting and freelancing work. The shift to ransomware to fund operations highlights the isolation of some groups from the rest of the regime, and the pressure to self-fund their operations. Mandiant observed DPRK conducting a large-scale cryptocurrency phishing campaign targeting users of the Bitcoin, Arbitrum, Binance Smart Chain, Cronos, Ethereum, and Polygon blockchains during the latter half of and into In line with the increased focus on cryptocurrency targeting, CryptoCore was also observed targeting financial institutions and cryptocurrency entities throughout In the samples and malware laden decoy documents were entities like a legitimate American hedge fund specializing in cryptocurrency and digital asset platform that deals in the holding, investing, and infrastructure of cryptocurrency and cryptocurrency products. In late , the group was identified leveraging several lure documents relating to cryptocurrency, as well as other financial entities including investment firms and banks. In addition to targeting crypto and leveraging lure material, the CryptoCore grouping of clusters has been observed masquerading as crypto institutions from around the globe. Lee Min-bok is a North Korean defector who previously worked for the Agricultural Research Institute in Pyongyang until , when he began efforts to defect to South Korea. Until Lee had sent information attached to balloons along with anti-Pyongyang leaflets into North Korea. This consistency in targeting is mirrored by the consistency over time between the current and historic organization of DPRK cyber operations. Reorganizations may take place, tools and infrastructure may be shared, but targeting and fulfillment of PIRs remain intact at this time. Gathers data to generate internal briefs and reports that provide insights and recommendations to the higher echelons of leadership in the government. The group enables a small skilled and efficient team of hackers to create malware and hacking tools for gathering information on their targets, which is then used to compile intelligence reports. APT43 conducts smaller financially focused side efforts such as cryptojacking and crypto theft likely in order to fund their own operations. Some of the DPRK-aligned cyber operators Mandiant tracks are highly skilled across numerous cyber endeavors. Operators have demonstrated the ability to conduct activities at high levels of sophistication and execution, then immediately pivot to separate tasks and maintain that same level of execution i. Highlighting past Department of Justice indictments see Figure 5 and Figure 6 illustrates how a single individual can supplement vastly different efforts. As stated previously, open-source reporting in early described the creation of 'Bureau ,' a collaborative effort between separate North Korean cyber operations targeting COVIDrelated information. Notably, Bureau reportedly includes individuals previously assigned to existing groups. Cyber groups within the DPRK ecosystem continue sharing tooling and malware. Figure 7 is a visual breakdown of malware families and their associated actors. These malware families seem to be given in order for the newer units to create their own group-tailored family. DOORED, which shows an increased interest in the development of macOS malware to backdoor platforms of high value targets within the cryptocurrency and the blockchain industries. The shifting DPRK cyber landscape is increasingly characterized by resource sharing and temporary collaboration. We believe that this will make precise attribution more difficult. Some increased fidelity is likely to arrive as additional data is collected, and may help better scope groups and identify any specialized in targeting specific industries or sectors. Malware infrastructure overlaps indicating resources and attribution muddled by shifting assignments show how DPRK cyber operations are changing. However, operations conducted to fulfill regime requirements remain steadfast and we believe they will continue. While defenders may not be able to easily sort new DPRK activity into a previously identified bucket, the malware reuse and shared resources creates opportunities for detection and country level attribution. Threat Intelligence. Latest DPRK nexus operations hint at an increase in adaptability and complexity, including a cascading software supply chain attack seen for the first time, and consistently targeting blockchain and fintech verticals. While different threat groups share tooling and code, North Korean threat activity continues to adapt and change to build tailored malware for different platforms, including Linux and macOS. Overlaps in targeting and shared tooling muddles attribution attempts for investigators while streamlining adversarial activities. Historical examples of activity and uncategorized clustering represent a way forward for maintaining visibility on separate groups. Figure 3: Bitcoin Bull Prediction. Room 35 APT43 Gathers data to generate internal briefs and reports that provide insights and recommendations to the higher echelons of leadership in the government. Appears to gather information to answer leadership and regime level PIRs. Table 1: Similarities between alleged units prior to and related interests by APT Related articles.

Shadow Fleet, Shady DPRK Activity, & Spotlighting the Typhoon – Trade Roundup

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And where did these calls occur? And how is Typhoon Bebinca affecting the supply chain? Port calls conducted by North Korea- flagged cargo vessels after conducting a port call in Nampo. September A North Korean-flagged cargo vessel made a port call in Chongjin after making a port call in Nampo between August-September example of a sequence. But some of the vessels are linked to UN-sanctioned companies and pose a risk. North Korea is increasing its munition production and its proliferation program, according to recent public reports , as well as aiding Russia with its arms trade. Daily calls at the ports of Shanghai and Ningbo-Zhoushan by container vessels, September , Data shows that the majority of container vessels deviated from their route near Shanghai on September Map showing the clustering of route deviations by container vessels in the Chinese EEZ, September 15, Example of a vessel that was headed towards Shanghai, but that deviated on September 15, likely to avoid the typhoon. These delays can further impact the supply chain by causing congestion and additional delays elsewhere toward the end of September, due to the late arrival of shipments to the port. Example of a vessel that is experiencing a day arrival delay to the port of Shanghai, possibly caused by the typhoon. It is expected to arrive on September 30, September and October are known as a typhoon season in China and the East Asian region, which can impact the supply chain and cause delays in shipping at major ports. But climate change means we can expect to see more typhoons and increasing power — typhoons Yagi and Bebinca were historically strong. The freight and shipping industries should continue preparing for upcoming extreme weather events. Sep 19, 12 min read. Additionally, eight out of the ten vessels sail under the flag of Gabon, which has been previously associated with Russian-sanctioned vessels owned by Sovcomflot. One other vessel is sailing under the flag of Liberia, a flag of convenience, and another vessel is sailing under the flag of Russia. The majority were flagged as early as March 1, Vessels were flagged due to their ownership, port calls in Russia, ship-to-ship STS operations with Russian vessels, and dark activities in Russia. This matches the data trends regarding the Russian oil supply chain to India and China. There have been multiple sanctions announcements against Russian-related vessels in previous weeks. This is mainly munitions and artillery shells for Russian war efforts in Ukraine. The majority of weapon manufacture facilities are reportedly located near Pyongyang, North Korea. But existing data does not show that Russian vessels arrived in areas near Pyongyang for freight shipments. Satellite images in March, showed increased Russian presence in the port of Chongjin. This port is located in the western Korea Bay neighboring Russia and was chosen as an offloading location for Russian oil traded for North Korean arms. There is a railway connecting Pyongyang and Chongjin that operates year-round, according to reports based on information from UN personnel. But North Korean infrastructure is considered slow and unreliable, with trains moving at top speeds of only 50 km per hour due to aging infrastructure. As a result, moving freight in North Korea heavily relies upon vessels, which are more effective than land vehicles. Due to harsh regulation on the North Korean side, only North Korean-owned vessels can enter the Taen checkpoint entrance leading to the port of Nampo, so they are the only vessels that can enter the port of Nampo. Windward data shows that this trend is new and started in November , without any sign of similar patterns seen before that date. In the Spotlight October 9, The ILA strike is over, but major U. Conflict zones October 6, In the Spotlight October 1, Hezbollah and its patron Iran continue to attract the attention of regulators. Windward customers knew about six of the nine vessels recently-sanctioned by OFAC back in Read on to find out which types of tankers they are and which flags they are flying under. And for the first time in almost five decades, it In the Spotlight September 26, Why did the largest number of ships in four years pass through the Bering Strait last week?

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