Putin's failed offensive offers an opportunity for Ukraine and Europe

Russia is failing to achieve the goals of its “summer offensive,” but continues to press forward on some fronts. Ukraine is increasingly regaining the initiative. Land war and air war are progressing differently. What is the situation and what is needed?

Russia's so-called “summer offensive” largely failed in Donbas. The situation around Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk remains critical for Ukraine. However, Russia is still unable to capture the cities soon.

Russia achieved nothing in the Sumy region during the offensive. Ukraine has now pushed Russian troops back across the border.

Russia continues to advance slowly on a few sections of the front in the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions.

Ukraine is holding back the Russian infantry mainly with drones. The Russians hardly dare to make any broader advances because this very quickly leads to high losses.

In recent weeks, Russian tactics have shifted from frontal infantry attacks to infiltration attempts by very small infantry groups, often guided by observation drones and concealing the soldiers' heat signatures.

With this new tactic, Russia is attempting to bypass understaffed Ukrainian positions and overcome the Ukrainian drone operations zone undetected by camouflaging and concealing signatures.

Ukraine is striving to expand the drone operations zone from the current 35-40 km to 60-70 km to keep Russian infantry at bay and avoid costly direct contact on its own side.

No Russian breakthroughs or strategic changes are expected on the front lines in eastern and southeastern Ukraine. Both sides can maintain the current equilibrium on the front lines for a very long time.

The thesis, widely disseminated in the information space, in many media outlets, and on social networks, that Russia is unstoppably advancing is false. Political considerations should not start from the wrong assumption that Russia cannot be defeated.

By the end of the current wave of attacks between May and November 2025, Russia will have lost around 100-120 thousand soldiers through injury and death. The Russian so-called “summer offensive” was more of an information offensive than a ground operation.

In winter, the political and military leadership in Moscow will face the question of whether to send the next large wave of soldiers to their deaths in spring 2026.

Largely independent of the land war, both sides are intensifying the air war. Ukraine is steadily expanding its own capabilities with drones, cruise missiles, and short-range rockets.

Ukraine is using Ukrainian-made drones, cruise missiles, and rockets to systematically and meticulously damage the Russian energy sector—refineries, LNG terminals, thermal power plants, pipelines. This is having an effect and putting pressure on Russia.

Russia continues to rely on mass production of Geran-2 drones and Gerbera decoys in its air war. Attacks on Ukrainian cities with 500-800 drones, combined with 30-40 cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and aero ballistic missiles, are the sad new standard.

Russian mass attacks repeatedly hit civilian residential buildings, including targeted strikes in Kyiv, to suggest to the media that Ukraine is losing the war. Russia is bombing and killing Ukrainian civilians for the sake of information warfare.

Ukraine needs more investment in its defense industry, joint ventures with Western companies, and industrial partnerships to rapidly expand its own capabilities. This is faster and cheaper than purchasing military equipment from the West.

Ukraine needs support in the production of battlefield-proven drones, missiles, ammunition, and weapon systems in Western European countries to leverage local industrial capabilities for scaling.

Ukraine needs more help with combat operations in the electromagnetic spectrum and with technological innovations for cheaper missiles for existing ground-based air defense systems as well as anti-drone drones.

The air defense of NATO's eastern flank and Ukraine should be integrated, airspace surveillance and systems networked, and drone defense improved. The experience of the Ukrainians, particularly in drone defense, should be transferred to NATO's eastern flank.

NATO air defense systems on the eastern flank should use their range to neutralize Russian drones and cruise missiles over western Ukrainian airspace.

Ukraine needs long-range stand-off weapons such as Taurus and Tomahawk to be able to target and sustainably take out Russian command centers, ammunition depots, airfields, and drone factories deep in the Russian hinterland.

The NATO PURL program, based on an initiative by Merz, Trump, and Rutte, is rapidly becoming a success and should be expanded with further procurements in the US beyond the current €2.1 billion.

Ukraine needs macro-financial support to stabilize its national budget in 2026. Proceeds from confiscated Russian assets or new reparations loans should be used not only for military purposes but also for the budget.

Ukraine's European partners should take advantage of the momentum of Russia's failed offensive and quickly stop Putin's energy revenues, increase military support, and finally take the initiative themselves.

The fact that Putin is constantly firing drones at Ukrainian residential buildings does not mean that he is prevailing militarily. A bold change of strategy by Ukraine's European partners can now further weaken Putin and build the necessary pressure for negotiations.