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Manuel Noriega has been compared to Genghis Khan, Richard III, and the Antichrist, among others, but he never deserved anything more flattering than the second rank of demonology. Even his record as a brute and a dictator was tame, by Central American standards: only about a dozen of his opponents died during the struggle in to oust him. So why were we so fascinated? His overthrow, capture, and trial will not solve these problems, but at least they have given Americans the sense that we are fighting back. For most Americans, the Panama story began and ended with Noriega. It is an impression reinforced by our press, which has largely ignored Panama since American troops pulled back in mid-February. Within days of the invasion, the U. The hype was intentional. Never mind that his sins were rather banal, by the standards of drug lords and tinhorn despots; or that the dispatch of 25, U. What is it about Panama that allowed this monster to rise so high and stay for so long? They never ask the question. Still, even the half of the story that they do tell is fascinating. Although neither book has come up with the smoking gun that conclusively links George Bush to the Iran-contra scandal, there is still plenty of embarrassment to go around. As early as the summer of , an American intelligence agent cabled Washington that a recent recruit, a cadet named Manuel Noriega, had been arrested for beating and raping a prostitute. Noriega stayed on the roster. In exchange for spending money, Noriega was reporting to the Castro-obsessed Americans on the leftist inclinations of his instructors and fellow students at the Peruvian military academy. Noriega returned to Panama in , and almost destroyed his new career. When Torrijos was made commander of Chiriqui province, he brought Noriega along as head of the transit police. As Torrijos moved up in the ranks of the National Guard, so did Noriega. Torrijos rewarded Noriega by making him head of military intelligence. But the bureau was more concerned about reopening its Panama City office, and when Torrijos gave his permission and named Noriega his official liaison, nobody in the Nixon administration complained. The soldiers were discharged quietly, and Noriega stayed on the CIA payroll. He was, you might say, a bipartisan burden. But officials in Washington, apparently from the State Department and the Pentagon, warned Noriega to stay out of Miami, and then quashed the investigation. Kempe charges Noriega with rape, sexual torture, political assassination and sexually motivated political assassination. Almost anything. This is always dangerous for a reporter. It can be disastrous in a country like Panama, where slander is the national sport. Noriega might have approved; he certainly would have smiled. Both Dinges and Kempe shine when they are delivering the Washington side of the story. They write with authority and with impressive detail about the bureaucratic infighting, the egos, the epidemic of expedience, the constant willingness to compromise values for political gain. They ably trace the decision to indict Noriega on drug trafficking. Those indictments were probably the biggest mistake in a saga of big mistakes. Everyone with eyes to see understood that the indictments would back Noriega and the United States into a corner: Noriega would never willingly step down with indictments hanging over his head, and no American politician could afford the political flak for lifting them. Still, in the months after Iran-contra, nobody was willing to block the indictments and risk the charge of a cover-up. Kempe stands out in his reporting of the last two years of the U. He gives an hour-by-hour account of the secret missions--of diplomats, lawyers, even a psychiatrist--that failed to negotiate Noriega out of power. Dinges rushes through this period in a chapter and an epilogue, but he provides one of the best analyses of American policy failures in Panama that I have read. Both authors fervently argue that the United States tolerated Noriega for one reason above all: his usefulness to the anti-Communist crusade in Central America. Noriega hosted American intelligence operations in Panama, transshipped arms to the contras and may have trained them, too. He also offered to assassinate Sandinista leaders, if the United States would help clean up his image. And yet the venality in the American policy toward Panama extends far beyond one man and four administrations. For the sake of economic and strategic advantage, this country has been compromising its values in Panama since Both Kempe and Dinges fail to provide the badly needed historical perspective. Without history, however, it is impossible to grasp not only why the Americans put up with Noriega for so long, but why the Panamanians put up with him, too. The most common explanation for what ails Panamanians is that they lack national pride. In truth, if Theodore Roosevelt had not answered a similar request in , there probably never would have been a Panama. But they have an even bigger problem: they lack even the sense of belonging to a single polity. To be sure, by the time of the American invasion in December , both rich and poor alike wanted Noriega out; but they never pooled their hatred and their resources to get rid of him. Now that the United States has done the job for them the new government must work to overcome those differences. If not they too will fall, perhaps to another Noriega. For Panama, more than for most places, geography has always been destiny. Fifty miles across, the country is the narrowest point in the Western Hemisphere, linking North America to South America and barely dividing the Atlantic from the Pacific. Spanish colonial officials surveyed for a canal in , but instead they built a Camino Real, or royal road; and so for years gold, silver, and slaves traversed the continents along the slender Panamanian thread. Americans first planned a canal as early as , but a group of New York investors, inspired by the California gold rush, chose instead to build a railway line across the isthmus. But the dream of a canal remained. Ferdinand de Lesseps, backed by French investors, arrived in to repeat his triumph at Suez. He gave up eleven years later, defeated by rains, mud slides, malaria, and yellow fever. Twenty-thousand people died in the attempt. American troops and warships were sent to Panama four times in the second half of the century to put down uprisings, the last time in In , however, with the Colombians now standing in the way of his canal plans, President Theodore Roosevelt switched sides. When Panamanians rebelled again in November of that year, the U. Nashville and a goodly sum of Wall Street gold were on hand to ensure their success. The revolution was bloodless. In Panamanian eyes, the revolution was genuine. For a brief moment, that is. For the next three decades, power in Panama was traded among the families of the small white oligarchy, descendents of European settlers--known derisively as rabiblancos, or white tails. Then, as now, most Panamanians were mestizo, mulatto, black, or Indian. Political parties were formed around personalities--there were no ideological differences--and organized solely to win elections; the parties were ginned up for the brief and costly campaigns and then they were abandoned. Elections still provoked violent passions, however, and regular calls for American intervention. As it had intended, the United States remained the final arbiter of Panamanian politics. But the really striking fact was that Panamanians seemed comfortable as permanent political adolescents. They could blame the United States for their failures, and they could call on the United States to put down any rebellions. There was no need to take responsibility, no pressure to work out a political consensus. With the Canal driving the economy, Panama developed no large industries and no trade union movements. Its middle and lower classes remained weak, dependent, and divided. The oligarchy dominated the urban service and commercial sectors that sprang up to meet the needs of the Canal. Squeezed out of business, the middle class became professionals and bureaucrats, and they voted--at least in the early years--with their betters. And the working class was further split by language and race: between Spanish-speaking mestizos, mulattos, and blacks--the descendants of colonial-era African slaves--and English-speaking blacks, as many as ,, brought in from the Caribbean to work on the railroad and the Canal. When the lower classes did rebel in the rent riots of , the oligarchy called on American troops to restore the peace. The United States was useful to the Panamanian powerful in many ways. Arnulfo Arias Madrid was the first Panamanian leader to recognize the political power of the masses. Arias was born in , in the interior town of Penonome, to middle-class parents. His father died when he was young, but his mother managed to send all five children to school abroad. Arnulfo received a B. His political baptism came in , when, brandishing a shotgun and a revolver, he overthrew a newly elected president. Arias was a gifted practitioner of the politics of resentment. A fiery speaker, with the white suits and the flashing eyes of a Latin movie idol, Arias eventually broadened his base to include the Spanish-speaking working class and the extreme right of the oligarchy. Was Arias a Nazi demagogue, as Washington believed, or was he merely a charismatic nationalist, as his followers insisted? His record was mixed. Above all, he wanted the Canal back. He hinted broadly that the increasingly powerful Axis states of Europe might be willing to get it for him. Washington became convinced that Arias--who served as ambassador to Italy in the late s--was a budding fascist. The fears up north turned to hysteria when Arias refused to grant the United States a hundred new military sites in Panama, each for years, and refused to permit the arming of Panamanian-flagged U. When the military overthrew Arias in late , the United States denied any involvement, but it was clearly pleased. It was the beginning of an enmity of fifty years between Arias and the military, and between Arias and the United States. Arias toned down his ideology in the years that followed. Hoping to turn the United States against Torrijos, Arias even advised Reagan during his campaign against Carter and a Canal treaty. But Washington never fully forgot. Fear of Arias was a central reason that the Americans were willing to overlook the abuses of military strongmen like Torrijos and Noriega, and were so slow in coming to an accommodation with their civilian opponents. Still, like his predecessors, he did not build a lasting political organization; his party remained a vehicle to elect Arnulfo Arias president. He paid the price for this: though he won three presidential elections between and , and likely had another two stolen from him, each time he was overthrown his fervent but disorganized followers were incapable of resistance. He seemed incapable of taking office without suspending the constitution, firing a top general, or otherwise self destructing. In the intervals, during the years from the s to the s, when Arias was in jail, exile, or banned from politics, leadership reverted to the traditional oligarchy. Some presidents were more progressive than others; all were sworn to recovering the Canal; but none, not a single one, ever tried to build a modern political party. The s were unsettled times for Panama. Workers demonstrated for higher wages, the urban poor for lower rents, the students for control of the Canal. Bloody riots in the Canal Zone in convinced Lyndon Johnson to begin serious negotiations for a new Canal treaty, although they took another thirteen years to complete. Arias most probably won the presidential elections, but by a margin small enough for the ruling party to jigger the results. Four years later, however, the vote for Arias was too large to deny. He immediately transferred several top military officers and began recruiting his own independent presidential guard. The National Guard overthrew him ten days after his inauguration. Rifles and anything larger were kept inside the Canal Zone. The United States more than made up for that during the cold war, particularly after the signing of the treaties, training and arming the National Guard for the future defense of the Canal; and the opposition later argued for American military action against Noriega on the grounds that the United States had created the Guard and was thus morally obligated to remove it. The Guard did serve one very important social function, though: it offered the surest route of social and political mobility for mulattos and blacks. Like Arias, he never trusted his followers enough to give them real political power. Torrijos was born in , the son of middle-class schoolteachers from the town of Santiago de Veraguas. He was ruggedly handsome, a dark-skinned mestizo with a puckish wit and an infinite charm that were unimpaired by his legendary capacity for drink. After it was representative but a dictatorship. Torrijismo was an idiosyncratic and often paradoxical mix of socialism, free market capitalism, and all-sides-against-the-middle pragmatism. Torrijos began a badly needed land reform and rewrote the labor code to make collective bargaining compulsory. He built public housing and hospitals in the cities, and schools, roads, and clinics in the neglected countryside. He filled his Cabinet and the swelling bureaucracy with darker-skinned Panamanians. While he pilloried the oligarchy in his rhetoric, he worked closely with business leaders to open up the economy. Still, benevolent or not, Torrijos was unmistakably a dictator. His civil improvements came at the cost of military rule. Torrijos suspended elections, disbanded the national assembly, outlawed political parties, jailed and exiled opponents, closed the national university, imposed strict censorship on the press. There was nothing that the Guard did not control and corrupt--immigration, customs, public utilities, casinos, hotels, banks. In the late s, with the economy faltering and strong pressure from the Carter administration, which feared that the Senate would never accept a treaty with a military dictator, Torrijos pledged to lead the Guard back to the barracks. He lifted political restrictions, and in he formally handed the presidency over to a civilian. But Torrijos and the Guard continued to run the country. Even Carter was convinced that Torrijos was the only Panamanian pragmatic enough to negotiate a treaty that could sway the U. Senate and the only Panamanian charismatic enough to sell it to the Panamanian people. Carter was correct, but just barely. Even with the Guard counting, the treaty passed with only 67 percent of the vote; Torrijos had promised 80 percent. Torrijos died in July , when his plane crashed into the side of a mountain. According to subsequent mythology, Noriega had placed a bomb aboard the plane, but it is more likely that the ever macho and frequently inebriated Torrijos foolishly ordered his young pilot to take off into a violent thunderstorm. He left a mixed legacy. Other development programs, such as public housing and highways, were more successful, but they saddled the country with one of the largest per capita debts in the world. Most important, it was under Torrijos that the National Guard developed its twin appetites for politics and corruption. Still, Torrijos died a national hero, revered for winning control of the Canal and securing a long-deferred national dignity. Torrijos promoted and protected Noriega, giving Noriega the dirty jobs so that he could maintain his own reputation for benevolence. But there is no evidence that Torrijos wanted his intelligence chief to succeed him. But by then the prize was seriously tarnished. The world recession and debt crisis hit Panama hard: growth dipped and unemployment soared, as international banks cut loans and forced the government to adopt a strict austerity program. By two out of every five Panamanians were either out of work or working sporadically. Noriega tried to carry on the Torrijos tradition--that is, he tried to run the country through a series of puppet presidents. For Noriega, loyalty had to be bought or bullied. Under his leadership the Defense Forces became increasingly brutal and even more corrupt. Once he took over in , Panama became a free port for the Colombian cartels, which used its airfields for shipping, its jungles for labs, and its banks to launder profits. The United States was aware of some of what was happening--but Noriega was always careful to throw his friends at DEA just enough mid-level dealers and launderers often ones who had crossed him to keep his American clients happy and his Colombian clients in line. Arias, eighty-two, who had spent most of the Torrijos years in comfortable exile in Miami, opposed Ardito Barletta. The United States recognized Ardito Barletta. He may have been unknown in Panama City, but he was a favorite of New York bankers and Washington policy-makers, and he had the special good fortune to have been taught by George Shultz at the University of Chicago. According to Kempe, Shultz traveled to Panama for the inauguration with a briefing book that included a cable detailing the fraud. Less than a year later, Noriega forced Ardito Barletta to resign after he ordered an investigation into the beheading of the dissident Spadafora. These riots had a particular historical significance: they represented the first time, other than driving the United States out of the Canal Zone, that rich and poor Panamanians united in a single cause. They all wanted Noriega out. The Civic Crusade that emerged to lead the opposition was an improbable group of revolutionaries. Its headquarters was the downtown Chamber of Commerce building, its leaders were drawn from business and civic groups. And yet these were not exactly Panamanian Babbitts out to restore rabiblanco rule. Calling for a moral renovation in Panama, the leaders of the Crusade consciously distanced themselves from the traditional parties and traditional politicians. Barria, a thirty-five-year-old graduate of Villanova and a political novice, discovered his political vocation earlier in , during a visit to the post-Marcos Philippines sponsored by the U. They rallied thousands of protesters across Panama City twice daily for pot banging, horn honking, and handkerchief waving. To the cynical Central American press, however, the Crusaders looked more than a little ridiculous. On weekends, or during the annual trade fair, protests were suspended. The Crusaders also had an embarrassing tendency to disappear whenever the water cannons or the tear gas trucks came out. Their problem was the old one: like the traditional politicians they criticized, the Crusaders failed to reach out to all of Panama, to the broad mass of Panamanians who were just as fed up with Noriega and more likely to put their lives on the line to rid themselves of him. Some of that was true; but the real difficulty began long before Noriega. After decades of ignorance, separation, and mistrust, the different classes of Panama simply do not know how to talk to each other. And they may not have tried harder because they believed--both the rich and the poor--that the United States would, as ever, bail them out. For months, Crusade leaders had been predicting a massive popular uprising on the day that Noriega could no longer meet the government payroll. With government funds frozen in New York, that day finally arrived on March 16, Thousands of public employees planned a massive protest in downtown Panama City. The evening before the big day, I dined with Barria. I had spent the day with striking port workers, and I asked him what the Crusade had planned to back up their demonstration. Barria said that they had planned nothing. When I asked why not, Barria admitted that the Crusade had no contact at all with the government unions. The coup was pure comic opera. The rebels, too, had failed to contact either the striking workers or the Crusade. Noriega put down both the coup and the strike with only minimum force. Arnulfo Arias had died the previous summer, at the age of eighty-six. In his place the opposition chose as its standard-bearer Guillermo Endara, an amiable, roly-poly attorney with no charisma and no political experience. Endara had spent fifteen years as a personal aide to Arias, which is probably the single most telling political fact about him. Running on a pro-democracy, antiNoriega platform, the opposition won big, although the true numbers will never be known. Noriega destroyed the tallies and annulled the elections before the results could be announced. The opposition hoped that the fraud would spark a massive protest. By then the United States probably had no other choice. And that is the most tragic indictment of American policy. The blustering diplomats of the Reagan administration had failed to negotiate Noriega out of power, and the opposition was clearly incapable of driving him out. Noriega is in a cell in Florida now. The new danger of Panamanian politics is that the new government has not learned the lesson of its failure. Panama has a new leader, but not quite a new political dispensation. Frankenstein creating the monster, then Panamanian politicians played the role of Igor. Politically, the Endara government is a mix of old and new. Consider its three leaders. He resents the United States for opposing Arias, for backing Torrijos and Noriega, for waiting so long to invade. The button-down Christian Democrats, with their credo of democracy, Catholicism, and capitalism, seem out of place in sin city, that is, in Panama. The success of their political style may infect the other parties, too. His small splinter party, however, has yet to reach out beyond its base of bankers and businessmen. Despite the grousing of American liberals and Latin American nationalists, the Endara government does have legitimacy in the eyes of most Panamanians. The invasion--and more important, the preceding two-and-a-half years of American economic sanctions--took a disastrous toll. Since the economy of Panama has shrunk by 25 percent. One-third of its labor force is unemployed. Hundreds of Panamanians lost their lives and more than 10, lost their homes in the invasion. The new government faces another challenge, too: cleaning up the military and placing it firmly under civilian control. Many Panamanians, including leaders of the Civic Crusade, believe that this particular mission is impossible, and argue that the military should be dissolved and replaced by a modest police force. Costa Rica did just that in the late s, and it has enjoyed stable, democratic rule ever since. But the five days of anarchy and the wave of violent crime that followed the invasion convinced the Endata government that it needed a large force to keep order, and that the old Defense Forces would have to provide the manpower. His first choice for commander had to resign, however, after investigators discovered a million dollar bank account in his name. The new force has had its automatic weapons, rifles, and truncheons taken away; they carry only revolvers and handcuffs. And every member must take American-taught courses in police work, which include lectures on respecting human rights and civilian authority. The habits of corruption and brutality die hard. It is unlikely that the military will try to seize power soon. The Noriega debacle discredited the military even in its own eyes. But there is only one certain way to guarantee civilian rule: for the first time in their history, Panamanians must build a government that is democratic and representative. The early record is mixed. The three top leaders are convincing, though, when they say they are committed to representative democracy; and they have rejected calls for vengeance and mass purges of Noriega backers from government ministries. More than anything else, this government must learn to talk to its own people. The Endara government will either reach out to the masses of Panamanians or it will be swept away like its predecessors. The United States must also learn the lesson of its Panamanian involvements. It must finally allow Panama to become a real country in its own right. It takes more than Marines to fix a political culture. You are using an outdated browser. Please upgrade your browser and improve your visit to our site.
The brother and wife of Eduardo Macea, alias Marshall, were captured in the operation, to whom the authorities attribute the control of cocaine.
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We hear about drug seizures in Panama with monotonous frequency. Is that all? Not hardly. The things that were announced without going into detail were and will be a bit more sensational yet. Security Minister said that it had been a seven-month investigation in which eight principal organizers of the racket had been identified but only five of whom have been captured. Everyone involved is identified as either Colombian or Panamanian. The basic racket was drugs by sea from Colombia to and through Guna Yala, then packed onto containers for shipment by a variety of land and sea routes to points north. Some of the surnames are also shared with some prominent figures from Colon. This Colon-born reporter, however, is not related to Ms. Jackson Quiroz. President Varela said that more arrests and revelations are coming in the case and called on all political parties to purge the drug traffickers from their ranks. We shall see who falls, but PRD and Cambio Democratico politicians from coastal Colon have been notoriously mobbed up in more or less the racket alleged here for many years. For the public official whose aim in life is to get rich, that area offers few other opportunities. Probably not. As the names of other public officials come out the same judicial jam-up that has the Martinelli gang running out the calendar with endless motions and claims of immunity will most likely increase public disenchantment with the entire system and with a president who has broken his promise to convene a constitutional convention that might sweep away some of the structural incentives for corruption. As an elected official Mr. Jaramillo enjoys electoral immunity from investigation and prosecution, which would have to be lifted by the Electoral Tribunal for the case to proceed. But is it already too late? So what were the circumstances of that raid in Viento Frio? Were police in hot pursuit of a suspect, or of contraband? Were they looking for someone or something else and did they stumble across Jaramillo? Lawyers may be arguing about the details of the arrest for years. And when they come for the legislator to be named later? Surely the defense would argue that the deputy was improperly investigated without the required supervision of the high court, and surely the accusers would say that there was an ongoing investigation of other people that happened to turn up said deputy. There it would face the stall that has been imposed on the 15 cases against Ricardo Martinelli and most of the other political corruption cases of recent vintage. The Colegio Nacional de Abogados is actively campaigning for a constitutional convention, but their proposal has yet to be written and they seem a very long way from having the forces at their disposal to gather the more than a half-million petition signatures needed to force the issue. The individual and organizational identities of the Colombians said to be involved have not been revealed, nor has there been any claim or denial of foreign involvement in the investigation. There are all sorts of criminal organizations running drugs through Panama, but the most notable Colombian faction operating along the coasts of Colon in recent years has been the Clan Usuga, a direct lineal descendant from the AUC paramilitary death squads that were informally yet quite closely allied with the United States in the s as part of Plan Colombia. But of course, American justice also sometimes arrests home-grown crooked cops, customs agents, prosecutors, elected officials or judges in US drug investigations. Especially if US intelligence is part of this drug investigation it could then be spun that rather than corruption in SENAN being part evidence of a drug war failure, the exposure of corrupted Panamanian law enforcement officers is a drug war triumph. Figure that this case will be the stuff of more spectacular claims and news attention for some time to come. I accept the Privacy Policy. The Panama News. Home News More than your ordinary drug bust. Share on Facebook. Click on them for more information. Editorials: PRD looting; and Long-running war. Ben-Meir, Despite a world being played by war propaganda…. Please enter your comment! Please enter your name here. You have entered an incorrect email address! Music so greasy that you should put it in your October 19, Paying the price; and VOTE! October 15, The Panama News lives, and will be up to full speed July 8,
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