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Trans-Mediterranean drug trafficking from Morocco has grown in line with European consumption, but now also provides the infrastructure for smuggling people and consumer goods. Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy reports. Most of the hashish produced in Morocco is sold abroad, overwhelmingly in Europe, although there is a significant domestic consumer market for the drug. European consumption has long acted as a pull factor on Moroccan hashish production. Spain and France not only contributed to the development of cannabis cultivation in Morocco during the colonial era but, more recently, their respective growing hashish consumer markets have also spurred production in the Cherifian kingdom. The parallel increases of hashish production in Morocco and of hashish consumption in Europe are attested to by the rise in European seizures of Moroccan hashish noted in the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime World Drug Report , which reports that seizures have risen from about tonnes in to tonnes in In , out of global cannabis resin seizures of 1, tonnes, were seized in Europe and 96 in Morocco. That Spain seizes that much hashish is evidence of the importance of the Spanish territory as a transit zone for Moroccan hashish. It is also most likely a legacy from when Spain and France split the Moroccan kingdom in two protectorates in , when Spain ruled over the northern half of the country and granted the right to cultivate cannabis to a few tribes. It is therefore worth noting that the former colonial powers that held sway over Morocco are most directly concerned about Moroccan hashish trafficking and consumption. Although all of the hashish consumed in Spain and 82 per cent of that consumed in France is estimated by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to be of Moroccan origin, the two countries are far from being the only European consumers of Moroccan hashish. Eighty per cent of the cannabis resin destined for the West and Central European markets is estimated to originate in Morocco, and national markets such as those of Portugal, Sweden, Belgium and the Czech Republic, among others, are overwhelmingly dominated by Moroccan hashish. In accord with a geographical logic, most Moroccan hashish consumed or transiting in France comes by way of Spain, mostly by road: most French seizures are conducted at the Spanish border. Also, due to the central location of France within Europe, less Moroccan hashish is imported from the Netherlands to France than from France to the Netherlands. As many seizures have shown during the last decades, most large shipments of Moroccan hashish are exported from Morocco across the Mediterranean Sea aboard fishing vessels and private yachts. According to the same report, the primary zone of export for Moroccan hashish is located around Martil, Oued Laou and Bou Ahmed on the Mediterranean coast, although the bigger ports of Nador, Tetouan, Tangier and Larache are also used by hashish traffickers. However, according to the Spanish press, the routes of entry of hashish into Spain have recently diversified due to the use of faster boats with a wider range. Important quantities have also been seized as far north as the Ebro river delta. Traffickers also export hashish concealed in trucks and cars embarked on ferries leaving from the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla or from Tangier. It also seems that large quantities are increasingly sent to West Africa before being exported to Europe. Recent seizures of cocaine and hashish packed together and in the same manner were made in Morocco and in Spain. This suggests that Colombian drug traffickers have allied themselves to Moroccan counterparts and either now ship cocaine directly to Morocco, or store it temporarily in Mauritania. Some Moroccan hashish is also exported to Algeria, via the Oujda-Maghnia road, along which contraband and human smuggling also takes place. The high level of drug trafficking across the Mediterranean Sea, where most transportation of hashish still occurs, implies that drug traffickers benefit from both low-level and high-level protection and complicity among some Moroccan authorities, a reality that more than one decade of arrests and trials have gradually confirmed. As is the case in all countries producing agriculture-based illicit drugs, farmers are very rarely directly involved in drug trafficking activities. This is also the case in Morocco, where very few cannabis growers from the Rif have the resources and connections required to ship hashish to the main ports of the Mediterranean coast, let alone across the sea to Spain. Most frequently, what traffickers and smugglers buy is the transit of their cargo, no matter what the cargo is. As recent important European seizures of hashish in Moroccan seafood exports confirm, both legal and illegal goods can be traded on the same routes or even together in the same cargo, something that is, of course, made easier by the marked increase in movements of goods by land, sea and even air, which has occurred globally during the last few decades. The Rif economy depends on a huge contraband trade that feeds off growing unemployment and pauperisation now that outmigration opportunities to Europe have been all but suppressed by strict immigration policies within the European Union. Lack of water, devastating land erosion, the highest unemployment rates in the country and political marginality have rendered this region incapable of sustaining its growing population. Contraband smuggling occurs via the same ports used for hashish trafficking, although, of course, in a reverse direction. The three most important entry points for smuggled goods are the two Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla and along the Algerian border around Oujda. Smuggled goods are numerous and range from cosmetics, tires and detergents, to gasoline and processed foodstuffs. According to the findings of an American Chamber of Commerce workshop in Morocco in , the contraband economy provided work for 45, people, 75 per cent of whom were women, and generated annual sales revenues of 15 billion dirhams USD1. Moreover, it is estimated by the same source that every job created in the contraband business deprives the national economy of 10 legitimate jobs and that the industrial and agricultural production of Morocco suffers considerably from the unfair competition of smuggled goods. The economy of Morocco and, to a larger extent, of the Rif region, also depends heavily on outmigration and foreign remittances sent from Europe. With USD3. In , official remittances represented 6. They also exceed the value of direct foreign investments, which are also much more unstable. In Between Morocco and Spain. During the early s, migrant smuggling on small open boats, a phenomenon called harraga, emerged in the area, and its socio-cultural and economic effects soon became visible all over northern and north central Morocco and in Andalusia, Murcia and Catalonia in Spain. The new immigration policy transformed migrants into profitable goods, which in many cases were more advantageous than hashish for the smugglers: the profit was guaranteed even if the boats failed to reach the Spanish coast. The migrants were also often more easily fooled than professionals in the drug business. In Larache province, the cheapest and most popular method is to cross the Strait of Gibraltar in pateras, small five- to seven-metre fishing boats. Quite often, illegal migrants smuggled to Europe are sent aboard pateras along with some hashish. The importance of the contraband economy and illegal migration clearly shows that hashish trafficking, while vital for the Rif region, is far from being sufficient to sustain its economy. Since the mids, a worsening economic situation in the Rif has pushed many people to migrate to Europe and immigrants from the Rif region have come to make up the vast majority of Moroccans settled legally or illegally in Spain. Clearly, the Rif region depends on a complex economy of illegal trades, made up by hashish trafficking, widespread contraband and illegal migration, three activities that have grown together since the mids. The economic development of the Rif is therefore an essential and urgent goal for the European Union EU , if its leaders are willing to reduce people smuggling and hashish trafficking from Morocco. The same could well be said of hashish production and trafficking if the worsening context of the Rif region and the growing European consumption were to be considered alone. However, the cannabis economy is an altogether different problem, since the ecological and legal contexts threaten an activity that is vital for the Rif economy. Therefore, a massive effort to develop the economy of the Rif region must be carried out by Morocco and the EU if its socio-economic and political stability is to be improved or even maintained. After the UN Office on Drugs and Crime revealed in its Cannabis Survey that cannabis was cultivated on , hectares in Morocco in , cultivation reportedly dropped by 10 per cent in , to , hectares. Many direct and indirect factors can explain this cultivation decrease after years of rapid expansion. Moroccan authorities therefore felt compelled to start acting, as is attested to not only by the eradication measures undertaken in some parts of the Rif region from on, but also by the cultivation interdiction pronounced in many areas by the authorities. However, while the Moroccan authorities have not conducted large eradication operations in the Rif region itself, they have carried out a few monitoring actions between 26 June and 17 July to the west of the region, in the province of Larache. The Moroccan press reported that at least 3, hectares of cannabis have been eradicated in the province of Larache. The eradication campaign was directed by the governor of Larache, who declared that he obeyed government orders and that a public awareness campaign had been carried out in the mosques and souks of the province. However, as previous eradication threats had been numerous and, say most farmers, clearly formulated so that tolerance by some officials could be bought, most farmers did not take the warning seriously. Eradication was nonetheless carried out, right before the harvest season and without any compensation provided to the targeted farmers. Notwithstanding the fact that eradication efforts have been shown to fail and, even worse, to be counterproductive, in Asia as well as in Latin America, the Moroccan authorities have resorted to a purely law enforcement-oriented policy without implementing any economic or development measures to help cannabis farmers cope with the sudden loss of income. The Agency for the Development of the Northern Provinces is supposed to conduct alternative development projects in the areas targeted by the eradication measures. But, so far, more than three months after the eradication campaign, no economic help has been received by the farmers even though experience from other regions of the world where illicit crops are grown clearly indicates that eradication is counterproductive if alternative development or alternative livelihood programmes are not set up and operative before eradication measures are resorted to. It must be noted that traditionally, cannabis cultivation is either tacitly authorised or expressly forbidden by Moroccan authorities throughout the Rif region on a yearly basis so that both its geographical spread and its total acreage is controlled and, to some extent, contained. Only such control can actually explain why entire valleys are covered with cannabis one year and void of it the following year. It is evident that all the cannabis farmers of a given valley could not have decided all at once and on their own to plant or not to plant cannabis. Individual cannabis farmers would have little reason otherwise to stop what is their most lucrative activity. In , many douars, or villages, in Chefchaouen province did not grow cannabis because they had been told not to by the local authorities. Every year, in each douar, the mokadem informs the population of the authorisation or interdiction to cultivate cannabis and reports about it to its hierarchy. There is no doubt that Moroccan authorities have every means to monitor cannabis cultivation across the country. Therefore, while cannabis cultivation is clearly illegal in Morocco, it has obviously been largely tolerated by the state since its independence in and its expansion has been condoned, and to an extent controlled, by the authorities. Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy holds a Ph. Trafficking from Morocco As many seizures have shown during the last decades, most large shipments of Moroccan hashish are exported from Morocco across the Mediterranean Sea aboard fishing vessels and private yachts. Eradication and prohibition After the UN Office on Drugs and Crime revealed in its Cannabis Survey that cannabis was cultivated on , hectares in Morocco in , cultivation reportedly dropped by 10 per cent in , to , hectares. View all posts. Read more. Publication list Photography Categories About. We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue to use this site we will assume that you are happy with it.
In , authorities announced two major drug busts that netted kilograms at a cocaine conversion laboratory in Oujda operated by two.
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Border closings between Algeria and Morocco have been the norm rather than the exception. Since Algeria gained independence from France in July , the Algerian-Moroccan land border has only been open for ten years in total. Territorial and resource disputes born from decolonization and continual heightened tensions led the border to close in the Sand War , the Western Sahara War , and after the terrorist attack on the Atlas Asni Hotel in Morocco. These repeated closures divided families Moroccans and Algerians along the border have historically married and traded with each other , but they did not disrupt cross-border commercial activities. During the s and early s, trade rules and regulations—and particularly the import restrictions imposed by Algeria —made the clandestine import of Moroccan agricultural products, clothes, shoes, and alcohol highly attractive. By the late s, many Algerian food and petroleum products became subsidized, reversing the flow of goods between the two countries. The smuggling of subsidized products —especially fuel—into Morocco became a lucrative business. Intermediaries and smugglers became indispensable in connecting border communities and delivering affordable basic goods. Contraband and illegal crossings became major facets of everyday life. State officials initially tolerated this state of affairs because alternative economic options were scarce. National development efforts in border areas were crippled by insufficient budgets, inappropriate allocations, and inadequate quality. For both the Algerian and Moroccan governments, smuggling generated a level of employment that helped attenuate youth unemployment and mitigate poverty. Over decades, smuggling helped to revitalize the Algerian border towns of Zouia, Bab al Assa, and Maghnia and the Moroccan towns of Ahfir and Oujda, transforming them into significant trading centers. For example, heavily subsidized gasoline in Algeria created the incentive for outbound smuggling to Morocco. Currency devaluation in Algeria also made a wide range of commodities cheaper compared to its neighbor, contributing to a boom in illicit trade. And, as is often the case, the trade opened up routes and crossings for the trafficking of other products, including prescription drugs and cigarettes from Algeria and cannabis from Morocco. Both residents and smugglers grew savvy in using their knowledge of the border to evade security patrols and collude with border authorities. In the early s, the black market trade carried on largely unabated. The government, fearing unrest due to lingering high unemployment and poverty, continued to heavily subsidize commodities, maintaining the allure and incentives for border residents to smuggle. The contraband economy also created financial incentives for border officials, corrupt politicians, select formal businessmen, and powerful illicit smugglers to fuel trading in gasoline, food, and cigarettes. Migrant smuggling from Algeria to Morocco also increased. While the Islamist insurgency in Algeria was weakened in the s, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb AQIM , formally established in January , continued to crisscross parts of the Maghreb and adjacent Sahelian areas. In the late s, the security risks were further compounded by parts of West Africa becoming a major transit hub for cocaine smugglers out of South America and into Europe. Both Algerian and Moroccan authorities feared that drug cartels could use the cigarette and cannabis trails to expand their territories. It was ultimately the Arab uprisings and the resultant political turmoil that engulfed Libya and Tunisia that drove both Algeria and Morocco to tighten border control. The overthrow of Libyan strongman Muammar Gaddafi triggered a far-reaching chain of events, resulting in a wave of refugees and arms proliferation. Algerian and Moroccan officials feared that transnational weapons smugglers, human traffickers, and terrorist groups would exploit the contraband trade and the corruption of some border officials to expand their routes. As a result, both governments began reinforcing their architecture for border management , increasing the number of observation posts, regular mobile patrols, and surveillance systems. This required investment in new technologies and man power, which, in turn, necessitated substantial financial capital, especially for the Algerian government, which was facing mounting security threats along its borders with Libya, Tunisia, Mali, and Niger, as well as rising social discontent. In the summer of , the Algerian regime started cracking down on smuggled fuel , hoping that regaining lost state revenues would help pay for its investments in border management and the substantial increase in social transfers, food subsidies, and state salaries intended to weaken popular opposition and shore up regime stability. With an upcoming presidential election in April , the Algerian regime had a strong incentive to combat the smuggling. The Moroccan government also took unilateral initiatives to clamp down on the inflow of undocumented migrants, tobacco, and medicines. In addition to enhanced electronic surveillance at the border, the authorities invested in strengthening national-level security coordination among the different agencies in charge of border security. Previously, young intermediaries would buy gasoline in Tlemcen, using ordinary passenger cars that have a double gas tank or trucks with extra large tanks. They would then transport it to warehouses, where they put it in storage tanks. Once the gasoline was put into jerry cans, smugglers used four-wheel-drive vehicles or motorcycles to transport the cans across the border to the Moroccan town Oujda. Smugglers of cigarettes, psychotropic drugs, and cannabis also used these animals. To stem the flow of human smuggling and prevent the possible infiltration of terrorists, Morocco began building a security fence begun in and ongoing with electronic sensors. Moroccan authorities also began identifying the donkeys in the region and branding them with ear tags for traceability, while Algeria started to purportedly shoot at any animals crossing the border unaccompanied. These enhanced border control measures appear to have succeeded in curbing the cross-border smuggling of Algerian fuel and other consumer goods such as dates , milk, and Turkish-made clothes. The impact is noticeable on the Moroccan side of the border, where the number of roadside stalls selling fuel has dwindled. Tightened border security, supplemented by government regulations and price changes, has also reduced cigarette smuggling. The 38 percent increase in the price of Algerian cigarettes between and and the emergence of low-priced brands in Morocco in led to a 49 percent decline in the inflows of counterfeit and contraband cigarettes from Algeria to Morocco in However, the allure of contraband cigarettes has not disappeared completely, as Algerian products are still about 43 percent cheaper than those available in Morocco. This helps explain why one in eight cigarettes consumed in Morocco come from contraband. Algerian illicit cigarettes are also prized in the European market, especially in France where, in , Algeria supplied more than 31 percent of contraband cigarettes. Advocates of border defenses point to this relative success in disrupting illicit cross-border trade. Yet, ramped-up enforcement and surveillance have not stemmed the illicit flow of all products between Algeria and Morocco. The most organized and well-resourced trafficking networks have shifted from trafficking highly lucrative fuel to smuggling migrants, cannabis, psychotropic tablets and other medicines, and narcotics. The Algerian border town of Maghnia continues to be a strategic transit point for sub-Saharan migrants intent on crossing into Morocco and eventually Spain. Since Moroccan King Mohammed VI ordered the regularization of over 25, undocumented sub-Saharans in , Morocco has seen the number of migrants increase significantly. Most migrants enter Algeria from Niger, where they travel south through the cities of Tamanrasset and Ghardaia to reach Tlemcen, near the Moroccan border. Assisted by Algerian smugglers, they cross Maghnia into Oujda. Some attempt to get into the Spanish autonomous city of Melilla by jumping over the fence, swimming around the harbor, or hiding under a truck. Others seek smugglers who can help them procure false documents to enter Melilla or Ceuta or attempt the sea crossing to Spain. Since , cannabis seizures have also increased significantly in Algeria. The enhanced border security between Spain and Morocco has driven more cannabis trafficking east. The cannabis shipments to Oran and Algiers are smuggled onto ferries traveling to France, Italy, and Spain. Moroccan authorities are alarmed by the staggering rise in the smuggling of psychotropic drugs. Local media have reported numerous incidents of violent crime being committed by an increasing number of young men under the influence of amphetamine pills Rivotril or Qarqobi in Moroccan colloquial Arabic. Media stories also abound about the dangers of black market medications. In Morocco, these medicines are among the leading causes of poisoning , with 4, cases in compared to 4, in , an increase of almost 30 percent. Yet the smuggling of prescription drugs into the Moroccan black market continues to boom. According to the Secretary General of the Federation of Pharmaceutical Unions, Abdelhamid Nacer, Algerian medicines for asthma, diabetes, and hypertension are prevalent in the Moroccan border town of Oujda. In his estimation, the black market for pharmaceuticals account for at least 10 percent of medicine consumption in the region of Oujda-Nador-Tetouan. Moroccan authorities have tried without success to dismantle this market. Every year, the number of seizures of large quantities of smuggled medicines goes up, but the cross-border trade in prescription medication endures. More worrisome, there has been a steady increase in the distribution of counterfeit medicines , further impacting public health and safety. The trade in fraudulent medicines tends to be linked to organized crime groups, who are attracted to the huge profits. The concern for Morocco is that the logistical infrastructure established for the trafficking and sale of counterfeit medicine may also be utilized by drug trafficking organizations. Both Algeria and Morocco fear becoming a transit route for cocaine originating from South America. Moroccan authorities regularly report interceptions of cocaine air couriers of mostly West African origin on the Rio de Janeiro—Casablanca flight. In , the BCIJ announced the seizure of kilograms of cocaine at the port of Casablanca in a container transported by a cargo ship coming from Brazil. The drug busts provide a window into the drug-related corruption of law enforcement officials. They also signal that narcotic traffickers might be shifting their routes to the Maghreb. Another cocaine scandal underscores the growing importance of the region to transnational drug-trafficking organizations. It also reaffirms the central role that corruption plays. The major bust in the western Algerian port of Oran not only netted kilograms of cocaine but also revealed the involvement of influential real estate moguls, judges, prosecutors, mayors, and the children of prominent politicians. The ringleader, Kamel Chikhi , was a well-connected real estate mogul. His contacts and reach reportedly ran deep, from government circles to the military, intelligence, and police sectors. Due to drugs coming in from multiple origins and pervasive corruption, Algeria and Morocco are struggling to fight against the rising volume of cannabis, cocaine, and pharmaceuticals. In the case of Algeria and Morocco, the vast array of border control measures have had serious side effects. For example, they have crippled the economies of borderland communities. There seems to be little or no limit to these disruptive absurdities. The same applies to agricultural commodities that Algeria imports in mass from outside of the Maghreb— many of the commodities are produced by Morocco. This importing practice has been prohibitively costly. The failure of the Algerian and Moroccan governments to provide formal employment opportunities has exacerbated the problem. The disruption of illicit trade has caused regional distress and popular anger along both sides of the Algerian-Moroccan border. The crackdown on fuel smuggling has set off intermittent protests. According to Driss Houat, former president of the Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Services of Oujda, this situation pushed 30, families living on profits from contraband fuel to organize many sit-ins in —in one instance, blocking the national road linking Oujda to Saidia. The months-long protests over the deaths of three young men extracting coal from abandoned mines in the impoverished eastern town of Jerada in January demonstrated this rising tension. Algerian border towns have also been gripped by intermittent protests. In February , angry protests broke out in the impoverished border towns of Souani and Labtime , where residents demanded alternative economic options to mitigate the impact of border fortifications on their livelihood. The situation bodes ill for other countries considering the use of fortified walls to help control access to their territory. In Maghreb countries that have even less resources and man power than Algeria and Morocco—such as Libya, Mauritania, and Tunisia—the impact on border populations is likely to be even worse. As long as Algeria and Morocco are taking a narrow approach to border security, enhancing law enforcement, erecting barriers, and increasing surveillance will not be wholly effective. Barriers and technology need to be accompanied by fully integrated border control strategies that account for the geographical, political, and socioeconomic contexts. Border enforcement measures that ignore smuggling as a core development issue and disregard win-win neighborly endeavors are likely to fail. The stifling of illicit cross-border trade in subsidized commodities such as fuel and food has merely resulted in new markets and routes. Smugglers still elude border control or bribe their way across the border. Others have simply set up new supply lines. Moreover, as long as Algeria and Morocco continue to work unilaterally, traffickers will continue to bore holes into the border strategies, aided and abetted by the corruption of security officials. Police and judicial reforms are necessary, but so is the political will to address corruption, the greatest enabler of drug trafficking and organized crime. In recent years, Algeria and Morocco have begun to reform and modernize their customs administrations. But more needs to be done to enhance both countries border management systems, including professionalizing the training, recruitment, and promotion of their customs officials and security managers.
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