On the Trinity - One and Three

A while back I said I would do a post on the Trinity, and now I will follow that through with one dealing with specifically one issue that is brought up when defending the Trinity. How can we maintain God is one, but three at the same time? This seems like it would be a contradiction, but it isn't. 

I will be using Boethius' argument from his treatise On the Trinity in dealing with this.

Historically, this has been described using the language of ousia and oupostasis - substance/essence and hypostasis/person. Three persons in one essence. 

But another point is levied that then we would be worshipping three distinct divine entities who share a common essence and that they are only one by a shared genus, the divine essence. It would be like saying three people are one thing when they are three things that share a common genus, a common essence, humanity.

So in either case, they argue, we would fall into polytheism or maintain God is composite, that the Trinities are parts of God, which we do not hold to.

So in order to answer this, we have to go over the senses in which things are said to be the same firstly and see if any of these apply to God.

A thing is said to be the same in virtue of a shared genus, i.e. man and cow are said to be the same in virtue of them both being animals.

A thing is said to be the same in virtue of a shared species, i.e. two individual men are said to be the same in virtue of them both being humans, sharing the species man.

A thing is said to be the same in virtue of number, i.e. one man is said to be the same man even if he is called by different names.

Now, none of these apply to God, as the first two entail composition in God and multiple distinct entities, while the latter entails modalism, wherein Father, Son, and Spirit are simply different ways of naming the same thing, which is not our position.

So, how do we defend the Trinitarian doctrine?

This is where the Aristotelian categories come into play. I will not go into them all, but only deal with one, relatives. But before doing that, I will say that we do not predicate anything of God like how we predicate of other substances, as God is not a substance in the true sense, but beyond substance. We predicate of God analogically.

And another thing to keep in mind is that when we predicate qualities of God, we must keep in mind God has no accidents, as then there would be something other than God, in God. And so all qualities of God are substantially predicated of Him, analogically of course. And of all the qualities substantially predicated of Him, they must not be qualities that God possesses, but God must be His qualities, as otherwise there would be composition in God, and so something more basic than God exists. So God is His goodness, His divinity, His power, His knowledge, etc. If this were not the case, there would be composition in God as stated previously.

Now, of course, we do not predicate these of God as He is known to Himself, but only as we know Him. The former is impossible. We can only say things of God as He is revealed to us, as we can both comprehend and experience Him.

This being established, we may move on to relatives.

Relatives are an important category in showcasing how the Trinitarian relations do not lead to composition while allowing for distinction.

Simply put, relatives are predicates that describe something in relation to another thing, such as taller, shorter, double, half, and so forth. They take two things and show how they can be said to relate to each other.

The important thing with relatives is that they are the only type of predication that does not necessarily entail composition, but the composition itself is assumed prior to the relative in most cases. Let's say I have two distinct actualities intrinsic to me, for example, two accidents, and they are related in virtue of being parts of me. But in this case, it isn't the relation that causes the composition, rather the composition is logically prior to the relation.

So in the case of relatives, merely predicating a relative does not assume composition, as in most cases the composition is prior to the predication.

How does this play into the Trinity? Simple. Keeping in mind that composition is prior to the relative predication, it is still possible to, at least in theory, to predicate a relative in something that has no composition, while still entailing a real distinction. This is how we predicate Father, Son, and Spirit of God while not entailing any composition in God.

To showcase this point further, I will use the example Boethius gave directly, that of the master and slave. If I have a slave, I am a master, and to the slave, I am his master. Now, I can still exist outside of being a master, and my slave can exist outside of being a slave, so the relative predication is accidental, not substantial.

Now, in speaking of the master-slave relative, when I stop being a master, the slave stops being a slave. But in doing so, in breaking the relation, I myself do not change, nor does the slave himself change, but only how we relate to each other. So there is something external that relative predication refers to other than the subject that bears the accident.

This is vital in speaking of the Trinitarian relations. When we predicate Father, Son, and Spirit of God, we predicate them as relatives. Now, as there is nothing external to God, the relative predication must refer to God as both the subject bearing the relative and as the force which binds the relative. So in predicating relatives of God, we get real distinctions in Him, while not entailing any composition or anything external to God. So it is possible to predicate Father, Son, and Spirit relationally of God, and this does not entail composition, but only distinction. The Trinity may be said to be how God relates to Himself, producing real distinctions while not entailing composition in God. The Trinitarian oupostases cannot simply be parts of God, as you cannot separate and isolate one oupostasis from another, only conceptually and not actually. So you have three in one - three real distinctions that are fully God and not merely distinct entities that share the divine essence as a common genus or of one entity that is named differently.

On this ending note, I really do recommend Boethius' On the Trinity. I got all of my arguments from him, and it's not too long nor difficult of a read.