Moscow buying blow

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Moscow buying blow

Following its failed attempts to browbeat neighbouring Ukraine into withdrawing its EU bid, Vladimir Putin had warned Moldova not to do likewise. She will face a second round ballot on November 3rd against her main rival, Alexandr Stoianoglo, whose candidacy has been backed by the pro-Russian Socialist party. Russian attempts to influence the referendum are alleged to have included funding pro-Kremlin opposition groups, spreading disinformation, meddling in local elections and backing a major vote-buying scheme. The latter, the brainchild of fugitive pro-Russian businessman Ilan Shor, included top-up pension payments to pensioners who agreed to vote No. He denies wrongdoing, openly offering on social media to pay Moldovans to convince others to vote No. Opposition to EU membership has been strongest in poor rural areas and those dominated by ethnic minorities, including Russians. Mon Oct 21 - Dublin city's malaise is at heart political. The decision of voters in Moldova to back EU accession is a blow to Moscow. In Gaza, the nightmare is intensifying. The costs of medical negligence claims create risks for both claimants and the State. When the general election finally comes, surprises are likely. Ryanair flight from Faro makes several unsuccessful attempts to land in Dublin. Where is our hot moral indignation when it comes to the fathers of the babies found at Tuam?

Missing the Drug Bonanza of Moscow

Moscow buying blow

But this once firm conviction has weakened in the past decade. This paper aims to explain the drivers and complexities behind Russian-Turkish convergences while considering their implications for Euro-Atlantic security. Russians and Turks trace the beginnings of their diplomatic relations back to the late fifteenth century. Their relationship oscillated between peace and war, under a constant state of competition. Russia, as the thinking among the Turkish leadership goes to this day, is an ambitious and disruptive regional rival that requires delicate handling. Balancing against Russia meant that Turkish policymakers occasionally sought outside Western support. In the — Crimean War, for example, the Ottomans allied with leading Western powers. But depending on the circumstances, the opposite—Turkish-Russian alignment—was also plausible. In the fledgling days of the newly founded Turkish Republic and the Soviet Union, the two empowered each other through political and material support against the shared threat of Western imperialism. In some ways, history is repeating itself today. While the practice of closing ranks and intensifying cooperation when faced with more pressing challenges is not altogether new, there are three distinguishing features today. Russia has made itself a pariah by bringing war back to the European continent. This puts an additional cost on deepening cooperation with such a country. It sees financial, economic, and, to some degree, political benefits in flexible engagement on the international scene, and it is not bothered by being misaligned with its Western allies when its national interests dictate such a course of action. Hence, while unique in its scope, the Turkish-Russian entanglement is a symptom of a larger novelty in Turkish foreign policy under its current government that has essentially become less Western-centric. Or has the relationship entered a qualitatively new era of sustained and close partnership? A defining element in contemporary Russian-Turkish relations has been the deliberate choice of both countries to rise above their differences and build synergies. Security is a cornerstone of the Russian-Turkish relationship. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the two countries found themselves in a new setting no longer constrained by confrontation between two opposing military blocs. That led Ankara and Moscow to reconsider their security relationship, learn to manage their ongoing differences, and build convergences. Both countries share an expansive neighborhood: from the Balkans, where both are important external powers, to the Black Sea, South Caucasus, Middle East, and Central Asia. Inevitably, there are many instances where their interests collide in this space, but there are also significant opportunities for collaboration. The end of the Cold War made the latter proposition even more probable—despite also unleashing a new stage of competition. The past decade saw three additional factors that paved the way for greater convergences between Ankara and Moscow. Finally, Russia entered into a deep confrontation with the West and reenergized its efforts to undermine and weaken U. At the same time, the country was striving to become more sovereign in its international affairs and less reliant on the United States. These common aims included fighting against Islamist radicals, offsetting the growing role of the United States and its Kurdish allies in Syria, and the broader prospect of restricting the regional security role of more distant powers. However, those situations were contained and compartmentalized to prevent the Libyan war from poisoning the broader relationship between Moscow and Ankara. On the other hand, the relationship with Ukraine had acquired a strategic character. Right before the war, the two countries signed an ambitious free trade agreement, cementing a shared appetite to deepen their partnership. This essentially worked well for both Ankara and Moscow. Sustaining functioning relations with Moscow also served a domestic political purpose. The intended target audiences of this depiction were both international and domestic. Non-littoral NATO allies have since not deployed naval assets in the Black Sea, while Russia has also been unable to bolster its presence by redeploying naval assets from its Baltic and Pacific fleets. In March and April , Ankara hosted rounds of face-to-face talks between Russian and Ukrainian delegations. It was extensively promoted by government controlled outlets and brandished as an achievement only he could have realized. Consequently, Ankara has built a wide network of suppliers to meet its coal, natural gas, and oil needs and sustain its economy. Russia plays a central role in this arrangement. Natural gas is a case in point. Two additional pipelines were built later: Blue Stream in and TurkStream in The latter consists of two lines of equal capacity, one of which carries gas to Europe via Turkish territory. Three additional aspects of this relationship merit attention. As part of this project, scores of Turkish nuclear engineers and technicians are being trained in Russia. When completed, Russia will, in effect, have control over a strategic piece of infrastructure on NATO territory, raising numerous concerns including around security. Second, both governments are acutely aware of the political utility of energy cooperation. Energy politics have long been a lifeline for Putin. Finally, Ankara's calculations in maintaining a steady energy partnership with Moscow entail a wider geopolitical component. Before the war, Moscow enjoyed more leverage. Since February 24, , however, Ankara has somewhat gained the upper hand. In this instance, Turkish leverage fell short. To be sure, Russia is unlikely to be erased as a powerful or at least consequential player from the Eurasian map. With the war in Ukraine becoming increasingly complicated and costly for Kyiv, a scenario in which Russia is militarily defeated seems remote. For these reasons, any leadership in Ankara will be inclined to carefully steer an unconfrontational relationship with Russia. Three current indicators support this assertion. A gentle realignment between Ankara and Washington and the West in general is already in motion. This is true from Syria to Libya and the South Caucasus. The same dynamic is silently spreading on the African continent, too, where both countries are striving for greater influence. Yet, this practical approach is simply a means to an end, which they both consistently define differently. Hence, their cooperation in the security domain is tactically smart and relevant but void of strategic endurance. While this may be difficult, it would be both timely and well worth the effort. A carefully articulated Western engagement strategy at this juncture could be impactful and help rebuild a much-needed culture of collaboration. Naturally, for this idea to work, Ankara would have to be equally willing to engage. This currently seems to be the case. Ideally, these separate lines of effort involving the EU and the United States could run in a mutually reinforcing manner by addressing similar aspects of Euro-Atlantic security where all sides have shared interests. Brussels and Washington could coordinate such a strategy. The difficult topic of Russia sanctions could also be debated here, at least for coordination purposes. There is an emerging consensus among the transatlantic community on the need to strengthen the European pillar of the Western security architecture. This will require work on all sides. Ankara also needs to signal its readiness to wash its hands of its flagship problem, the Russian-built Ss. Whether through a sale to a third party or another palatable model for Ankara and Washington that can be worked out behind the scenes, it is time to close this chapter. The United States can follow suit by officially declaring its readiness to end CAATSA sanctions and begin technical talks with Ankara and the related matter of resolving the S problem in earnest. Given its urgency and relevance for European security, designing a realistic way to achieve closer cooperation between Brussels and Ankara in supporting Ukraine would be invaluable. The benefits of this policy shift would be obvious to the EU. If the union is to reduce its dependence on fossil fuels, it will need to rely on its neighbors to increase their supply of green energy. This change of tack would have some indirect benefits for policymakers in Washington, too—for instance, by reducing regional tensions related to the transportation of natural gas in the eastern Mediterranean. The first U. They could be used to work toward the long-term objective of accelerating decarbonization. Finally, another idea could be incentivizing Ankara to implement the oil price cap and a potential natural gas price cap for Russian-origin hydrocarbons. The fact remains that dealing with a resentful Russia will be a serious challenge for transatlantic security long after the war in Ukraine is finally over. Having Ankara on speaking terms with the hard man in the Kremlin—while still being part of the Western security architecture—will be an asset in managing this problem for years to come. Today, Turkish-U. It can add value to Western efforts aimed at synchronizing policies toward a rising China. China and Russia face different trajectories in the Gulf. These trajectories will be shaped by prevailing strategic interests and influence, which are evolving and can shift abruptly. Russian forces proved more flexible and effective in the conduct of defensive operations in Yet the Russian military remained committed to defending forward and aggressively counterattacking in a manner that proved costly to the force. Source: Getty. Full Text PDF. Link copied. Published on October 15, Five Hundred Years of Geopolitical Jockeying. Contradictions with Alliance Commitments. A Symptom of Something Larger. Managed Rivalry Amid Converging Interests. The Security Dimension. The Energy Dimension. Asymmetrical Leverage. Going Forward. Enhanced Political Engagement. Increased Defense Industry Cooperation. Climate and Energy Dialogue. More work from Carnegie. A common adversary has brought these natural rivals together. Assessing Russian Military Adaptation in

Moscow buying blow