Misha Cross dans un bunker
🔞 TOUTES LES INFORMATIONS CLIQUEZ ICI 👈🏻👈🏻👈🏻
Misha Cross dans un bunker
Wenn Ergebnisse zur automatischen Vervollständigung angezeigt werden, verwenden die Pfeile nach oben und unten, um sie dir anzusehen und sie auszuwählen. Nutzer von Geräten mit Touchscreen können die Ergebnisse durch Antippen oder mit Streichgesten durchsuchen.
Finde diesen Pin und vieles mehr auf Misha collins von Red 🍁 .
Finde diesen Pin und vieles mehr auf Misha collins von Red 🍁 .
Melde dich an, um Pinterest optimal zu nutzen.
(Visited 254 times, 1 visits today)
This website uses cookies to improve your experience. We'll assume you're ok with this, but you can opt-out if you wish. Cookie settings ACCEPT
This website uses cookies to improve your experience while you navigate through the website. Out of these cookies, the cookies that are categorized as necessary are stored on your browser as they are essential for the working of basic functionalities ...
Written by admin • March 9, 2022 •
Featured
On July 1, 2016, at the inauguration of the massive Osman Gazi Bridge, Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama appeared as a passenger in a Turkish presidential limousine with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the driving seat. The Albanian prime minister, the guest of honor and the only foreign guest, sat in the dignitary’s back seat, radiating a triumphant smile, as he tried to be attentive to the conversation led by the special driver.
Does the fact that the Prime Minister of Albania was the only foreign guest at the inauguration of the Osman Gazi Bridge have any meaning? Of course, there must be some significance as official channels in Ankara and Tirana distributed the video and news before the official ceremony was even over. Even more importantly, it is clear there was meaning in the President of Turkey himself coming out to greet the Albanian guest, even taking on the driver role.
Those who are most enthusiastic and supportive of the foreign policy of the government of Mr. Rama read the scene depicted above as proof of the special relations between Albania and Turkey, thanks to the excellent personal relations that Mr. Rama has managed to build with President Erdoğan.
For skeptics and critics, the scene was more proof that Albania is increasingly sinking into the orbit of Turkey, distancing from Europe. Some would go as far as saying Tirana has already handed over its foreign policy’s driving seat to Ankara. A more realistic explanation can and should be found somewhere between these two extreme positions in the ongoing debate on contemporary Albanian-Turkish relations.
The very fact that the debate about these relations has built and continues to build two conflicting narratives suggests the necessity to have a critical analysis of these relations — and their future in particular.
Albanian-Turkish relations are unique — first and foremost due to their strategic character when it comes to defense and security issues. These relations have always been strategic in the post-Cold War environment, and Turkey has played a balancing role in the geopolitical setting of the troubled Balkans. Having just emerged from communism as a failed state and lacking the capacities and abilities to defend itself under the threat of being involved in the Yugoslav wars, Albania based its defense on a close relationship with Turkey, in addition to its strong ties with the United States.
But Albania-Turkey relations are not strategic only because of certain historical events, such as the end of the Cold War or the disintegration of Yugoslavia. In Albania’s national security equation, Turkey plays a balancing role vis-a-vis Albania’s southern neighbor, Greece, which has historically had territorial claims based on what it calls “Vorio Epirus.” [1] So ingrained is this perception of the danger coming from its southern neighbor and the necessity of balancing it out with Turkey, a rival of Greece, that it continues to linger today even though all three countries are members of NATO.
Second, the relations between Albania and Turkey are also unique due to religious-cultural similarities and, at the same time, the differences that set up clear cultural boundaries between the two peoples.
Third, the relations between Albania and Turkey since the end of the Cold War are unique on another level. Turkey has been neutral toward Albania’s domestic policies. For Turkey, but also for Albania, it has never been important who was in power in Tirana or Ankara. Since the fall of communism in Albania and the new beginning of relations between the two countries, Turkey has never shown a preference for political parties in Albania or for particular leaders who have ruled Albania for almost three decades now. Ankara has never intervened in Albania’s internal political game to support political parties, or particular political leaders. Likewise, Turkey’s foreign policy towards Albania has not been influenced by the ruling political parties or by the ideologies they have represented. Although there is a perception that the Socialists in Albania have been more preferential in their relations with Greece while the Democratic Party has preferred Turkey, Ankara has pursued the same friendly policy and developed relations without being influenced by whether the Socialists or Democrats were in power.
Another almost permanent characteristic feature since the fall of the communist regime in 1990 is that Albanian-Turkish relations have developed linearly without ups and downs, without contrasts or reversals, something truly unique given the fact that Albania-Turkey relations are in a way postcolonial relations.
Last but not least, although Turkey is not Albania’s top economic partner, economic cooperation with Turkey is a strategic component of relations if we take into account the fact that Turkish investments are concentrated in energy, banking, infrastructure and telecommunications.
But what has led to the discussion over these relations splitting into two distinct and conflicting narratives over the past eight years? What has changed in these relationships, which for almost three decades had developed in a linear way? Is Albania losing its independence in foreign affairs under the influence of Turkey? Does Turkey continue to be neutral in Albania’s domestic politics? Is Turkey revising its foreign policy toward Albania? Is Turkey trying to turn Albania into an area of its influence as part of what is seen as a Neo-Ottoman policy in the Balkans? Is Turkey increasing its influence in Albania at the expense of other countries with which Albania claims a strategic relationship? Is Turkey an alternative to Albania’s hopes of joining the European Union? Last but not least, is Turkey trying to cross the cultural boundaries that exist between the two peoples based not only on cultural, religious and Ottoman heritage? The following chapter aims to answer the above questions.
Albanian-Turkish Relations during the Cold War
In general, Albanian-Turkish relations during the Cold War were poor. Before WWII, a Memorandum of Friendship was signed between the two countries in December 1923, one of the first agreements that Albania signed with foreign countries. More than a friendship treaty with the relevant instruments to develop cooperation and friendship, the memorandum was a demonstration of the political will of both countries. In the case of Albania, it was another step in consolidating its sovereignty in an unfriendly regional and international environment — to be accepted as a new state in the Balkans with the territories of which all its neighbors had claimed and continued to claim. The reason for the very sporadic and unsubstantial relations must be sought, among other things, in political instability and internal conflicts in the state-building process, as well as the very backward agrarian economy of Albania.
For almost two decades after the end of World War II, Albanian-Turkish relations were almost non-existent, excluding a small episode that took place at a distance, albeit one that was important. Thus, in December 1955, Turkey supported Albania’s membership in the United Nations, despite objections by other countries, including neighboring Greece. Albania responded with the same gesture a decade later, in 1965, when it backed Turkey in not recognizing Cyprus as a new UN member. Albania would have secured a seat at the United Nations even without Turkey’s vote, and, likewise, Albania’s first vote with Turkey against Cyprus’ UN accession in 1960 did not prevent the latter from being admitted as a UN member. But both gestures showed the countries were sympathetic to each other, even at a distance, and actually helped to start and develop some sort of relationship during the Cold War.
Two basic factors influenced the nature of Albanian-Turkish relations during that period. First, the regional geopolitical setting, in which relations among Albania, Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia were influenced by bilateral relations, if not interdependent. In the post-Cold War environment, a fourth country, Italy, must be added to this geopolitical equation. A clear example of the impact of this regional geopolitical setting on Albania-Turkey relations is, for example, the breakdown of Albania’s relations with the Soviet Union in the 1960s. Relations with Turkey took precedence in this difficult period, and Albania began to see Turkey as a strategic ally (Xhaferi 2017,42-62) in the face of permanent dangers and threats coming from its northern and southern neighbors, respectively Yugoslavia and Greece. The influence of third countries, especially Greece, in bilateral relations between Albania and Turkey continued to be present after the end of the Cold War – and even continues today. While the real degree of this influence is very debatable, there is no doubt that there is a strong perception of its importance, up to the degree of dependence. Thus, a realistic and critical analysis of Albania-Turkey relations would not be complete without considering the influence, or perception of the influence, of Greece. As in bilateral relations between Albania and Greece, the potential influence of Turkey and up to a balancing role of Ankara with the relations between Tirana and Athens should be taken into consideration. [1]
The second factor that influenced Albanian-Turkish relations during the Cold War relates to the perceptions Tirana’s communist regime held about Turkey. Although Turkey had been a NATO member since 1952, it seemed that Tirana did not identify it as part of the “Western imperialist world,” much less as an enemy of Albania, a label reserved for the United States, and its “American imperialism,” and after 1961 also for the Soviet Union, or as the Tirana regime called it, “Soviet Social Imperialism.”
There is no doubt that such a perception has been influenced by history — the long coexistence resulting in shared cultural or religious components. However, softer language and almost neutral attitudes from communist Albania were also used with other countries in the West — members of NATO, an alliance that the regime called “a tool in the hands of American imperialism.” One significant example was the case of relations with Canada, a Western power with which the Albanian communist regime tried to establish relations, despite the fact that Canada was a purely capitalist country and, moreover, a NATO member. [2] Nonetheless, political relations throughout the Cold War between Albania and Turkey were sporadic but not insignificant, although contacts were limited. It is interesting, for example, that in 1968 the speaker of the Turkish parliament, a NATO member, visited Albania in an attempt to discuss cooperation between the two countries. During the late 1980s, the two countries intensified political communication, including visits at the ministerial level culminating in the visit of the Turkish Foreign Minister in 1988. In the meantime, there were cultural exchanges in the field of tourism. In 1982, the two countries signed a trade agreement. Two years later, an aviation agreement was signed, although flights did not start before 1986. [1] It appeared easier for Albania to open to the world starting with countries like Turkey, toward which the communist regime had not attempted to cultivate any particular hostility and had generally been shown to be neutral. Thus, when the regime in Tirana was still on its feet, although in its last throes, the communist president, Ramiz Alia, chose in 1991 to visit Turkey.
Post-Communist Albania: The Strategic Dimension of Relationships
For almost a quarter of a century after the fall of communism and Albania’s emergence from its long isolation and ideological bunker, Albanian-Turkish relations developed in a linear way, consolidating and advancing steadily. In the international relations of post-communist Albania, relations with Turkey were probably the only ones that didn’t go through ups and downs — there were no clashes, disagreements and even less any crisis — phenomena that have actually accompanied the relations with many other states, including countries with which Albania claims to have strategic relations. With the exception of the different positions regarding Turkish Cyprus, which Albania does not recognize as an independent state, there is no dispute between Albania and Turkey that could damage the relations and the climate of friendship that exists between the two peoples. The fact that Albania does not recognize Turkish Cyprus has not had any impact on relations, and Turkey has never conditioned the development of relations on the issue of recognition. [1]
For more than 25 years, Turkey has offered Albania a privileged relationship in the Balkans. Turkey was the first country to provide assistance to Albania’s devastated economy through a $13.87 million loan in 1991 when the communist government was still in power. Turkey was the first country with which Albania signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation just three months after the first non-communist government came to power. [2] In three critical moments for the sovereignty and national security of Albania, in 1991, with the outbreak of wars in Yugoslavia, with the crisis of 1997 that led to the fall of the Albanian state, and in 1999 during Serbia’s aggression against Kosovo, Turkey has unreservedly supported Albania. In all three cases, the sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of the country were endangered.
Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize the independence of Kosovo and, since 2008, supports and helps the internal and external consolidation of the state of Kosovo. Consistently, Turkey has optimistically supported Albania’s membership in NATO.
From the first aid to soft loans, economic relations have grown, paving the way for investments in strategic sectors such as the banking system, [3] energy, telecommunications, education, construction and health. The revival of religious practices in Albania after a total ban under communism, Islam in particular, through the education and training of clerics, building infrastructure and religious institutions, was greatly assisted by Turkey and its relevant institutions. [4] In this solid development of relations, the strategic dimension is the basic feature . During the Cold War, Turkey had outlined a strategic and balancing role in the Balkans, especially in terms of Albania’s relations with Yugoslavia and Greece. With the dramatic developments of the late 1990s, the resurgence of national issues, the outbreak of conflict, especially the war in Kosovo and the resurgence of Greece’s aspirations in southern Albania, according to the Vorio Epirus platform, Turkey seemed to be Albania’s natural ally. In addition to the common historical past and Turkey’s own interest in expanding its influence in the Balkans, a fundamental reason why Turkey became Albania’s natural strategic ally was Turkey’s rivalry with Greece in the region. [1]
Throughout the trajectory of the development of Albanian-Turkish relations during the past three decades, one can notice the strategic character of the relations and the behavior of Turkey as a natural ally of Albania. First of all, this can be seen in the area of defense and security. In 1992, Albania and Turkey signed a special pact in the field of security and defense. [2] Emerging from communism with a bankrupt state, economy, and defense capabilities, Albania, which risked a military confrontation with Serbia, sought and supported its defense and security with special relationships with the United States, Turkey, and other NATO member states. (Biberaj, 1998).
The security and defense pact was first tested in the 1997 crisis, which accompanied the collapse of pyramid schemes and almost led to the failure of the Albanian state. The crisis of 1997, the most severe in the modern history of Albania, questioned the existence of the state and endangered the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. Anarchy and the loss of state control over its territory and international borders during this crisis encouraged nationalist forces and groups in the Balkans (Biberaj 2011, 312-341) and, in particular, extreme nationalist circles in Greece, which reverted to the narrative of Vorio Epirus. When a senior Greek government official visited southern Albania without announcing and coordinating with authorities in Tirana, it led to harsh words and conflict between Tirana and Athens. [3] The stern messages didn’t just come from Albania, but Turkey too. Ankara sent a clear message that it supported Albania, its sovereignty, and territorial integrity. [4] During Albania’s turbulent years in relations with Greece in 1994 [5] and 1997 [6] or the risk of a military confrontation with Serbia in 1999, Turkey was not really tested in terms of a possible military engagement. However, in the diplomatic field, in both cases, in 1997 and 1999, Turkey sided with Albania, sending clear messages to Belgrade and Athens. When war broke out in Kosovo, the risk of Albania’s involvement in the conflict with Milosevic’s remaining Yugoslavia was imminent, and the Albanian Prime Minister turned to Turkey for military assistance. Following Albania’s request, Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit responded that “Turkey and its Armed Forces were ready to defend the territorial integrity of Albania.” [1]
But the strategic character of Albania-Turkey relations goes beyond the new geopolitical map created by the end of the Cold War and the fall of totalitarian/authoritarian regimes in the Balkans or subsequent changes on this map. Moreover, the relations’ strategic character relates to more than just security and defense issues. The two countries’ economies and the complex economic relations between them make Turkey an important and strategic country for Albania. [2] The two countries have signed several agreements on economic cooperation and investments. And, in 2018, Albania and Turkey signed a new economic agreement, which provides for the establishment and functioning of joint committees. In 2019, Turkey was one of the four most important trading partners of Albania besides Italy, Greece, and China, with the volume of trade exchanges reaching 512 million Euros. [3] Although trade exchanges have increased, and these are quite competitive with EU member states Greece and Italy and outside the EU with China, in fact, it is Turkish investment and its ever-increasing level and above all the nature of investment that makes economic relations with Turkey strategic.
Turkey is one of the largest foreign investors in Albania, ranking third overall. Since 2014, Turkish investments have reached 419 million Euros [4] . Turkish investments include strategic sectors such as energy, banking, telecommunications, health, construction, education, and communications.
Albania’s newly-established national flag carrier, Air Albania, is also a pa
Un coach baise une salope
Un couple mature en action
Le voisin vient chez moi et me baise en levrette