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The focus on social attention and urban revitalization rather than zero tolerance goals, such as imprisoning drug market participants or winning the war on drugs, was paramount in the sustainability and success of the intervention. The paper poses two main contributions to the debate of illicit economies and urban peace. Extralegal actors set parallel mechanisms of social control when crime is normalized and state-sponsored protection rackets perform adequately. Therapeutic policing, a street level combination of policing and social work, was the way in which the state built local capabilities to connect social policy with drug users and homeless citizens while allocating resources towards urban revitalization. The paper develops in three moments. In the first, I describe the social order of El Bronx that shaped the architecture of the illegal market and how different actors, including legal and extralegal ones, participated in it. Here, I focus on the mechanisms through which state-sponsored protection rackets enhanced criminal governance and the way in which this type of governance was disrupted. Amid this process, contested informalities, defined as the disputed character of everyday economic hustle of people living under criminal control, remain a crucial and unexplored area of criminal governance. The conclusion discusses the lessons learned from the El Bronx intervention and how they can inform the selected responses to tackle illegal economies in other urban contexts. The present paper is not a public policy or impact evaluation. It falls within the crime analysis field of applied research in criminology and criminal justice to address immediate policy needs. In doing so, crime analysis is a systematic, analytic process aimed to provide information about crime patterns that help to understand who is doing what with whom by focusing on the relationship between persons and organizations involved in illegal activities Hagan The analysis proceeds as follows. One of these two years of participant observation elapsed after state interventions, assessing the aftermath and response of extra-legal organizations to the loss of territorial control. Also, semi-structured interviews were conducted with city officials, prosecutors, social workers, and community leaders following a combination of nonprobability quota and snowball sampling. Secondary analysis of open sources, such as official reports and statistics, as well as press articles, supplemented participant observation and interview data. For years and since the s Colombia has been known as the top cocaine producer country in the world. Despite the recent spike in coca leaf crops registered in the last years, anti-narcotics efforts held in Colombia during the last decades largely affected main drug cartels. Following a global trend in which drug use has heightened in producing countries that have the dual condition of producer and consumer countries UNODC , drug consumption in Colombia quadrupled over the previous two decades Camacho et al. Urban violence is one of the problems of contemporary societies that demand the most resources and efforts from countries around the world whose political and economic life revolves around cities Atkinson and Millington ; Kilcullen Being home to the outcast and most marginalized sections of urban populations, impoverished, unruly, and crime-ridden areas, known as skid rows, ghettos, and inner cities or slums, often lodge different types of illegal markets and criminal activities. Paradoxically, in these places, chronic poverty and addiction tend to appear intertwined with some of the most profitable illegal markets around the world, such as drugs, street sex trade, or stolen goods. Informal and illicit economies overlapped in El Bronx for decades, converting it in the open-air drug market by antonomasia in Colombia. By contested informalities, I refer to the struggle and challenges of people to afford living in stigmatized areas controlled by criminal groups such as gangs or cartels that depend on informal markets. A vast majority are law abiding citizens tied to jobs from the off-the-books economy in which a structure of unwritten standards define who can trade what with whom, who can work on one street corner or the other, what the prices are, and so on Venkatesh Informal markets in these communities emerge as a shady and contested economy given that while actions are technically illegal they are not often criminalized or seen as a threat to public safety Boel ; Konove The social disorder and plight that characterizes these places remain a challenge for public authorities affecting the design of policing strategies that are deployed Bittner ; Braga and Weisburd ; Wilcox et al. To solve the surge in crime, governments opted for the implementation of tough-on-crime policies. Comprised of minimum mandatory sentencing, the stiffness of criminal codes regarding drug-related crimes, and the diffusion of crime control techniques in lower income communities, tough-on-crime policies led to systematic confinement and mass incarceration Hinton Hence, the narrative of urban informality as a problem of criminality and lawlessness unique to the urban ghetto prevailed as the underlying conception of urban decay Sharkey As a result, law enforcement interventions followed by urban renewal projects gained legitimacy as a well regarded and technical solution to urban violence fueled by illegal markets, receiving vast quantities of public and private resources Lehrer Yet, in some cases, state intervention plans have failed in their purpose to shut down illegal markets and restore governance, which poses a variety of public policy challenges related to illegal economies, policing, and urban peace. For that reason, homeless people in a condition of problematic consumption or addiction, can be offered treatment as far as it is consensual by the future patient. No person in Colombia can be forced into shelters or drug treatments, even if the person is under homelessness or exploitation. This legal restriction is critical in how social and drug policies overlap and shape urban drug markets in Colombia, and in the path through which the country has slowly advanced in harm-reduction urban programs despite being one of the main epicenters of the enduring global war on drugs. The first strand of relevant literature for the present study is the one on illegal markets and criminal governance. Illegal markets, particularly drug ones, not always breed violence Andreas and Wallman ; Beckert and Dewey ; Curtis and Wendel ; Reuter Evidence suggests that criminal organizations exist as a form of protection given the extended uncertainty of drug markets where information problems often trigger violence and the need for increased reputation, rather than as a way of controlling offer and demand PAHO These are places where property crime rates might fluctuate from low to high, yet featuring low violence rates that are usually maintained by local authorities. However, when things go wrong violence is used to enforce agreements Grillo ; Skarpedas A moral economy of violence emerges as an encrusted feature of places where the law is rarely enforced or enforced selectively and thus everyday violence is exerted discretionally against disposable subjects Scheper-Hughes ; Willis Furthermore, the existence of monopolistic players that have enough power and violent capacity in order to display territorial control and to enforce a criminal order explains low levels of violence in illegal markets Bowden ; Jacobs ; Levi ; Reuter , Nevertheless, low levels of violence in the context of competitive organized crime operations, illegal markets, or places with the absence of strong statehood can also be explained by a arrangements between extralegal groups Idler ; Shortland or b arrangements between extralegal groups and the state Barnes ; Sobering and Auyero ; Willis This relation means that less violence does not necessarily imply less criminal activity Aziani et. For instance, Snyder and Duran-Martinez argue that one of the mechanisms by which illegal markets maintain low levels of violence is the existence of state-sponsored protection rackets. State-sponsored protection rackets are informal institutions through which law enforcement and civil authorities refrain from enforcing the law or enforce it selectively against the rivals of a criminal organization, in exchange for a share of the profits generated by the criminal business Snyder and Duran-Martinez Despite the common belief that only criminals participate in criminal networks, organized crime schemes often provide incentives to institutional participants, from law enforcement to civil agencies Salcedo and Garay Recently, an emerging body of literature has looked at the ways in which criminal groups govern and the incentives they have to set parallel forms of governance to contend violence, deliver public goods, regulate informal economics, establish community arrangements, and impart justice Desmond Arias ; Feltran ; Lessing , ; Trejo and Ley Some literature on criminal governance, or governance without the state in the context of organized crime, often understands criminal orders as a function of state weakness, especially in peripheral geographies where weak state institutions are not able to deliver public goods Duncan ; Felbab-Brown et al. In the case of Colombia, Abello and Guarneros found that criminal actors mediate the roles they played in local governance through strategies of deinstitutionalization. The paper also builds on the concept of street-level bureaucracies Lipsky to highlight the relationship between street-level peace building and urban transformation at the macro level. As Lipsky states, there is a significant gap between planned policies and their actual implementation at the street level. In the implementation process, public servants deal with unexpected interactions and problems that demand constant decision-making, discretion and accountability. In the policing world, everyday policing or patrol work implies interactional definitions of deviance depending on the labeling, typifications, or perceptions that police officers have of people living in crime ridden areas Sharp ; Van Maanen The nature of patrol work and the everyday interactions between drug users, criminals, and the state demands a local and rooted approach to the dynamics of urban violence and how the city is permanently negotiated through the territorial production of the politics of care and crime control James Smith and Hall Finally, researchers have also strained the importance of a local turn in peace building policies. They understand the local turn as a vehicle to design more effective interventions but also to empower local communities towards emancipation and transformative action Leonardsson and Rudd The set of norms that organized the architecture of the black market, as well as its primary operating illegal economies, was not the result of monopolistic actions to impose arrangements in terms of price and social order to consumers, dealers, or other participants in the market. Instead, the social order of El Bronx was a function of constant bargaining in everyday interactions between criminals and street-level bureaucracies, comprised of law enforcement agents and social workers from the city. Furthermore, while drug trafficking was the central element of the illegal operation at El Bronx, other driving factors of crime make this place different from the conventional street corner selling spot. Similar to other cases, factors such as legal cynicism, waste accumulation, youth out of school, and social disorganization contributed to the insecurity of the place Sampson ; Shaw and Mckay Entrenched in the territorial control gained in this sector of the city and in state sponsor protection rackets, local gangs called ganchos 1 created a sort of liberated zone where they set up a diversified criminal portfolio strengthened by the concentration of hundreds of drug users in the same place. In fact, Figure 1 illustrates the criminal operation at El Bronx between the years and Because was the last war among local gangs that led to gunfire exchange inside and outside of the open-air drug market, this period was considered RCN It was also the last year in which authorities conducted a significant crackdown attempt before the comprehensive intervention El Tiempo These events might have changed the architecture and patterns of the criminal operation that prevailed until The illustration of the illegal operation was made with data from the Police Sectional Intelligence unit SIPOL , field reports from local officials in charge of managing security incidents at the neighborhood level between and , interviews with street-based social workers at El Bronx, and secondary data available in open sources. I organized the data using crime script models applied to analysis in criminal justice policy. Crime scripts are used to understand the process that occurs prior to the commission of a crime, specifically those classified as rent seeking that demand a social organization of resources such as drug trafficking Chiu et al. Notwithstanding that the above mentioned were the leading operators of the El Bronx open air drug market, the whole process involved other problematic and occasional drug users, neighbor communities, and business owners, as well as state agents in the service of local gangs. Figure 1 illustrates the illegal circuit, not the geography of El Bronx. The different points of entrance to the circuit for a drug user or a client are in gray, namely a buy drugs, b buy or sell stolen goods, and c access to entertainment services. Given that drug trafficking was the main economy at El Bronx, buying drugs was the most common way to enter the circuit. Drugs were available for retail or wholesale in case there was a previous trusted relationship between the buyers and the ganchos. Wholesale transaction was also the most concealed part of the illegal operation at El Bronx. Most of the operation was coordinated in these places, including arms trafficking, bribes payments to corrupt police officers, details on selective homicides, and coordination with other local drug trafficking structures around the city. These structures functioned as satellite selling points from El Bronx. These places were crafted as entertainment places pools, bars, liquors stores , cheap motels, or the public space in the case of impoverished homeless users. The payment could be made in cash or stolen goods e. Regarding robbery and mugging, it is important to clarify that the ganchos controlled the handling of stolen goods inside El Bronx, not outside. Dynamics of supply and demand mediated the relationship between ganchos and robbers. In the case of places of entertainment pools, bars, and liquor stores , infamous parties took place without any sort of legal restrictions on hours, underage participants, spurious liquor, slot machines, and gambling. These places constituted the contact point to the offering of sexual services with kids and teenagers who were victims of human trafficking or were held in chronic addiction as local gangs extorted them to perform sexual acts in return for drugs. Once the service was agreed, it took place in the adjacent motels. The motels, known as paga diarios , were the preferred place for consumers from a higher economic status that spent extended sprees or even considered these places their home. Several reports mentioned the use of exemplary physical punishments against homeless drug users. Exemplary physical punishments consisted of public beatings and degrading treatments by the sayayaines against homeless people and drug users. This form of protection racket enabled local gangs to achieve territorial control while further commanding a competitive adaptation process to socially control consumers. According to the typological distinctions of illegal markets proposed by Beckert and Dewey , El Bronx economy and its adjacent ecological urban settings showed an ongoing process of contested informalities. A process in which the whole palette of illegal economies provided a living for thousands of people based on the following markets: 1 markets in which the good or service is illegal i. Controlling the overlap of criminal activity with thriving illegal and informal economic activities was one of the major challenges for the rule of law at El Bronx since organized crime cannot run illegal markets for long periods without a certain level of cooperation from state officials. According to Dewey , in a street-level clandestine order, the presence and action of the state are not replaced or nullified but instead transformed into a type of governance explicitly or implicitly shared with criminals to deliver both public goods, such as social services, and public bads, such as coercion and disciplinary violence. Although hosting the biggest open-air drug market of the country, it still featured a low homicide rate and some violent but contended conflict resolution. In El Bronx, the result was a highly diversified thriving public drug market, the deepening of the criminal control over vulnerable populations, and the erosion of civil authorities that had to implicitly bargain their presence and social service delivery with local gangs. From traditional corruption mechanisms to more sophisticated shared governance schemes, the offending model in El Bronx embedded state-sponsored protection rackets as follows:. Within criminal governance schemes emerging in the new local-urban war on drugs in Colombia and Latin America, interactions between criminal and law enforcement agents are creating parallel power structures specialized in controlling populations rather than territory. This is a crucial distinction as some of the literature on criminal governance is based on the notion that territorial control is a necessary and previous condition for criminals putting into practice of norms, rules, and parallel forms of justice Duncan ; Koonings and Kruijt ; Lessing ; Willis The conditions and mechanisms of this criminal resilience are beyond the scope of this paper and demand further future research on the theoretical distinctions between forms of criminal control. Following Arjona , shared expectations are understood here as a marker of emerging social contracts among parties. Shared expectations and their enforcement both by state-sponsored rackets in El Bronx that facilitated, and even encouraged, social control imposed by local gangs, created patterns and regular interactions that shaped a steady criminal governance structure. However, criminal governance requires more than pure coercion Arias and Barnes As criminal groups embed in the social fabric through family, kingship, and other everyday support networks, they are expected to deliver public goods, such as El Bronx safe heavens for drug using and informal justice. Three other types of norms showed shared expectations among local gangs, vulnerable drug users, and street-level bureaucracies. The variety of social agents involved, the diversity of the interactions between this variety of actors, and the institutional effects of the parallel set of norms that governed contested informalities at El Bronx and adjacent locations indicates the complexity of illegal urban markets in Colombia. In this section I show how two main aspects of state intervention converged into a sustainable form of drug market intervention. Dismantling state-sponsored protection rackets, complementing territorial control with vulnerable population focalized social programs, and building bottom-up governance capabilities at the street level enabled public authorities to shut down one of the biggest open air drug markets around the world. Rather than a traditional broken windows Wilson and Kelling or zero tolerance approach Orlando , the intervention conducted at El Bronx falls more into a selective targeting and deterrence model for two main reasons. First, it was not focused on punishing all the offenses and all the offenders but those that represented a higher degree of harm, in this case, violence specialists. Secondly, the model displayed a continued targeting over prioritized organizations—and places—considered responsible for serious offenses, such as homicide and human trafficking. However, according to Felbab-Brown 8 , for an intervention to be considered focused deterrence, the ability of punishment has to be credible. In El Bronx, state-sponsored protection rackets led to the collapse of deterrence. In February , three months before the comprehensive intervention in El Bronx, 14 active police officers were captured for charges of cooperating with criminal networks behind the El Bronx drug-dealing operation. All of them were assigned to the same police beat, including the commander of the Immediate Attention Command CAI next to the illegal market. Due to the high reliance and dependence that the criminal operation had on the state-sponsored protection rackets, disrupting the collusion scheme was the real no return point of state intervention. According to a police officer testimony filtered to the press,. They know when they are followed or monitored. Allegedly, at least 45 police officers—including a colonel—cooperated with the drug operation. As non-enforcement or protection of the state was no longer available with corrupt law enforcement agents out of the equation, it was a matter of time until local gang rule was dismantled. In May , more than two thousand units entered El Bronx and disrupted the black market. Among the different numbers of the outcome of state action, teenagers under criminal exploitation by local gangs were rescued. The unrest supposed a policy entanglement for city authorities. With an inelastic demand for drugs in adjacent streets and neighborhoods, the ganchos rapidly changed territorial control for intermittent presence while keeping and further strengthening population control. Social control was crucial to assure criminal rents and the only way local gangs had to achieve equilibrium and functionality once again. This is the point where the building of local governance capacity in the form of therapeutic policing was key to address criminal adaptation. Following Stuart 15 , therapeutic policing operates as a form of outreach social work that aims to transform and reintegrate residents as productive self-governing citizens. Although, in his study of Skid Row in Los Angeles, Stuart understands this form of policing as a moral one and as a street level mode of poverty governance, in places where criminal governance thrives and impedes police and social workers providing different services, such as shelter, counseling, and primary healthcare, therapeutic policing can be a main asset for local capacity. From a stable concentration in between 1, and 2, drug users hosted at El Bronx, the city witnessed a reduction to concentrations of roughly to in the following weeks and from to in the following months. Paradoxically, affected local gangs decided to assess competition problems through the means of disciplinary violence targeting their longtime consumers for buying basuco from competitors instead of targeting competitors themselves. Referring to homicide trends in the central district where the Bronx was, and adjacent areas where criminal networks tried to resettle, a local security liaison for the City Hall stated,. I think this is a consequence of the need for consolidation that these structures are experimenting; now, we have mobile and smaller drug markets that are operated by extended arms of the old ganchos that owned the business at El Bronx. Two points are revealing about this excerpt. The first one is how in the absence of territorial control, violence against homeless that were frequent users in the illegal market turned into disciplinary violence regardless if it was to sanction unpaid drug debts or any other motive. The other one is how from the perspective of street-level security bureaucracies and decision-makers in the security secretariat of the city, population clustering was a crucial feature and marker for criminal governance. For instance, a main drawback and challenge of this experience is the displacement of criminal activity to the city sewer system, pushing the drug market to the urban limit. It transformed it into a shadier and high-risk business for consumers where local gangs continue to display social control mechanisms. To maintain business after state action, supply lines might be forced to exchange territorial control for territorial presence but cannot waive the population and social control. In another instance of adaptation, criminal networks behind El Bronx adopted a cuckooing practice, also known as trap houses in adjacent areas. Following Curtis and Wendel , this adaptation falls into both the technical and the social organization of drug markets. Street vendors, Venezuelan immigrants, sex workers, or just vulnerable people blend themselves with drug users and local gangs. On the one hand, the new role that police officers were to perform as guards of the social offer that the city was trying to deliver contrasted with the traditional mistrust between police officers and illegal market regulars, the corruption, the disciplinary violence, and intermittence that characterized law enforcement. On the other hand, street-based social workers that for years had to negotiate their presence in El Bronx with criminal networks were now seen by vulnerable populations as a source of peril as long as state interventions were both preceded and followed by extensive social services offerings. The latter brought tension within social policy agencies and nonprofits that, for years, pursued a harm reduction approach at the cost of not reporting criminal activity to law enforcement and security agencies. It also puts us into danger as folks were banned from talking to us or receiving any help at all. This dynamic not only showed the intermittent, selective, and contradictory ways by which the state intervenes in crime-ridden areas through police action but also demanded alternative street governance mechanisms to replace a criminal order with a conventional one. In this case, homeless problematic drug users, the weakest link of the multiple interactions of the El Bronx open-air drug market but also the most numerous and hence most problematic subjects from the perspective of public opinion, are reached out to with actions ranging from therapeutic and educational programs to counseling and shelter, to self care services, to formal social control mechanisms. Figure 3 shows the formats presented by therapeutic policing efforts deployed to stem the concentrations of drug users around selling hubs. The novelty of therapeutic policing stands in the notion of coercive benevolence that reconciles traditionally opposite punitive and rehabilitative insights to drug policy. Within this frame of intervention, law enforcement agents use social control to discourage deviant behavior and to make street living a costly and uncomfortable option for drug users, given the legal restrictions that Colombian constitutional law imposes. As an asymmetric response to organized crime, which included actions in the prevention, social policy, and urban planning spheres, therapeutic policing can be implemented as a peace-building tool only if it is oriented towards the golden thread of harm reduction, namely the implementation on people centric policy options Shaw In other words, the therapeutic policing formats exposed in Figure 3 constitute a selective targeting effort at the street level to avoid vertical integration of criminal groups while striking their corruptive and coercive power Felbab-Brown The present study has made theoretical and empirical contributions to the way we understand criminal governance in urban settings and how therapeutic policing can be a sustainable intervention that on the one hand provides social services to vulnerable populations while refraining from escalating lethal violence. The intervention that provided services to vulnerable populations and regained territorial control was sustainable because it did not confront criminal actors involved in drug supply like it had been done in earlier years. Still, criminals and law enforcement agents are not always on opposite sides of the law. Instead, under specific circumstances, street-level bureaucracies might further enforce criminal orders when trying to address vulnerable populations without destabilizing highly complex settings, such as crime-ridden areas. It increases the risk of detection once political authorities decide to shut down open-air drug markets. Fixed demand guaranteed through population control might condition whether local gangs can perceive constant profits from illegal activity. In that sense, the loss of territorial control does not affect gang rule as much as the loss of population control. El Bronx was much more a social reality shaped by criminal-state interactions—whether they were oppositional or cooperative—than a geographical one. While this distinction and the different forms of criminal governance that emerge from it is a promising theoretical path of further exploration within the criminal governance literature, it goes beyond the scope of this study and is part of a soaring interdisciplinary research agenda. Although the criminal organizations could never challenge the authority of the state over the city center, the impunity with which they operated represented an intolerable message to the public about the capacity of City Hall to provide security and justice. In this case, the power of the criminal structures consisted above all in deterring the mayor, as happened for many years, from disrupting the illegal market for an alleged social cost that such a decision would entail. Therapeutic policing models directly affect the resilience efforts of criminal networks after state intervention, given that they erode mechanisms of population control by connecting social needs with social policy portfolios. Meanwhile, gender and race awareness is crucial when implementing harm reduction and care programs at the intersections of public safety, drugs, and social policies. This research cannot conclude that interactions between social policy agents and local gangs before the intervention were the product of corruption, collusion, or the participation of city government officials in the informal institution of state-sponsored protection rackets. However, it found to what extent criminal networks behind the drug supply operation were comfortable and confident with state presence, mining city peacemaking efforts. The mechanisms and set of rules through which local gangs at El Bronx interacted with other criminal groups remain unclear and should be addressed in future research. Urban peace building needs to happen at the street-level. Given the uncertainty and the perils that characterize unlawful urban life, flexibility, adaptability, and constant evaluation is required to respond to criminal governance challenges without harming vulnerable populations. Law enforcement and public health approaches to the problems of local drug markets are not necessarily antagonistic. However, while interagency territorial work is a valuable asset in terms of street-level peace building, organizational cultures from police departments, first responders, and social services teams need to be addressed. Shared understandings of the problem of illegal economies become a crucial part of urban resilience. From now on used indistinctively to refer to local gangs. Olla is a Colombian slang word to call the place where someone can buy and consume drugs in a relatively free way. All state officials including law enforcement spoke on strict conditions of anonymity. Informed oral consent was obtained from all individual participants included in the study. I thank the thorough feedback of anonymous reviewers and editors of this special issue. I also appreciate the invaluable guidance of participants that struggle with addiction, homelessness and violence at the street-level in their everyday lives. Feldmann at the Latin American and Latino Studies Department of the University of Illinois Chicago, who provided intellectually enriching environments and conversations. This research was generously supported by Fulbright Colombia through a Fulbright — Colciencias grant — Abello, A and Guarneros, V. Urban Studies , 51 Andreas, P and Wallman, J. Illicit Markets and Violence: What is the Relationship? Crime, Law and Social Change , — Arias, ED. New York: Cambridge. Arias, D and Barnes, N. Crime and plural orders in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Current Sociology , 65 3 : — Arjona, A. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Atkinson, R and Millington, G. New York: Routledge. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency , 1— Barnes, N. Perspectives on Politics , 15 4 : — Beckert, J and Dewey, M. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bergman, M. New York: Oxford University Press. Bittner, E. American Sociological Review , 32 5 : — Boel, D. The Informal Economy. Ebook: Palgrave McMillan. Bowden, M. New York: Palgrave McMillan. Braga, A and Weisburd, D. Policing Problem Places. Crime Hot Spots and Effective Policing. Brodkin, E. Public Administration Review. Drug Consumption in Colombia. British Journal of Criminology , — Curtis, R and Wendel, T. Journal of Drug Issues , 37 4 : — Dewey, M. Buenos Aires: Katz. Duncan, G. El Tiempo. Felbab-Brown, V. Modernizing Drug Law Enforcement. Report 2. London: International Drug Policy Consortium. Ending the War on Drugs. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute. Feltran, G de S. Gambetta, D. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Grillo, I. Gangster Warlord. New York: Bloomsbury. Hagan, F. Research Methods in Criminal Justice and Criminology. New York: Pearson. Hinton, E. From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime. Holland, A. Idler, A. Jacobs, BA. Boston: Northeastern University Press. James Smith, R and Hall, T. Everyday Territories: Homelessness, outreach work and city space. The British Journal of Sociology , 69 2. Kilcullen, D. Konove, A. Black Market Capital. Oakland: University of California Press. Kruijt, D and Koonings, K. London: Zed Books. Lehrer, E. Crime-fighting and urban renewal. Public Interest , Leclerc, B. Crime Scripts. Leonardsson, H and Rudd, G. Third World Quarterly , 36 5 : — Lessing, B. Making peace in drug wars: Crackdowns and cartels in latin america. Conceptualizing Criminal Governance. Perspectives on Politics. Levi, M. Organized Crime and Terrorism. In: Maguire et al. Lipsky, M. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Noticias Uno. Reporte de Drogas Colombia Orlando, JR. Policy Perspectives , 4 1 : 3. Drug Policy and the Public Good. Balacera en el Bronx. Reuter, P. Disorganized Crime; Illegal Markets and the Mafia. Systemic Violence in Drug Markets. Crime, Law and Social Change. DOI Risse, T. Governance Without a State? Politics and Policies in Areas of Limited Statehood. New York: Columbia University Press. Salcedo, E and Garay, J. Macro-criminalidad: Complejidad y Resiliencia en Redes Criminales. Bloomington: I-Universe. Sampson, RJ. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Scheper-Hughes, N. In: Violence at the Urban Margins. London: Oxford University Press. Sharkey, P. Uneasy Peace. Sharp, E. Law and Policy Quarterly , 4 2 : — Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Shaw, M. A Lesson from the Drug Policy Debate. Journal of Illicit Economies and Development , 1 1 : 99— Shortland, A. Kidnap, Inside The Ransom Business. Skarpedas, S. The political economy of organized crime: Providing protection when the state does not. Economics of Governance , 2: — Does Illegality Breed Violence? Drug trafficking and state-sponsored protection rackets. Sobering, K and Auyero, J. Collusion and Cynicism at the Urban Margins. Latin America Research Review , 54 1 : — Stuart, F. Trejo, G and Ley, S. Why did Cartels go to War in Mexico? Comparative Political Studies , 51 7 : — United Nations. World Drug Report Sales E 19 XI 8. Van Maanen, J. The Asshole. In: Manning, P et al. California: Goodyear Pub. Varese, F. Barcelona: Malpaso. Venkatesh, SA. Philadelphia: Temple University. Willis, GD. The Killing Consensus. Oakland, CA: University of California. Making neighborhoods safe. The Atlantic , Home About. Research Integrity. Crime Beyond Borders. Abstract Law enforcement interventions in drug markets require policy coordination to prevent collateral outcomes that might harm vulnerable people under criminal control and spread crime across places. This paper analyzes street-level peace building in the inner city at the frontline of the ongoing urban war on drugs in Colombia. Furthermore, the paper addresses the ways in which street-level bureaucracies and therapeutic policing interventions can become a way of building urban proximity, connectedness, and trust in the context of contested informalities. Keywords: street-level bureaucracies peace building contested informalities illegal economies criminal governance. Year: Submitted on Mar 15, Accepted on Jul 20, Published on Feb 23, Peer Reviewed. CC BY 4. Data and Methods The present paper is not a public policy or impact evaluation. The urban face of the war on drugs in Colombia For years and since the s Colombia has been known as the top cocaine producer country in the world. Urban violence and contested informalities Urban violence is one of the problems of contemporary societies that demand the most resources and efforts from countries around the world whose political and economic life revolves around cities Atkinson and Millington ; Kilcullen Previous Literature The first strand of relevant literature for the present study is the one on illegal markets and criminal governance. The Social Order of El Bronx The set of norms that organized the architecture of the black market, as well as its primary operating illegal economies, was not the result of monopolistic actions to impose arrangements in terms of price and social order to consumers, dealers, or other participants in the market. Figure 1 El Bronx Criminal Operation. Protection Rackets and Criminal Governance According to the typological distinctions of illegal markets proposed by Beckert and Dewey , El Bronx economy and its adjacent ecological urban settings showed an ongoing process of contested informalities. Therapeutic Policing as Street-Level Peace Building In this section I show how two main aspects of state intervention converged into a sustainable form of drug market intervention. Figure 3 Therapeutic Policing Formats. Conclusion, Discussion, and Policy Implications The present study has made theoretical and empirical contributions to the way we understand criminal governance in urban settings and how therapeutic policing can be a sustainable intervention that on the one hand provides social services to vulnerable populations while refraining from escalating lethal violence. Notes From now on used indistinctively to refer to local gangs. Ethics and Consent All state officials including law enforcement spoke on strict conditions of anonymity. Acknowledgements I thank the thorough feedback of anonymous reviewers and editors of this special issue. Funding Information This research was generously supported by Fulbright Colombia through a Fulbright — Colciencias grant — Competing Interests The author has no competing interests to declare. References Abello, A and Guarneros, V.

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Mar del Plata buying Ecstasy