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These datasets underpin the analysis presented in the agency's work. Most data may be viewed interactively on screen and downloaded in Excel format. All countries. Topics A-Z. The content in this section is aimed at anyone involved in planning, implementing or making decisions about health and social responses. Best practice. We have developed a systemic approach that brings together the human networks, processes and scientific tools necessary for collecting, analysing and reporting on the many aspects of the European drugs phenomenon. Explore our wide range of publications, videos and infographics on the drugs problem and how Europe is responding to it. All publications. More events. More news. We are your source of drug-related expertise in Europe. We prepare and share independent, scientifically validated knowledge, alerts and recommendations. About the EUDA. Key findings and threat assessment. Global context. Trafficking and supply. Criminal networks. Prices, purities and offences. Retail markets. Actions to address current threats and increase preparedness. However, this decline is registered from a relatively high baseline, as in the number of seizures reported in the EU was at its highest level recorded 31 The number of seizures remained largely stable until around 28 , gradually declining thereafter and reaching 18 in This decline in the number of seizures may be due to a number of factors, one of which is a deprioritisation of law enforcement actions against retail-level interdiction. In , there was a stable number of heroin seizures but a considerable drop in the quantities seized, reflecting a temporary reduction in trafficking and a reprioritisation of law enforcement activities during the COVID crisis. Despite the marked decline in the number of seizures between and , the quantities of heroin seized in the EU more than doubled in this period from 4. This indicates that large quantities of heroin are trafficked in individual shipments and reflects a reprioritisation of wholesale-level rather than retail-level interdiction. Over 9. Furthermore, a record quantity of The source data for this graphic is available in the source table on this page. This suggests that large quantities of the drug are still reaching consumer markets. Historically, the trafficking of heroin to the EU from Afghanistan and neighbouring countries — Iran and Pakistan in particular — has been concentrated along a few established routes. However, the intensity of use of particular routes has varied over time and the combinations of routes used by traffickers appears to be increasing. This is driven by a range of factors, such as geopolitical, social and economic conditions, including the level of perceived or actual risk of interdiction along the routes, the volume of migration flows, the state of the transportation infrastructure, the level of corruption vulnerability and market size. Four routes are commonly documented for heroin trafficking from Afghanistan to Europe see Figure Indicative heroin trafficking routes :. Since late , two major political and security changes have occurred that have implications for the production and trafficking of opiates to Europe. The collapse of the Afghan government and the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in August and the subsequent ban on opium cultivation announced in April may significantly influence the production of opiates in Afghanistan and, by extension, the availability of heroin on the EU market see Section Key developments in the opiate trade in Afghanistan. On this route, heroin usually enters the EU at land border crossing points in Bulgaria or Greece. This is an established corridor for the trafficking of heroin to the EU and of acetic anhydride in the opposite direction see Section Acetic anhydride: the key chemical used for the production of heroin. Preliminary data for , however, indicate a sharp drop to 7. A proportion of the heroin smuggled along the southern and central branches may be diverted for local consumption or temporarily stored in warehouses in the Western Balkans region, before being transported to the EU markets EMCDDA, a. As a gateway to the EU, Bulgaria is particularly important for this trafficking route. Until recently, law enforcement authorities have regularly reported sizeable amounts of heroin at border crossing points, particularly at the Kapitan Andreevo crossing National Customs Agency of the Republic of Bulgaria, a,b, a,b, b-d. In , the National Customs Agency in Bulgaria reported 10 seizures amounting to 1 kilograms. In addition to using the established land entry points to the EU, trafficking groups appear to be increasingly transporting heroin to Turkish ports on the Mediterranean Sea, where ferries and cargo vessels carry the consignments onward to EU ports in Croatia, Italy and Slovenia. The apparent reasons for the shift to trafficking via maritime transportation include a lower perceived risk and the increased cost-effectiveness of this modus operandi, particularly for large shipments. Exploiting this existing intramodal shipping infrastructure allows traffickers to smuggle larger quantities of heroin in single shipments than they could in the historical modus operandi of moving smaller consignments through concealment in vehicles on other land routes. This apparent recent shift in trafficking also increases the complexity of monitoring and disrupting illicit heroin flows to the EU. Over the past decade, the importance of the Southern route for the EU heroin market has grown. This can be seen in the large quantities of heroin departing from ports on the Iranian or Pakistani sides of the Makran Coast, such as Chabahar and Bandar Abbas Iran and Gwadar Pakistan. These heroin consignments are either transported by traditional sailing vessels dhows or, increasingly, concealed in maritime containers from commercial ports. Overall, a range of modi operandi and transhipment points are combined on the Southern route to smuggle heroin to Europe. The growing importance of the Southern route is driven by several factors. First, increased use of maritime containers allows more efficient transportation of large quantities of heroin. The main commercial maritime routes from east to west are exploited for these purposes. In addition, intensified trafficking along the Southern route may be due to the perception or reality of stricter border controls on the Balkan route. The Netherlands continues to be a hub for the consolidation and distribution of heroin for EU consumer markets, including for maritime heroin consignments trafficked along the Southern route see Section Heroin trafficking within the EU. Similar to other drugs, heroin shipments are stored in distribution and wholesale centres in the Netherlands before being broken down and smuggled to criminal networks that supply other EU Member States and the United Kingdom see Box Transhipment of heroin in containerised shipments to the United Kingdom. Heroin may be shipped to the EU using the various branches of the Southern route, all departing from Iran or Pakistan. The first branch of the Southern route appears to have seen increased activity since , facilitating containerised trafficking of large consignments of heroin to the EU. This can be seen in a number of large heroin seizures shipped in maritime containers, originating from ports in Iran and Pakistan and bound for the European market see Box Large-scale direct heroin shipments to European ports. While the ratio of consignments that are successfully delivered to those that are seized is unknown, this development presents a clear threat of increased access to heroin in Europe. Large shipments of heroin along the second branch of the Southern route have also been observed see Table Examples of large maritime heroin seizures in the EU, Based on the available information, the UAE in particular appears to have emerged as a hub for heroin transhipment to Europe, and possibly a storage point where the origin of the drugs may be obscured. Seizures indicate that heroin consignments trafficked from key source countries on one route are in some cases switched to another route at transhipment points. This provides greater flexibility for traffickers and allows them to exploit new opportunities. Heroin trafficked along the third branch of the Southern route departs from the Makran Coast, typically in dhows, and is unloaded in several countries along the east coast of Africa. From there, the drugs are transported overland to South Africa or to other countries in East or West Africa. However, it appears that heroin is also increasingly being transported in container ships, which, unlike the dhows, can sail directly from the Makran Coast to South Africa. In addition, some of the drugs trafficked along this route are destined for local consumption, owing to sustained demand for heroin and other opioids in some African countries Cousins, ; Harker et al. This established heroin trafficking route appears to be increasingly exploited for the co-trafficking of methamphetamine to global markets, including the EU GITOC, This may be due to the recent surge in methamphetamine production in Afghanistan see Methamphetamine module. Routes used for further transportation from the East African coast to other countries in Africa and to Europe are complex. Note: This graph is based on the frequency of reports and not on heroin seizure quantities. Given that the data are incomplete, this graph does not present a ranking of countries. There is also evidence of large quantities of heroin arriving in the EU from countries in Africa by sea. In May , 2. Other methods employed to bring heroin from Africa to the EU include postal and parcel services and the use of air passengers as drug couriers. Several large heroin seizures on this route in recent years confirm that it is used to smuggle large amounts of opiates from Iran to Europe via Armenia or Azerbaijan and Georgia Customs. A number of recent seizures in Azerbaijan have involved heroin trafficked in trucks with legal goods from Iran. Iranian authorities also routinely report seizures of heroin in liquid form near the borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan, some of which appear to have been intended for onward trafficking IRNA, This phenomenon warrants awareness, including in the EU, where heroin seizures in liquid form have not been reported. Heroin trafficked on this route appears to be destined mainly for consumer markets in Central Asia, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine Bobokhodzhiev, Significant heroin seizures have recently been reported by countries along the Northern route, such as kilograms seized by Kyrgyzstan in This suggests that criminal networks active on this route may be able to smuggle large quantities of heroin towards consumer markets in Russia and beyond Kadyrov, EU Member States rarely seize heroin trafficked via the Northern route. Nonetheless, a proportion of the heroin shipped on the Northern route may eventually enter the EU from Russia and through Poland and the Baltic countries, and from Ukraine to Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. Some heroin seized in Belarus, Romania and Ukraine in recent years was reported as having originated from Central Asia and being intended for Western European markets. The analysis shows that large heroin consignments arrive in the EU through various entry points and that the established trafficking routes are flexible and fluid, as are the methods of transportation and concealment. An example of this is the growing practice of combining trafficking routes, whereby criminal networks move heroin consignments from one means of transport to another at transhipment points see Box Key transhipment points for heroin trafficking. When heroin is trafficked by land, it is typically hidden in concealed compartments or among legal goods. While typically trafficked in powder form, traffickers also dissolve heroin in liquids to conceal it and minimise the risk of checks. In recent years, heroin trafficking by maritime routes appears to have increased see Section Southern route. Roll-on roll-off ferries and pleasure boats also appear to be used in some places, although this method is not well understood. One of the most frequently used methods for trafficking heroin by sea involves concealment in maritime containers and among legal goods through the use of fake labelling, documentation or packaging. Heroin is also trafficked by air, albeit in smaller quantities than in other modes of transport. While limited data are available on trafficking using private aircraft, heroin is regularly trafficked to Europe by couriers travelling on commercial flights from African countries see Box Heroin trafficked from Africa by air couriers. Another method employed to bring heroin into the EU is through mail consignments. The online trade relies heavily on post and parcel shipping, including through express courier services, and criminals take advantage of the large volume of parcels passing through mail distribution centres. As in the case of other drugs, criminals exploit the services of parcel delivery providers operating across the world to smuggle heroin. While the data available are limited, there is evidence of heroin trafficking through the postal system both within and to the EU from Africa and the Middle East see Box Heroin trafficked through mail consignments. Trafficking routes connect heroin production and consumer markets in the EU and may vary over time due to various factors. Importantly, criminal networks seek to maximise profits while minimising costs see Box Comparison of heroin markups on selected European wholesale markets. Based on the present analysis, three factors of particular importance emerge. First, globalisation has facilitated rapid connection and transportation between heroin production and consumer markets. Continuing international developments in transport infrastructure, such as the Chinese-led Belt and Road Initiative, courier services and containerised shipping, offer a range of new opportunities to traffickers to conceal heroin consignments while hampering the efforts of law enforcement. Ongoing developments in this area can influence changes in the relative preference for different routes. Second, changes in law enforcement activity and the availability and use of new sources of information on criminal activity, such as intercepting encrypted communications, may cause traffickers to adapt their modi operandi. Overall, law enforcement knowledge on heroin trafficking has improved considerably over recent years, with information being obtained from the lawful interception of encrypted communication platforms, such as Sky ECC. However, decryption and the translation and analysis of information present an ongoing challenge for law enforcement in the EU. It is also important to note that changes in law enforcement approaches and priorities may result in the discovery of trafficking routes and methods that have been in existence for some time rather than newly established routes and methods. Third, unexpected events, such as global crises, instability and armed conflicts, and significant political or economic changes, may affect drug trafficking. Criminal networks will strive to adapt to these events, both to overcome any difficulties they create and to exploit opportunities they present. For example, armed conflicts often lead to the displacement of populations and a breakdown of social structures, which can lead to vulnerable populations becoming more susceptible to exploitation for drug trafficking or use. Understanding how drug trafficking continuously adapts to global or regional crises can help to anticipate changes in trafficking patterns. Once smuggled into the EU, heroin is then distributed to consumer markets across Europe. Therefore, large quantities of heroin are likely to be trafficked to these countries to meet local demand. Consumer markets for heroin appear to remain stable, with only limited fluctuation in the number of users in the short term. However, there are several caveats that might suggest that recent changes in heroin use are not fully captured in current monitoring systems see Section The consumer market. The market for illicit synthetic opioids in the EU is supplied by both medicines intended for therapeutic purposes diverted from the legal market and a broad range of illicitly manufactured opioids. Synthetic opioids intended for therapeutic purposes enter the illicit drug supply chain in a number of ways. For example, they may be stolen or diverted from the legitimate supply chain including from manufacturers, wholesalers and pharmacies ; from healthcare systems from hospitals or through corrupt healthcare professionals or forged prescriptions ; or from licit use stolen directly from patients or when users sell or give away a proportion of their prescribed opioids. The illicit production of synthetic opioids in the EU remains uncommon see Section Synthetic opioid production in Europe: a marginal phenomenon. Generally, synthetic opioids are produced outside the EU and enter Europe through key logistics hubs. Typically, producers and traffickers of these substances ship small quantities anonymously through freight forwarders and postal or express courier services. Darknet markets, e-commerce and social media platforms are also exploited by sellers. Because of their potential presence in very small quantities, synthetic opioids may be difficult to detect using routine analytical methods and techniques currently employed by forensic laboratories. Another issue is the emergence of new synthetic opioids that are not controlled by international drug control agreements, as these may also pose particular difficulties in terms of detection see Box Detections and seizures of new synthetic opioids. This therefore remains an area requiring vigilance and some precautionary measures. Falsified or counterfeit opioid-containing medicines are a growing cause for concern as they are associated with high public health risks. Falsified medicines contain different quantities of the active substances than claimed, or different active substances entirely. Counterfeit medicines have the composition that is claimed but they infringe trademark rules European Medicines Agency, n. Overall, more information is needed on the diverse sources of these medicines. To gain a better understanding of this situation would require both forensic analysis of reported seizures to determine their source, and consistent reporting of the number of seizures and quantities seized. Based on reports to the EMCDDA from the Reitox national focal points, which do not necessarily contain results from forensic analyses, it has been possible to analyse seizures of some synthetic opioids in the EU. However, the number of reporting countries has varied from year to year, limiting the comparability of results see Table Seizures of selected synthetic opioids in the EU, The trafficking of fentanyl and its derivatives, such as carfentanil, is a particular concern for the EU. These extremely potent substances have high associated morbidity and mortality, posing serious and complex public health and law enforcement challenges. Information made available to Europol indicates that parcels containing fentanyl, some of which were connected to sales on darknet markets, have been sent to the EU from the United States. Although the problem of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids in the EU is much less severe than the opioid crisis in North America, the high potency of some of these substances means that small-scale suppliers can have a significant harmful impact. As with other synthetic opioids, fentanyl derivatives are produced mainly in clandestine laboratories outside the EU. Their distribution, primarily to the Baltic and Nordic countries, occurs in two strands. In one strand, fentanyl derivatives are distributed by criminal networks operating in EU destination countries, although there is an intelligence gap regarding their composition and nationalities. In the other strand, they are purchased directly by consumers and retail-level distributors via online platforms on the surface web and the darknet. On the Estonian market, fentanyl has replaced heroin as the main opioid consumed since An increase in the availability of fentanyl derivatives was also seen in neighbouring markets, especially Latvia, Lithuania and Sweden, until around , after which it declined. New fentanyl derivatives not covered by fentanyl controls were also detected in Europe in and New non-fentanyl synthetic opioids, including benzimidazole nitazene opioids, have also appeared on the drug market in the EU, posing concerns. Isotonitazene has been detected on the market in Latvia and Estonia, substituting for other opioids that are in short supply LSM. Ten EU Member States consistently provide seizure data on fentanyl derivatives. Only Austria reported an increase, from four seizures in to 11 in see Figure Number of seizures of fentanyl derivatives in 10 EU Member States, However, due to the low number of seizures, caution should be exercised in interpreting this increase. While the data give strong evidence of a decrease in the number of seizures of fentanyl derivatives, less data are available to draw firm conclusions regarding quantities seized see Table Seizures of selected synthetic opioids in the EU, Although the quantity reported by weight seized in was lower than in previous years, a wide range of fentanyl derivatives were reported to have been seized. This included carfentanil in combined seizures with fentanyl, and sometimes with methadone reported by Latvia in and Lithuania in , and remifentanil and alfentanil reported to have been seized in Slovakia in Furthermore, following a significant drop in the reported number of tablets seized, from 19 in five reporting countries to 91 in four reporting countries , the number rose to 5 in five reporting countries. These changes in the reported number of tablets seized were almost exclusively driven by Sweden. The overall decline in the number of seizures of fentanyl derivatives is probably driven by two key factors. These are the targeting, both offline and online, of fentanyl derivative distribution networks by law enforcement in affected EU Member States and controls placed on new psychoactive substances in China. Other European countries have systematically targeted criminal networks involved in the distribution of these substances. Despite the notable decrease in the number of seizures in the 10 EU Member States that consistently provided data between and , there is evidence of continued trafficking of fentanyl derivatives. For example, Estonian police reported the seizures of grams and grams of carfentanil in two operations near the Latvian border in April and May , respectively. The drugs were trafficked from Latvia by Latvian nationals, allegedly for distribution on the Estonian market see Photos Carfentanil seized in two operations in Estonia, April and May Efforts at national level have been boosted by the generic control measures on fentanyl derivatives imposed in in China, historically one of the main source countries for new psychoactive substances. This measure covers the illicit production, export and sale of all fentanyl derivatives. In , the INCB noted that this legislation had led to a sharp drop in the quantity of fentanyl-related substances of alleged Chinese origin being seized globally INCB, a. However, traffickers and producers appear to have adapted by using new methods, such as the use of non-scheduled chemicals and chemically masked fentanyl precursors, to circumvent the ban INCB, a. The long-term impact of these developments on Europe needs to be monitored. A number of other synthetic opioid medicines, including methadone, buprenorphine, tramadol and oxycodone, continue to be seized in the EU. In addition to illicit production both outside and inside the EU, medicinal products containing synthetic opioids are also diverted from legitimate supplies. Synthetic opioids are key active pharmaceutical ingredients in many medicines prescribed and sold in the EU and come in a variety of forms, including tablets, patches, sprays and lozenges. Fentanyl-containing medicines diverted from legal supply are most commonly seized as patches, sprays and lozenges see Box Operation Chimera: diversion and trafficking of fentanyl and other opioids in Romania. In some countries, such as France, the diversion of opioid medicines, such as methadone and buprenorphine, is reported to be the main source for their illicit drug markets. Some of the opioid medicines seized in the EU are intended for use outside the region. For example, seizures of tramadol reported in a number of EU countries appear to have been in transit to the Middle East and Africa. Despite high availability in the EU, tramadol currently has a low rate of misuse across European countries with the possible exception of France; see Section Overdose deaths related to heroin and other opioids Iwanicki et al. This is in contrast to data from some countries in Africa and Middle East, where no other prescription opioids are available and where rates of non-medical tramadol use have been rising UNODC, ; WHO, Of concern is the recent increase in oxycodone seizures in the EU. Developments have also been seen in the illicit buprenorphine trade. The misuse of buprenorphine in some EU Member States is considerable. For example, buprenorphine has been the main opioid misused in Finland for a number of years, with France being consistently reported as the source. It appears that relatively large buprenorphine shipments are moved from France via Germany, Sweden and Estonia to Finland. Following an increase in the number of seizures between and , a drop was noted in The decline was driven by fewer seizures reported by Austria, Finland, Greece and Sweden. However, this analysis is hampered by a lack of data from France and Germany see Figure Number of buprenorphine seizures in 11 EU Member States, Fourteen EU Member States consistently provide methadone seizure data. This large increase was driven mainly by seizures in Spain, where methadone seizures amounted to less than 10 kilograms per year between and , but increased to kilograms in The number of reported methadone tablets or capsules seized remained stable in this period, based on reporting from five EU Member States. Consult the list of references used in this module. Homepage Quick links Quick links. GO Results hosted on duckduckgo. Main navigation Data Open related submenu Data. Latest data Prevalence of drug use Drug-induced deaths Infectious diseases Problem drug use Treatment demand Seizures of drugs Price, purity and potency. Drug use and prison Drug law offences Health and social responses Drug checking Hospital emergencies data Syringe residues data Wastewater analysis Data catalogue. Selected topics Alternatives to coercive sanctions Cannabis Cannabis policy Cocaine Darknet markets Drug checking Drug consumption facilities Drug markets Drug-related deaths Drug-related infectious diseases. Recently published Findings from a scoping literature…. Penalties at a glance. Frequently asked questions FAQ : drug…. FAQ: therapeutic use of psychedelic…. Viral hepatitis elimination barometer…. EU Drug Market: New psychoactive…. EU Drug Market: Drivers and facilitators. Statistical Bulletin home. Quick links Search news Subscribe newsletter for recent news Subscribe to news releases. This make take up to a minute. Once the PDF is ready it will appear in this tab. Sorry, the download of the PDF failed. Table of contents Search within the book. Introduction Introduction Key findings and threat assessment Key findings and threat assessment Global context Global context Production Production Trafficking and supply Trafficking and supply Criminal networks Criminal networks Prices, purities and offences Prices, purities and offences Retail markets Retail markets Actions to address current threats and increase preparedness Actions to address current threats and increase preparedness. Search within the book Operator Any match. Exact term match only. Main subject. Target audience. Publication type. EU Drug Market: Heroin and other opioids — main page. On this page.

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Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit. The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands. The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits. The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law. The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing. The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities. The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market. The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market. The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach. The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance. Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership. Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups. The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities. A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime. The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities. Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs. Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime. Latvia's recent economic progress has made it an enticing destination for human traffickers, especially in cases of labour exploitation. Ukrainians who have been affected by the war are also at risk of falling victim to trafficking in Latvia. The absence of risk-prevention measures, and unregistered refugee centres, contribute to the vulnerability of potential victims. At the same time, Latvian nationals are subjected to forced labour in other parts of Europe — a practice often facilitated by organized crime groups. Women are trafficked domestically and elsewhere in Europe, where they are often recruited for brokered marriages. The use of modern technology in fraudulent marriages complicates the detection and prosecution of these crimes, leading to substantial financial gains for organized criminal groups. When it comes to human smuggling, Latvia is a transit area for individuals attempting to reach Scandinavian countries. Organized crime groups take advantage of Latvia's strategic location to facilitate smuggling between Asia and Europe. The smuggling of people primarily occurs from east to west; Riga has been identified as a central hub for this illicit activity. Local actors in border communities play a role in facilitating human smuggling, while online platforms are used for recruitment, logistics, exploitation and the advertisement of prostitution. Extortion and protection racketeering are not common in Latvia. Most occurrences are digital in nature, but more traditional forms of extortion are still perpetrated by some organized crime groups, mainly performed in the context of the privatization of state-owned companies. Criminal organizations engaged in extortion also tend to operate in related fields of car theft, fraud and counterfeiting. The arms trafficking market in Latvia is relatively small but it does pose a moderate threat. While organized criminal groups have limited involvement, individuals play a key role in the illegal movement of firearms. Due to its location, Latvia has the potential to be an attractive transit hub for transporting stolen weapons. There has been an increasing trend in trafficking reactivated firearms and modified gas pistols; many criminal offenses are associated with the illegal excavation and modification of these weapons. The country also faces challenges concerning legacy firearms, including the illicit retrieval of World War II-era weapons and the unlawful possession of historical arms from other wars and the Soviet occupation. Latvian authorities have discovered firearms of German or Soviet manufacture, which can be restored and adapted for firing. Residents, particularly in rural areas, store unregistered weapons and ammunition and sometimes engage in illegal hunting. There are also reports of trafficked firearms between Latvia and Lithuania, with an intra-regional route passing through the Netherlands. Smuggling between Latvia and Russia has also been reported. The sale of counterfeit goods causes millions of euros in losses in Latvia every year. In recent years, there has been an increasing trend in the online purchase of counterfeit goods, including counterfeit medicine, cosmetics, perfumes, toys and more. The consumption of counterfeit cigarettes is rapidly increasing as illegal manufacturers use more sophisticated methods. Organized criminal groups are increasingly involved in the illicit trade of excise goods: these activities, which encompass the illegal movement, sale and purchase of excisable goods such as cigarettes and tobacco products, are detected on a daily basis. The trade in illegal excise goods is driven by significant price disparities between neighbouring countries like Belarus, Ukraine and Russia, where prices are much lower than in Latvia and other EU countries. The smuggling of excise goods not only involves the influx of these products into the country, but also a number of illegal cigarette and alcohol production facilities. Goods are stored in various locations and distribution involves small quantities to minimize legal consequences. There is no established or well-developed market for flora crimes in Latvia. However, the country's economy relies heavily on timber, which is its primary natural resource and main export product. Even so, the risks associated with illegal logging are currently considered to be low. Fauna-related crimes are also not widespread, but they do exist; Latvia is a source and destination country in this regard. Incidents have been recorded involving the escape of exotic animals from private owners. There have also been individual incidents involving various fauna by-products, like a polar bear skin, different bird species, wolves, lynxes, a black panther and a monkey. Coral and crocodile products, along with other smuggled souvenirs and gift items, are commonly found in Latvia. The border with Russia facilitates the entry of illegal wildlife into the country for further distribution in the European market. The illicit market for non-renewable resources in Latvia is primarily focused on fuel smuggling and the illegal trade of amber. Like other Baltic countries, Latvia's fuel market attracts criminal groups due to disparities in fuel tax. Fuel smuggling from Russia into Latvia has become more challenging since the war in Ukraine. Even though there are active groups involved in non-renewable resource crimes in Latvia, the size of this shadow economy is smaller compared to other Baltic states. The illicit market for non-renewable resources consequently has limited influence on society and generates relatively low value. Latvia is primarily a transit country for the heroin trade, which is largely controlled by Russian organized crime groups. While overall heroin usage has been declining in the country, it remains one of the most popular drugs. Heroin enters the country through land routes from Russia and Belarus, with the highest risk of narcotics trafficking occurring at the Latvian-Russian border, and on ferry lines from Western Europe. Organized crime groups do not earn their main income from heroin sales within Latvia, but rather from smuggling heroin through the country. The heroin market has witnessed a shift towards carfentanil, a synthetic opioid that is cheaper and more potent. Cocaine has gained in popularity among local consumers. Latvia primarily serves as a transit point for trafficking: the drug is further transported to Russia and Scandinavian countries. Latvian and other eastern Baltic nationals have been involved as couriers in these operations. Former communist countries around the Baltic Sea have become important hubs for cocaine smuggling, with notable seizures in ports such as Riga in Latvia, Klaipeda in Lithuania, and Tallinn Airport in Estonia. Organized crime groups act as consignors and consignees in the cocaine trafficking trade, while transportation within Latvia is often carried out by legal logistics companies. The use of the internet, cryptocurrencies, postal services and courier services all facilitate the transfer and sale of cocaine: smuggling techniques including concealing drugs among legal goods in trucks displaying popular freight company logos. The cannabis trade in Latvia involves cultivation, distribution and transit. The country is a known hub for production: cannabis is grown both indoors and outside in uninhabited spaces. In recent years, the number of confiscated plants has decreased. The distribution of marijuana is concentrated in the Riga region; several marijuana farms have been discovered in the area. Cannabis use is prevalent among young adults, particularly males, and recent trends indicate an increase in marijuana use among youth. Despite the impact of COVID, general cultivation and self-cultivation for personal use have both increased. Herbal cannabis is imported from countries such as the Netherlands, the UK and Germany, while cannabis resin primarily originates from Morocco and enters Latvia through other EU states, often en route to Russia. The synthetic drug trade has become prevalent in Latvia, where synthetic opioids are busy replacing heroin in the illicit market. These synthetic drugs, some of which are extremely potent, present challenges for doctors treating overdoses. Drug distribution occurs through various means, including air and road transportation, as well as postal and courier services. Synthetic substances are mainly imported from European countries, but there is also domestic production within Latvia, carried out by organized criminal groups operating professional laboratories, or by chemistry enthusiasts setting up homemade labs. Domestic production of synthetic drugs has been on the rise, with instances of raw materials being transported to Russia and Belarus. Carfentanil, a synthetic alternative to heroin, is sold by drug dealers at the same price as heroin, making it more profitable. Cybercrimes have increased in Latvia due to technological advancements and the growing popularity of cryptocurrencies. Criminals are using increasingly sophisticated methods and creating complex schemes that make the detection and investigation of these crimes more challenging. The availability of viruses, malware and ransomware on online marketplaces and forums are key factors that facilitate cybercrimes. Since the onset of the war in Ukraine, there has been a rise in cyberattacks in Latvia. Nevertheless, these incidents remain a cause for concern. Financial crimes have undergone a digital transformation, making it more challenging to identify perpetrators and prove their guilt. The COVID pandemic saw a noteworthy surge in fraud cases, particularly on websites and in the media. Latvian nationals have increasingly fallen victim to telephone fraud and online scams, where fraudsters use deceptive tactics like courier company logos to mislead individuals into purchasing unseen goods. Various forms of financial fraud have been observed, including phishing, telephone fraud and attempts to acquire customer payment card data. Fraudsters often impersonate well-known companies and employ tactics such as creating fake internet banking websites. Additionally, victims are enticed into investing in dubious websites with promises of high returns. Foreign criminal activity in Latvia is noticeable but not pervasive. Lithuanian organized crime groups have a significant influence, particularly in vehicle-related offenses and property crimes such as theft. As COVID restrictions eased, the presence of foreign criminal groups became more apparent, especially in the cyber realm. Russian organized crime groups dominate the landscape when it comes to foreign mafia-style groups operating in Latvia. These groups engage in activities such as human trafficking, illicit tobacco trading, drug trafficking, theft and money laundering. Language and cultural barriers often limit their interaction with locals. Certain Russian groups have alleged connections to the Russian government, raising concerns about their potential influence over governments in Eastern and central Europe. Other foreign criminal groups, like the Azerbaijani mafia, are involved in activities such as human smuggling. Mafia-style groups are involved in various illicit activities in Latvia, including drug trafficking, theft, fraud, armed robbery and money laundering. The leaders of some of these groups are believed to have connections with Russian criminal groups and similar organizations in Europe. While there are numerous organized crime groups in Latvia, only a few operate internationally. Outlaw motorcycle gangs are active and engage in illegal activities at national, regional and transnational levels. However, the number of criminal networks has been decreasing in recent years, partly due to the impact of the COVID pandemic and the implementation of more effective regulations by the police. Drug trafficking remains a prominent source of income for Latvian organized crime groups. Leveraging its strategic geographical location next to Russia, Latvia serves as a significant transit point for the illicit transportation of narcotics from western countries to Russia. Private sector actors are mainly involved in financial crimes, particularly money laundering cases. These money mules are often students or individuals facing financial difficulties. Professional money launderers, well-versed in the financial system, devise more sophisticated schemes and seek ways to circumvent national laws. Crimes involving public officials are rare in Latvia. Evidence implicating public figures often customs officials in bribery or other forms of corruption is limited. Despite a low level of public trust in the government and parliament, some efforts have been made at the ministerial and political levels to combat organized crime. Although Latvia is relatively stable compared to other countries, the perception remains that internal security, including the fight against organized crime, is insufficient; and the allocation of financial resources to the internal affairs system, including the state police, is limited. Corruption is recognized as a notable problem affecting politics, the judiciary and the overall criminal justice system in Latvia. While the government has taken steps to combat corruption and money laundering, investigative and auditing bodies have faced challenges due to a lack of consolidated power within their areas of competence. Although Latvia has an extensive legislative framework for transparency and accountability, there is a lack of transparency in state-owned companies and public procurement processes. Access to information is considered poor, and there is no external administrative level of appeal for information requests. According to public opinion, the perception of corruption is highest among parliament members, government officials, municipality employees, banking sector employees and leaders of private companies. Latvia cooperates at an international level to combat organized crime, collaborating with various international organizations and participating in extradition, mutual legal assistance and other forms of legal cooperation. The effectiveness of Latvia's international cooperation is evident in successful operations such as the arrest of an international criminal group involved in the distribution of narcotics and psychotropic substances across multiple countries. To combat transnational organized crime, Latvia has implemented various national policies and laws. Offenses such as human trafficking, human smuggling, money laundering, arms crime, drug crimes, flora crimes, fauna crimes and illegal organ harvesting have been criminalized. Latvia has also adopted national strategies for the prevention of human smuggling and has established penalties for these crimes. While the country's national policies and laws are generally implemented well, there are still shortcomings in the implementation of the anti-corruption framework. The judicial system in Latvia has shown gradual improvement. While the system is generally considered efficient, challenges persist regarding judicial independence and public expectation. According to research, about half of the general public and companies in Latvia perceive the courts to be independent. Issues remain regarding the prosecution and adjudication of corruption cases, which are often lengthy and drawn-out. Efforts are underway to enhance lobbying transparency and strengthen conflict-of-interest regulations. There are some concerns about inconsistencies regarding the provision of legal aid, and incidents of interrogation without a lawyer present. Lengthy pre-trial detention periods and a backlog of criminal cases also hamper the justice system, particularly in human trafficking cases where lenient sentences are common. Law enforcement in Latvia is resilient at combating organized crime. Although a new plan for the prevention and combating of organized crime was approved, that plan has not yet been adopted. Insufficient financial resources hinder the safe implementation of laws. While the risk of corruption in Latvian law enforcement is low, there are concerns about how reliable law enforcement is at protecting citizens from crime and upholding the rule of law. Latvia is part of the Schengen Area and benefits from open borders with neighbouring countries such as Lithuania, Estonia and a maritime border with Sweden. However, the country faces challenges on its borders with Belarus and Russia. To address security concerns, Latvia has constructed a barbed-wire fence along its Russian border and plans to build a similar fence along the Belarusian border. The state of emergency has been extended in border areas due to an increase in illegal border crossings, particularly from Belarus. The eastern regions of Latvia, such as Latgale, have territorial integrity issues due to the influence of Russian and Belarusian media and socioeconomic disparities. Riga, the capital city, has been identified as a hub for smuggling and money laundering: efforts are being made to combat these activities. Money laundering remains a significant concern; Latvian banks are being exploited to legitimize illicit funds from abroad. In response to international pressure, Latvia has taken steps to improve its money laundering laws and enhance cooperation among local and international authorities. The establishment of a financial intelligence unit has been crucial in recovering assets and combating money laundering in general. Money laundering activities often involve funds connected to offshore accounts: popular locations include the Seychelles, the British Virgin Islands, Belize, Panama and Hong Kong. Despite some improvements, Riga is still seen as a hub for money laundering, and money laundering schemes continue to operate there. The country has made progress in areas such as financial sanctions, client assessment, regulation of financial institutions and international cooperation. Additionally, action plans have been approved for anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism. Latvia's economic regulatory environment faces challenges, particularly concerning organized crime and the shadow economy. The prevalence of the shadow economy seems to have increased during the pandemic. Concerns exist that certain groups and criminal interests may exploit EU funds. Entering the Latvian market can be expensive for businesses due to the country's small population, leading many companies to consider Latvia as part of the broader Baltic region or the EU market. Additional challenges include local labelling requirements, the potential for market saturation, and the difficulty of protecting business secrets in a small market. Despite these challenges, Latvia demonstrates the capacity to uphold land and property rights, as reflected in its economic regulatory framework. Latvia has both a legislative framework and concrete mechanisms to combat human trafficking and provide support to victims and witnesses of crime. The state-funded victim assistance programme offers comprehensive services, including medical, psychological and legal support, as well as housing and reintegration assistance. However, there are shortcomings, such as the lack of specialized legal aid and long-term psychological support and the lengthy duration and monitoring of assistance need to be addressed. The identification of victims remains a concern, particularly child victims and those involved in sexual exploitation within the legal prostitution industry. The Latvian government has implemented various methods to monitor and assess the effectiveness of their efforts in combating organized crime. Some methods include the monitoring of reports regarding illicit activities such as the movement of tobacco and petroleum products, and surveys to gauge public experience with combating crime. At municipal level, task forces and training programmes have been established to address human trafficking. The government has also undertaken awareness-raising initiatives, such as publishing books by trafficking survivors for use in schools. Specific measures to reduce demand within the commercial sex industry have not yet been reported. Non-governmental organizations NGOs play a major role in running government-funded victim assistance programmes in Latvia, providing various forms of support to victims of human trafficking. While the government has made efforts to improve civil society protection measures, the civic space in Latvia is still considered limited and advocacy by NGOs is sometimes seen as partisan. In terms of media freedom and pluralism, Latvia has passed legislation to enhance the independence of the media regulator and safeguard journalists' rights and access to information. However, journalists continue to face personal attacks online, often from politicians, indicating ongoing challenges in this area. Concerns have also been raised regarding restricted access to Russian media outlets due to propaganda concerns. Lagging media literacy, the spread of hate speech and increasing online attacks against journalists are growing concerns that need to be addressed. The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel. A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index. We're constantly working to improve the Index. By participating in this survey, you will be providing us with insights and suggestions that will help us make the Index an even better resource. This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State. The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State. Capital Riga. Income group High income. Population 1,, Geography type Coastal. GINI Index Criminal markets 4. An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type. Human trafficking 5. Human smuggling 4. Extortion and protection racketeering 3. Arms trafficking 3. Trade in counterfeit goods 6. Illicit trade in excisable goods 6. Flora crimes 1. Fauna crimes 2. Non-renewable resource crimes 2. Heroin trade 4. Cocaine trade 5. Cannabis trade 5. Synthetic drug trade 5. Cyber-dependent crimes 6. Financial crimes 6. Criminal actors 3. An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society. Mafia-style groups 4. Criminal networks 3. State-embedded actors 2. Foreign actors 4. Private sector actors 2. Political leadership and governance 7. Government transparency and accountability 6. International cooperation 8. National policies and laws 8. A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime. Judicial system and detention 8. Law enforcement 8. Territorial integrity 8. Anti-money laundering 6. Economic regulatory capacity 8. Victim and witness support 7. Prevention 7. Non-state actors 7. Analysis Download full profile english. People Latvia's recent economic progress has made it an enticing destination for human traffickers, especially in cases of labour exploitation. Trade The arms trafficking market in Latvia is relatively small but it does pose a moderate threat. Environment There is no established or well-developed market for flora crimes in Latvia. Drugs Latvia is primarily a transit country for the heroin trade, which is largely controlled by Russian organized crime groups. Cyber Crimes Cybercrimes have increased in Latvia due to technological advancements and the growing popularity of cryptocurrencies. Financial Crimes Financial crimes have undergone a digital transformation, making it more challenging to identify perpetrators and prove their guilt. Criminal Actors Foreign criminal activity in Latvia is noticeable but not pervasive. Leadership and governance Despite a low level of public trust in the government and parliament, some efforts have been made at the ministerial and political levels to combat organized crime. Criminal justice and security The judicial system in Latvia has shown gradual improvement. Economic and financial environment Money laundering remains a significant concern; Latvian banks are being exploited to legitimize illicit funds from abroad. Civil society and social protection Latvia has both a legislative framework and concrete mechanisms to combat human trafficking and provide support to victims and witnesses of crime. 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