Kirkuk buy blow

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Kirkuk buy blow

Content from the Brookings Doha Center is now archived. In September , after 14 years of impactful partnership, Brookings and the Brookings Doha Center announced that they were ending their affiliation. The Kurds may no longer control Kirkuk, but they will still be fundamental to any government formation process in Baghdad after the coming elections, says Ranj Alaaldin. This piece originally appeared on Foreign Affairs. It is an indictment of U. It contains as much as an estimated nine billion barrels of oil and hosts a series of strategic installations and facilities, including its oilfields, airport, and the important K-1 military base. The Kurds immediately moved into Kirkuk to fill the resulting security vacuum. Observers have been quick to declare that the loss of Kirkuk could set the KRG and, more generally, the Kurdish state-building project back by a decade, and so soon after the Kurdish independence referendum held three weeks ago. But this is not the end of the road for Kurdistan, and it is certainly not the first battle for Kirkuk and will likely not be the last. Fundamentally, it is Iraq that faces an existential crisis resulting from its weak or collapsed institutions, sectarian conflict, and the continued threat from jihadist groups. The United States has not condemned the Kirkuk offensive and, according to some reports, was even provided with advance notice of the offensive. Essentially, the stronger Abadi looked to the electorate, the greater his chances of winning forthcoming elections—or so goes the thinking in Washington. But that was always faulty logic. But doing so was dangerous for him. In large part, such efforts were aimed at preventing Abadi from projecting himself as an effective and unifying leader ahead of elections in April The creation of a U. But the alliance of unlikely bedfellows will be short-lived as the battle within the Shiite political class over the Iraqi state and its resources deepens in the coming months. In Iraq, power is diffuse, distributed among parties, militias, tribes, and clerics that have turned the Iraqi state and its ministries into patronage networks. Since the toppling of the Saddam regime, elections have been contested on the basis of ethnicity and sect, resulting in coalition governments and confessional power-sharing arrangements that have required grand bargaining between multiple ethno-sectarian factions. Although that system may allow for more inclusive governance, in the absence of national unity, it has also resulted in political deadlock. For the Kurds, such dysfunction enhances their bargaining position. Since , no government has been formed without Kurdish participation. In fact, Kurdistan was banking on this dynamic as it consolidated its position in places such as Kirkuk. The Kurds may no longer control Kirkuk, but they will still be fundamental to any government formation process in Baghdad after the coming elections. It may be that Baghdad closes the door to Kurdish participation in the governing coalition, but that would be disastrous for Iraq and resisted by both Arab Sunni and Shiitefactions in Baghdad, as well as by Turkey, the United States, and much of the Arab world, since they would fear that such a measure could ultimately favor the Iranian-backed elements of the political class while also putting the legitimacy of the Iraqi state in doubt. Regionally, Kurdistan will weather the storm because of the volatility in the Middle East and the battle between Iran and Turkey for hegemony. Iran and Turkey are united against the referendum and backed the operation in Kirkuk. In northern Iraq, Turkey and Iran already back rival armed groups that are wrestling for control of strategically significant, resource-rich territories that lie adjacent to Syria, where Iran and Turkey fight on opposite sides. Meanwhile, the KRG is an important conduit through which to counter and manage Kurdish groups based in Turkey and Iran, as it has been for decades. The latter has been afforded sanctuary by the KRG and has held back from engaging Iran in a full-scale conflict, thanks in large part to the efforts of the Iraqi Kurdish leadership. The intra-Kurdish web of personal and organizational ties has provided Turkey and Iran with nonviolent, cost-effective means through which to manage their internal Kurdish issues. A weakened KRG would undermine such efforts. Moreover, both could soon compete for stronger ties with the KRG to shift the regional balance of power in their own favor and protect themselves from whatever will follow the end of the military campaigns against ISIS in Syria and Iraq. At the time of writing, locals in Kirkuk and Khanaqin located in the disputed province of Diyala were resisting the PMF and Iraqi security forces, and they may yet force them out. Baghdad may soon realize the scale of the challenge it has taken on by exacerbating ethnic and sectarian tensions in a province that it had previously failed to govern and stabilize, let alone control. In other words, Baghdad is not yet in any position to celebrate. Indeed, it is not the Kurds who face an existential crisis. It is Iraq, which is divided among several centers of power, faces Arab Sunni discontent that may yet enable a resurgence of ISIS, and lacks the credibility and legitimacy it would need to solve any of these problems. The Kurds may have the last say. The clash over Kirkuk: Why the real crisis is in Baghdad—not Erbil. Sections Sections. Ranj Alaaldin. More On. Social protection, not just legal protection: Migrant laborers in the Gulf.