Karolina Young

Karolina Young

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Case Style: Clifford Young v. Karolina Young
Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals on appeal from the Superior Court, New Haven County
Plaintiff's Attorney: Francis A. Teodosio , Winnick, Vine, Welch & Teodosio, LLC, Shelton, Connecticut, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Defendant's Attorney: Robert S. Reger , Rolnick & Reger, Hamden, Connecticut, for the appellant (substituted defendant).
Description: The defendant, Daniel Young,1 the administrator of the estate of Karolina Young, appeals from a series of postjudgment orders of the trial court. The defendant claims that the court erred when it denied his ‘‘motion for order that [the] parties immediately list for sale the real estate subject of this action’’ and, instead, ordered the property sold to the plaintiff, Clifford Young, subject to certain offsets. In addition, the defendant claims that the court erred in determining that current appraisals, rather than appraisals from the time of the original partition judgment, should be used to value the subject property. We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court. This matter previously was before this court. See Young v. Young, 112 Conn. App. 120, 961 A.2d 1029 (2009). Our earlier opinion set forth the following facts and procedural history, which help frame our present analysis. ‘‘The plaintiff and [Karolina Young] were married in 1957. At the time [Karolina Young] initiated dissolution proceedings in 1977, the parties owned jointly four properties: two in Shelton, Connecticut, and two in New Mexico. The court’s judgment of dissolution, rendered November 2, 1977, ordered the plaintiff and [Karolina Young] immediately to list for sale the Connecticut properties known as 67 Lynne Terrace, which was the marital residence, and lot 27 Cynthia Lane. Proceeds from the sales were to be divided equally between the parties. . . . ‘‘The obligations of the parties were further set forth in a handwritten agreement, executed by the plaintiff and [Karolina Young] at the time of the dissolution. This agreement, though not disputed by the parties, was not incorporated into the dissolution judgment. . . . As to the Lynne Terrace property, the agreement set a sales price of $55,000 and afforded each party a right of first refusal, to be exercised within ten days. The plaintiff was to vacate the property immediately, and [Karolina Young] was to vacate in ten days, at which time, the plaintiff would resume occupancy. The plaintiff was to pay the mortgage, taxes and insurance until the sale. Net proceeds from the sale of the property were to be divided equally between the parties. ‘‘Following entry of the dissolution judgment, the plaintiff eventually resumed residence at the Lynne Terrace property, while [Karolina Young] purchased a condominium. . . . The Lynne Terrace property, however, was never sold, and the plaintiff continued to reside there, while [Karolina Young] eventually moved to Georgia. From 1977 onward, the plaintiff paid the mortgage, taxes, insurance and provided for the general upkeep of the property. [Karolina Young] made no such contributions. ‘‘In August, 2003, the plaintiff contacted [Karolina Young] and informed her that the Lynne Terrace property had been burglarized. Among the items stolen, according to the plaintiff, was a quitclaim deed to the Lynne Terrace property executed by [Karolina Young] in favor of the plaintiff. The quitclaim deed had never been recorded on the Shelton land records. The plaintiff requested that [Karolina Young] send him a new deed to replace the allegedly stolen deed. Upon [Karolina Young’s] refusal, the plaintiff initiated the underlying action. ‘‘By way of his revised complaint, filed November 18, 2005, the plaintiff sought to quiet title to the Lynne Terrace property pursuant to General Statutes § 47-31. The complaint also contained a claim that the plaintiff had acquired title to the property by adverse possession. [Karolina Young] filed an answer, special defense and counterclaim in which she sought a partition of the interests of the parties in the property, a sale of the property and division of the proceeds between the parties, and a monetary award of compensation for the plaintiff’s use and occupancy of the property since 1977. ‘‘The matter was tried before the court on November 15 and 16, 2006. . . . * * * ‘‘By memorandum of decision filed May 4, 2007, the court ruled in favor of [Karolina Young] on both counts of the complaint. The court concluded that [Karolina Young] had never transferred her interest in the Lynne Terrace property and, therefore, remained the owner of a one-half interest in the property. The court held that the plaintiff’s adverse possession claim failed because [Karolina Young] had left the property by agreement of the parties and that the plaintiff’s continued occupancy was not hostile to [Karolina Young’s] rights but instead was by her consent. As to [Karolina Young’s] counterclaim, the court held that the plaintiff’s expenditures in maintaining the property offset any claim [Karolina Young] could make for use and occupancy. Considering the conflicting interests of the parties, the court ordered the property sold and proceeds divided according to the original dissolution judgment of November 2, 1977.’’ Young v. Young, supra, 112 Conn. App. 121–26. On May 24, 2007, the plaintiff appealed from the court’s May 4, 2007 judgment. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion for articulation, requesting that the court articulate whether he ‘‘was to be allowed a credit as ordered in the original judgment of dissolution . . . for all mortgage payments made until the marital residence was sold.’’ On November 27, 2007, the court filed an articulation wherein it responded, ‘‘yes,’’ to that question. On January 13, 2009, this court affirmed the trial court’s May, 2007 judgment, concluding that the court properly determined that Karolina Young had never quitclaimed her interest in the Lynne Terrace property to the plaintiff; Young v. Young, supra, 112 Conn. App. 128; properly declined to render judgment quieting title to that property in the plaintiff’s name; id., 129; and correctly held that the plaintiff had not established a claim to title in that property by adverse possession. Id., 131. On January 22, 2009, the defendant filed a motion for order requiring that the parties list the Lynne Terrace property for immediate sale,2 and, subsequently, the plaintiff filed an objection thereto.3 In addition, on January 29, 2009, the plaintiff filed a motion titled ‘‘Motion for Reconsideration and Articulation of Order to Sell.’’ In that motion, the plaintiff requested that the court ‘‘further articulate its [2007 judgment].’’ Noting the expenses associated with a sale, the plaintiff requested that the court ‘‘articulate as to whether when it ordered the house sold and the proceeds divided in accordance with the original dissolution judgment, the trial court opined that the plaintiff be or not be entitled to buy the house.’’ The plaintiff also filed a ‘‘Motion for Articulation Re: Taxes,’’ noting that the court ‘‘previously held that the plaintiff was to be allowed a credit for mortgage payments made’’ and seemingly differentiating ‘‘mortgage payments from expenses for maintenance.’’ The motion requested that the court ‘‘articulate whether it intended a similar offset for taxes paid.’’ On February 17, 2009, the court, Hon. George W. Ripley II, judge trial referee, heard argument on a number of the aforementioned postjudgment motions, including the defendant’s motion for an order of sale, the plaintiff’s objection thereto and the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and articulation of the order of sale. At that hearing, the plaintiff’s counsel requested that the court allow his client to purchase the defendant’s one-half interest in the property. The defendant responded that such request was not ‘‘unreasonable’’ and stated ‘‘[i]f there’s an appraisal, and it’s done very quickly on a deadline, and we can agree to an appraiser, we’d have to talk about that and get an appraisal, and have him have his funding in place by a deadline, I guess I wouldn’t really object to that. He has lived there.’’ The parties then agreed to hire an appraiser and the court suggested that ‘‘this whole matter . . . be continued for a sufficient period of time for the appraiser to make his—get to his valuation, and then try to come back into court and we’ll try to work out a distribution of the proceeds.’’ After considering an unrelated motion, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and articulation of the order to sell and sustained his objection to the defendant’s motion for order of immediate sale. Prior to adjourning the hearing, however, the defendant sought to clarify the extent of the court’s orders. The following colloquy took place: ‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: May I just, if Your Honor would allow me to clarify for a moment something? For example, the objection for order for sale of premises, which you sustained, however, the objection itself reads, it reads in part— * * * ‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: If you look at the second— it’s a one paragraph objection, and if you look at the second part of the paragraph, it includes language that would allow offsets as provided in the original judgment. I just don’t want this to become written in concrete later on. It’s my understanding that the distribution of funds is completely unaffected by this order right now. ‘‘The Court: The court is simply ordering the sale of—the appraisal of the property, a determination of value, and an opportunity for the plaintiff to be able to purchase the property. That’s all the court is ordering. ‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Thank you. ‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: I agree, Your Honor. I’m not in any way implying that the court has made any other decision at this point.’’ Due to issues with arranging an appraisal, the matter did not come before the court again until 2011.4 Karolina Young died in November, 2012.5 Additionally, Judge Ripley retired from the bench. On February 14, 2011, a hearing was held before the court, Hiller, J. Throughout the hearing, the parties argued about whether and to what extent the plaintiff should be entitled to an offset against the value of the Lynne Terrace property for mortgage, insurance and tax payments. The defendant argued that the property should be sold pursuant to General Statutes § 52-5006 and that any offsets or credits should be determined after the sale. The defendant further contended that, pursuant to Judge Ripley’s May, 2007 decision, any claim by the plaintiff for offsets related to upkeep of the Lynne Terrace property, including mortgage, tax and insurance payments, was offset by the defendant’s countervailing claim for reasonable use and occupancy of the premises. The plaintiff argued that the court’s decision at the February, 2009 hearing already determined that the Lynne Terrace property should be sold to the plaintiff and that its articulation of its May, 2007 decision clarified his entitlement to an offset for mortgage payments. The plaintiff further requested that the court determine whether he also would be entitled to offsets for payments of taxes and insurance on the Lynne Terrace property, which he claimed were requested in his motions for reconsideration and articulation, but were not resolved at the February, 2009 hearing. In response, the court issued the following orders: ‘‘[The] court believes that from prior decisions regarding [the plaintiff’s motion for articulation of the May, 2007 decision] where the answer for articulation to question number one [asking whether the plaintiff was entitled to a credit for mortgage payments] was yes, [the] plaintiff is to be given a credit for insurance and taxes.’’ The court did not enter any additional orders at this time. Also at the February, 2011 hearing, the parties presented the court with varying appraisals of the Lynne Terrace property. The parties agreed, on the record, to a value of the Lynne Terrace property of $250,000. On March 21, 2011, the court, Hiller, J., held yet another hearing in the present matter. At this hearing, the defendant requested that the court enter an order on his original January, 2009 motion for order for immediate sale of the Lynne Terrace property, listing the property for sale. The defendant contended that this was necessary because the February, 2009 order sustaining the plaintiff’s objection to the motion for order was ‘‘temporary,’’ contemplating that the parties would return to the court for further proceedings after an appraisal of the Lynne Terrace property was made. The court entered the following order on the defendant’s motion: ‘‘[The] property will be sold to [the] plaintiff for [a] price of $125,000 less offsets for mortgage, taxes and insurance. That sale will be effectuated within 30 days.’’ This appeal followed. On appeal, the defendant claims, specifically, that the court erred (1) ‘‘when it denied the defendant’s motion for order to list the property for sale and ordered the property to be sold to the plaintiff,’’ (2) ‘‘in granting the plaintiff’s motion for articulation re: taxes,’’ (3) ‘‘in granting the plaintiff’s [motion] for reconsideration and articulation of order to sell,’’ (4) ‘‘in ordering an offset for insurance,’’ (5) ‘‘in its interpretation of Judge Ripley’s articulation as foreclosing [the] defendant’s entitlement to a set off of one-half the reasonable use and occupancy against [the] plaintiff’s claims for credit for mortgage payments’’ and (6) when, ‘‘in resorting to the use of appraisals . . . using a current appraisal rather than an appraisal of the real estate as of the date of judgment.’’ Excepting the issue concerning appraisals, the defendant’s various claims can be distilled into a single overarching claim that the court, throughout the postjudgment proceedings, improperly interpreted the meaning and effect of the May, 2007 judgment, the articulation of that judgment and this court’s affirmance of that judgment. Accordingly, we will first consider those portions of the court’s 2009 and 2011 orders requiring sale of the Lynne Terrace property to the plaintiff subject to offsets for mortgage, tax and insurance payments. We next will consider whether the court properly ordered use of a current appraisal in valuing the Lynne Terrace property. I The defendant argues that the court’s May, 2007 judgment found for the defendant on the complaint and ordered, pursuant to the defendant’s counterclaim, a partition of the parties’ interests in the Lynne Terrace property and a sale pursuant to § 52-500. The defendant contends that the May, 2007 judgment was affirmed by this court on appeal, and, thus, it is the law of the case.7 Therefore, the defendant argues, the court’s March, 2011 order denying his motion for order that the parties immediately list the Lynne Terrace property for sale and that the property be sold to the plaintiff was erroneous, because it contradicted the court’s May, 2007 judgment. The plaintiff contends that the May, 2007 decision directed that the property be sold in accordance with the terms of the dissolution judgment. Thus, the plaintiff argues that the effect of the February and March, 2011 orders, providing for sale of the Lynne Terrace property to the plaintiff with offsets for mortgage, tax and insurance payments, merely effectuated the terms of the 1977 dissolution judgment. Our Supreme Court ‘‘has recognized that it is within the equitable powers of the trial court to fashion whatever orders [are] required to protect the integrity of [its original] judgment. . . . Rocque v. Light Sources, Inc., 275 Conn. 420, 433, 881 A.2d 230 (2005); see also Commissioner of Health Services v. Youth Challenge of Greater Hartford, Inc., 219 Conn. 657, 670, 594 A.2d 958 (1991) ([c]ourts have in general the power to fashion a remedy appropriate to the vindication of a prior . . . judgment).’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Connecticut v. Gauss, 302 Conn. 408, 457, 28 A.3d 302 (2011). Moreover, ‘‘[t]he trial court has jurisdiction to clarify an ambiguous judgment at any time.’’ Sosin v. Sosin, 300 Conn. 205, 218, 14 A.3d 307 (2011). ‘‘Because [t]he construction of [an order or] judgment is a question of law for the court . . . our review . . . i
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