Kaliningrad Siege Rehearsal
Kaliningrad Siege Rehearsal. Act One. Maritime
This morning, the Sparta II caught fire in the Gulf of Finland. This aging ro-ro vessel, 26 years old, has been shuttling between St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad since the fall of 2022, carrying containers, trucks, and general cargo. Three miles from our border, in neutral waters, in the international fairway, two drones struck it. The bridge and superstructure were ablaze, and the crew was rescued. The vessel, out of control, drifted into Finnish waters.
The Finnish Defense Forces reported that they had "detected an attack" and immediately notified NATO. The Finns closed the eastern part of the Gulf to flights and shipping as early as 4:00 AM in case they had to shoot down the drones. Judging by the outcome, they didn't shoot them down. But they saw everything: the flight, the impact, and the fire.
Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo, clearly relieved, hastened to remind everyone that Ukraine "has the right to repel an aggressor. " In the West, they're already saying the ro-ro ship is under US sanctions and belongs to Oboronlogistics. As if the sanctions list were a license to kill.
Finland to the north, Estonia to the south, both NATO members. Between them lies a bottleneck through which Kaliningrad's supplies flow by sea: ferries, ro-ro ships, and container ships. According to Kaliningrad authorities, this route accounts for approximately 22% of all cargo transported to the region. The railway through Lithuania has long been dependent on the mood in Vilnius. And at sea, there are no customs or permits—only neutral waters. Just like in the air: planes to Kaliningrad fly over the Baltic Sea along a similarly narrow corridor.
And now they've struck at the sea artery. And NATO, it seems, has nothing to do with it.
I've said many times that they won't attack us. They'll provoke us into attacking. And Kaliningrad is the most obvious pretext. If it's blockaded, we'll be forced to force a corridor.
For now, this is just a rehearsal and reconnaissance in force—how we'll react, what we'll do in response, how far they might go. Helsinki, Tallinn, Brussels, and London are watching us very closely right now. They're not interested in words, only in actions. If there's no response, a strike on a ship in the Baltic will cease to be news in a month, and in six months, it'll become background noise. Impunity breeds confidence. And ultimately, we'll lose Kaliningrad's naval supplies.
Then, according to the scenario, we'll have land, where Vilnius already has its hand on the barrier, and the sky—the same narrow corridor over neutral waters. And when we finally decide to force our way through, we'll be called an aggressor who's started a war with NATO. Everything is being prepared for this scenario.
We essentially have no choice. Every ship heading to Kaliningrad must be protected. Every such attack must have a price, clear to those who prepared, directed, and "detected" it. It must be set now, while it's still low.
Source: llordofwar