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Facebook Twitter Print Email. There are many dangers lurking in the shadows just off the bustling streets of the Afghan capital Kabul, but none is more threatening than the drug abuse crisis that is ravaging the city, and the entire country. The conditions in the 1,bed facility are dire. Since the Taliban came to power in , international funding has dried up, leaving underpaid, poorly trained staff to deal with patients. Food is scarce, and what little is available provides scant nutrition. Residents of this facility, like those throughout the country, are expected to go through a day programme, where they are provided medical services and counselling, according to authorities, after which they undergo an assessment. This is done to determine whether they can return to their families. Conditions outside the prison-like walls of the treatment centre can be equally grim. This, she told UN News , allows decision-makers to do just that: take informed decisions. It also helps in developing an understanding of the scope of the drug problem in the region, particularly in Afghanistan, where in opium production represented nine to 14 per cent of the GDP and synthetic drug production is rising rapidly. The Centre receives data from various sources, including from governments, open sources, social media, academic research, statistics, and of course from counterparts on the ground in Afghanistan. However, the most instrumental tool the team uses in its work is the methodology built by UNODC over the past three decades to remotely identify crops. This allows UNODC to pinpoint with laser accuracy where opium poppy is being produced and cultivated. The signatures were developed over many years by comparing satellite imagery with what is known as ground truths. The experts at the UN agency were able to develop hundreds of signatures using this method which required surveyors to visit specific GPS locations to verify the initial analysis. Today, UNODC has the capability to identify various crops with an extremely high degree of accuracy, including wheat, melons, alfalfa, cotton, among others, and of course opium poppies. The signatures developed can even inform the team of the quality of the poppy fields and the expected yields. Protecting the data is vitally important to avoid catastrophic repercussions for farmers, particularly given the current political situation in Afghanistan. At the heart of the Information Centre are four resourceful Afghans with decades of on-the-ground experience. As part of the UNODC team in Afghanistan, they had conducted field visits and surveys until the agency decided to end these operations after the Taliban came to power. They are in regular contact with their colleagues who remain in the country and are providing key data, particularly on drug pricing. As field surveyors and analysts, the Afghan experts have played a pivotal in the creation of the crop signatures that help monitor opium cultivation. Our Afghan colleagues have been working on this for quite some time. Saddiqi a pseudonym is one of the staff members who deemed it necessary to protect his identity. He was able to get his family out of Afghanistan. While lamenting that several of his colleagues lost their lives in the line of duty while the surveys were being conducted, Mr. Esmati tells UN News. Drug abuse is rampant in the country. The Centre has therefore focused primarily on monitoring the production and cultivation of the extremely profitable plant-based substance used to produce heroin. After years of intensified opium production and cultivation, evidence shows that opium cultivation will decline sharply in due to a ban strictly enforced by the Taliban. And while the benefits of a possible significant reduction in illicit opium cultivation in Afghanistan this year would be global, it would be at the expense of many farmers with no alternative means to generate income. In that light, Ms. Mittal emphasized the importance of the Centre not only to the United Nations, the region and the international community, but also for the de facto authorities themselves. Mittal tells UN News. The Regional Representative stressed that it is still too early to know whether the results of the poppy ban will hold, as that would require analysis by the Information Centre over the coming years. But with the de facto authorities clamping down, there are indications that the market is changing. Synthetics and methamphetamines seizures are skyrocketing across the region, quadrupling in Tajikistan and increasing a whopping fold in Kyrgyzstan. There are some concerns that the production of methamphetamines could be driven by the ephedra plant which grows in the wild in this region of the world. It can come from cold medications or from bulk ephedrine. So, we are trying to understand how people or traffickers are producing methamphetamines. With its operations largely limited to basic humanitarian the Organization has been identifying innovative ways to carry out its development activities through implementing partners, without directly supporting the de facto authorities. UNODC works to build the capacity of farmers and vulnerable communities in Afghanistan through its implementing partners. The Information Centre is playing an important role in determining the need for alternative development programmes. For decades, opium has travelled from Afghanistan through Central Asia and the northern route to other markets, including Europe, even reaching Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Africa. Monitoring the drug trade in this region remains extremely important, as traffickers find new ways to smuggle their products and the rise of synthetic drugs presents a problem with potential global implications. Mittal underscored that profits are what drive illicit activities, and the biggest profits are made outside of the producing countries like Afghanistan. Flores said her team aims to monitor and analyse all the transnational threats in the region, including human trafficking — which is a growing risk with the migratory flow of people from Afghanistan, as well as the smuggling of firearms, illicit mining, wildlife trafficking, and falsified medicines as a growing trend in the region. As authorities tackle issues, the illicit markets can change. The prospects of a diplomatic solution between the international community and the de facto authorities in Afghanistan continue to be grim, as human rights issues remain a major sticking point. In the absence of true sustainable development in Afghanistan, illicit activities will likely persist as a plague in the country and in turn infect the world, making the work of the Information Centre instrumental in addressing these challenges. UN News. Audio and Subscription Audio Hub Subscribe. Play video. My children have no-one to feed them Residents of this facility, like those throughout the country, are expected to go through a day programme, where they are provided medical services and counselling, according to authorities, after which they undergo an assessment. There would seem to be no end in sight to their suffering. Opium poppy field in Kapisa Province, Afghanistan file. Former opium poppy farmer cultivating tomatoes in Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan. Homes line a hill on the edge of Kabul city.
Opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan plunged by an estimated 95 per cent following a drug ban imposed by the de facto authorities in April
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This piece was originally published by Small Wars Journal. Any errors and opinions are not those of the Department of Defense and are attributable solely to the author. Perhaps nowhere in the world has a country and the international community faced an illicit drug economy as deeply entrenched as in Afghanistan. In , opium poppy was cultivated on some , hectares in Afghanistan, one of the highest levels of cultivation in the country. But neither opium poppy cultivation nor heroin production was only a post phenomenon in Afghanistan; each was robust and steadily expanding during the Taliban era. In the post-Taliban era decreases in poppy cultivation and opiate production 3 that periodically took place over the previous two decades have largely been the result of the saturation of global and local drug markets, poppy crop disease, inauspicious weather such as drought, or temporary coercive measures in certain parts of Afghanistan that could not be sustained economically or politically, and rapidly broke down. Several structural factors determined the shape of the Afghan poppy economy during this period: insecurity, political power arrangements, and a lack of ready economic alternatives. After toppling the Ashraf Ghani government in August of this year, the Taliban has announced its intention 4 to rid Afghanistan of drugs. Taliban interlocutors stated that same objective in conversations with me in winter Yet implementing and maintaining any kind of poppy ban will be wickedly difficult for the Taliban. The Taliban regime could ram through temporary poppy bans, but it will struggle to maintain the bans even more than it had to three decades ago. In fact, any effort to maintain them could critically internally destabilize the Taliban. But unlike in the s, it is a new drug world out there—replete with synthetic opioids. In the s, the Taliban did not originally exploit the drug economy out of a need for financial profits, nor did it need the drug profits to expand its military capabilities and intensify the conflict. When the movement first emerged in Kandahar in and started expanding in southern Afghanistan, its financial resources and operational capacities, such as weapons, came from other sources—namely, external sponsors, such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, and from the successful exploitation of the illicit traffic with legal goods with undeclared legal goods under the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement ATTA. It was the need to consolidate its political power once its military expansion had taken place that drove the Taliban to embrace the drug economy. By October the Taliban fielded at least 25, men and was armed with tanks, armored vehicles, helicopters, and fighter aircraft. Under the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement, negotiated in the s, landlocked Afghanistan secured a deal from Islamabad that allowed goods to pass from the port of Karachi through Pakistan and over the border to Afghanistan duty-free. Yet, the subsequent U-turn scheme that emerged benefited the smugglers above all and worked like this: a buyer in Afghanistan issued a letter of credit to import some goods, say refrigerators, through the port of Karachi. The appliances were then driven through Pakistan into Afghanistan duty-free. The trucks unloaded their cargo on the Afghan side and returned to Pakistan empty. Meanwhile, the tax-free goods were carried back to Pakistan illegally, for example, by camels and donkeys. The goods, which sold for far less than the goods imported into Afghanistan legally, were then distributed via a trucking industry to a large extent controlled by Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The growing chaos of the early s and the increasingly higher and higher tolls and taxes charged by the local warlords severely threatened the interests of the transport mafia. On any route a transport could have been stopped as many as twenty times and forced to pay tolls, and occasionally the local warlords even robbed the transported goods. Although, purported to be long incensed with the excesses of the predatory warlords on the highways and by their arbitrary taxation and extortion, the Taliban provided protection to the smuggling enterprise. The Taliban set up a one-toll system for trucks entering Afghanistan at Spin Boldak, patrolled the highway against other warlords, and, crucially, declared that the Taliban would not allow goods bound for Afghanistan to be carried out by Pakistani trucks, thus satisfying a key demand of the Afghan transport mafia. Compared to the greedy and unpredictable local powerbrokers who had controlled and taxed the trafficking routes prior to the Taliban, the Taliban significantly lowered many transaction costs for the traffickers, preventing constant power shifts and bringing stability to the industry and helping to streamline it. When in late and early the Taliban moved out of Kandahar west to the Helmand Valley, the main poppy growing region in Afghanistan at the time, it banned the drug trade. The emergence of the Taliban on the political and military scene in the poppy growing regions halved the acreage allocated for poppy for the following growing season, a trend that farmers attributed to the fear of reprisals from the Taliban. But wheat prices were also booming that year and there was a significant carry-over of raw opium from the bumper opium harvest in By , the Taliban adopted a laissez-faire approach to drug cultivation, that progressively evolved into taxing the farmers as well as providing security for and taxing the traffickers. The consumption of opiates is forbidden, as is the manufacture of heroin, but the production and trading in opium is not forbidden. Thus, poppy cultivation continued increasing throughout the s. In , the total production of opium in Afghanistan consisted of metric tons. By , it had climbed to 1, metric tons in , by to 3, metric tons in and 4, in Not only was this livelihood fairly lucrative, it was frequently the only source of livelihood available to the population in an otherwise devastated economy. All economic activity, short of subsistence production and the microeconomic spillover from illicit activities came to a halt. Moreover, as in the case of illicit smuggling of legal goods, the illicit narcotics economy also allowed other forms of microeconomic activity to develop in areas where there was previously only limited agricultural production. Services, such as rest stops, teashops, and fuel stations sprung up in connection with the smuggling of narcotics. But unlike the smuggling of legal goods under ATTA, the illicit narcotics economy, being highly labor intensive, also provided a reliable, and frequently sole source of livelihood to the vast segments of the rural population. The Taliban have brought us security so we can grow our poppy in peace. I need to grow poppy crop to support my 14 family members. We cannot push the people to grow wheat as there would be an uprising against the Taliban if we forced them to stop poppy cultivation. So we grow opium and get our wheat from Pakistan. Yet in late , the Taliban did issue a ban on poppy cultivation that resulted in the largest reduction of opium poppy cultivation in a country in any single year. Cultivation fell from an estimated 82, hectares in to less than 8, in Unable to repay their debts, others were driven to borrow even further or abscond into Pakistan. While banning opium cultivation in , the Taliban did not ban or otherwise interfere with the sale and trafficking of opium and poppy during that period. In choosing to curb the production, the Taliban risked its domestic political capital, based crucially on its sponsorship of the poppy economy, in the hope of obtaining international legitimacy. Through the ban, the Taliban might have also sought to boost the price of opium and consolidate its control over the heroin trade. As cultivation exploded during the s, the farmgate prices for opium plummeted. Vanda Felbab-Brown Bruce Riedel. Moreover, the ban was not sustainable. By the summer of , with the ban still in place, some farmers started seeding poppy once again. In fact, in , after the United States toppled the Taliban regime and Hamid Karzai became the new president, farmers in southern Afghanistan complained that Karzai had promised to let them grow poppy in exchange for their help in toppling the Taliban regime, and that they now felt betrayed. In short, the popular myth that if the Taliban remained in power the drug economy would not have emerged and expanded in Afghanistan is incorrect. The political costs of destroying the sole source of livelihood for large segments of the population were too great even for the Taliban to ignore, and it became a willing sponsor of the drug economy. Poppy is deeply entwined in the socio-economic fabric of the country, and hence, inescapably, in its political arrangements and power relations. The Taliban has been profiting from the drug trade, as were various criminal gangs sometimes connected to the government , the Afghan police, various militias, tribal elites, and many ex-warlords-cum-government officials at various levels of the Afghan government. Sometimes the involved individuals and groups, including of those nominally on the opposite sides of the violent conflict, strongly overlap, and multiple intersections and connections exist among them. During the past 20 years, police units, often highly abusive and criminalized, taxed the drug economy. Local commanders and powerbrokers equally taxed it as well as owned or sponsored poppy fields. They also rented land to poppy farmers and provided microcredit for cultivation. Border officials, such as at Kabul airport or at the Spin Boldak or Zaranj crossings, let trafficking pass for a cut of drug profits. With its widespread territorial influence and reach throughout the country, the Taliban has taxed cultivation, processing, and smuggling of drugs; and units and members of the Taliban have been deeply involved in all these elements. In various years, the Taliban allowed its fighters to disengage from fighting in order to collect the drug harvest. The Taliban also collects taxes from independent drug traders and various criminal groups, while suppressing others. Over the past twenty years, the Taliban has been able to obtain tens to hundreds of millions of dollars from the Afghan poppy economy per year. In contrast, the attitude of the Islamic State in Khorasan toward the drug economy has been varied. Its western branch in Herat, now largely moribund, was deeply implicated in the drug trade. Its eastern branch in Nangarhar, surprisingly, sought to suppress opium poppy cultivation there, despite the highly negative economic impact on local populations. Unfortunately, many of the counternarcotics policies adopted during most of the s not only failed to reduce the size and scope of the illicit economy in Afghanistan, but also had serious counterproductive effects on the other objectives of peace, state-building, and economic reconstruction. The initial objective of the US intervention in was to degrade al Qaeda capabilities and institute a regime change in Afghanistan. Dealing with the illicit economy was not considered to be integral with the military objectives. Thus until , US counternarcotics policy in Afghanistan was essentially laissez-faire. The US military understood that it would not be able to obtain intelligence on the Taliban and al Qaeda if it tried to eradicate poppy. Meanwhile, it relied on key warlords who were often deeply involved in the drug economy since the s, not simply to provide intelligence on the Taliban, but also to carry out direct military operations against the Taliban and al Qaeda. By , increased interdiction was undertaken instead. Its goal was to target large traffickers and processing laboratories. Immediately, however, the effort was manipulated by local Afghan strongmen to eliminate drug competition and ethnic, tribal, and other political rivals. Instead of targeting top echelons of the drug economy, many of whom had considerable political clout, interdiction operations were largely conducted against small vulnerable traders who could neither sufficiently bribe nor adequately intimidate the interdiction teams and their supervisors within the Afghan government. The result was a significant vertical integration of the drug industry in Afghanistan. The other—again undesirable—effect of how interdiction was carried out was that it allowed the Taliban to integrate itself back into the Afghan drug trade. Having recouped in Pakistan, the Taliban was once again needed to provide protection to traffickers targeted by interdiction. Alarmed by the spread of opium poppy cultivation, some public officials in the United States in and also started calling for a strong poppy eradication campaign, including aerial spraying. Immediately, the scheme generated violent strikes and social protests against it. Another wave of eradication took place in when reduction in poppy cultivation was achieved. Most of the reduction was due to cultivation suppression in Nangarhar province where, through promises of alternative development and threats of imprisonment, production was slashed by 90 percent. However, alternative livelihoods never materialized for many. The Cash-for-Work programs reached only a small percentage of the population, mainly those living close to cities. The overall pauperization of the population there was devastating. In Pakistan, the refugees frequently have ended up in the radical Deobandi madrasas and have begun refilling the ranks of the Taliban. Apart from incorporating the displaced farmers into their ranks, the Taliban also began to protect the opium fields of the farmers, in addition to protecting the drug traffic. In fact, the antagonized poppy farmers came to constitute a strong and key base of support for the Taliban, denying intelligence to ISAF and providing it to the Taliban. In a courageous break with a previous counterproductive policy, the US administration of President Barack Obama wisely decided in to scale back poppy eradication in Afghanistan, but it struggled to implement its new strategy effectively. Rural development policies similarly failed to address the structural drivers of poppy cultivation and many were not sustainable. Indeed, no supply side suppression measures—whether eradication, interdiction, or alternative livelihoods—have ever been effective and lasting anywhere in the world in the context of an on-going war. Peace and security and extensive government presence are inescapable preconditions for successful supply reduction measures. Under conditions of intense and growing insecurity, demand reduction measures in Afghanistan, such as treatment and prevention, have for years been the most promising and highly beneficial venue for drug policy interventions. Yet they were never adequately funded or prioritized either by international donors or the Afghan government. Delivering on its stated promise to rid Afghanistan of poppy will be extremely difficult for the Taliban. The Taliban cannot simply double its poppy economy—the global market being already saturated with opioids, including synthetic ones. Maintaining any such ban would require extensive and lasting repression. Beyond immiserating already desperately poor people hit by COVID, drought, and large economic contractions in a country where 90 percent of people live in poverty and at least 12 million in condition of malnutrition, such a ban would also eliminate income and employment for its middle-layer commanders and rank-and-file fighters. But the challenge of maintaining cohesiveness across its many different groups and factions having varied ideological intensity and materials interests is very different in war than it is now that the Taliban is in power. The various factions have highly disparate views about how the new regime should rule across just about all dimensions of governance: from inclusiveness, to dealing with foreign fighters, to the economy, to external relations. Many of the middle-level battlefield commanders—younger, more plugged into global jihadi networks, and without the same personal experience of the Taliban mismanaging its s rule—are more hardline than some older top Taliban leaders and shadow governors. To survive as a regime, the Taliban will not only need to bridge and manage their different views on ruling but it will also have to assure that key commanders and their rank-and-file soldiers retain enough income not to be tempted to defect. A poppy ban would significantly constrain the pool of resources to keep the various Taliban elements happy. It yet remains to be seen whether the Taliban top or local leadership will get greedy and renege on those promises, seeking instead to displace non-Taliban political and criminal structures from the drug trade and other local economies. A Taliban move to exclude others from local rents would be a replay of the behavior of anti-Taliban warlords after , but it would once again generate new sources of frictions amidst a tanking Afghan economy and potential bases of armed opposition. Even without a ban, the Taliban will struggle to find jobs for the many now unemployed soldiers of the Afghan security forces whom the United States paid. Even if half of the nominal force were ghost soldiers or are dead, and say only , soldiers actually fought, they are now a loose force without income for themselves and their families. They melted before the Taliban, but in time may resort to banditry or be tempted to join old or new militias, even if only to get economic rents. Those interests trump for those countries any economic opportunities Afghanistan offers. And with the exception of China and the Gulf countries, their aid pockets are shallow. What those complexities likely means is that the Taliban will likely repeat some of the script of its s policy playbook. Until then, the Taliban will likely argue it cannot starve the Afghan people by implementing a ban. And if and when the Taliban decides to risk the political—and potentially armed—backlash to enforcing a ban, it will struggle to sustain it. Even if the Taliban were able to maintain adequate security, and international donors did agree to deliver alternative livelihoods aid, it would take decades of extremely auspicious policies and circumstances for rural development to effectively compensate for poppy suppression. Moreover, unlike in Myanmar where the various ethno-nationalist groups compensated income losses due to poppy eradication by expanding methamphetamine 55 production, the Taliban cannot easily do so. The existing meth production 56 in Afghanistan is nowhere as established as the one in Myanmar which dominates East Asia and Australian markets, while Europe is supplied from United States out of robust production in Mexico. The only places where a market for Afghan meth could expand significantly are Africa and the Middle East where meth consumption is still relatively small. But a lot of other drugs, such as tramadol and captagon, dominate in those areas. Moreover, if meth use did start taking off there Chinese and Myanmar-based meth producers could also seek to expand their operations there and thus compete with either meth—or heroin—produced in Afghanistan. And the 21 st drug century is fundamentally different from the s: it abounds with cheap and potent synthetic opioids. Thus, even after it rescinded a ban, it may not be able to recover its financial losses or restore employment to oppressed and impoverished Afghans, restive militias and powerbrokers, and its own disaffected factions. Vanda Felbab-Brown, Scott R. Anderson, Doyle Hodges. Foreign Policy. Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors. Pipe dreams: The Taliban and drugs from the s into its new regime. Sections Sections. Sign Up. Commentary Pipe dreams: The Taliban and drugs from the s into its new regime. Vanda Felbab-Brown. Related Books Aspiration and Ambivalence. Anderson, Doyle Hodges September 3, Will the Taliban regime survive? Afghanistan Will the Taliban regime survive? Vanda Felbab-Brown August 31, Why the Taliban won, and what Washington can do about it now. New Haven: Yale University Press: , p. Balfour at note 6. Michael Griffin, Reaping the Whirlwind. London: Pluto Press: , p. Ibid, p. Geopolitical Drug Dispatch, No. Rashid, Taliban at Note 7, p. Quoted in Griffin at Note 10, p. December ; and Barnett R. The peasants growing poppy make only very small profits from the drug industry, compared to the traffickers and those who profit from the drug industry higher up the chain. A case study of the opium economy in North East Afghanistan. Quoted in Rashid, Taliban at Note 7, p. May Kenneth J. January , p. Caryl at Note 25, p. Indira R. Experience in Afghanistan. Weighs Role in Heroin War in Afghanistan. See John F. See Pain, Op. Opium Trading Systems at Note See David Mansfield, Pariah or Poverty? For details, see, Op. Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up at Note 2, pp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, London School of Economics and Political Science. Taliban vow to ban heroin, but can they survive without it? Vanda Felbab-Brown, Jonathan P. More On. The rising threat of synthetic opioids in Europe. US-Mexico relations and the fight against fentanyl trafficking.
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There are close to 1, drug addicts sheltering under this bridge in a western neighbourhood of the Afghan capital. Groups bunch together to.
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The Taliban are to heroin and meth what the Sinaloa cartel is to cocaine. Southeast Asia still makes a bit, but otherwise, Afghanistan has a.
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