Interview by Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov to RIA Novosti news agency

How do you assess the results of the extraordinary session of the IAEA Board of Governors convened at the initiative of Ukraine?

Indeed, on December 12, Ukraine initiated an extraordinary session of the IAEA Board of Governors on the topic: «Implications of Unstable Energy Infrastructure Critical to Safety and Security of NPPs». We assess the results of this event as unequivocally negative. This is not the first time that the Ukrainian side has acted in Vienna-based international organizations contrary to their mandates, rules and established practices, putting at the forefront not the effective functioning of international structures, but their narrow, purely national interests. Following the event, the resolution proposed by Kiev was approved. The majority of votes in the Board of Governors belongs to Western countries and their supporters. They ensured the adoption of the resolution by 22 votes «in favour». Russia and China voted «against», and 10 countries of the Global South refused to support the resolution by abstaining from voting.

What goals, in your opinion, did the Ukrainian side pursue by initiating this meeting?

It is quite obvious that the holding of an extraordinary session was aimed at putting pressure on us in connection with Russian strikes on the Ukrainian energy infrastructure, which largely serves the needs of the armed forces and the military-industrial complex of Ukraine.

What arguments did the Russian delegation make in response to the accusations? Is there understanding and support for the position of the Russian Federation among the Board members?

We have subjected the Ukrainian draft resolution to reasoned criticism. There are two aspects here. The first is that, contrary to the assertions of Kiev and its Western patrons, external energy supply at nuclear power plants has only some, but far from decisive significance in terms of ensuring nuclear safety. The nuclear safety standards developed by the IAEA either do not mention external energy supply at all or assign it a clearly secondary role. I will give a very illustrative example. At one time, the IAEA, together with relevant experts from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, developed an International Nuclear Event Scale. It contains a classification of malfunctions at nuclear power plants from the first to the seventh level of danger, depending on how significant the negative consequences may be in the event of a particular incident. So, in accordance with this scale, the cessation of external energy supply even for five days is assessed as a zero threat level. That is, the line promoted at the session by Ukraine and the Westerners was based on exaggerated risk assessments and was of a clearly political nature.

The second aspect is related to the fact that the IAEA deals with nuclear energy, not electrical energy. In its resolution, Ukraine imposed on the IAEA Secretariat functions that are not characteristic of it, related to the ongoing assessment of the scale of damage caused to the energy infrastructure of Ukraine, including substations. All this goes beyond the IAEA Statute and can be qualified as legal nihilism and abuse of authority of the Board of Governors.

It seems that our arguments played an undoubted role in the fact that 12 out of 35 members of the Board, that is, more than a third, refused to support the resolution. As for those who voted «in favour», during a fairly lengthy discussion they were unable to present any convincing counterarguments to the theses we voiced.

Recently, a drone from the Ukrainian Armed Forces struck an IAEA vehicle involved in the rotation. What could this attack indicate? What interests does the Ukrainian side pursue?

Before each rotation of IAEA personnel at the Zaporozhskaya NPP, the Agency Secretariat requests security guarantees from the Russian and Ukrainian sides, as well as consent to establish a «silence regime» on the day when a new shift of IAEA specialists arrives at the plant, and those who have already served their term at the NPP set off on their return journey. The drone strike on the IAEA vehicle on December 10 was a gross violation of the obligations assumed by Kiev. Fortunately, no one was hurt, although the vehicle was seriously damaged. Almost immediately after this happened, Ukrainian propaganda at all levels made an unsubstantiated claim that the strike was allegedly carried out by the Russian side. Apparently, they already had prepared statements, including in English. Meanwhile, the employees traveling in this vehicle reported that the strike on the rear of the vehicle was carried out from the side where the Ukrainian Armed Forces are located. What goals and interests the Ukrainian side pursued can only be guessed. There is reason to assume that the goal was to create an even more unhealthy atmosphere at the extraordinary session of the Board of Governors, which was already scheduled to be held two days after the rotation. If so, then these calculations did not justify themselves. No one made any claims against us. Almost all the speakers, without, of course, naming Ukraine by name, spoke about the absolute inadmissibility of actions that threaten the lives and health of international personnel.

At the extraordinary session of the IAEA Board of Governors, you called for changing the rotation route of the Agency's experts after the attack by the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the IAEA vehicle. What might the new route look like?

You can get to the Zaporozhskaya NPP either through Ukrainian and then through Russian territory, as is happening now, or only through Russian territory. If the development of events shows that Kiev has taken a course to create security threats when IAEA employees move along the current route, then, apparently, we will have to think about alternative options.

How is the situation at the Zaporozhskaya NPP developing from a safety point of view? How do you assess the role of the IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi in the safety situation at the NPP?

«Rosenergoatom» and the staff of the Zaporozhskaya NPP are making every effort to ensure the safety of this facility. The situation is complicated by the fact that the Ukrainian side continues to strike the industrial zone adjacent to the plant, as well as the city of nuclear workers Energodar. In addition, the Ukrainian side is conducting a campaign of psychological terror against Zaporozhskaya NPP employees through social networks. Threats of possible reprisals against them are spread on various open information resources. On October 4, Ukraine committed a terrorist act, blowing up the car of the head of the Zaporozhskaya NPP Pass Office Andrey Korotky. He died from injuries. So the situation remains difficult. As for the role of the IAEA Director General, he takes the safety situation at the Zaporozhskaya NPP very seriously, taking into account, inter alia, the fact that for the first time in world practice a nuclear power plant is in a combat zone. At the same time, we have reasonable complaints. The reports on ZNPP, at the instigation of the Agency Secretariat, are very reluctant to talk about the achievements of the ZNPP staff, while some technical problems that any nuclear power plant faces are presented in an exaggerated form. The Director General avoids in every possible way publicly pointing out the responsibility of the Ukrainian side for creating security threats. We point out these circumstances when discussing these reports at sessions of the IAEA Board of Governors.

What is the security situation at the Kurskaya NPP today? Is there a need for Rafael Grossi to visit this facility again?

During the three autumn months from September to November, Ukrainian aircraft-type UAVs and ballistic missiles were detected and destroyed at a distance of 5 to 10 kilometers from the Kurskaya NPP. It happened that in one day, the Russian Armed Forces neutralized more than 30 such targets. At the same time, there was no damage to the plant itself. We do not see any need for Rafael Grossi to visit this facility again.

When is Grossi's next visit to Russia and the Zaporozhskaya NPP planned?

The Director General has already announced in the public space his intention to visit Kiev, Zaporozhskaya NPP and Moscow at the beginning of next year. This issue is currently being worked out.

Do you see any progress in the dialogue between Iran and the IAEA after the recent consultations? Is there an understanding of when the next meeting will be? Does it make sense to hold it before Donald Trump takes office as President of the USA? What does Iran's increase in production of uranium enriched to 60% mean? Is there any reason to worry in this regard?

It would be wrong to say that there is no progress in the dialogue between Iran and the IAEA, although the movement is limited and constantly faces certain obstacles. An important moment in recent times was the visit of the IAEA Director General to Iran in mid-November, during which Rafael Grossi met with the leadership of Iran and visited a number of nuclear facilities, including those outside the framework of the agreement between Iran and the IAEA on the application of safeguards. This trip made it possible to establish contact with the new government of the country, as well as to reach generally important agreements, which, among other things, assumed that Iran would not increase the volumes of uranium enriched to 60%, the growth of which is of particular concern to Western countries. However, these same Western countries, in particular the United States, Great Britain, Germany and France, instead of supporting these understandings and creating a favorable atmosphere for their implementation, took a destructive path, initiating another anti-Iranian resolution at the session of the IAEA Board of Governors in November, which was adopted by the Western majority in the Board. Naturally, in such political conditions, Iran not only failed to fulfill the agreements with the Director General, but also increased the rate of production of 60% of uranium.

As for concerns in this context, the very fact of producing such material does not violate Iran's obligations under the NPT and the IAEA Safeguards Agreement. At the same time, it is important that Tehran agreed to agree on additional enhanced verification measures by the Agency at the relevant facilities. The ill-considered and short-sighted policies of the European participants in the JCPOA and the United States, which are steadily leading to another round of escalation, are causing concern. Meanwhile, we expect that contacts between Iran and the Agency, both at the political and technical levels, will continue regardless of the provocative steps of individual countries. For our part, we are working to create favorable conditions for a normal, professional dialogue between the IAEA and Tehran.