Incest Taboo 2

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Question: What factors undermined American/South Vietnamese intelligence gathering in Vietnam?
Answer: American intelligence played an important role in the course of the Vietnam War. The American and South Vietnamese coalition attempted to aim its goals of victory over the North Vietnamese communists with the assistance of covert intelligence and counter intelligence operations. Through their concerted efforts, they were able to win victories by developing a “highly evolved and sophisticated system for developing knowledge of an adversary’s secrets” (Prados, pg. 137). By combining the intimate cultural and geographical knowledge of the South Vietnamese with the highly evolved technology and intelligence networks of the U.S., allied ground troops were able to penetrate North Vietnamese strong-holds with superior man and airpower.
           Unfortunately, the type of war they were fighting became more complex than they originally assumed. “At times the conflict was purely guerilla war; at times it became conventional warfare” (Prados, ph. 138). This means that the level of operations that had been originally developed may have fallen victim to circumstantial situations. According to Prados, “an ebb and flow of success and failures, with Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces in some locales [became] driven from conventional warfare back to guerrilla existence…[causing] intelligence to vary with the type and scale of warfare [creating] huge headaches [by the] changing in time and by place” (pg.138).
           American forces were accustomed to fighting in a capacity where adversarial attacks and troop movements were based on the tracking of units and their intentions. During the Vietnam conflict, however, “political and psychological initiatives are of primary importance [as opposed to] raw military strength” (Prados, pg. 138). This means, obstacles of engagement were variant and ambiguous; the element of surprise, insurgency, U.S. and foreign domestic relations, and political arenas contributed to the compromise of tactical success on the ground. Many U.S. personnel found themselves unaware or bewildered by the irregularity of enemy movements. Causality, in retrospect, could have been attributed to the lack of accuracy in intelligence reporting, rendering intelligence application to little avail.
           In some instances, intelligence reports inaccurately estimated North Vietnamese troop concentration. In August 1965, Lieutenant Colonel Harold G. Moore led 450 American troops into the Chu Pong Mountain during the battle of Ia Drang based on an intelligence report that estimated enemy resistance at 200 men. To their disbelief, a captive NVA soldier made an astonishing revelation that 3 battalions, equaling 1,600 NVA soldiers, were waiting for them instead. At the end of the day, success was based on the amount of casualties; 200 American losses to 1000 NVA losses. Although American ground troops won the day, how many American casualties could have been prevented with a more efficient stream of intelligence? The question is not who is solely to blame for the over-all failure in Vietnam, but where the breakdown of accurate intelligence reporting contributed to multiple failures? Is it possible for a government to advance the efficiency of intelligence reporting in the wrong way? If so, where did networks, based on that system, undermine one another and how did it play to the enemy’s advantage?
           In order to analyze the system, an examination of all of its parts must be established. U.S. intelligence agencies took advantage of a variety of technologies. One such technology was provided by long range optical surveillance systems such as satellites and high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft. The Skunk Works U-2 “Dragon Lady” and its replacement the A-12 and the SR-71 “Blackbird” provided high magnification photos of ground level enemy activity. Once their missions were accomplished, information trickled down through agencies that could provide “a wealth of raw data and analytical capability” (Prados, pg. 139). The National Security Agency (NSA), Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Army G-2, and the Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV), were all held responsible for the viable and accurate intelligence for U.S. commanders to use as guidelines for troop deployment.
            Unfortunately, “the highly technical collection capabilities of the Americans and South Vietnamese had little capacity to gain information about guerrilla activities in the villages” (Prados, pg. 139). This caused U.S. ground forces to contend with a highly operable enemy entrenchment within South and North Vietnamese villages that furnished the enemy with both goods and services while coercively safe-guarding their activity. According to Prados, “strategic hamlets were compromised because the Viet Cong infrastructure moved into new villages along with the innocent peasants” (pg.143). This means, the U.S. underrated the enemy’s ability to hide under the camouflage of vast jungle landscapes and its inhabitants.
           In addition, the counting and locating of “guns, tanks, and planes [only contributed to American success if the enemy entered into a] stage of conventional warfare” (Prados, pg. 139), otherwise, guerilla tactics and insurgency drastically reduced the United States’ ability to rely on things that could be “measured or counted” (Prados pg.139). In short, the enemy’s home field advantage ensured their security by otherwise fooling U.S. strategies. While the U.S. relied on their technical capabilities to acquire concrete evidence of the enemy’s movements, the North engaged the U.S. with subtle methods such as using aspects of their terrain to their advantage.
           Secondly, intelligence compromises, during the Tet Offensive of 1968, came to light due to the lack of information provided by the U.S.’s Vietnamese counterparts. In response to this blunder, Washington began to “develop an insatiable demand for ‘the latest’ on Vietnam” (Prados pg 144) and subsequently valued its agency service operators “by the number and quality of their cables from the field” (Prados pg. 145). But the competitive pressure for reporting compromised the true integrity of reports because agency operators began to “break down their reports so as to generate more cables from a given amount of information” (Prados pg. 145). Consequently, competition undermined the scope and accuracy of reports which could have contributed to a communication breakdown that may have transferred to a field commander’s disadvantage.
           Lastly, there were simply too many agencies with cross-over jurisdiction for U.S. intelligence operators to contend with. A massive breakdown in organization and jurisdiction happened on a bureaucratic level as intelligence networks would seek to undermine the operations of others. For example, “the Phoenix program was itself aimed at neutralizing the NLF (Viet Cong) hierarchy, which meant the CIA’s agents were targets of Phoenix activities like everyone else” (Prados pg. 149). This means Phoenix operatives may have seized CIA operatives within the NLF by mistake. Even though “twice-weekly coordination meetings where all agencies were to report what they were up to, so that things like Phoenix neutralization of active agents could be prevented” (Prados pg. 149) the occurrence still may have compromised the integrity of agent networks working in deep cover. On the other hand, “the CIA had priority on recruitments, which meant that as Phoenix advisors recruited agents of their own, when the CIA heard of them it had free rein to take over the agents it developed. [The CIA would then use these reports from their twice-weekly meetings] to identify agents it could take over” (Prados pg. 149). Consequently, this created an incentive for other agencies to avoid reporting their best intelligence to prevent their agents from being taken away by the CIA” (Prados pg. 149). 
           In summary, the breakdown of accurate intelligence reporting contributed to multiple failures. In this case, it is possible for a government to advance the efficiency of intelligence systems in the wrong way. During the Vietnam conflict, intelligence networks not only undermine one another but attributed small breakdowns that culminated into a massive epidemic of inefficacy. As those breakdowns transferred to field commanders, valuable information cables became defective and unreliable.
Let ye’ swallow her up inside your eloquent muses.
To inspire, to toil, to reap- delicate fancies forged in flame,
By the power and wisdom of loves everlasting embrace.
Snow cloud over the sound of sleet,
melting on the floor of mother’s porch.
The mantel; so cold, so dreary, so tired,
where the frame that holds the weather sleeps,
“We carry the weight of our worlds on our backs like beasts when god only knows our time to rest.”
“We could walk a million paths a million miles and still not find what we are looking for. It is not untill you consider the ‘now’ to find a speckle of truth hidden along the jouney of life’s wild confusion.”
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