How did the Supreme Court (STF) help crime rise in Rio de Janeiro during the pandemic?

BARRICADES AND THE CRIME

Barricades range from the simplest, and of a transitory nature (which may consist of heaps of rubbish that are set on fire, with furniture and cars crossing the roads), to the most complex, with pieces of rails firmly anchored to the ground and also blocks of concrete.

THE PROBLEM WITH FAVELAS

A good deal of time has passed since the restrictions determined by the Federal Supreme Court in relation to the operations of the Rio de Janeiro security forces in communities, except in so-called “absolutely exceptional” cases, came into force. During that time, organized crime took advantage of this hiatus to “breathe” and reinforce its control over these areas. For those who have no idea of ​​the number of existing communities in Rio de Janeiro and the number of inhabitants they house, the numbers are surprising: the census carried out in 2010 by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics - IBGE indicated the existence of 793 favelas in the city, where 22% of the population lived, that is — at the time — about 1,400,000 people (and if we consider the entire metropolitan region, or the so-called Greater Rio, this total would rise to more than 1,700,000 inhabitants.

However, a more recent survey, from 2021, revealed a significant expansion in the number of this type of settlement, indicating that organized crime operates in 1,413 communities in Rio (about 12% of the total existing favelas in the country, and, in In round numbers, drug trafficking dominates 81% of these areas (the largest faction controls 828 favelas, the second operates in 238 and the third has 69 in its hands) , leaving the remaining 19% in the hands of militias . favelas grew so much that they ended up uniting, forming the so-called “Complexes” (Alemão, Penha, Maré, Pedreira, Lins, etc.), composed of several communities. Complexo do Alemão, for example, is made up of 13 favelas, while Complexo do Penha — adjacent to it — groups 15, and Complexo da Maré includes 17 ).

These numbers, however, should not be considered definitive, as the “map” of who dominates which areas is sometimes subjected to mutations, due to the dispute for control of the territory. Regarding this aspect, it is important to point out that, for organized crime, police action is different. This is because the security forces carry out operations that do not have the objective of controlling territories, that is: the police enter, fulfill their mission (for example: execute arrest warrants) and leave. As a rule, criminals resist, but there is always the option of withdrawing if they find themselves at a disadvantage, returning to the scene when the police leave.

But these options do not exist when it comes to incursions by other factions or the militia, as they aim to oust their opponents and take physical control of certain areas, to increase their presence, influence and profit. The rivalry between these groups is extremely exacerbated, and they include heavy punishments for residents who, for example, dress in clothes that in some way symbolize rival groups, whether by their colors or prints, or on young people who are somehow related or dating residents of areas considered as “enemy”. Thus, these confrontations, when they occur, are of extreme violence.

Another important difference is that the security forces operate within well-defined rules of engagement, with rules explaining when they can or cannot open fire, etc. The police take every possible precaution to avoid victimizing residents. Criminals, on the other hand, use their weaponry without any concern about where the projectiles will end up or what they will hit. Many of the victims are hit by the so-called “stray bullets” even though they are hunting, trusting that the walls will be enough protection — which does not always happen, as 5.56mm and 7.62mm ammunition can pierce them, especially if the bricks are not coated, as is most often the case.

As for the argument that the police do not always follow the rules of engagement, it can be said that these cases are configured as exceptions, and are not as numerous as the media intends to show. For the press, invariably, whenever a community resident is hit by a “stray bullet”, the blame is placed on the security forces. In addition, casualties among criminals are often identified as the result of “massacres” or “slaughter”, even if there has not been enough time for any type of investigation.

The dominance of criminals over communities is very strong, being exercised with an iron fist. For example: an ambulance only has access to a dominated community to pick up a sick person, or a hearse to pick up a corpse, or the electricity concessionaire to carry out repairs, if its entry is authorized by the dominant faction. Nowadays, the presence of the UPP (Pacifying Police Unit), which experienced a positive period when they were implemented, is — in most of the communities where they are installed — merely “tolerated” by criminals, as long as they “don’t make waves”, that is, do not interfere with their activities.

The prohibition of police raids has also greatly favored a different type of crime from drug trafficking: the theft of cargo. Trucks are often approached on roads or already in the urban perimeter and their drivers forced to deviate from their path, entering communities, where the load is removed and stored, and the vehicle is abandoned. To win the sympathy of the residents, they are sometimes allowed to take part of the transported cargo for themselves (those that are not in the interest of the criminals who carried out the theft, due to lack of storage space or low profitability).

In addition to having plenty of ammunition (so much so that they often shoot in automatic rather than semi-automatic mode), and that normally — due to the fact that many of the favelas are located in rough terrain — they occupy higher positions than the security forces (tops of staircases, slabs, etc.), criminals have weapons equal to, or many times more powerful than, police officers (the discovery of 12.7mm anti-material rifles in the possession of criminal groups is disturbing), unrivaled knowledge of the terrain, “support” from residents (due to kinship, friendships, or threats) and often a certain degree of “immunity” when it comes to the press.

A recurring question whenever this subject is addressed is: “But how do weapons get into the hands of traffickers and militiamen?”. In a recent interview given to a YouTube channel, delegate Fabrício Oliveira , who heads the Special Resources Coordination (CORE) of the Civil Police of the State of Rio de Janeiro, and who was the first head of the Police Station Specialized in Weapons, Ammunition and Explosives – DESARME, created in 2017, stated that it was found that the vast majority of these weapons come from the black market in other countries, mainly the United States, using sea, air and land routes (in the latter case, via Paraguay). He further said that the vast majority of these weapons are capable of automatic fire.(read: weapons that can fire in bursts), a type of weapon that is not sold to CACs (Hunters, Sport Shooters and Collectors), which debunks the myth that this concept would explain the origin of crime rifles . It also revealed that sometimes these weapons are loaned to other groups of criminals so that they can carry out large robberies or invade rival territories. According to him, a study by the General Department of Specialized Police estimated that, in Rio de Janeiro, there were 60,000 criminals at large (in comparison, there are approximately 8,000 civil police, and about 45,000 military police,of which only half work in the streets), and if we consider that possibly half of them use rifles, the total of this type of weapon in Rio could reach 30,000 units, an amount immensely higher than the approximately 500 rifles seized by the security forces each year, as in 2022. And that is without considering that, in the State, there are about 51,000 prisoners linked to criminal factions.

In summary, we could relate to some of the main effects of the prohibition of police operations in communities, from the author's point of view, most of them established through personal experience:

1. Taking advantage of the “ loosening ”, organized crime sought to reinforce its dominance over the areas in which it operates, which is reflected, for example, in the growth in the number and effectiveness of barricades; These physical obstacles to the progression of vehicles impede the access of police vehicles or “channel” their progress along roads heavily hit by the fire of outlaws. The types of barricades range from the simplest, and of a transitory nature (which may consist of heaps of rubbish that are set on fire, with furniture and cars crossing the roads), to the most complex, with pieces of rails firmly anchored in the ground and also concrete blocks. The removal of this second type is very difficult, and often requires machines such as backhoes, etc., and even then it is not always possible to remove them. In any case, the embarked troops always have to disembark (to progress or even remove simple barricades, made up of furniture or vehicles crossing the street), and their members become inviting targets for criminals.
2. Significant growth of the Comando Vermelho – CV, the largest criminal faction in Rio de Janeiro — the other two are AdA (Amigos dos Amigos ) and TCP (Terceiro Comando Puro) .
3. As already mentioned, the quantitative and qualitative increase in weapons in the hands of criminals
4. Increased presence, within areas dominated by drug trafficking, of criminals from other states who feel protected here to remain outside the reach of the law or to continue commanding actions in their respective areas. The Civil Police allegedly already identified the presence in Rio of hundreds of criminals from eleven states.
5. Decreased participation of the Federal Police – PF and the Federal Highway Police – PRF in joint actions with Rio de Janeiro security forces.
6. Although the number of police operations in communities has been drastically reduced, the violence of confrontations, when they occur, has increased . With organized crime strengthened and more strongly positioned in its “ citadels ”, the level of resistance opposed to the security forces has grown. Comando Vermelho , for example, instructed its militants not to abandon their weapons or their positions when confronted by the police or rival groups, under pain of severe punishment , which could include death . This causes the risk of “ collateral damage ”, imposed on the population of the conflicted areas, to increase exponentially.
7. Reduction in the participation of the population in dominated areas in helping to fight organized crime , which was done mainly through the Disque Denúncia , reporting the location of hiding places of fugitives, or informing places where there were large amounts of drugs or hidden weapons.

The solution to this complex problem is neither easy nor quick, and requires numerous measures in various segments of public administration. But there is no doubt about one thing: the solution demands tougher legislation, bringing tougher penalties, which can really have a discouraging effect on those who think of following the path of crime. Often, a criminal who is active in drug trafficking, carries a rifle, shoots at police, sets buses on fire and, in short, causes countless problems, receives a relatively light sentence compared to his crimes and, therefore, in a short time may be released and return to crime.