How can I buy cocaine online in Tehran

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How can I buy cocaine online in Tehran

Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit. The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands. The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits. The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law. The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing. The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities. The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market. The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market. The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach. The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance. Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership. Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups. The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities. A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime. The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities. Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs. Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime. Human trafficking is a widespread issue in Iran, primarily involving sex trafficking, forced labour and the recruitment of child soldiers. The country is situated along one of the main human trafficking routes in the region, with young women being trafficked from Asia into Europe and the Gulf. Iranians are also trafficked to countries in the Gulf and Caucasus, as well as to Iraqi Kurdistan. Domestic trafficking is mainly an issue in larger cities such as Tehran, Shiraz and Tabriz, where organ and blood trafficking contribute to the pervasiveness and profitability of this criminal market. Millions of child labourers are estimated to be working in Iran, but due to the country's lack of transparency on the issue, especially on trafficked women and girls, accurate statistics are hard to find. Since the onset of the pandemic, the Iranian population has significantly increased its use and reliance on technology and social media platforms, thereby providing criminal groups with more opportunities to exploit vulnerable people through online channels. The human smuggling market is also pervasive in Iran. The crisis in neighbouring Afghanistan has further driven the demand for irregular migration, increasing fees and boosting financial incentives for smuggling groups. Arms trafficking is a key element of Iran's regional geopolitical strategy. The country is a major supplier of conventional weapons to countries in Western Asia, as well as North Africa and Russia. Many non-state actors in the region also use Iranian arms, ammunition and drones, and Tehran's support contributes to military capacities in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen, the Palestinian territories and Somalia. There have also been allegations that military equipment and drones are being transferred to Russia to be used in the war in Ukraine. While Iranian involvement in the arms trafficking market is propelling the proliferation of illicit arms sales across Western Asia, the country's domestic illicit arms market is relatively small, largely due to strict gun control laws and low firearms possession rates. A relatively minor market is found in the Baluchistan and Sistan provinces and western Iran. Iran has sizable markets for counterfeit and excisable goods. During the global pandemic, the country saw an increase in fake medicines and medical supplies and, as a result, Iran has become one of the primary transit points for counterfeit pharmaceutical products entering the EU. Most illicit trade into and out of the country occurs through official ports and border crossings, many of which are controlled by the IRGC, leading to accusations of its complicity in smuggling operations. While flora and fauna crimes are present in Iran, they are comparably smaller than other illicit markets in the country. Iran's natural geography includes a diverse range of ecosystems, making it vulnerable to a wide variety of flora crimes. Deforestation in the country is mainly caused by illegal logging and wood smuggling, encroachment on forests, exploitation of natural resources and coal mining. The critically endangered Iranian maple tree is only found in Iran's Hyrcanian forest and is threatened by illicit logging, agriculture and climate change. The pandemic has boosted the traditional medicine industry in Iran, leading to an increased demand for plant species used in alternative treatments. Orchid tubers are illegally collected and exported to neighbouring countries or to South Asia for use in traditional drinks and medicines. Home to several rare species, Iran also offers an attractive market for wildlife crime. In particular, sheep and ram subspecies are poached for meat or to be used as trophies, especially in the Masjed mountain range in Yazd province. Afghan-sourced species also transit Iran before onward travel to the Caucasus, Syria and Iraq. Iran has one of the world's largest oil reserves, and the country's oil exports have increased in recent years despite Western sanctions. Iranian oil supplies are reportedly shipped in large quantities through international waters using Dubai-based tankers, and are primarily destined for Oman, Yemen, Somalia and China. Illicit oil flows also occur on a small scale, leading to some socio-economic and environmental challenges in the country, including the destruction of wildlife and biodiversity, water pollution, degradation of critical farmland, public health concerns and the prolongation of armed conflicts. Fuel smuggling occurs largely in the border regions, especially in Baluchistan and Kurdistan, where smugglers transport Iranian oil and subsidized fuel to neighbouring countries and reap high profit margins. It is estimated that millions of litres of fuel are smuggled out of the country each day. This is allegedly facilitated by corruption among border personnel, including the IRGC. Iran accounts for a large share of heroin seizures worldwide, much of which is sourced from Afghanistan and destined for Turkey, the EU, the Gulf region and beyond. Iran is among the cheapest places in the world to buy heroin, contributing to the country having one the highest addiction rates worldwide. The heroin trade is associated with violence and has resulted in multiple clashes between Iranian border guards and traffickers over the past years. Sanctions have been placed on high ranking IRGC commanders for their alleged involvement in the heroin trade in Sistan-e-Baluchistan. As the second most consumed drug in the country, cannabis is widespread in Iran, and there is relative tolerance towards the drug compared to other narcotics. The cannabis trade has significantly grown over the past decade, resulting in large-scale domestic cultivation fields throughout the country, while small-scale production is believed take place in Tehran. Cannabis resin is also imported from Afghanistan. Iran continues to be a source, transit and destination country for methamphetamine. In recent years, increased methamphetamine production in neighbouring Afghanistan has affected Iran, with low-cost competition leading to an influx of cheaper Afghan methamphetamine into the country. These developments have contributed to the surge in methamphetamine use in Iran over the past few years. Moreover, while the synthetic drug Captagon is spreading across the region, the role of this drug within Iran remains unclear. Iran is known for its strong offensive cyber capabilities, with state-embedded criminal actors believed to be particularly active in conducting cyber-dependent crimes. The increasing reliance on digital platforms in Iran and other countries during the COVID pandemic has created a conducive environment for cybercriminals to exploit. These crimes target both national and foreign private and public sectors, including political dissent, activists, journalists, entities, critical infrastructure and organizations. In recent years, Iranian actors have been increasingly targeting government entities in countries like the US and Israel, as well as in the EU and the Gulf. Iranian actors reportedly collaborate with criminal groups in Russia and North Korea, learning new cyber-attack techniques from one another and constantly adapting their tactics. There has been a particular increase in ransomware attacks by Iranian-backed actors. Financial crime is a pervasive issue in Iran, with economic fraud, misuse of funds, embezzlement and large-scale tax evasion being the most common types of financial crimes in the country. The number of corruption and embezzlement cases in the country has tripled in recent years. The majority of these cases involve either government employees or people appointed to managerial positions at state-run economic entities, exemplified by the presence of bonyads - untaxable and opaque organizations. These bonyads have reportedly diverted trillions of dollars in public funds into the bank accounts of political elites, leading clerics and other prominent Iranians. In addition, phishing has emerged as a growing issue in Iran, with fake text messages impersonating government services and entities being used to scam unsuspecting victims. Tens of thousands of Iranians have fallen prey to these scams, costing them up to thousands of dollars each. The rise in phishing attacks has been linked to the increasing use of mobile phones and the internet, as well as a lack of awareness among the population about how to protect themselves from financial crime. Criminal activities in Iran are mainly carried out by state-embedded actors and criminal networks. In particular, the IRGC allegedly has enduring ties with criminal and terrorist organizations both within and outside the country. State-embedded actors in Iran are believed to be involved in the trafficking of people and drugs, including cocaine, heroin and synthetic drugs, as well as oil smuggling and other non-renewable resource crimes. It is unclear whether state actors are involved in human smuggling or cannabis trafficking, and there is little evidence to suggest that they control flora or fauna crimes. The line between the sale of arms by the state and arms trafficking has also been blurred in recent years. The criminal networks that operate within the country are primarily based in Tehran, as well as in the eastern and western provinces. These networks usually specialize in one or two illicit markets. Some small criminal networks collaborate with similar networks outside Iran to smuggle and traffic people and goods. Loose criminal networks involved in areas such as human trafficking or drugs may have connections to foreign networks. The level of violence perpetrated by these networks varies depending on the illegal activity they are involved in, with heroin trafficking being the most violent. Even though there is less evidence of significant-sized mafia-style groups operating in the country, mafia-like syndicates do exist in Iran and are mostly engaged in money laundering and financial crimes, among others. Iran's lack of a strong private sector and the dominance of state institutions, including the IRGC, is a major factor in driving the private sector towards illicit means of competition. These practices include tax evasion, involvement in the black market and bribery, among others. Ongoing Western sanctions against the country have further strengthened the private sector's illicit activities. The influence of foreign actors in Iran is generally kept to a minimum due to the country's opposition to foreign intervention. However, there are some examples of cross-border cooperation in the drug trade, with joint ventures between Iranian and Afghan partners, as well as smuggling activities in the Kurdish region. Iran has a governance system that is a mix of democratic and religious elements. However, the religious supreme leader has minimal checks and balances, and elected officials struggle to exercise leadership, which makes it difficult for the government to tackle issues such as corruption and organized crime. Anti-corruption efforts tend to be politicized and target opponents rather than addressing the root causes. The IRGC is thought to actively obstruct Tehran's attempts to combat organized crime, as it is reportedly complicit in certain criminal activities. In recent years, there has been growing support for moderate and reformist candidates, and uprisings and protests have emerged from traditionally pro-government communities, underscoring the regime's vulnerability. In , the government violently cracked down on protests, blocking internet access, pressuring media not to cover the protests, and arresting protesters and activists. Iran's cybercrime laws give the government full control over the internet, enabling it to enforce widespread censorship and surveillance, and systematically violating the Iranian people's rights to freely access information and freedom of expression. The government's ongoing efforts to implement strict online surveillance undermine transparency and accountability. Moreover, there have been increasing reports of nepotism, cronyism, corruption and embezzlement among members of parliament and councils throughout Iran. Iran's track record of engaging in international cooperation is limited, with few exceptions. While the country expressed its intention to increase international cooperation on extradition matters, concerns about persecution in the country have hampered such agreements. Furthermore, the government introduced a controversial so-called cyber protection bill in recent years, which is considered draconian and oppressive by human rights organizations. Additionally, Iran has strict drug laws that include the death penalty and prison sentences for people who use drugs in public. The country's laws to combat human trafficking have been widely criticized for being inadequate. The Iranian judicial system is characterized by duality, comprising the ordinary criminal courts and the Revolutionary Courts. However, there is a significant disparity between these two entities. While ordinary criminal court defendants have access to a lawyer and can appeal their cases, Revolutionary Court defendants do not have due process, are not entitled to legal counsel and are often executed without public notice. Most people become involved in the Iranian criminal justice system due to drug trafficking; over a third of all prisoners are incarcerated for drug-related offences. Prison standards in Iran are typically poor, with overcrowding a common issue. Prison officials have denied food and medical care to prisoners, and both physical and psychological torture is prevalent. Thousands of people convicted of drug-related crimes are on death row, and over the past year, Iran has had the highest execution rate in the world, including of children. Recent trials and subsequent sentences, including executions, handed down by the Iranian courts against protestors, demonstrate a concerning disregard for due process. These incidents further highlight the politicized nature of the judicial system in the country. While these entities engage in law enforcement activities, their focus tends to be on counterinsurgency. The country's law enforcement forces were leading players in the suppression of the widespread protests, and their ineffectiveness has been criticized. Corruption is widespread within law enforcement, and security services are often poorly equipped and trained. The lack of functioning equipment in law enforcement agencies has contributed to considerable setbacks in stemming the flow of drugs and tracking criminals throughout the country. Iran's borders are difficult to monitor due to their length and varied terrain. They are also home to armed opposition groups. Heroin and methamphetamine are smuggled into Afghanistan, Azerbaijan and Iraq by drug traffickers. The recent Taliban takeover of Afghanistan has raised concerns about the influx of irregular migrants, as well as fears of a potential resurgence of the Islamic State or a civil war in Afghanistan. Despite these challenges, Iran's territorial integrity remains relatively strong, and it is unlikely to change soon absent significant conflict. The country's deficiencies in fighting money laundering and terrorist financing have landed it on the FATF blacklist. Even though the country made efforts to address strategic deficiencies in its money laundering and terrorist financing systems by introducing new legislation, major strategic deficiencies persist. Iran's economy is heavily dependent on the Basij and the IRGC, which have significant control over the national economy. This can make it challenging for independent businesses to operate. The situation is compounded by corruption and criminal activity at the state level, as well as Western sanctions, which contribute to Iran's ongoing economic decline. The impact of the global pandemic has only worsened this situation, with the country being hit harder than any other country on the continent. As a result, over one-third of the population now lives below the poverty line. Although the government typically releases five-year economic planning documents, it has not made these public since the imposition of sanctions. The Iranian government does not have a cohesive or strategic approach to crime prevention. However, in recent years, the government has shifted its approach to treating drug addiction from punitive measures to a more pragmatic, health-based approach. Drop-in centres and clinics now offer harm reduction services and medical treatment to drug users, including women. The country also has a witness protection programme, but it lacks a policy and practice to protect victims and crime witnesses; international NGOs are not allowed to provide assistance in such instances. Arbitrary arrests of tribunal witnesses and their families based on undefined national security threats have occurred, leading to witnesses concealing their identities during public hearings by wearing masks, sunglasses and headscarves. There are a number of social activities aimed at reducing the incidence of crime, though their effectiveness is questionable. The main form of crime prevention in Iran remains deterrence through rather harsh punishments. The state heavily censors Iran's media, bans social media and undertakes efforts to curb the flow of information from outside the country. Although the space for civil society and media is heavily restricted, civil society organizations have been very active, particularly in drug policy and carrying out prevention programmes. There is no meaningful freedom of assembly in Iran, and authorities have been heavy-handed in their crackdown on protests criticizing the government or other sensitive subjects. Non-state actors also played a role in the protests that began in September The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel. A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index. We're constantly working to improve the Index. By participating in this survey, you will be providing us with insights and suggestions that will help us make the Index an even better resource. This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State. The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State. Capital Tehran. Income group Lower middle income. Population 87,, Geography type Coastal. GINI Index Criminal markets 7. An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type. Human trafficking 8. Human smuggling 8. Extortion and protection racketeering 4. Arms trafficking 9. Trade in counterfeit goods 7. Illicit trade in excisable goods 8. Flora crimes 4. Fauna crimes 4. Non-renewable resource crimes 9. Heroin trade 9. Cocaine trade 5. Cannabis trade 6. Synthetic drug trade 9. Cyber-dependent crimes 8. Financial crimes 9. Criminal actors 6. An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society. Mafia-style groups 5. Criminal networks 7. State-embedded actors 9. Foreign actors 6. Private sector actors 5. Political leadership and governance 2. Government transparency and accountability 2. International cooperation 4. National policies and laws 4. A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime. Judicial system and detention 3. Law enforcement 3. Territorial integrity 5. Anti-money laundering 2. Economic regulatory capacity 2. Victim and witness support 3. Prevention 3. Non-state actors 2. Analysis Download full profile english. People Human trafficking is a widespread issue in Iran, primarily involving sex trafficking, forced labour and the recruitment of child soldiers. Trade Arms trafficking is a key element of Iran's regional geopolitical strategy. Environment While flora and fauna crimes are present in Iran, they are comparably smaller than other illicit markets in the country. Cyber Crimes Iran is known for its strong offensive cyber capabilities, with state-embedded criminal actors believed to be particularly active in conducting cyber-dependent crimes. Financial Crimes Financial crime is a pervasive issue in Iran, with economic fraud, misuse of funds, embezzlement and large-scale tax evasion being the most common types of financial crimes in the country. Criminal Actors Criminal activities in Iran are mainly carried out by state-embedded actors and criminal networks. Leadership and governance Iran has a governance system that is a mix of democratic and religious elements. Criminal justice and security The Iranian judicial system is characterized by duality, comprising the ordinary criminal courts and the Revolutionary Courts. Economic and financial environment The country's deficiencies in fighting money laundering and terrorist financing have landed it on the FATF blacklist. Civil society and social protection The Iranian government does not have a cohesive or strategic approach to crime prevention. Read the analysis Listen the podcasts View all events. Next Skip. How to measure organized crime? Read more on globalinitiative. Give us feedback We're constantly working to improve the Index.

World Drug Report 2024

How can I buy cocaine online in Tehran

The introduction to the first installment of the series read:. For the better part of a decade, a San Francisco Bay Area drug ring sold tons of cocaine to the Crips and Bloods street gangs of Los Angeles and funneled millions in drug profits to a Latin American guerrilla army run by the U. Central Intelligence Agency, a Mercury News investigation has found. This drug network opened the first pipeline between Colombia's cocaine cartels and the black neighborhoods of Los Angeles, a city now known as the 'crack' capital of the world. The cocaine that flooded in helped spark a crack explosion in urban America. The three-day series of articles, entitled 'Dark Alliance: The Story Behind the Crack Explosion,' told the story of a Los Angeles drug operation run by Ricky Donnell Ross, described sympathetically as 'a disillusioned year-old. Blandon and Meneses reportedly sold tons of cocaine to Ross, who in turn converted it to crack and sold it in the black communities of South Central Los Angeles. Blandon and Meneses were said to have used their drug trafficking profits to help fund the Contra army's war effort. Stories had previously been written about the Contras' alleged ties to drug trafficking. For example, on December 20, , an Associated Press article claimed that three Contra groups 'engaged in cocaine trafficking, in part to help finance their war against Nicaragua. However, the Mercury News series contained -- or at least many readers interpreted it to contain -- a new sensational claim: that the CIA and other agencies of the United States government were responsible for the crack epidemic that ravaged black communities across the country. The newspaper articles suggested that the United States government had protected Blandon and Meneses from prosecution and either knowingly permitted them to peddle massive quantities of cocaine to the black residents of South Central Los Angeles or turned a blind eye to such activity. The Mercury News later proclaimed that the article did not make these allegations. The news media picked up on the Mercury News series' insinuation and made it explicit in coverage of the series. Critics and commentators would later debate whether the Mercury News articles in fact accused the United States government of being responsible for the nation's crack cocaine epidemic. In an October 2, , Washington Post article, Gary Webb, the reporter who wrote the Dark Alliance series, asserted that the article had not claimed that the CIA knew about Blandon's drug trafficking. The Washington Post article quoted Webb as saying, 'We've never pretended otherwise. This doesn't prove the CIA targeted black communities. It doesn't say this was ordered by the CIA.. Essentially, our trail stopped at the door of the CIA. They wouldn't return my phone calls. It's been a very subtle disinformation campaign to try to tell people that these stories don't say what they say. Or that they say something else, other than what we said. So people can say, well, there's no evidence of this, you know. You say, well, this story doesn't prove that top CIA officials knew about it. Well, since the stories never said they did, of course they don't. According to The Washington Post , Mercury News editor Jerry Ceppos stated that he was troubled by the interpretive leap many people made about the article's claims of CIA involvement in the growth of crack cocaine. Ceppos was quoted as saying, 'Certainly talk radio in a lot of cities has made the leap. We've tried to correct it wherever we could. People \[have been\] repeating the error again and again and again. Rather than stating:. For the better part of a decade, a Bay Area drug ring sold tons of cocaine to the Crips and Bloods street gangs of Los Angeles and funneled millions in drug profits to a Latin American guerilla army run by the U. Central Intelligence Agency. The Mercury News published a three-part series in late August that detailed how a San Francisco Bay Area drug ring sold tons of cocaine to the street gangs of South-Central Los Angeles in the s, sending some of the millions in profits to the Contras. The series never reported direct CIA involvement, although many readers drew that conclusion. Regardless of the intent of the Mercury News , the accusation of government involvement in the crack epidemic had taken root. This dramatic interpretation of the series continued to build with ferocious velocity, especially in black communities, as the Mercury News story attracted the attention of newspapers across the country. Throughout September , the Dark Alliance series was published in one newspaper after another: the Raleigh News and Observer ran the articles on September 1, ; the Denver Post published them on September 13, ; the Pittsburgh Post Gazette ran them on September 15, ; and so on. While many other newspapers did not publish the Dark Alliance series, they carried stories about the sensation created by the series' claims. The story garnered further exposure from television and radio talk show appearances by Gary Webb. Ricky Ross' attorney, Alan Fenster, also made several appearances on television shows to assert that the government, not his client, was responsible for cocaine dealing in South Central Los Angeles. Many African-American leaders were particularly troubled by the articles, mindful of the frequency with which young black men were being incarcerated for drug offenses. If the Mercury News was right, it appeared that the same government that was arresting so many black men had played a role in creating the drug crisis that precipitated their arrest. This point was emphasized by the Mercury News ' Dark Alliance series, which included articles entitled, 'War on drugs has unequal impact on black Americans; Contras case illustrates the discrepancy: Nicaraguan goes free; L. The Congressional Black Caucus and many leaders in the black community also insisted upon an investigation into the charges raised by the Mercury News. As noted above, the Mercury News series was not only a story about the United States government and crack cocaine. It also revisited allegations concerning the Contras and drug trafficking that has been reported upon and investigated for many years. In , the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations began an investigation focusing on allegations received by the subcommittee chairman, Senator John Kerry, concerning illegal gun-running and narcotics trafficking associated with the Contras. A two-year investigation produced a 1,page report in analyzing the involvement of Contra groups and supporters in drug trafficking, and the role of United States government officials in these activities. Allegations of cocaine trafficking by Contras also arose during the investigation conducted by Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh into the Iran-Contra affair. Drug trafficking allegations, however, were not the focus of that inquiry and the Walsh report included no findings on these allegations. The issue of drug trafficking by the Nicaraguan Contras has also been the subject of books: e. It was also reported upon in the news media. Following the December piece mentioned above from the Associated Press , the San Francisco Examiner ran stories in about Norwin Meneses, Carlos Cabezas an individual with links to Contra organizations who was convicted in the mids of drug charges , and drug trafficking by the Contras. It is undisputed that individuals like Meneses and Blandon, who had ties to the Contras or were Contra sympathizers, were convicted of drug trafficking, either in the United States or Central America. There is also undeniable evidence that certain groups associated with the Contras engaged in drug trafficking. The pervasiveness of such activities within the Contra movement and the United States government's knowledge of those activities, however, are still the subject of debate, and it is beyond the scope of the OIG's investigation, which we describe below. Yet it is noteworthy that, as interesting as the story of Contras and illicit drug deals may be, it was not the catalyst for the public's or the media's interest in the Dark Alliance series. Investigations into the alleged connection between Contras and cocaine dealing were conducted and articles were printed in the late s, at a time when interest in the Iran-Contra story was cresting. Neither those investigations nor the published articles tracking the allegations sparked a firestorm of outrage comparable to that created by the Dark Alliance series. The furor over the Mercury News series was driven by the allegations of the government's complicity in cocaine deals within black communities. If the Dark Alliance series had been limited to reporting on Contras, it seems unlikely that the groundswell of press and public attention would have occurred. Notwithstanding the Mercury News ' explosive allegations, the series did not receive extensive coverage from major newspapers in either August or September The Los Angeles Times briefly discussed the Mercury News series in several articles in August and September that covered Ross' postponed sentencing and other events in the Ross trial. Similarly, the Dark Alliance series did not initially receive much television coverage. With the exception of CNN, which ran several pieces on the story in September, and the NBC Nightly News, which ran a piece about the allegations on September 27, , the story received little national television news coverage. By early October , however, that changed. It did not, for the most part, wrestle with the series' claims about drug dealing by the Contras. The Washington Post noted that the series had been selective in its use of Blandon's testimony to support its claims:. The Mercury News uses testimony from Blandon in establishing that Nicaraguans selling drugs in California sent profits to the Contras. But if the whole of Blandon's testimony is to be believed, then the connection is not made between Contras and African American drug dealers because Blandon said he had stopped sending money to the contras by \[the time he began selling to Ross\]. And if Blandon is to be believed, there is no connection between Contras and the cause of the crack epidemic because Blandon said Ross was already a well-established dealer with several ready sources of supply by the time he started buying cocaine from Blandon. The Washington Post piece also emphasized apparent contradictions between Ross' and Blandon's accounts. For example, while Blandon claimed to have been a used car salesman in who on the side sold two kilograms of cocaine for Meneses, Ross said Blandon was instead handling bulk sales of kilograms of cocaine for Meneses at the time. The article did not seek to resolve these issues and merely noted the conflicts. It concluded, after conducting interviews of various unnamed sources:. Meneses and Mr. Blandon may indeed have provided modest support for the rebels, including perhaps some weapons, there is no evidence that either man was a rebel official or had anything to do with the C. Nor is there proof that the relatively small amounts of cocaine they sometimes claimed to have brokered on behalf of the insurgents had a remotely significant role in the explosion of crack that began around the same time. After reportedly assigning three editors and fourteen reporters to the story, the Los Angeles Times published its own three-part analysis of the Mercury News piece, which ran from October 20 to October 22, The Los Angeles Times concentrated on three claims raised by the Mercury News series: 1 that a drug ring related to the CIA had sent millions of dollars to the Contras; 2 that the same drug ring had created a cocaine epidemic in South Central Los Angeles and other United States cities, and 3 that the CIA had approved a plan for the ring to raise money for the Contras through drug trafficking or had deliberately turned a blind eye to the drug ring's activities. The Los Angeles Times found that 'the available evidence, based on an extensive review of court documents and more than interviews in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Washington and Managua, fails to support any of those allegations. The first installment of the Los Angeles Times series was devoted to a discussion of the origins of crack cocaine. It found that crack cocaine existed in Los Angeles long before Ross began selling it. In response to the claim that Ross had played a principal role in bringing cocaine to South Central Los Angeles, it identified several drug dealers from South Central Los Angeles who were contemporaries of Ross and were reputed to have sold similar quantities of cocaine. The second installment of the Los Angeles Times series explored whether there was in fact a CIA-sanctioned operation that funneled millions of dollars into the Contras. Indeed, the Los Angeles Times article concluded that the Mercury News had arrived at its million-dollar estimate of Meneses' and Blandon's donations based on its own calculations derived from 'the volume of cocaine that they were selling, and Blandon's statement that what he sold, he gave to the Contras. The second installment of the Los Angeles Times series also suggested, based on interviews with various CIA officials and former government officials, that CIA involvement in such a scheme was improbable. But the article quoted the chief investigator for Senator Kerry's subcommittee investigation, Jack Blum, as saying that, while the CIA did not have agents selling drugs to fund the Contras, the United States government may have opened channels that helped drug dealers bring drugs into the United States and protected them from law enforcement. The last installment of the Los Angeles Times series examined the reaction in black communities to the series, particularly the proliferation of conspiracy theories. The Los Angeles Times , New York Times , and Washington Post articles were criticized by some who believed that the mainstream press was attempting to minimize a story that it had failed to cover. Some accused the papers of erecting strawmen by accusing the Mercury News of making allegations that it had not in fact made: e. Others stated that the major papers had committed the same mistakes it criticized the Mercury News of making: e. Despite the major newspapers' mounting criticism of the Dark Alliance series, the Mercury News continued to defend its story. However, in the meantime the paper launched its own investigation of the claims made by the Dark Alliance series. On May 11, , Jerry Ceppos, the Executive Editor of the Mercury News , published the results of the newspaper's analysis of its own series. Ceppos wrote that the story had four short-comings: 1 it presented only one side of 'complicated, sometimes-conflicting pieces of evidence'; 2 it failed to identify the estimate of Blandon's financial contributions to the Contra movement as an 'estimate'; 3 it 'oversimplified the complex issue of how the crack epidemic in America grew,' and 4 it contained imprecise language and graphics that fostered the misinterpretation concerning the CIA and crack dealing. Ceppos attributed some of these problems to the newspaper's failure to present conflicting evidence that challenged its conclusions. The column also revealed that the same debate over the correct interpretation of the Mercury News ' conclusions found in the press also existed in the Mercury News newsroom:. The drug ring we wrote about inflicted terrible damage on inner-city Los Angeles, and that horror was indeed spread to many other places by L. Webb believes that is what our series said. I believe that we implied much more, that the ring was the pivotal force in the crack epidemic in the United States. Because the national crack epidemic was a complex phenomenon that had more than one origin, our discussion of this issue needed to be clearer. Some of the reporting on Ceppos' column by the major newspapers failed to recognize that it was not intended as a repudiation of the entire Dark Alliance series. Rather, it was a limited admission that portions of the story had been misleading and should have been subjected to more rigorous editing. Ceppos specifically did not disclaim what he believed were the articles' central allegation -- that a drug ring 'associated with the Contras sold large quantities of cocaine in inner-city Los Angeles in the s at the time of the crack explosion there' and that 'some of the profits went to the Contras. It is difficult to discern which allegations the Mercury News intended to make, in large part because the series is replete with innuendo and implication that verge on making assertions that are in fact never made. Many readers interpreted the series to assert that the CIA and other agencies of the United States government had intentionally funneled crack cocaine into black communities by either permitting or endorsing cocaine trafficking by Blandon and Meneses. Others interpreted the Dark Alliance series to charge that the spread of crack cocaine was the unintended -- but proximate -- result of actions taken by the United States government to promote the Contra war effort. While the series does not allege that there was a deliberate plan to target black communities by the CIA or other agencies of the United States government mentioned in the article e. First, the title of the series, 'Dark Alliance,' is itself ambiguous, since the series fails to identify the parties to the purported 'alliance. However, another interpretation, bolstered by the repeated mention of the CIA throughout the series, is that the title refers to an agreement between the CIA and drug-trafficking Contras. The web page bearing the 'Dark Alliance' title and the image of a crack smoker silhouetted against the CIA emblem strengthened the insinuation. The Dark Alliance story also included leaps of logic that suggested direct CIA involvement in Blandon's trafficking activities. For example, the article notes: 'The most Blandon would say in court about who called the shots when he sold cocaine for the FDN was that 'we received orders from the -- from other people. One oft-quoted portion of the articles relates to a meeting that allegedly occurred in Honduras among Meneses, Blandon, and Enrique Bermudez, a leader of the FDN's military effort. The preceding paragraph in the article recounted how cocaine 'has spread across the country. So we started raising money for the Contra revolution. The implication of this paragraph, made through its juxtaposition to the discussion of black communities ravaged by cocaine, is that a 'CIA agent' decided to raise money for the Contras by any means, including by selling cocaine in black communities. The parenthetical underscores reputed ties between Bermudez and the CIA. The specter of a government-wide plan to target black communities is raised throughout the article in other ways, but mostly through innuendo. The subtext of the article seems to be: If there was no government plot, why else would an Assistant U. Attorney prevent evidence relating to Blandon's drug trafficking from being raised in open court under the claim of protecting classified information during a federal trial? While the allegation of a deliberate government plan was not explicitly made, the drumbeat of questions insinuated a multi-agency, government scheme designed to protect Blandon's illegal activities, which 'opened the first pipeline between Colombia's cocaine cartels and the black neighborhoods of Los Angeles. The Mercury News stated repeatedly that the series was not intended to allege a deliberate government scheme to use cocaine dealing in black communities to finance the Contra effort, notwithstanding the logical inference that could be drawn from the series' substance. But while it is true that the articles did not explicitly allege a government conspiracy, the path charted by the Dark Alliance series' trail of implications led to that conclusion. In fact, a prophetic editorial that appeared in the Mercury News on August 21, , the day after the Dark Alliance series finished running in the paper, made just that point. It read:. At times, the Mercury News sent conflicting messages that confounded attempts to correct misconceptions about the article. While the newspaper was disavowing allegations of CIA involvement in the spread of crack, the articles' author was making public comments to the contrary. In an article entitled, 'The CIA-crack connection: The story nobody wants to hear: Your worst fears are true -- the CIA did help to smuggle drugs into American ghettos, says an investigative reporter,' Webb was asked whether his story had confirmed the suspicion within the black community 'that the crack cocaine epidemic might be part of a government conspiracy. It confirms the suspicion that government agents were involved. Clearly, when you're talking about drug dealers meeting with CIA agents it does go a long way toward validating this suspicion. There's a grain of truth to any conspiracy theory and it turns out there are a lot of grains of truth to this one. If you want to stretch it to its logical conclusion, the government was involved in starting the crack epidemic, because it was this pipeline that did it. Now we know what we didn't know in the '80's -- which is where they were selling the stuff. We were able to close the circle and show how this affected American citizens, whereas before it was some sort of nebulous foreign policy story. Now we can see the damage. Whether or not these guys were part of our government or just contract agents is unclear. Further, the newspaper itself was sending mixed messages. It's impossible to believe that the Central Intelligence Agency didn't know about the Contras' fund-raising activities in Los Angeles, considering that the agency was bankrolling, recruiting and essentially running the Contra operation. The CIA has a long history of embarrassing the country it is supposed to work for, from the Bay of Pigs in Cuba to the jungles of Vietnam. But no action that we know of can compare to the agency's complicity, however tacit, in the drug trade that devastated whole communities in our own country. In contrast, Webb has made other statements all but stating that the Dark Alliance series did demonstrate CIA involvement in the spread of crack in America. In September , in the immediate wake of the Dark Alliance series, Webb reportedly posted the following comment on the Mercury News electronic bulletin board: 'One thing I did want to respond to directly is the writer who claimed there wasn't any 'proof ' of CIA involvement in this thing. That's like saying there's no proof of General Motors involvement in making Chevrolets. When you look at that cash, the sums are obvious. Blandon told a federal grand jury in that he sold between and kilos of cocaine for Meneses in L. See , e.

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