How can I buy cocaine online in El Salvador

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How can I buy cocaine online in El Salvador

Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit. The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands. The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits. The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law. The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing. The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities. The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market. The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market. The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach. The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance. Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership. Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups. The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities. A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime. The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities. Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs. Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime. Those Salvadorans who migrate irregularly to Mexico or the US are more exposed to the risk of human trafficking and are frequently abducted by groups affiliated with human smugglers who demand ransoms in exchange for their release. Criminal actors control human smuggling in El Salvador and collaborate with corrupt security officers and public officials. Identifiable national networks have loose connections with foreign transnational groups and pay quotas for passages while bribing corrupt state actors to facilitate their activities. Victims of human smuggling face various risks, such as abandonment, extortion, kidnapping, human trafficking, sexual violence, torture and environmental exposure. Extortion is the primary source of income for gangs in El Salvador. The gangs use the money to buy weapons, pay lawyers, and support the families of murdered and jailed members. It is estimated that El Salvador loses hundreds of millions of US dollars in extortion to gangs each year. Many shop owners still pay or contribute in other ways to gangs for fear of retribution. The transport sector is one of the most affected, and even food and beverage suppliers must pay extortion money to pass through certain communities to restock local shops. Some companies have designated people to make the payments, include extortion in their operational costs, or require their employees to bear the costs of extortion. Most extortion cases are not reported, with victims typically preferring to deal directly with the gangs rather than filing a complaint with the police. Gangs have typically reinvested extortion revenues by setting up their own car wash businesses, storehouses, or private transportation activities, displacing competitors by force. Arms trafficking is of great concern in El Salvador, with most weapons entering the country by land or sea from neighbouring countries like Guatemala and Honduras. The high rate of crime-related homicides fuels the illegal arms market, with evidence suggesting that most homicides in El Salvador involve firearms, both legal and illegal. Although few large criminal groups traffic weapons, several factors contribute to the facilitation of the arms trafficking market, including the availability of weapons in the region, leftover stocks from past wars, the constant movement of people and goods to and from the US and the demand for weapons from criminal organizations, drug wars, violence, impunity and the lack of state monopoly over security in many areas. Corruption and impunity further enable these criminal organizations to operate without consequence. El Salvador serves as a provenance economy for counterfeit clothing and leather articles. The central market and the historic center in the capital are the main distribution hubs. Criminal organizations participate in the distribution of these products and have all the logistics, storage places, contacts and experience needed. Gangs have attempted to take control of the wholesale market, but these criminal organizations are powerful and have prevented them from doing so. Transnational criminal structures that are not part of the gangs are also involved in smuggling merchandise and counterfeit products. Cigarettes, liquor and cooking oils are the most smuggled excise goods in El Salvador. Most contraband goods enter the country through hundreds of illegal points, with technical smuggling representing almost all smuggling in the country. This type of smuggling is linked to under- and over-billing and the provision of erroneous information in public records. Since the current government took office in El Salvador, it has increased the number of armed forces officials at entry points to control contraband merchandise. Contraband cigarettes are a source of financing for Salvadoran gangs and it is estimated that four out of every 10 cigarettes in the country are contraband. Whiskey and vodka are also widely smuggled, with almost half of the products on the market being contraband. In El Salvador, flora crimes are not particularly pervasive but illegal logging for fuel and building materials probably constitutes a large part of this market. Nevertheless, traffickers are not organized in large or sophisticated criminal organizations and can be considered part of loose criminal networks. Overall, flora crimes do not appear to generate violence and authorities do not usually intervene. Fauna crimes are prevalent in the country and their impact on biodiversity is significant, as many endangered or nearly extinct species are captured and sold illegally. Iguanas and parrots are the main species confiscated, and up to half of the iguanas are estimated to be wild-caught and laundered as captive-bred. The country is often used as a bridge or destination for illegal exports from neighbouring Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. Hundreds of birds are poached annually and trafficked to the central market in San Salvador. However, fauna traffickers do not appear to be part of larger criminal organizations. El Salvador is the only country in the world where mining is completely banned. As such, non-renewable resource crimes are not prevalent in the country. There are few recorded deaths related to heroin in El Salvador and its prevalence appears to be negligible. This is mainly due to the economic dominance of the cocaine market in the north Central American triangle region. Although the cocaine trade in El Salvador may be small in comparison to other countries, it is growing and has become a considerable source of conflict and violence. Criminal networks, including gangs, are actively involved in cocaine transportation, and some have collaborated with Mexican and Colombian cartels. Drug traffickers commonly use low-profile-vessel semi-submersibles to transport cocaine between the Salvadoran coastal area and Guatemala. The small percentage of cocaine that stays in El Salvador is distributed by criminal networks in the urban peripheries of the main cities. El Salvador is not a major marijuana trafficking route, but gangs remain important distributors of the drug in communities. The local demand for cannabis has remained stable in recent years. The drug enters the country mainly by land from Mexico, Guatemala and Honduras, with remnants of well-known smuggling cartels managing its entry and transport. Gangs usually manage the distribution, contributing to an increase in gang conflicts, homicides and arrests, especially of poor youths from provinces or slums. The mass arrest campaign increased pressure on gangs and disrupted some of their operations, including marijuana trafficking. Although synthetic drug use has increased in El Salvador, it is not a major player in the transnational market. These drugs enter the country mainly by land from Mexico, Guatemala and Honduras. Despite the high market value of these drugs, they do not represent significant profits for criminal organizations, as they are more often handled by independent individuals. One of the reasons for the limited involvement of criminal organizations in this drug market is because of the profile of consumers of synthetic drugs in the country. Consumption is concentrated in the medium- and high-income population to which traditional criminal actors have restricted access. Cyber-dependent crimes are on the rise in El Salvador. Businesses are frequently targeted by cyber-attacks, with over half of all companies in the country having experienced at least one attack in recent years. Journalists and activists have also been targeted, with criminals using the Pegasus programme to hack the cell phones of members of the media to extract messages, photos and emails. Criminals have also targeted the local crypto wallet system, seeking to take advantage of government bonuses. Online bank accounts and social media accounts are also frequently hacked in El Salvador. Despite the implementation of an anti-evasion plan resulting in the recovery of hundreds of millions of US dollars from tax evasion cases and the filing of hundreds of cases in court, financial crimes remain a prevalent issue in El Salvador. Private companies continue to perpetrate tax evasion by providing false information or not reporting income accurately. Embezzlement of public funds by high level state officials and NGOs are also not uncommon in the country. These activities have not been linked to organized crime groups, but they do suggest that El Salvador is vulnerable to financial crime, given its geographic location, dollarized economy and cryptocurrencies. These gangs extort Salvadoran citizens and businesses, collect rent from businesses in their areas of influence, and participate in other illegal activities like human trafficking and domestic drug dealing. The relationship between the two groups is one of fierce rivalry, and mobility between areas controlled by the gangs is prohibited and sanctionable by death. Both gangs have significant access to firearms, thanks to permissive ownership laws, high gun imports and leftover weapons from the civil war. Due to strong law enforcement against these groups, the murder rate has decreased. However, gangs have historically increased murders as a political tool to negotiate with the government. Once an agreement is reached, they decrease violence and help with electoral support. The state of exception reduced gang operations and the murder rate, but thousands of members, collaborators and relatives remain at large, making gang presence considerable. With respect to state-embedded actors, there is no evidence of a cartel-like state structure within the Salvadoran government, but there are numerous instances of state actors facilitating criminal acts, protecting criminal actors, obstructing criminal investigations, and selling weapons and ammunition to criminal actors on a systematic basis. The release of a top gang leader from prison demonstrates the extent to which the relationship between state-embedded actors and criminal actors is intertwined. Recent accusations suggest that state-embedded actors not only use their positions to facilitate criminal activities, but are also allegedly directly involved in illicit activities, including human smuggling and corrupt schemes. El Salvador has seen a shift in criminal networks involved in commodities trafficking, with the main groups being dismantled and replaced by unfamiliar groups. Some of these dismantled groups were composed of members of Salvadoran politics and business, who worked with international drug cartels to transport cocaine and other narcotics through El Salvador or they were the main group of contraband transporters. The presence of foreign criminal networks is limited in El Salvador. Salvadoran criminal actors involved in drug trafficking, human trafficking and human smuggling cooperate with transnational groups, including Mexican cartels. This money laundering occurs in the form of paper companies, motels, auto hotels, transport, gas propane and water distribution companies, among others. The second is tax evasion, which reduces state income, as some companies provide misleading information or do not report accurate tax information. El Salvador has an ineffective strategy for combating organized crime. This is due to high-level corruption and collusion with criminal groups. The current government and its allies have weakened the system of democratic checks and balances by enacting laws that remove hundreds of prosecutors and lower-level judges. In March , an exception regime was declared to address an increase in gang violence, suspending several due process guarantees, including the rights to freedom of association and assembly, and privacy of communications. The government attributes the absence of homicides for days to its territorial control plan and exception regime. However, accusations of human rights violations have been made and there are uncertainties about the death toll. Despite this, current government methods have a high approval rating. The government is proposing a bill to reform the constitution, which includes extending the presidential term and reforming some democratic institutions. The government of El Salvador has relied heavily on social media to promote an anti-corruption message. However, state actors are believed to facilitate criminal activity and obstruct investigations. In recent years, there have been serious setbacks in terms of transparency, democratic dismantling and the system of checks and balances. This includes the unconstitutional dismissal of magistrates and the shutdown of an international anti-impunity commission. These setbacks have resulted in a reduction in civic space and dialogue between state actors and other sectors of society. As a result, violations of various human rights, including association, expression, press freedom and access to information have increased. El Salvador has implemented several laws to investigate, prosecute and punish organized crime. However, corruption in judicial institutions and state cooperation with criminal actors hamper the implementation of anti-organized crime legislation. Moreover, new laws have been proposed to silence critics, restrict freedom of expression and criminalize independent media and human rights groups. Recently, the National Assembly approved six reforms to regulations related to gang criminal activities, which increase jail sentences for gang-related crimes, including membership. The judicial system in El Salvador has long struggled with inefficiency and corruption, creating major obstacles in the fight against organized crime. Judges have been forced to retire, which many see as an attempt to replace them with judges who are more loyal to the government. In addition, the fairness and equity of the judicial system have been called into question, with hundreds of accused people convened for hearings simultaneously, thereby limiting the right to a fair trial. El Salvador faces significant challenges in its law enforcement efforts, as organized crime groups continue to maintain territorial control and operate with impunity. The police force is limited by inadequate resources and faces considerable obstacles in building public trust due to a lack of investigation and reliance on anonymous complaints. Although there have been improvements in police work conditions and technological equipment, overall law enforcement remains weak and under-resourced. The government has relied heavily on donors to fund training for law-enforcement and criminal-justice officials. El Salvador also struggles to maintain its territorial integrity due to porous borders and limited resources to control cross-border flows of illicit goods. El Salvador participates in the container control programme and has intensified border checks and created border patrol units, but much work still needs to be done in terms of border and maritime control. The navy has made progress in pursuing drug traffickers at sea, but overall, the country struggles to contain the flow of illicit goods due to limited resources and infrastructure and corruption. El Salvador is considered to be at an increasing risk of money laundering and terrorist financing. Another challenge is the unregulated introduction of cryptocurrencies, which makes it more difficult to detect illicit financial flows. Currently, all companies in the country are required to report their accounts to the government. This contributes to an unfavourable environment for economic growth. The country consistently has the lowest economic growth rate in Central America due to crime and burdensome regulations. However, signs of recovery were observed in , driven by remittance-based consumption, exports and an increase in cryptocurrency-driven tourism. Civil society actors are taking the leading role in providing victim support, as the government has not provided resources to address this issue. Although there is a promise to create a national system of attention to victims, El Salvador does not have a specific law focused on providing support and reparation to victims of extortion, which results in a lack of mechanisms to encourage victims to report this crime. In addition, disappearances in El Salvador are increasing and few cases are being investigated. Concerns have been raised that the PCT, which promises access to justice, reparations and better opportunities for communities abandoned by the state, is increasingly relying on law enforcement and militarization, prioritizing a punitive approach rather than prevention. El Salvador is currently experiencing widespread violence that not only affects citizens but also media and civil society organizations. Journalists have been physically attacked or killed, and legislation provides little protection for them. Officials harass and threaten journalists who investigate corruption or government finances. Civil society organizations and churches play a crucial role in filling the gaps left by the government, but their work was made more difficult during the state of exception. The government discredits NGOs, including international human rights NGOs, by implying they are affiliated with opposition parties or criminal gangs. Since the new government took office, aggression against journalists has increased, raising concern. The country has suffered one of the steepest declines in this area in the Americas region. The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel. A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index. We're constantly working to improve the Index. By participating in this survey, you will be providing us with insights and suggestions that will help us make the Index an even better resource. This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State. The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State. Capital San Salvador. Income group Lower middle income. Population 6,, Geography type Coastal. GINI Index Criminal markets 5. An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type. Human trafficking 7. Human smuggling 7. Extortion and protection racketeering 7. Arms trafficking 7. Trade in counterfeit goods 5. Illicit trade in excisable goods 5. Flora crimes 5. Fauna crimes 5. Non-renewable resource crimes 1. Heroin trade 1. Cocaine trade 7. Cannabis trade 7. Synthetic drug trade 2. Cyber-dependent crimes 5. Financial crimes 6. Criminal actors 6. An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society. Mafia-style groups 8. Criminal networks 7. State-embedded actors 7. Foreign actors 4. Private sector actors 4. Political leadership and governance 2. Government transparency and accountability 2. International cooperation 4. National policies and laws 4. A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime. Judicial system and detention 2. Law enforcement 3. Territorial integrity 5. Anti-money laundering 3. Economic regulatory capacity 2. Victim and witness support 3. Prevention 4. Non-state actors 2. Analysis Download full profile english spanish. Trade Arms trafficking is of great concern in El Salvador, with most weapons entering the country by land or sea from neighbouring countries like Guatemala and Honduras. Environment In El Salvador, flora crimes are not particularly pervasive but illegal logging for fuel and building materials probably constitutes a large part of this market. Drugs There are few recorded deaths related to heroin in El Salvador and its prevalence appears to be negligible. Cyber Crimes Cyber-dependent crimes are on the rise in El Salvador. Financial Crimes Despite the implementation of an anti-evasion plan resulting in the recovery of hundreds of millions of US dollars from tax evasion cases and the filing of hundreds of cases in court, financial crimes remain a prevalent issue in El Salvador. Leadership and governance El Salvador has an ineffective strategy for combating organized crime. Criminal justice and security The judicial system in El Salvador has long struggled with inefficiency and corruption, creating major obstacles in the fight against organized crime. Economic and financial environment El Salvador is considered to be at an increasing risk of money laundering and terrorist financing. Read the analysis Listen the podcasts View all events. Next Skip. How to measure organized crime? Read more on globalinitiative. Give us feedback We're constantly working to improve the Index.

El Salvador

How can I buy cocaine online in El Salvador

These datasets underpin the analysis presented in the agency's work. Most data may be viewed interactively on screen and downloaded in Excel format. All countries. Topics A-Z. The content in this section is aimed at anyone involved in planning, implementing or making decisions about health and social responses. Best practice. We have developed a systemic approach that brings together the human networks, processes and scientific tools necessary for collecting, analysing and reporting on the many aspects of the European drugs phenomenon. Explore our wide range of publications, videos and infographics on the drugs problem and how Europe is responding to it. All publications. More events. More news. We are your source of drug-related expertise in Europe. We prepare and share independent, scientifically validated knowledge, alerts and recommendations. About the EUDA. Much of our knowledge about cocaine trafficking routes results from law enforcement activity and intelligence. Information on types and quantities of drugs seized and information on the origin and destination of shipments give indications of the main routes and modes of transport. However, such information is affected by factors such as law enforcement strategies, resources and priorities, as well as temporary changes to routes and practices in response to interdiction efforts or new opportunities. Hence, caution is needed in interpreting these data. The 1 tonnes of cocaine seized worldwide in was the highest ever to be reported. As in previous years, the vast majority of the global total was seized in the Americas, followed by western and central Europe. Although small in comparison with the Americas and Europe, quantities seized in emerging cocaine markets in Africa and Asia also reached record highs in UNODC, a see Figure Global quantity of cocaine seized. The source data for this graphic is available in the source table on this page. Record levels of cocaine production have been matched by record quantities seized, especially from containers handled in the numerous ports along the transatlantic cocaine routes. Most of the cocaine seized in the EU is transported by sea, primarily in maritime shipping containers. Cocaine is shipped to the EU directly from the countries of production but also from neighbouring countries of departure in South and Central America as well as the Caribbean. Based on quantities of cocaine seized in European ports and in ports elsewhere destined for Europe see Box Detailed analysis of cocaine seized in or destined for EU , Brazil about 71 tonnes , Ecuador The latter is a relative newcomer in the top countries of origin for shipments destined for Europe, confirming that Central America now has a more significant role EMCDDA and Europol, This is likely to reflect a diversification of trafficking routes within the Americas. In total, 25 countries in the Americas reported seizures of cocaine with Europe as the intended destination in In addition to the countries previously listed, also mentioned are Paraguay There have traditionally been two main areas through which maritime and air shipments of cocaine transit en route to Europe: the Caribbean, and the West African mainland and neighbouring islands of Cape Verde, Madeira and the Canaries. While these are likely to remain significant transit areas, there are indications that North Africa continues to grow in importance and that transhipment through the Western Balkans, while remaining more limited in scope, may also have increased. From the Caribbean, cocaine is typically shipped on pleasure craft via the Azores, or by air, either on direct flights or via a variety of transit points. The quantities of cocaine seized in the West African mainland and neighbouring islands, together with those seized in Europe coming from the region appear to be small in comparison to the amounts seized at departure points in the Americas. Data reported at the international level indicate that cocaine seizures in West Africa totalled This includes a finding that more than 16 tonnes of cocaine was seized in the region that year, reversing the dearth of seizures recorded since Bird, Large seizures were also reported in This includes a shipment of 2. According to media reporting, Gambian drug authorities were searching for the owner of the consignment, a French national, in connection with the incident News24, ; Reuters, Although considerably less cocaine was seized in North Africa 1. However, developments in the last four or five years suggest that the region, particularly its coasts on the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, is a growing transit and storage hub for cocaine both arriving by sea directly from South America and coming via West Africa by land for onward transport to Europe or elsewhere, for instance the Middle East EMCDDA and Europol, ; GI TOC, The main cocaine hub of North Africa is probably Morocco. The country has traditionally seized the largest quantities of cocaine in the region, which continued in with seizures totalling 1. There are indications that the Moroccan total could be even higher. For instance, in October , more than 1. The drugs were concealed in a container on a ship that had departed from Brazil and was bound for Antwerp, Belgium, and Portbury, a middle-sized port in Bristol, United Kingdom Kundu, On a much smaller scale than Morocco, international cocaine trafficking activities in Algeria and Libya reported in the last edition of this report EMCDDA and Europol, ; Micaleff, appear to have continued in the recent period. In , Algeria reported seizing about kilograms UNODC, a , while there are indications that Libyan seizures amounted to over 44 kilograms. In December , there were two significant seizures from containers bound for Libya: one in Ecuador on a container bound for Libya and Syria kilograms , and another in Malta from a container originating in Ecuador kilograms Dixon, This area is a known hub for the transhipment of drugs at sea, particularly cannabis resin from Morocco, on ships bound for Europe or Libya, while significant quantities of cocaine have been seized in the port of Oran recently Ben Yahia and Farrah, For instance, non-routine data reported by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency Frontex on drug seizures at a number of border posts between the EU and the Western Balkans in and indicate that comparatively small amounts of cocaine enter the EU from that region. Meanwhile, Frontex data confirm the large quantities of cocaine seized in Spain, a traditional entry point for cocaine into the EU Frontex, Nevertheless, individual seizures in and could suggest that cocaine trafficking through ports in the Western Balkan region, particularly in Albania and Montenegro, may have increased. For example, kilograms was seized in the port of Durres, Albania in April Exit. Montenegrin authorities also suspect that more than 3 tonnes were smuggled through the port of Bar in the second half of Kajosevic, Furthermore, Kosovo seized a shipment of kilograms of cocaine in May after it had been smuggled through the Albanian port of Durres Halili, For the fourth consecutive year, record amounts of cocaine were seized in Europe in At Meanwhile, new records were also established elsewhere in , including Greece 1. This indicates that entry points of cocaine shipments are diversifying and that cocaine consumer markets are developing in eastern Europe including Turkey see Cocaine retail markets: multiple indicators suggest continued growth and diversification. Source: The source data for this graphic is available in the source table on this page. Data available for a few key countries indicate that even larger quantities of cocaine were seized in the EU in For instance, data on cocaine seizures in Belgium indicate that almost 92 tonnes of cocaine was seized in , almost all in the port of Antwerp. If seizures made elsewhere of shipments that were destined for Antwerp are taken into account, then close to tonnes of cocaine was seized in connection with Antwerp in Belgian Federal Police, personal communication. The preliminary data available from a few countries indicates that more than tonnes of cocaine were seized in the EU in , exceeding the previous record European total Cocaine traffickers flexibly use a wide range of innovative trafficking methods, which evolve over time in response to enforcement efforts and other factors. Although cocaine also enters the EU by air, the main route used to smuggle the drug into Europe is still the maritime route from South America to western Europe, especially taking advantage of the licit containerised trade. Maritime transport allows the smuggling of large quantities, and the nature of international commercial maritime traffic means that a vast number of routes can be and are used. In addition, smaller, private sailing boats or even semi-submersible vessels are capable of bringing in large quantities of cocaine in single shipments, entering Europe at many points see Box First two semi-submersible drug-smuggling vessels captured in Europe. Criminal networks involved in cocaine trafficking now also more frequently employ methods of transport such as mother ships, pleasure craft, fishing vessels, cruise ships and the drop-off method. Major European container ports have recorded many seizures of large cocaine shipments in recent years. In addition to targeting major ports, organised criminal networks are now increasingly shipping larger amounts of cocaine from South America to smaller ports in the EU or neighbouring countries, where security measures may be easier to circumvent. Corruption of maritime and aviation port employees and security officials throughout Europe is, in most cases, a key condition for the successful use of these facilities for cocaine importation by criminal networks. Most of the cocaine available in Europe continues to be smuggled into the largest container ports of the EU located in Belgium Antwerp , the Netherlands Rotterdam and Spain Valencia and Algeciras. The German authorities have attributed the recent increase in seizures in the port of Hamburg to the activities of Balkan and Albanian-speaking organised crime networks BKA, The use of these ports shows how criminal networks continue to exploit established commercial maritime routes between Latin America and Europe to smuggle cocaine into the EU. Taking advantage of the large volume of containerised trade in goods between the two regions, criminal networks are able to conceal large quantities of cocaine in individual shipments. As a result, the main European container ports have recorded increasing numbers of large-volume cocaine seizures in recent years. While these main container ports continue to be targeted, it is likely that law enforcement activities at these facilities have pushed some criminal networks to find alternative smuggling routes, resulting in a recent intensification of cocaine shipments to smaller ports in the EU or in neighbouring countries where security measures may be viewed as easier to evade. The available data suggest that cocaine trafficking towards the EU continued during the COVID pandemic without any apparent disruption. At least tonnes of cocaine destined for Europe was seized in Some tonnes was seized at departure ports located in Latin America, and approximately tonnes was seized at EU ports. As in previous years, the largest quantity of cocaine in the EU was seized in Belgian ports 69 tonnes , followed by Dutch 45 tonnes and Spanish ports 26 tonnes. In Latin America, the largest amount was seized at ports in Brazil 45 tonnes , Ecuador 24 tonnes and Colombia 18 tonnes see Figure Top 10 countries for quantity of cocaine destined for Europe seized at ports in A total of 60 tonnes of cocaine was seized in such secondary EU ports in see Figure Top 10 EU seizing ports for quantity of cocaine. For a description of different concealment methods, see Figure Maritime trafficking: diversification of modus operandi. The available data indicates that in Latin America, the largest quantities of cocaine destined for Europe were seized in Guayaquil, Ecuador 23 tonnes , and Santos, Brazil 21 tonnes. If all seizures departing from these ports are taken into consideration, totalling about 61 tonnes shipped from Guayaquil and 31 tonnes from Santos, it becomes clear that these two ports are used intensively by cocaine trafficking criminal networks. Analysis of concealment methods emphasises some key features that enable large quantities of cocaine to be smuggled to the EU. Criminal networks are creative and appear to be able to rapidly adapt to avoid detection, which explains why a range of modi operandi are implemented. The data indicate that the port of Antwerp is probably the main entry point for cocaine smuggled into the EU. Europol intelligence suggests that most of the cocaine entering Antwerp is destined initially for the Netherlands, where further distribution is arranged. Focusing exclusively on cocaine seized outside Europe and destined for Belgian ports in the period, a variety of modi operandi can be observed in the 10 main shipping ports see Figure Top 10 source ports for quantity of cocaine destined for Belgian ports. The reasons for this are unclear and require additional research and closer monitoring. That said, Ecuador, which shares land borders with both Colombia and Peru, two of the main cocaine-producing countries, seems to have transformed in the last decade or so from a transit country into a major trafficking hub. Furthermore, it is now also reportedly emerging as a cocaine-producing country Pichel, Such transformation is thought to have fuelled recent violence between local gangs rumoured to be used by important cocaine trafficking networks from Colombia and Mexico. A recent surge in assassinations, which nearly doubled between and , including violent prison gang riots in which hundreds of inmates died in , are reportedly linked with cocaine trafficking in the country, particularly in the port of Guayaquil. Only the top 5 ports with data available for all years are shown. Operations supported by Europol have exposed the role played by corruption in the functioning of drug markets in Europe, a factor that may have been underestimated in the past. Corruption is a crime enabler for all types of criminal activities and is a significant facilitator of drug trafficking activities. In this regard, corruption is used by traffickers to gain entry to ports, to access drugs hidden in containers, to set up or ensure control over businesses used as covers for smuggling activities, such as renting transport vehicles or storage premises, and also to facilitate money laundering, among others. Indeed, various modi operandi used to smuggle cocaine through EU ports require corruption, and recent investigations in some EU ports have provided valuable insights on the methods used by criminal networks to retrieve cocaine shipments from containers in the EU. Of course, the threat of corruption is not restricted to EU ports, since it is also used in most other ports targeted by criminal groups globally. Subsequently, criminal actors will need to introduce the drugs into the container and replace the seal that has been broken during this process with a counterfeited one. Usually, this operation takes place after customs have cleared the container. In the destination port, the criminal network will, again, need inside help and information as they usually require the targeted container to be placed in a specific location in order to facilitate access to it, for instance on the ground and with unimpeded access to the doors. Additionally, they must receive confirmation that the container has been placed in the desired location and, depending on the type of rip-off method used, extract the cocaine from the container and transport it outside the port area. Other modi operandi may also require corruption as a facilitator. Concealing cocaine within shipments of legitimate goods can also use corruption, for instance in order to be informed and take necessary action if the container has been selected for physical inspection, or to receive customs clearance without such inspection. According to a law enforcement official from Seaport Police, a unit of the Dutch Police, interviewed in the press in , acts of corruption involving staff from shipping companies were identified in the port of Rotterdam in the previous two and a half years Driessen and Meeus, An investigation that led to the seizure of An ex-governor, a harbour master, three police officers and a lawyer were among the 22 suspects arrested during this operation Eeckhaut, Workers in other large EU ports such as Le Havre, France, or Alicante, Spain, have been targeted by criminal networks and engaged to facilitate cocaine importation. Recruitment into corrupt activities is usually carried out by offering large sums of cash or other valuable assets and services, but can also be achieved using violence and intimidation Gil, Kidnappings and murders of port workers have been reported in various EU ports in recent years Auvray, ; Europol, e. Cocaine smuggling by air primarily involves the use of commercial passenger flights, cargo aircraft and general aviation private aircraft. Fairly large shipments of cocaine are smuggled directly from South America and the Caribbean to western Europe by private business aircraft, and use of this method is expected to increase in the future. Stricter border controls and more effective security checks may encourage criminal networks to use secondary international airports and small airfields see Box Private jets: the Achilles heel in the fight against cocaine trafficking by air. With some travel restrictions remaining in place and significantly reduced air passenger traffic, it is likely that the use of air couriers will remain limited compared to the pre-COVID period. In the pre-pandemic period, smaller quantities of cocaine were smuggled using commercial flights. Couriers flew from airports in South and Central America and the Caribbean to major European airports, either directly or after stopovers in countries such as Morocco, Nigeria and the United Arab Emirates. After arrival at the main EU distribution hubs, cocaine shipments are primarily trafficked by road in passenger vehicles and lorries to local markets. Intra-EU trafficking of cocaine also involves commercial flights, light aircraft and helicopters, railway, sea transport, and post and parcel services. Cocaine loads are often hidden in sophisticated concealed compartments in cars, trucks and other vehicles, sometimes with shipments of other drugs. These compartments are also used to transport cash back to the distribution hubs. In addition, Europol intelligence indicates that some European criminal networks orchestrate cocaine shipments directly from South America to Asia without the drugs ever entering the EU. In , cocaine was the most frequently seized substance from air couriers intercepted at European airports and the third most frequently detected drug at European mail centres, after cannabis and other psychotropic substances Council of Europe, The COVID pandemic accelerated an expansion in the use of post and parcel services to fulfil orders placed online. Postal and parcel services are exploited for the distribution of drugs such as cannabis, cocaine, synthetic drugs Council of Europe, , new psychoactive substances, counterfeit currency, stolen and fraudulent documents, and many other illicit commodities. The distribution of illicit goods using post and parcel services is set to increase further in line with the expected growth of online retail activity. Consult the list of references used in this resource. Homepage Quick links Quick links. GO Results hosted on duckduckgo. Main navigation Data Open related submenu Data. Latest data Prevalence of drug use Drug-induced deaths Infectious diseases Problem drug use Treatment demand Seizures of drugs Price, purity and potency. Drug use and prison Drug law offences Health and social responses Drug checking Hospital emergencies data Syringe residues data Wastewater analysis Data catalogue. Selected topics Alternatives to coercive sanctions Cannabis Cannabis policy Cocaine Darknet markets Drug checking Drug consumption facilities Drug markets Drug-related deaths Drug-related infectious diseases. Recently published Findings from a scoping literature…. Penalties at a glance. Frequently asked questions FAQ : drug…. FAQ: therapeutic use of psychedelic…. Viral hepatitis elimination barometer…. EU Drug Market: New psychoactive…. EU Drug Market: Drivers and facilitators. Statistical Bulletin home. Quick links Search news Subscribe newsletter for recent news Subscribe to news releases. On this page. Europe and the global cocaine trade. PDF is being prepared. This make take up to a minute. Once the PDF is ready it will appear in this tab. Sorry, the download of the PDF failed. Last update: 6 May

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