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Illicit economies are an issue of paramount importance and an opportunity for social mobility for millions in Brazil. The literature about them lacks empirical accuracy and less normative interpretive keys. It adopts an approach centered on a theory of everyday action and focused on the boundary between legal and illegal and its pragmatic social effects. I argue the lack of public regulation of illicit economies has, over the last few decades, prevented their actors from obtaining social rights and started a vicious cycle of violence and reproduction of inequalities on a social level, as well as given rise to criminal populism in the public arena. This article has been published in both Portuguese and English. This paper is divided into three sections. The second section tells the story of a stolen Toyota Hilux to map the illicit car market in Brazil, which feeds formal, informal, and criminal economic niches. It highlights the inequality observed in those worlds. In the last section, I argue the lack of public regulation of illicit economies leads to violence and inequality on a social level, as well as criminal populism on a political level. However, I start by outlining the theoretical and methodological inspirations of this paper, as well as my arguments against the literature. There are extensive studies on illegal markets across different fields of knowledge—economics, finance, sociology, criminology, law, security, and law enforcement studies. They diverge not only on topics and concepts, but especially on the assumptions of understanding—epistemology. Therefore, the vast majority of them choose to focus their analytical perspective on the State, law and order, so that a strictly economic approach has prevailed for decades Becker ; Masciandaro There has been an intense debate over the last few decades in Brazil, in which illegal economies have been very strong and violent since the s. Even though the social disorganization and broken windows theories have also thrived in the tropics and played a decisive role in punitive policies, a specific current of violence studies has sought to examine the connections between illegal economies, violence, and politics from a situational perspective. Those interpretive efforts focused mainly on the Brazilian context and inductive inference Zaluar ; Machado da Silva ; Rabossi ; Misse , ; Hirata Michel Misse, in particular, conducted empirical and documentary research in Rio de Janeiro for decades and synthesized his findings into a conceptual grid extremely useful for other contexts as well. It should be noted the analytical focus shifts from the wrongful—or economic—act in itself to the relationship between illegal actors and law enforcement bodies in managing illegal economies. That is the game that matters Whyte Thus, the extortion and bribery market , which often coexists side by side with illegal economies in many contexts worldwide, is as important as the first. In short, there is a political and administrative game to be deciphered wherever there is an illegal economy. It took a new generation of ethnographers—although they followed in the footsteps of the previous generation—a long time to realize economic issues 4 play a central role. In the case of the PCC, this is done to standardize the criminal conduct patterns of drug traffickers, arms traffickers, bank robbers, car thieves, smugglers, or participants in any other legal or illegal market working together. Carrying out those business activities separately, PCC members see themselves and each other as equals within the criminal fraternity and are strengthened both in and out of Brazil by implementing security policies. This paper follows this line of research, theoretically developed in close keeping with the classical sociology of action Georg Simmel and Max Weber and the contributions of the empirical turnaround of French pragmatism e. In short, the purpose is, once the field experiments have been described, to seek the set of assumptions—form and content—that in the course of the action described ethnographically give it meaning. It is by contrasting those theoretical assumptions, which are collective and socialized, with his or her own assumptions, sometimes identical or sometimes radically different, that the researcher can transcend the level of individual action into that of abstraction, producing comparative inferences step by step. This paper is based on two empirical studies. The material I examined comprises systematic and non-systematic field notes, sequential interviews, and many informal conversations later reported in journals. The first narrative in this paper is centered on this individual experience. It focuses on the life story of Samuel as a typical low-ranking actor of illegal economies and analyzes the effects of his work on the boundary between legal and illegal. The second source of material presented here is a mainly ethnographic collective multimethod study which I coordinated and which involved seven other researchers. We also used a great deal of newspaper, secondary, and documentary material. The second part of the paper, which tells the story of a stolen Toyota Hilux, shows how extensive this economy—both legal and illegal, both local and transnational Knowles —is and how it operates. His hour shift ended at midnight, and Samuel went straight home. He found his mother, Ivonete, crying because he was becoming a drug dealer. What had been dirty money, obtained by selling drugs illegally, became just money the following day. Companies and governments are thankful. Dirty money, especially from drug dealing, is laundered mainly through consumption. Marijuana, cocaine, and crack are sold retail almost always by teenagers, prone to compulsive shopping. They do not save the money they receive, which, therefore, goes straight to official economies. Insurance and auctions also serve as legal connections between those economies, which are mutually strengthened, as seen below. There are countless other ways to launder money, and new ones are devised every day. It was not money laundering, but merely shopping. It is, therefore, clear that Samuel is not the only one making money from illegal markets. On the other hand, some still reject that money. In fact, Ivonete made her son pack up and leave home in , when she was sure he had already become a drug dealer. On another April Tuesday, this time in , the teenager was shot in the back by a police officer while trying to escape a routine blockade on an avenue near his home. By then, the police considered Samuel not only a drug dealer, but also a motorcycle thief, and he was on the run. His girlfriend was pregnant, and he recovered from his bullet wound after many days in the hospital. His baby daughter is now 18 months old. Still wanted by the police, Samuel is soon about to be arrested. Illicit economies create criminals, and the war between the police and criminals breeds great violence. How can we grasp this boundary between dirty and clean money, licit and illicit economies, so relevant for Ivonete, but so irrelevant for a fast food restaurant from a global chain in a shopping mall? The key issue seems to be the scale, the depersonalization of money. Samuel embodies this finding; he comes from a family with many people active in the world of crime, whom I examined thoroughly in another work Feltran His mother is keenly aware of the fate of favela dwellers involved in illicit activities. Outlaws like Samuel spark a public outcry for repression , and there are many young black Samuels living in favelas and occupying low positions in illegal markets. The day after one of them is arrested or killed, there is another in his place. However, the same illegal money that takes Samuels to prison boosts certain industries and becomes brands, profit, a global financial market, and economic development, calling for growth. Whenever money circulation increases in illegal economies, more jobs are created in their drug, arms, car theft, bribery, fraud, and smuggling businesses. As a result, more opportunities arise to employ other Samuels, who have no access to the formal labor market. Samuel obviously went no further than elementary school and had difficulty completing it. He went to no libraries, speaks no foreign languages, and cannot write easily even in Portuguese. With the money they obtain by dealing drugs, Samuel and his friend either buy motorcycles legally and illegally to resell them or buy stolen or legally acquired ones to strip for parts. Illegal businesses are almost always associated with legal enterprises, not least because of the need to launder money. As a result, the boundary between legal and illegal creates, on the one hand, big business people and, on the other hand, petty criminals and major criminal factions. The same governors, presidents, and senators are keen to buy military drones in Israel, have police cars armored, and toughen laws against criminals, who cause so much damage to society. Little do they know—if they know at all—that the money that produces business people produces criminals in Brazil. Even though he does not sell stolen cars as a routine, Samuel once helped a friend hired to steal a brand-new Toyota Hilux. Four young men from the same favela gathered for the operation. The year was The vast majority of the recipients bought a new car with that money, thus boosting car sales. Brazil currently has a fleet of 97 million motor vehicles, about , of which are reported as stolen every year. In turn, markets estimate about , vehicles are actually stolen in Brazil each year, a number remaining relatively stable in recent years. How many of those establishments are there in Brazilian cities? One on each corner? The direct route to those market niches starts with the very groups that steal vehicles and deliver them to fences. In general, fences are people both thieves and the police know. They may either hire young men to boost any cars or motorcycles they may need, or occasionally receive stolen vehicles they have not requested. In other words, criminals may have vehicles stolen to strip them for parts, to reassemble and resell them, or to send them to the Bolivian or the Paraguayan border. In addition, thieves may steal a given car on their own initiative due to its appeal or price, or because there is a window of opportunity. In those cases, insurance companies lose the entire compensation amount, less the insurance premiums paid. The indirect route to those markets is taken when thieves—mainly inexperienced ones like Samuel at that time—steal a car just to go on a weekend joyride, keep whatever they find in it, drive around the city, or even use in their everyday lives. This activity, known as take and drive , is common in other countries. Both experienced and inexperienced thieves may also steal cars for an immediate purpose: to run away from the police or use them to commit other crimes after quick procedures such as changing license plates. They abandon those cars shortly afterwards. Those cars and motorcycles are then found by the police after remaining parked somewhere for a few days. Insurance companies then have a few options to make money on those vehicles to minimize their losses. The first one is to auction them. There is a law allowing insurance companies to put recovered stolen cars up for auction, with very strict terms about auctioneers. Recovering stolen cars is, therefore, a big business for insurance companies, which invest heavily in technology, tracking devices, recovery teams, management, and law enforcement relations for that purpose. However, there are other ways in which an insurance company can not only minimize losses, but also make money on recovered stolen vehicles. For example, it can auction them itself—by hiring private auctioneers as required by law—or send them to its own chop shops and car dealers. Major insurance companies either have had or have been considering having their own chop shops for a few years. In fact, they have been lobbying aggressively for that Fromm , in this volume. In addition, the more completely disassembled the vehicle, the greater the price of each part. An entire car costs much less than the combined price of its parts just as a new engine costs far less than the sum of the individual price of its parts. The engine alone of a car like the Hilux can cost as much as two economy cars in the legal market. All dealers keep their prices secret either because there is always uncertainty about the physical condition, origin, and guarantee of their products or because they are in an extremely competitive market. In fact, information is crucial, and confidentiality plays a key role in those markets. When seeking auction services, another heavily regulated and very poorly known billion-dollar market, insurance companies or governments must hire private auctioneers. It should be noted many of those professionals make a living from auctioning stolen cars. Furthermore, they can also work in partnership with more structured car dealers, which increase their profits by selling on credit, in never-ending installments and at high interest rates. Financialization is obviously an integral part of this market, and actors from the credit industry also profit from it. Thus, car dealership owners and auctioneers make ten times more than Samuel, who helped steal the Hilux. The vehicle was stolen in forty seconds. However, his crime did pay—and handsomely—for all other actors who, acting within the law, made a great deal of money on that car. The businesses of stripping cars for parts and reselling cars do use stolen vehicles, which are, however, purchased legally at auctions. Insurance companies, auctioneers, car dealerships, and chop shops could all manage without stolen vehicles, but since , of them can be brought into their supply chains per year in Brazil, why not? Upper-, middle-, and lower-class business people are interested in the money coming from those economies. The same goes for business people associated with the PCC. In this case, they profit both from their contacts with boys who can bring them cars for low prices and from long-time connections with corrupt police schemes, which allow them to conduct transactions securely. I have been there twice for one week each time to do field research. That type of vehicle is exchanged for 5—7 kg 11— A brand-new motorcycle and a passenger car are usually exchanged respectively for 1 kg 2. That would be a very bad deal for ordinary sellers. Still, it is not as good a deal as it could be with more criminal contacts and skills. The deal is really attractive if the seller is also familiar with the inner workings of the local retail drug trade. Factions like the PCC obviously benefit greatly if that is widely known across its networks. It is still not bad for someone who would otherwise earn a minimum wage in the labor market. However, those who manage to exchange a stolen car for kilograms of cocaine paste or even pure cocaine make a much lower initial investment and reap a far greater profit. That is a lot of money, which explains why so many cars are stolen and the drug trade is so active. What other business or investment would be so profitable? Exporting this drug, for example. However, no preparation and no commission payments to vapores and gerentes , retail drug dealers, are needed in this case. Without paying them, drug traffickers make a much greater profit since they pay only for transportation—by helicopter, plane, truck, pickup truck, or car. Drug traffickers pay employees in many other ports and airports in Brazil to make it easier for drugs to be carried in carry-on or checked luggage and parcels. Secret criminal organizations and factions, be it the PCC or any other, talk internally about those contacts and their manner of operation, as well as business difficulties and opportunities. Nevertheless, the PCC is the only one that does not require the members of its mutual support networks to share a portion of their profits with the organization, as we have seen. That is why it has been able to expand so widely. No less than 1, Toyota Hilux were stolen in Brazil in alone, considering just one car model among all others. Would it be possible to make even more money with that pickup truck? Of course, it would, as always. All it takes is associate the route taken by the car with the import or export of weapons—such as automatic pistols, rifles, or machine guns—acquired legally or illegally in Paraguay and smuggled into Brazil. They are nothing but the gateway to a frighteningly large money-making machine connected internationally in However, as we have seen, those transactions actually deliver much greater profits than stripping stolen cars for parts or reselling them, or even trafficking drugs only. With no regulation, all the repression in the world can be deployed against small-scale actors, yet there will always be others interested in those activities. That is why advocating more imprisonment and more police against the Samuels from the world of crime may sound like a good policy in Latin America, but it is not. It would be better to regulate those economies, offer their actors social rights, thus reducing social conflict and removing them from illegality, which is—at least partly—what makes them so profitable and so violent. However, we are no longer in the 20th century, in which all that was a political project, not a dream. Whenever marijuana or cocaine is seized in Brazil, the cargo must be destroyed to prevent it from being resold, which is considered harmful to society; after all, marijuana and cocaine are drugs. Seized vehicles and weapons are like gold. They fuel major economies comprising a mechanism that breeds inequality. The lowest-ranking actors in the chain receive punishment for wages, instead of social rights. In contrast, the highest-ranking actors become themselves legislators or governing authorities. There are countless means to launder money, all of which are already well-known, in both domestic and international transactions, including: bitcoins, fake invoices issued by hotels, gas stations, or car dealerships, as well as very expensive jewelry and works of art, or even soccer players and investments from multinational churches. Therefore, there is no point at which an illegal market ends and a legal market begins, in analytical terms, when money is considered a mediating object to study. Both markets are connected directly through consumption or indirectly through other markets money laundering, but also auctions and insurance, all legally organized. Monetary economy connects legal and illegal markets. In default of public regulation and in view of the high profits it yields, this mechanism, which creates inequality and in which money circulates, also breeds violence, in this case understood as the use of force, mainly with guns, focused entirely on the interaction between thieves, victims, and police officers, all of which are paradoxically on the same side—the weakest—in this business chain. This violence also reaches auctioneers, car dealers, or automakers, which sell new cars bought with insurance compensation money, as threatened or actual robberies. However, it is much more extreme among young people like Samuel. All real names are withheld to protect the identities of my research interlocutors. Feltran a , , , Nery et al. I thank each of my partners for the pleasure of being on this team. I had contact with him during my field research between and For further details about the economy of stolen vehicles in Brazil, as well as its internal inequalities, refer to Fromm , in this volume. Agier, M. Lieux, situations, mouvements. Louvain-la-Neuve, Academia-Bruylant « Anthropologie prospective » 5. Anderson, N. The hobo: The sociology of the homeless man. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Andreas, P and Wallman, J. Illicit markets and violence: What is the relationship? Crime Law and Social Change , 52 3 : — Arias, ED and Barnes, N. Crime and plural orders in Rio de Janeiro Brazil. Current Sociology , 65 3 : — Violent pluralism: Understanding the new democracies of Latin America. Durham, NC: Duke University. Becker, GS. Crime and punishment: An economic approach. Journal of Political Economy , — Beckert, J and Dewey, M. The architecture of illegal markets: Towards an economic sociology of illegality in the economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. Biondi, K. The University of North Carolina Press. Blokland, T. Facing violence: Everyday risks in an American housing project. Sociology , 42 4 : — Ethnographie du Samu social de Paris. Dewey, M. Journal of Latin American Studies , 44 4 : — Feltran, GS. Cadernos CRH 59— Revista de Antropologia , 53 2 : — Entangled city. Manchester University Press forthcoming. Feltran, G and Horta, F. Gluckman, M. Analysis of a Social Situation in Modern Zululand. Manchester, Manchester University Press. Goffman, E. On cooling the mark out: Some aspects of adaptation to failure. Psychiatry , 15 4 : — Interaction Ritual. Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior. Garden City: Anchor Books. Guyer, J. Money matters. Instability, values and social payments in the modern history of West African communities. Marginal gains: Monetary transactions in Atlantic Africa. Hartnett, A and Dawdy, SL. The archaeology of illegal and illicit economies. Annual Review of Anthropology. Hirata, DV. Sobreviver na adversidade: Mercado e formas de vida. Hirata, DV and Grillo, C. Tempo soc. Joseph, I. Knowles, C. London: Pluto Press. Marques, VA. Masciandaro, D. Illegal sector, money laundering and legal economy: A macroeconomics analysis. Journal of Financial Crime , 8: — Melo, FAL. Misse, M. Rio de Janeiro: Lumen Juris. In: Stanley, R. Madrid: Entimem. Lua Nova, n. Violence, criminal subjection and political merchandise in Brazil: An overview from Rio. International Journal of Criminology and Sociology. Mitchell, JC. The Kalela Dance. Aspects of social relationships among urban Africans in Northern Rhodesia. Neiburg, F. Mana , 13 1 : — Padovani, N. Tese de doutorado em Antropologia Social. Rabossi, F. Silva, EC. Simmel, G. Philosophy of Money. London: Routledge. Tilly, C. Durable inequality. Whyte, WF. Sociedade de Esquina. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Editor. Wilkinson, J. Contested markets: An overview. Williams, P. Illicit markets, weak states and violence: Iraq and Mexico. Crime, Law and Social Change , 52 3 : — Willis, GD. The killing consensus: Police, organized crime, and the regulation of life and death in urban Brazil. London: University of California Press. Zaluar, A. Zelizer, V. Economic lives: How culture shapes the economy. Home About. Research Integrity. Crime Beyond Borders. Abstract Illicit economies are an issue of paramount importance and an opportunity for social mobility for millions in Brazil. Publisher's Note: This article has been published in both Portuguese and English. Year: Submitted on Oct 10, Accepted on Mar 8, Published on Jun 4, Peer Reviewed. CC BY 4. Method This paper is based on two empirical studies. The Story of a Stolen Hilux Even though he does not sell stolen cars as a routine, Samuel once helped a friend hired to steal a brand-new Toyota Hilux. Insurance and auctions Those cars and motorcycles are then found by the police after remaining parked somewhere for a few days. Closing Remarks Whenever marijuana or cocaine is seized in Brazil, the cargo must be destroyed to prevent it from being resold, which is considered harmful to society; after all, marijuana and cocaine are drugs. Notes All real names are withheld to protect the identities of my research interlocutors. Competing Interests The author has no competing interests to declare. References Agier, M.

Paraguay Drug Consumption Problem

How can I buy cocaine online in Ciudad del Este

That can put my life at risk,' the multimedia journalist told LJR. The border between Paraguay and Brazil is one of the most dangerous drug trafficking regions in South America. There is an unspoken daily alert that forces communication professionals to censor themselves. That is: in the news they avoid using names or information that could compromise them. Stories of threats are always present in the lives of journalists in this border region. In , when drug boss Jorge Rafaat was murdered , the article published on the news site coordinated by this journalist had to be withdrawn at the express request of criminal gangs. They immediately called me to take it offline,' the journalist said. A journalist received threats via telephone after publishing an article about the murder of drug kingpin Jorge Rafaat in Illustration: AI-generated. They are twin cities. The Brazilian state of Mato Grosso do Sul has miles of so-called dry border by land with Paraguay. Practicing journalism in this region has cost lives and threats since the s. International organizations have reported and investigated from outside the region. Reporters are often the targets of violence during protests. Most attacks on journalists go unpunished. Fear seeps into their coverage and in the newsroom. There have already been at least 10 journalist deaths on that border in the last decade. Especially on the Paraguayan side, where 21 journalists have been murdered in 30 years. This country is ranked No. The list begins with a ranking from best to worst in terms of press freedom. Brazil ranks No. In , the case of the cold-blooded murder of Leo Veras, a journalist who covered police and drug trafficking issues, shocked the local press and affected the work of journalists in the region. To this day there is no news about those responsible for the murder of Leo Veras. However, some time later, in March , the Paraguayan Judiciary overturned the acquittal and ordered a new trial. TV, radio and online media report the facts , but without getting into investigative details so as not to involve names of drug traffickers, politicians and smugglers. When a journalist dies or disappears, the local community withdraws out of fear. Practicing freedom of expression in that territory becomes an exercise in self-censorship. The working conditions of journalists in the region increase their exposure to danger and fear is part of everyday life. Does this action alone solve the situation? What is the responsibility of authorities in both countries? In all circumstances, they should ask for help,' said journalist and researcher Nunes. In , after spending 24 years and 8 months under police protection and working for the newspaper ABC Color, Figueredo moved from Pedro Juan Caballero to the United States, where he is currently in the process of applying for asylum. The day after his death, the Brazilian Federal Police informed me they had intercepted a phone call and that the next victim would be me,' he told LJR from Philadelphia, where he lives and works teaching Spanish at Thomas Jefferson University. Figueredo lived on the border in the s and s. Those were times of growing drug production and distribution in the region. Fear took hold of the inhabitants and curtailed freedom of expression. Fear made people not want to mess with them and many bowed to the mafias for benefits, such as Paraguayan politicians,' Figueredo said. One of the most striking incidents involved Figueredo and a lawyer for a criminal group who wanted to bribe him not to write or publish articles that would compromise them. I followed the conversation and asked him how much he would pay me for not publishing. I got a voice recording of the conversation with a tape recorder I had in my pocket and a written text the lawyer had drafted for eventual publication according to his criteria and that he intended for me to publish,' Figueredo detailed. Once the lawyer left, Figueredo wrote an article about the bribery incident. And he donated the three thousand dollars to a children's hospital so they could buy fans. The bribery story was published in ABC Color and came to the attention of the local mafia. The message he received was clear: 'As soon as I can, I'll kill you. The protective measures Figueredo took when he lived in Paraguay was a strategy of minimal public exposure. Figueredo said that a lawyer for a criminal group bribed him not to publish articles that would compromise their clients. The journalist donated the money to a hospital and wrote about the incident. Illustration: Generated using AI. Besides, I had an agreement with my closest circle. My relatives said I was crazy and that they had not been in contact with me for a long time. For my part, I said I had no contact with them either. It was a family agreement to get my relatives out of sight and and out of danger from drug traffickers,' he said. Where the State is absent, these sectors take over territory and power. Drug trafficking causes journalists to self-censor in Brazil-Paraguay border towns. Brazil Paraguay Self-censorship Transnational Journalism.

How can I buy cocaine online in Ciudad del Este