Hedging Risks: Turkey's Pivot to BRICS

Against the backdrop of the Turkish establishment's disappointment with the European future due to the stagnation of the European Union accession procedure, the Middle Eastern state is gradually to bet on the opposite pole: the BRICS. Recently it became known that Ankara has applied to join the organisation as an alternative to the EU.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan expressed interest in BRICS membership back at the 2018 summit held in Johannesburg, seeking to establish new contacts beyond the Western perimeter of the traditional allies. Now, the President sees BRICS as a new diplomatic vector of relations with other countries, while remaining a key member of NATO.

In the current context, Turkey's potential entry into BRICS is considered as a result of the country's disagreements with its NATO colleagues over Turkish support for Russia amid a special military operation, but there is more to come. Ankara's deteriorating relations with NATO member states were also affected by the purchase of the S-400 surface-to-air missile system from Moscow, being subsequently excluded by the Pentagon from the F-35 development program in 2019. Western pressure on Turkey has been intensified by Turkey's refusal to join the unprecedented US and EU sanctions against Russia.

Obviously, the gradual expansion of Turkey's political pole in BRICS indicates its desire for even greater independence in world affairs and its growing interest in weakening the economic and political hegemony of non-Western formats of interaction.

Turkey can categorize its influence in the Global South into the following baskets: geopolitical factors, independence of the Turkish position on key world issues, and, no doubt, deepening economic cooperation with BRICS member states, with each of which Ankara has a special interest. 

Nevertheless, President Erdoğan stated in his recent July address that “Turkey is a country that cannot be squeezed into a single bloc,” reaffirming Ankara's desire for strategic autonomy. Recall that Turkey's stronghold Baku has previously applied to join BRICS. Thus, BRICS may gradually fill up with a Turkish-centric space, which will make Turkey feel even more confident in the non-Western bloc.

It seems that Turkey does not fully understand what BRICS is: an economic association seeking to establish trade, technology and investment partnerships, or a political multilateral format that Ankara does not want to be left out of. The BRICS membership is now quite heterogeneous, with countries on the same chessboard that are not equal in terms of major indicators. Turkey, for its part, has been articulating its interest in BRICS for a reason, as the legal framework for membership of new participants has never been detailed, which means that the accession process will not force any onerous obligations, as is the case with the EU. 

Issues related to the candidates and the format of their joining the group will be decided at the BRICS summit in Kazan in October. Whether the organization decides to continue on the path of enlargement and pursue a policy of inclusiveness remains to be seen. Nevertheless, the prospects for Turkey's accession as a Eurasian power with an advantageous geographical position cannot be discounted.